Plaintiff, Randall Hall, appeals the July 31, 2002,order of the Coles County circuit court denying plaintiff'smotion for a protective order to prevent defense counsel fromcommunicating ex parte with Dr. Gaylin Lack, one of plaintiff'streating physicians. Plaintiff also appeals the September 24,2002, order of the court granting defendants' motion for summaryjudgment on the issue of causation. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 27, 2000, plaintiff filed a complaint,alleging that he was entitled to damages sustained from thenegligent administration of an intravenous pyelogram (IVP)performed by defendant Joyce A. Flowers, a radiological technologist, on October 30, 1998, at defendant Sarah Bush Lincoln HealthCenter (Sarah Bush). An IVP involves the intravenous injection(IV) of water-soluble contrast material. The contrast materialcollects in the kidneys for the purpose of performing an X ray. Flowers admitted in her deposition that when conducting the IVPprocedure on plaintiff's right arm, she penetrated plaintiff'svein, allowing contrast material to seep into the surroundingtissues. She testified that plaintiff's right arm was notdiscolored, did not blister, but was slightly swollen. Plaintifftestified in his deposition that he remembered a strong metallictaste with the initial injection of contrast material. He felt aripping sensation in his right arm, and he experienced a numbingand tingling sensation in his right hand. An X ray of plaintiff's right arm indicated complete extravasation, or escape, ofthe contrast material into the arm. An IVP was then successfullyperformed on plaintiff's left arm.

The day after the IVP procedure, plaintiff experiencedsoreness and a lack of sensation in his right hand. He soughtcare from Sarah Bush's emergency department. Plaintiff was toldto stay off work and follow up with Dr. Mark Dettro, plaintiff'sfamily practice physician.

Dr. Gaylin Lack is an orthopedic surgeon practicingmedicine in Coles County. Dr. Lack has been a member of SarahBush's active medical staff, that is, he has had medical privileges, since 1980. In April 2001, Dr. Lack became an employee ofSarah Bush.

Dr. Lack treated plaintiff's complaints of soreness andlack of sensation in his right arm from February 2000 throughMarch 2001. On June 9, 2000, Dr. Lack performed surgery onplaintiff's right arm at Sarah Bush. During Dr. Lack's firstconsultation with plaintiff, on February 24, 2000, Dr. Lack wrotein his physician's notes that plaintiff's carpal tunnel syndromemay have been based on a "double crush syndrome." In his physician's notes of November 9, 2000, Dr. Lack wrote, "I believe thatwe may be dealing with a double crush type of problem with anirritation or some [type] of persistent injury to the brachialplexus or some of the nerves proximally in the arm as a result ofthe extravasation of the contrast material that was injected whenhe had the IVP."

Plaintiff's attorney attached his affidavit to thecomplaint, as required by section 2-622 of the Code of CivilProcedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-622(a)(1) (West 2000). The report of aboard-certified radiologist, Dr. Jeffrey Dach, was also attachedto the complaint. Dr. Dach's report stated that in his opinion,"based upon the review of the records, it appears that the IVcontrast extravasation into the patient's arm may have causedsignificant injury to the arm."

The court's case-management order directed plaintiff todisclose opinion witnesses by October 1, 2001. That order wasextended twice. On June 3, 2001, plaintiff filed a third motionfor an extension of time to disclose witnesses. The next day,defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Apparently onJune 21, 2002, plaintiff disclosed Dr. Lack as an independentexpert witness. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 213(f) (eff. May 1, 1997). Plaintiff was given 30 days to take Dr. Lack's deposition. OnJuly 15, 2002, plaintiff filed a motion to extend the time fortaking Dr. Lack's deposition to August 20, 2002, and a requestfor a protective order to prohibit ex parte communicationsbetween defense counsel and Dr. Lack. The request for a protective order was denied July 31, 2002.

During his deposition, August 20, 2002, Dr. Lacktestified he had two ex parte conversations with defense counselabout his treatment of plaintiff. The first of these conversations probably took place sometime in 2002, after he had stoppedtreating plaintiff, and after he had become an employee of thehospital. During this conversation, they examined recordscounsel had received from other physicians, specifically Dr.Dettro, and they discussed plaintiff's condition. The secondsuch conversation took place immediately before Dr. Lack'sdiscovery deposition.

During his deposition, Dr. Lack testified that he could not say to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the IVPprocedure could have been the cause of plaintiff's problems. Dr.Lack testified he rejected that possibility after review of thechart, "recollection of instances when we've had other peoplewith extravasation of contrast material in the soft tissueswithout any significant long-term complication," talking withdefense counsel, and looking at Dr. Dettro's records, whichindicated plaintiff had recovered from the extravasation and thenbegan to have more complaints after he returned to work.

On September 24, 2002, the trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and on December 3, 2002,denied plaintiff's motion to reconsider. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that the trial court abused itsdiscretion by denying plaintiff's request for a protective orderto prohibit ex parte communications between Sarah Bush's defensecounsel and plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Lack. Plaintiffrelies on the doctrine set forth in Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 499 N.E.2d 952 (1986). ThePetrillo doctrine forbids ex parte communications between defensecounsel and a plaintiff's treating physician because theseconferences jeopardize the sanctity of the physician-patientrelationship and are prohibited as against public policy. Petrillo, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 588, 499 N.E.2d at 957.

Plaintiff's reliance on Petrillo is misplaced. InPetrillo, the defense attorney for Syntex Laboratories appealedthe trial court's order finding him in contempt of court forfailing to comply with the court's order barring him from engaging in private, ex parte communications with plaintiff's treatingphysician in connection with plaintiff's products liabilityaction. The Petrillo court affirmed the trial court and concluded that defense counsel could communicate with plaintiff'streating physician only through court-approved discovery methods. The court was concerned with the situation where "the physiciandivulges to a third party information which the patient originally disclosed to the physician with the belief that the information would remain confidential unless the patient gave hisconsent otherwise." (Emphasis added.) Petrillo, 148 Ill. App.3d at 591, 499 N.E.2d at 959.

The Hospital Licensing Act (Act) (210 ILCS 85/6.17(b),(d), (e) (West 2000)) carves out an exception to the Petrillodoctrine. Where a patient institutes a legal action against ahospital, "[t]he hospital is not a third party with respect toits own medical information, which is compiled by the hospital'sown caregivers." Burger v. Lutheran General Hospital, 198 Ill.2d 21, 57, 759 N.E.2d 533, 555 (2001) (upholding the constitutionality of subsections 6.17(d) and (e) of the Act). The clearand unambiguous language of sections 6.17(b), (d), and (e) of theAct permits limited ex parte communications between a hospital'sdefense counsel and plaintiff's treating physician. 210 ILCS85/6.17(b), (d), (e) (West 2000); In re Medical Malpractice CasesPending in the Law Division, 337 Ill. App. 3d 1016, 1025, 787N.E.2d 237, 244 (2003). Subsection (b) states that "[a]llinformation regarding a hospital patient gathered by the hospital's medical staff and its agents and employees shall be theproperty and responsibility of the hospital." 210 ILCS85/6.17(b) (West 2000). Subsection (d) allows members of ahospital's medical staff, its agents, and employees to disclosethe nature or details of services provided to patients to thoseparties responsible for "peer review, utilization review, qualityassurance, risk management[,] or defense of claims broughtagainst the hospital arising out of the care." (Emphasis added.) 210 ILCS 85/6.17(d) (West 2000); In re Medical Malpractice CasesPending in the Law Division, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 1022, 787 N.E.2dat 241-42. Subsection (e) states that the hospital's medicalstaff members, its agents, and employees "may communicate, at anytime and in any fashion, with legal counsel for the hospitalconcerning *** any care or treatment they provided or assisted inproviding to any patient within the scope of their employment oraffiliation with the hospital." 210 ILCS 85/6.17(e) (West 2000).

In dicta, the Burger court interpreted these subsections to allow communications between hospital defense counseland treating physicians so long as (1) the communications arestrictly limited to the intrahospital setting, (2) there is nodisclosure of a patient's medical information to outside thirdparties, (3) the communications are narrowly circumscribed toinclude only medical care and treatment rendered to the patientat the hospital, by the hospital's own medical staff agents oremployees, and (4) the communications involve only informationalready known to the hospital by virtue of subsection (b). Burger, 198 Ill. 2d at 54-55, 759 N.E.2d at 553.

Plaintiff argues that Dr. Lack was a third party andnot a member of the medical staff, an agent, or employee when hetreated plaintiff for the alleged injury to his right arm. Dr.Lack testified that he became affiliated with Sarah Bush in 1980as a member of the medical staff and became an employee in April2001. As a member of the medical staff he was entitled to"practice orthopedics and orthopedic surgery. It requiredcoverage of call in the emergency room, as well as giving [him]the privilege to admit patients to the hospital, use of surgicaland ancillary services." He testified that his affiliation withSarah Bush before 2001 is commonly referred to as having "privileges" at the hospital. Regulations to the Act define "medicalstaff" as an organized body composed of the appropriately licensed individuals granted the privilege by the governing authority of the hospital to practice in the hospital. 77 Ill. Adm.Code 250.150 (Conway Greene CD-Rom March 2002). Plaintiff was apatient of Dr. Lack from February 2000 through March 2001, whileDr. Lack was a member of Sarah Bush's medical staff. On June 9,2000, Dr. Lack performed surgery on plaintiff at Sarah Bush totreat symptoms related to this litigation. The ex parte communications took place after Dr. Lack became an employee of SarahBush.

Next, plaintiff argues that the ex parte communicationswere not authorized by the Act because they concerned treatmentrendered outside of the intrahospital setting. We disagree. OnJune 9, 2000, Dr. Lack performed surgery on plaintiff at SarahBush to alleviate plaintiff's symptoms in his right arm. Thecommunications at bar involved Dr. Lack's treatment of plaintiff's right arm and his opinion on the issue of the causation ofplaintiff's symptoms. It is true that Dr. Lack treated plaintifffrom February 2000 until the June 9, 2000, surgery, without anyinvolvement of Sarah Bush. Perhaps the mere fact that Dr. Lackhad privileges at Sarah Bush would not have entitled Sarah Bush'sattorneys to communicate with Dr. Lack regarding that treatment,if there was nothing more to it. However, the fact that Dr. Lackdid surgery on plaintiff on June 9, 2000, at Sarah Bush, changesthe picture. Sarah Bush was entitled to know everything Dr. Lackknew about that surgery, including information he acquiredleading up to the surgery. "All information regarding a hospitalpatient gathered by the hospital's medical staff and its agentsand employees shall be the property and responsibility of thehospital ***." 210 ILCS 85/6.17(b) (West 2000). "[I]t followsfrom subsection (b) that any information known by any hospitalcare-giver with respect to a patient's care at that hospital ishospital information." (Emphasis in original.) Burger, 198 Ill.2d at 41-42, 759 N.E.2d at 546.

The purpose of the Act "is to provide for the betterprotection of the public health through the development, establishment, and enforcement of standards *** for the care ofindividuals in hospitals." 210 ILCS 85/2(a) (West 1995). Alimited intrahospital exchange of information is beneficial tothe general health and welfare of the public. Burger, 198 Ill.2d at 41, 759 N.E.2d at 546. The Burger court found that "communication of a patient's medical information to legal counsel orrisk[-]management personnel may be necessary in order not only toadequately and appropriately respond to the occurrence, but alsoto prevent any similar adverse occurrence in the future." Bur-ger, 198 Ill. 2d at 43, 759 N.E.2d at 547. The court listedother legitimate reasons for communicating information that areseparate and apart from litigation but concluded that the filingof a lawsuit does not affect the hospital's right to access itsown information. Burger, 198 Ill. 2d at 58, 759 N.E.2d at 555. Determining the effects of extravasation following an IVP performed at Sarah Bush is certainly an appropriate response to theoccurrence and within the scope of preventative practice. B. Summary Judgment

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in grantingdefendants' motion for summary judgment because a genuine issueof material fact as to causation remains.

When reviewing a trial court's grant of summary judgment, this court liberally considers the affidavits, depositions,admissions, exhibits, and pleadings in the record de novo and ina light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Espinoza v.Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 165 Ill. 2d 107, 113, 649 N.E.2d1323, 1326 (1995). Summary judgment is a drastic means ofdisposing of litigation and is only appropriate when there is nogenuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitledto judgment as a matter of law. Espinoza, 165 Ill. 2d at 113,649 N.E.2d at 1326. On a motion for summary judgment it is themovant who bears the burden of persuasion and the initial burdenof production. Where a defendant is the movant, it is only whenthe defendant satisfies its initial burden of production that theburden shifts to the plaintiff to present some factual basis thatwould arguably entitle him to a judgment under the applicablelaw. Wortel v. Somerset Industries, Inc., 331 Ill. App. 3d 895,900, 770 N.E.2d 1211, 1214 (2002); Williams v. Covenant MedicalCenter, 316 Ill. App. 3d 682, 689, 737 N.E.2d 662, 668 (2000). Adefendant who moves for summary judgment may meet the initialburden of production either: (1) by affirmatively showing thatsome element of the cause of action must be resolved in defendant's favor; or (2) by demonstrating that plaintiff cannotproduce evidence necessary to support the plaintiff's cause ofaction. Fabiano v. City of Palos Hills, 336 Ill. App. 3d 635,641, 784 N.E.2d 258, 265 (2002). Only if defendants satisfytheir initial burden of production does the burden shift toplaintiffs to present some factual basis that would arguablyentitle them to a favorable judgment. Rice v. AAA Aerostar,Inc., 294 Ill. App. 3d 801, 805, 690 N.E.2d 1067, 1070 (1998).

Where plaintiff in a medical malpractice case is unableto procure the necessary expert testimony, summary judgment forthe defendant is appropriate. Stevenson v. Nauton, 71 Ill. App.3d 831, 835, 390 N.E.2d 53, 57 (1979). The basis for such asummary judgment is that plaintiff is unable to procure anexpert. Where plaintiff indicates that he will be able to obtainan expert, he must be given every opportunity to do so. SeeStevenson, 71 Ill. App. 3d at 835, 390 N.E.2d at 56; Addison v.Whittenberg, 124 Ill. 2d 287, 295-96, 529 N.E.2d 552, 556 (1988)(refusing to uphold summary judgment on the basis that the Rule220 deadline had passed (see 134 Ill. 2d R. 220 (repealed))). Ofcourse, the trial court is not required to accept a plaintiff'spromise that an expert will be forthcoming and may set a deadlinefor production. The basis for the summary judgment, however, isthe trial court's determination that no expert will be produced. The trial court held that plaintiff failed to presentevidence that his injuries were caused by Flowers's negligence inperforming the IVP. To prove this element, plaintiff profferedthe notes and deposition testimony of Dr. Lack. Dr. Lack admitted and his physician's notes indicate that at the time hetreated plaintiff, Dr. Lack entertained the possibility thatplaintiff's physical complaints were caused by Flowers's allegednegligence. Dr. Lack, however, testified in his deposition thathe did not believe, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty,that the IVP procedure could have been the cause of plaintiff'sproblems. Dr. Dettro also testified with a reasonable degree ofmedical certainty that plaintiff's symptoms are more likelycaused by plaintiff's employment rather than from infiltrationduring the IVP procedure.

Plaintiff argues there is a material issue because Dr.Lack allegedly changed his opinion as to causation after plaintiff filed the lawsuit and after his ex parte conversations withdefense counsel. In his discovery deposition, Dr. Lack indicatedhe did not change his mind as to causation because he had notpreviously formed an opinion as to whether the IVP procedurecontributed to plaintiff's symptoms. Dr. Lack formed his opinionafter his treatment of plaintiff and after gleaning new information, some of which was learned before Dr. Lack became an employee of Sarah Bush. Plaintiff failed to produce any expertopinion showing the IVP procedure caused plaintiff's symptoms inhis right arm despite the trial judge's repeated extension ofwitness-disclosure deadlines giving plaintiff ample opportunityto support the causation element of his claim. Summary judgmentis appropriate.

III. CONCLUSION

Defense counsel's limited, ex parte communications withplaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Lack, were permitted by theAct. The trial court's denial of plaintiff's protective orderwas not an abuse of discretion. Defendants demonstrated thatplaintiff cannot produce an expert. The trial court properlygranted defendants' motion for summary judgment. We affirm. Affirmed.

KNECHT and TURNER, JJ., concur.