Harvey Park District v. American Federation of Professionals

SUPREME COURT CASES

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State: Illinois

Court: 4th District Appellate

Docket No: 4-07-0862 Rel

Case Date: 09/26/2008

Preview:No. 4-07-0862 IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT

Filed 9/26/08

HARVEY PARK DISTRICT, ) Direct Appeal of an Petitioner-Appellant, ) Order of the Illiv. ) nois Labor Relations THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF ) Board, State Panel, PROFESSIONALS; THE ILLINOIS LABOR ) No. S-CB-07-023 RELATIONS BOARD, STATE PANEL; JACKIE ) GALLAGHER, MICHAEL HADE, CHARLES ) HERNANDEZ, REX PIPER, and MICHAEL ) COLI, the Members of Said Board and ) Panel in Their Official Capacity Only; ) and JOHN BROSNAN, Executive Director ) of Said Board in His Official Capacity ) Only, ) Respondents-Appellees. ) _________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE McCULLOUGH delivered the opinion of the court: Petitioner, Harvey Park District (District), appeals the decision of respondent Illinois Labor Relations Board, State Panel (Board), finding the refusal of respondent, American Federation of Professionals (Union), to sign a collective-bargaining agreement following a failed ratification vote was not an unfair labor practice within the meaning of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (Act) (5 ILCS 315/1 through 27 (West 2006)). Harvey Park District v. American Federation of Professionals, 23 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 132, No. S-CB-07-023 (Illinois Labor Relations Board, State Panel, September 10, 2007) (hereinafter 23 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 132). The District

argues that the Board erred in holding that the failed ratifica-

tion vote provided adequate grounds to resume bargaining because the Union did not notify the District that the collective-bargaining agreement required ratification and approval by the membership. We affirm.

In July 2005, the Board certified the Union as the exclusive representative of certain public employees of the District and the parties began negotiating the terms of an initial collective-bargaining agreement. The parties did not The District

identify ground rules for the bargaining sessions.

representative advised the Union representatives that he did not have authority to make a binding agreement without the approval of the District's board of commissioners. The Union's constitu-

tion provides that "[a] collective[-]bargaining agreement must be ratified and approved by a majority of the members covered by said agreement present and voting on the question by secret ballot before the same shall be executed on behalf of the Union." On September 20, 2006, the District representative and Union representatives reached an accord on the terms of an agreement. On September 21, 2006, the agreement was "officially

and publicly ratified" by the District and signed by the president of the District's board of commissioners. Also on September The member-

21, 2006, the Union conducted a ratification vote.

ship rejected the agreement, identifying five issues: "(1) more money, (2) part-time employees not having equality in the con- 2 -

tract, (3) termination being at will, (4) recall rights, [and] (5) subcontracting of the grass." On September 22, 2006, the

Union representatives advised the District representative that its membership had rejected the agreement and requested that the District and Union representatives resume bargaining. The

District refused, claiming the parties had an agreement on September 20, 2006, and demanded the Union representatives sign the document. In October 2006, the District filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board, stating that on September 20, 2006, the District and the Union, by their representatives, fully agreed to all of the provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement and "[d]espite repeated requests, the Union has failed to sign the [a]greement." In June 2007, the executive director

of the Board dismissed the unfair labor practice charge, stating: "[T]he Board has not yet spoken to the issue contained in this charge. Specifically, the

District's claim is essentially that the Union must have specifically reserved its right to present the tentative agreement to the membership in order to establish a right to continue negotiations thereafter. *** Accordingly, one factor that leads to an - 3 -

administrative dismissal of the charge is that it allows for direct access to the Board via an appeal of the [d]ismissal." 23 Pub.

Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 132, at 580 (Executive Director's dismissal order). Further, the executive director opined that "a dismissal is appropriate on the merits," stating: "The [District's] position on this matter is that the Union is required to specifically put an employer on notice of its intent to have a membership ratification vote in order to establish a right to further negotiations in the event that the membership rejects the agreement. This position might have more

merit were it not that contract ratification votes are a nearly universal component of the bargaining process. *** In sum, I find that a failed contract ratification vote is sufficient basis for the Union's demand to continue negotiations, and that the [Union] did not waive its right to such a vote if it failed to specifically notify the [c]harging [p]arty of its intent - 4 -

to do so.

***

Clearly, party representa-

tives present at negotiations are bound to support tentative agreements or advise their counterpart in advance that they will not do so, and party representatives are required to keep their proposals and representations in line with the parameters set by the principals. The District does not assert that the

Union's representatives acted in blatant disregard of the negotiation process by bringing the tentative agreement to the membership. There is no evidence or assertion

that the Unions's negotiation team actively encouraged the membership to reject the agreement." 23 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.)

par. 132, at 580 (Executive Director's dismissal order). In August 2007, the Board upheld the executive director's dismissal. This appeal followed.

Judicial review of an agency's decisions is governed by the Administrative Review Law (Review Law) (735 ILCS 5/3-101 through 113 (West 2004)). 5 ILCS 315/9(i) (West 2004); City of

Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 204, 692 N.E.2d 295, 301-02 (1998). - 5 The Review Law speci-

fies that judicial review of a final administrative decision extends to all questions of law and fact presented in the record. 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2004). The Board's findings of fact are held prima facie true and correct and will only be reversed on appeal if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Illinois Fraternal

Order of Police Labor Council v. Illinois Local Labor Relations Board, 319 Ill. App. 3d 729, 736, 745 N.E.2d 647, 653 (2001). decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident. City of Tuscola v. A

Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 314 Ill. App. 3d 731, 733-34, 732 N.E.2d 784, 786 (2000). Where the issue before the

reviewing court involves the Board's conclusions of law, however, the court's review is de novo. Illinois Fraternal Order of

Police, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 736, 745 N.E.2d at 653. The District alleges the Union violated sections 7 and 10(b)(4) of the Act. Section 7 of the Act provides that a public

employer and the labor organization have the authority and duty to bargain collectively with regard to matters directly affecting wages, hours, and conditions of employment. 2004). 5 ILCS 315/7 (West

Section 10(b)(4) of the Act provides that a labor organi-

zation commits an unfair labor practice if the labor organization or its agents refuse to bargain collectively in good faith with a public employer. 5 ILCS 315/10(b)(4) (West 2004). - 6 -

The Act does not itself require ratification and approval of a collective-bargaining agreement by a majority of the members. In this case, however, the Union's own constitution

mandates that collective-bargaining agreements be ratified and approved by a majority of the members "before the same shall be executed on behalf of the Union." The Labor Management Reporting

and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Disclosure Act) requires a union to file its constitution and bylaws with the Secretary of Labor (29 U.S.C.

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