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JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a premises liability action arising from a slip and fall. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor ofthe defendant.

On January 31, 1999, plaintiff Sheila Hastings wasvisiting her mother-in-law Bonnie Exline at the mobile home whereExline lives. Exline's home has two doors, a "front" and a"back." The front door has covered wooden stairs leading to it. The rear door has stairs of metal mesh leading to it and isexposed to the elements. Exline prefers that her guests use theback door so as not to track debris into her home, and generallykeeps the front door locked. Prior to Hastings' fall, Exline hadnoticed that the mesh stairs leading to the back door becameslippery when wet. Exline covered the stairs with a carpetremnant. Hastings admitted that the remnant also appeared unsafewhen wet and was unable to say that the remnant made the stairsany less hazardous. Hastings used the back door upon arriving atExline's on January 31 and noticed that the rear stairs were wet. She also left Exline's home using the back door. She did so outof deference to Exline's general preference and also because itwas more convenient to get to her car that way. While on theback stairs, she slipped on the carpet, breaking a bone in herfoot. She was holding on to a handrail at the time and was notdistracted. She slipped because the carpet was slick, notbecause the carpet itself had moved appreciably. Exline had aclear path to her front door, but the front door had remainedlocked.

After the depositions of Hastings and Exline had beentaken and filed, the trial court granted summary judgment infavor of Exline. On appeal, the parties dispute whether Exlineowed a duty of care to Hastings.

The peril in this case was open and obvious. Generally, a landowner is under no duty to protect invitees from openand obvious perils. Bucheleres v. Chicago Park District, 171Ill. 2d 435, 448-49, 665 N.E.2d 826, 832-33 (1996). However,some exceptions to this general rule have evolved in the commonlaw. One such exception, the "forgetfulness" or "distraction"exception, was discussed in the familiar case of Ward v. K martCorp., 136 Ill. 2d 132, 554 N.E.2d 223 (1990). That exception isnot applicable here. Hastings relies on another exceptioninitially contemplated by Ralls v. Village of Glendale Heights,233 Ill. App. 3d 147, 598 N.E.2d 337 (1992). There, a foreman ona construction site slipped and fell on an ice-covered incline. For the sake of convenience, workers had been using the inclineto access a particular area despite the fact that another (presumably safer) means of access existed. Ralls, 233 Ill. App. 3dat 150, 598 N.E.2d at 341.

The Ralls court began by stating that the known andobvious risk principle is not a per se rule relieving a defendantof a duty of care. Ralls, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 155, 598 N.E.2d at344. "Rather, the existence of a duty in the face of a known orobvious condition is subject to the same analysis of duty as isnecessary in every other claim of negligence." Ralls, 233 Ill.App. 3d at 155, 598 N.E.2d at 344. Thus, the court applied theusual standards for determining the existence of a duty inpremises cases: (1) whether the plaintiff's injury was reasonably foreseeable by defendants, (2) the likelihood of his injury,(3) the magnitude of the burden of guarding against it, and (4)the consequences of placing that burden on defendants. Ralls,233 Ill. App. 3d at 155, 598 N.E.2d at 344.

As is typical in most cases, the concept offoreseeability was central to the Ralls court's analysis. Thecourt began by noting that the plaintiff's testimony indicatedthat he was expressly aware of the condition of the snow-coveredincline and that the distraction cases were therefore inapplicable. Ralls, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 155, 598 N.E.2d at 344. According to the court's reasoning, however, the case before it wassimilar because it was reasonably foreseeable that workers at thesite would use the incline to reach the area rather than use thelonger and more inconvenient path. Ralls, 233 Ill. App. 3d at155, 598 N.E.2d at 344.

A Ralls-type approach was modified and approved by theSupreme Court of Illinois in LaFever v. Kemlite Co., 185 Ill. 2d380, 706 N.E.2d 441 (1998). There, the plaintiff's employercontracted with Kemlite to remove waste from a container locatedon Kemlite's property. The waste in question was a type offiberglass or similar substance that was very slippery. Oftentimes pieces of the fiberglass would be strewn around the container. On one occasion LaFever, despite being aware of thedanger, was climbing over a pile of such refuse to empty thecontainer. He slipped, fell, and was injured. LaFever, 185 Ill.2d at 384-86, 706 N.E.2d at 444-45.

The appellate court ruled that Kemlite owed LaFever aduty based upon the traditional four-point analysis referencedabove. The supreme court agreed with the conclusion that Kemliteowed LaFever a duty but disagreed that direct application of thefour-point analysis was the proper approach. The court agreedwith Kemlite's contention that section 343A of the Restatement(Second) of Torts, adopted by the court in Ward, generallyabsolves a landowner from duties regarding open and obviousdangers. Restatement (Second) of Torts