IL Department of Central Management Services v. IL Labor Relations Board

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State: Illinois

Court: 4th District Appellate

Docket No: 4-06-0083 Rel

Case Date: 05/02/2007

Preview:NO. 4-06-0083 IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT

Filed 5/2/07

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, DEPARTMENT OF ) Direct Appeal from CENTRAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES (DEPARTMENT ) Illinois Labor OF CORRECTIONS), ) Relations Board, Petitioner-Appellant, ) State Panel v. ) THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, LABOR RELATIONS ) BOARD, STATE PANEL; JACKIE GALLAGHER, ) No. S-CA-03-002 MICHAEL HADE, CHARLES HERNANDEZ, REX ) S-CA-03-052 PIPER, and LETITIA TAYLOR, the Members ) S-CA-03-054 of Said Board and Panel in Their ) S-CA-03-056 Official Capacity Only; and THE ) S-CA-03-064 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY ) S-CA-03-068 AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, COUNCIL 31, ) S-CA-03-090 Respondents-Appellees. ) S-CA-03-092 ______________________________________________________________ JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court: This case arises out of an impasse in negotiations between petitioner, the State of Illinois Department of Central Management Services (Department of Corrections) (hereinafter CMS), and respondent American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 (hereinafter AFSCME). The

negotiations involved the impact on security employees of CMS's closure of several correctional facilities. AFSCME was the Both parties

exclusive representative of the employees at issue.

agree that the employees in question are "security employees" as defined by the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (Act) (5 ILCS 315/3(p) (West 2002)). Because security employees are afforded

access to certain dispute-resolution procedures under section 14

of the Act, both parties often refer to the security employees as section 14 employees (5 ILCS 315/14 (West 2002)). This case

centers around the scope of section 14 dispute-resolution procedures afforded to section 14 employees, specifically whether section 14 authorizes "midterm interest arbitration," i.e., arbitration in the middle of a contract as opposed to its beginning or end. On December 21, 2005, respondent Illinois Labor Relations Board (Board) issued a decision and order finding that (1) section 14 authorizes "interest arbitration" for disputes involving section 14 employees in "midterm" disputes and not merely in "initial" or "successor" disputes; and (2) the collective-bargaining agreement relevant to this case did not contain a waiver of the statutory right to midterm interest arbitration for security employees. In keeping with these findings, the Board

held that CMS violated sections 10(a)(1) and 10(a)(4) of the Act when it refused to proceed to impasse resolution pursuant to section 14 of the Act (5 ILCS 315/10(a)(1), (a)(4) (West 2002)). The Board ordered CMS to cease and desist from refusing to proceed to impasse resolution pursuant to section 14. The Board

did not allow immediate access to interest arbitration but instead ordered the parties to design a process for the resolution of the dispute under section 14(p), with any disagreements subject to the Board's compliance (5 ILCS 315/14(p) (West 2002)). - 2 -

CMS appeals the Board's findings.

American Federation of State,

County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, 22 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 10, Nos. S-CA-03-002, S-CA-03-048, S-CA-03-052, S-CA-03-054, S-CA-03-056, S-CA-03-064, S-CA-03-068, S-CA-03-090, S-CA-03-092 (Illinois Labor Relations Board, State Panel, December 21, 2005) (hereinafter 22 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 10). We affirm. I. BACKGROUND At all times relevant, a bargaining agreement between CMS and AFSCME was in effect. The bargaining agreement was

extensive in nature and was part of a long-standing relationship of bargaining agreements between the parties. The bargaining agreement contained a general no-strike provision, which applied to all employees, both section 14 security employees and nonsection 14 employees. In contrast, by statute, section 14 employees

are generally prohibited from striking and nonsection 14 employees generally have the right to strike. 5 ILCS 315/17 (West As is required when a

2002) (general right-to-strike provision).

bargaining agreement contains a no-strike clause, the bargaining agreement also contained a grievance-arbitration provision, which applied to all employees in the bargaining unit and provided for final and binding arbitration of disputes concerning the administration or interpretation of the bargaining agreement. See 5

ILCS 315/8 (West 2002) (bargaining agreements that contain no- 3 -

strike clauses must also contain grievance-arbitration provisions). The bargaining agreement also contained a memorandum of

understanding in its appendix, which provided that, within 60 days of the employer's announcement of a correctional-facility closure, the parties "agree to negotiate over such matters that may impact upon employees *** on questions of wages, hours[,] and other conditions of employment." Accordingly, in 2002, CMS and

AFSCME entered into negotiations concerning the impact that the closure of nine correctional facilities would have on security employees. The parties were unable to reach full agreement on several points concerning the closure of the facilities. The

subjects on which the parties reached impasse included issues relating to the filling of vacancies and transfer, recall, and seniority rights of the affected employees. It appears that

these issues were not specifically covered by the bargaining agreement. AFSCME requested that the parties enter into "interAFSCME thought

est arbitration" to resolve the remaining issues.

that it had a statutory right to interest arbitration under section 14 of the Act, entitled "Security Employee, Peace Officer[,] and Fire Fighter Disputes," which delineates interestarbitration procedures of security employees (5 ILCS 315/14 (West 2002)). CMS refused to enter into interest arbitration, and

implemented its "final offer" as determined by the 2002 negotia- 4 -

tions, including all the terms upon which the parties were unable to agree. In the July through October 2002 period, AFSCME filed nine unfair-labor-practice charges against CMS, each alleging that CMS violated sections 10(a)(1) and 10(a)(4) of the Act because CMS refused to proceed to interest arbitration (5 ILCS 315/10(a)(1), (a)(4) (West 2002)). These sections state that an

employer commits unfair labor practice under the Act when it restrains an employee's ability to exercise the rights guaranteed by the Act (5 ILCS 315/10(a)(1) (West 2002)) and when it "refuse[s] to bargain collectively in good faith with a labor organization which is the exclusive representative of public employees in an appropriate unit, including, but not limited to, the discussing of grievances with the exclusive representative" (5 ILCS 315/10(a)(4) (West 2002)). ultimately consolidated into one. 048. AFSCME's nine complaints were AFSCME withdrew No. 5-CA-03-

In June 2004, the case went before an administrative law The ALJ ordered the

judge (ALJ), who found in favor of AFSCME.

parties to proceed to "interest arbitration" under section 14. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Council 31, 22 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 10, Nos. S-CA-03002, S-CA-03-052, S-CA-03-054, S-CA-03-056, S-CA-03-064, S-CA-03068, S-CA-03-090, S-CA-03-092 (Illinois Labor Relations Board, State Panel, ALJ recommended decision and order, April 25, 2005). - 5 -

CMS filed exceptions, and the case then went before the Board. Both parties stipulated that there was "no issue" as to

whether this dispute should be "deferred" to the grievancearbitration procedures contained in the bargaining agreement. this, we presume the parties meant that the existence of the grievance-arbitration provision contained within the bargaining agreement did not (1) require a finding that the current dispute should be resolved through the contractual grievance-arbitration procedures rather than the statutory procedures, or (2) preclude the Board from addressing whether the Act also authorized midterm interest arbitration. AFSCME stated in closing that the issue of By

whether good-faith bargaining had occurred was a statutory issue and was not to be determined by the contractual grievance-arbitration procedures. CMS argued that AFSCME did not have a

statutory right to midterm interest arbitration because, according to CMS's interpretation of the statute, section 14 gave security employees the right to interest arbitration only for disputes arising during the formation of "initial" or "successor" contracts (i.e., comprehensive bargaining agreements), not for "midterm" disputes (i.e., an ancillary dispute arising while the bargaining agreement is still in effect) that were not the subject of contract "reopeners" (i.e., where the parties agree to "reopen" the agreement or designated part of the agreement). In

the alternative, CMS argued that AFSCME contractually waived any - 6 -

statutory right to midterm interest arbitration. The Board found that the Act allowed for midterm interest arbitration and declined to follow CMS's narrow interpretation of section 14. Instead, the Board relied largely on

the general policy language in section 2 of the Act, which states that all collective-bargaining disputes involving security employees shall be submitted to impartial arbitrators (5 ILCS 315/2 (West 2002)). The Board also held that AFSCME did not

contractually waive its statutory right to access midterm interest arbitration in this matter. The Board ordered CMS to desist

from "[r]efusing to proceed to impasse resolution, pursuant to [s]ection 14 of the Act." at 28. 22 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 10,

The Board's decision differs slightly from that of the

ALJ because the ALJ ordered the parties to proceed to interest arbitration. However, the Board stated that "[s]ection 14 of the

Act does not contemplate immediate access to interest arbitration, without some sort of mediation attempt, unless the parties agree to such a process." at 29. 22 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 10,

Therefore, pursuant to section 14(p), the Board ordered

the parties to design a process for the resolution of this dispute, with any disagreements subject to the Board's compliance (5 ILCS 315/14(p) (West 2002)). Section 14(p) states that

"[n]otwithstanding the provisions of [section 14] the employer and exclusive representative may agree to submit unresolved - 7 -

disputes concerning wages, hours, terms[,] and conditions of employment to an alternative form of impasse resolution." 315/14(p) (West 2002). CMS filed a petition for judicial review of the Board's decision, and a question exists as to whether said petition was timely filed. The Board and AFSCME each filed separate appellate Additionally, the 5 ILCS

briefs in support of the Board's decision.

American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and the Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council (IFO-PLC) each filed separate amicus curiae briefs in support of the Board's decision. II. ANALYSIS A. Timing The Board argues that, as a threshold issue, this appeal should be dismissed because CMS's petition for direct review was not timely filed. Parties proceeding before an

administrative agency shall be barred from obtaining judicial review of the agency's decision if review is not sought within the time and in the manner provided by the statute. 735 ILCS

5/3-102 (West 2004); Rodriguez v. Sheriff's Merit Comm'n of Kane County, 218 Ill. 2d 342, 349-50, 843 N.E.2d 379, 382-83 (2006). Section 11(e) of the Act states that any direct appeal should be filed within 35 days from the date that a copy of the decision sought to be reviewed was served upon the parties. - 8 5 ILCS

315/11(e) (West 2002).

Because the term "service" is not defined

by the Act, we must defer to section 3-113 of the Administrative Review Law, which provides in relevant part: "The method of service of the decision shall be as provided in the Act governing the procedure before the administrative agency, but if no method is provided, a decision shall be deemed to have been served either when a copy of the decision is personally delivered or when a copy of the decision is deposited in the United States mail ***." added.) (Emphasis

735 ILCS 5/3-113 (West 2002).

Illinois precedent is clear that date of "service" means the date that the decision was mailed, not the date it was received. Rodriguez, 218 Ill. 2d at 351, 843 N.E.2d at 383. Here, the Board issued its decision on December 21, 2005, and asserts that it mailed out its decision on the same day. CMS received the decision on December 23, 2005. CMS filed

its petition on Friday, January 27, 2006, 37 days after the decision was mailed, but only 35 days after the date the decision was received. CMS requests, however, that we find exception to the definition of service contained in section 3-113 because the Board's own regulations concerning the time limits set forth in - 9 -

the Act deem that "[s]ervice of a document upon a party by mail shall be presumed complete three days after mailing, if proof of service shows the document was properly addressed." 80 Ill. Adm.

Code

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