Defendants, Danny Pedigo, Wanda Pedigo, Tony Capranica,Linda Capranica, and Joseph Bonefeste, treasurer of Sangamon County,Illinois (hereinafter defendants), appeal the trial court's award ofsummary judgment in favor of plaintiff, the Illinois Department ofNatural Resources (Department), arguing the trial court erred in (1)granting summary judgment in favor of the Department, (2) barringDanny Pedigo's testimony, (3) barring Linda Capranica's testimony,(4) refusing to bar Barry W. Taft's testimony, and (5) its determination of what the "whole" of the condemned property constituted. Wereverse the trial court's judgment and remand with directions.

On February 6, 2001, the Department filed a complaint forcondemnation against defendants. The Department sought fee simpletitle to defendants' real property for the acquisition, development,and construction of the Chatham Trail Bikeway, a seven-mile biketrail from Chatham to Springfield. The Department also sought athree-year temporary construction easement. On February 26, 2001,defendants filed a traverse, challenging the Department's right tocondemn their property. Defendants argued that (1) the taking wasnot for a public use or purpose, (2) the property sought to beacquired was not necessary or convenient for the purposes for whichit was sought to be taken, and (3) the complaint was filed withoutlegal authorization in the form of the written consent of the Governor as required by section 5-675 of the Departments of State Government Law (20 ILCS 5/5-675 (West 2000)) or in the form of formalaction by the Department itself authorizing condemnation. On June13, 2001, the trial court denied defendants' traverse, finding theDepartment presented sufficient evidence to sustain its burden topresent a prima facie case that (1) the taking was for a public useor purpose, (2) the property sought to be acquired was necessary orconvenient for the purpose for which it was sought to be taken, and(3) the complaint was filed with legal authorization in the form ofwritten consent of the Governor.

On July 2, 2001, defendants filed a cross-complaint,alleging that the remainder of their real estate would be damaged bythe Department's taking and requesting that damages be assessed. TheDepartment moved to strike defendants' cross-complaint becausedefendants did not properly allege unity of use between the disputedparcel and the remainder property. The trial court granted theDepartment's motion to strike but granted defendants leave to file anamended cross-complaint. On January 31, 2002, defendants filed anamended cross-complaint, alleging that the land described in thecomplaint for condemnation was contiguous to and used in conjunctionwith defendants' remaining lands. On November 26, 2002, defendantsfiled a second-amended cross-complaint, correcting a legal description of defendants' land.

On December 23, 2002, the Department filed its firstmotion in limine to prevent and exclude Danny Pedigo from testifyingon behalf of defendants as to his opinion of damages to the remainderproperty. The Department argued Pedigo considered an improperelement of damages in reaching his opinion of the market value of theremainder, i.e., the potential for trespassing on his land by usersof the bike path. Trespassing, the Department argued, is not acompensable element of damages. Defendants disagreed, arguing thattrespassing, when not a remote threat, is a proper measure of damages. On February 19, 2003, the trial court denied the Department'sfirst motion in limine.

On December 23, 2002, the Department also filed a motionfor a judicial declaration of whole property. The Department soughtthis declaration because the measure of just compensation dependedupon which property was considered the remainder. The Departmentbelieved only the 0.59-acre triangular parcel in section 31, fromwhich the 0.147-acre parcel was being taken, was the "whole property." Defendants responded that the land being taken did not whollylie within the 0.59-acre parcel and the Department's motion wasfatally flawed because it did not properly describe the lands to betaken. Further, defendants argued that the "whole property" constituted 58.89 acres of defendants' land, including parcel 1 located insection 29, parcel 2 located in section 31, and parcel 3 located insection 32. The Department filed a response admitting the mistakenreference to the 0.59-acre parcel. The Department argued its mistakewas in name only as the taken area was properly described in exhibitssubmitted to defendants and the court. The Department asserted thatthe whole property constituted 0.90 acres, which included thatportion of defendants' property in section 31 that is located southof the line where the sod farming stops and west of the bike pathcorridor already owned by the Department. On February 19, 2003, thetrial court declared the whole property to be that portion of defendants' property in section 31, west of the property already owned bythe Department and south of the line where the sod farming stops.

On March 14, 2003, the Department filed another motion inlimine, seeking to prevent and exclude Danny Pedigo from testifyingas to the value of the remainder because he improperly consideredspecial value to himself as well as special value to the City ofSpringfield, an adjacent landowner, instead of relying on the fair-market value of the property. On March 31, 2003, the trial courtdenied the Department's motion. However, on the Department's motionto reconsider, the court granted the motion and excluded Pedigo fromtestifying as to the value of the remainder.

On April 7, 2003, the Department filed a motion forsummary judgment. The Department argued that the only issue to bedetermined by a jury was the amount of just compensation to beawarded to defendants. Because the court had ruled that Pedigo'stestimony was to be excluded, the only witness left to testify as tothe value of the remainder was the Department's expert, Barry W.Taft. As such, the Department argued, summary judgment should begranted to the Department for $1,100, the amount of just compensationand the temporary construction easement. On April 30, 2003, defendants, in response to the Department's motion for summary judgment,asserted that Linda Capranica had appraised the property, and therefore, the Department's motion for summary judgment should be denied. In addition, defendants made a motion to exclude Taft's testimonybecause he had used improper elements in forming his opinion as tothe value of the remainder property. Defendants argued that Taft (1)used the wrong evaluation dates; (2) erroneously claimed no part ofdefendants' land was under water; (3) believed only Danny Pedigo wasthe owner; (4) believed no leaseholds were involved; (5) appraisedthe property with limited data; (6) was unable to view a portion ofthe property; (7) made no effort to determine who the adjacentproperty owners were; (8) used a "non-arms-length" transfer as acomparable sale; (9) knew of no other comparable properties thatresulted in a value as low as he valued defendants' property; (10)did not consider defendants' riparian rights to Lake Springfieldwater; and (11) did not recognize the value of any structure on theproperty. On May 22, 2003, the Department filed a motion to barCapranica's testimony on the grounds that her disclosure as a witnesswas untimely. On June 3, 2003, the trial court denied defendants'motion to bar Taft's testimony and granted the Department's motion tobar Capranica's testimony. The court also denied the Department'smotion for summary judgment. However, on reconsideration, the courtgranted summary judgment and awarded defendants $1,100 as justcompensation. This appeal followed.

Defendants appeal, arguing the trial court erred in (1)granting summary judgment in favor of the Department, (2) barringPedigo's testimony, (3) barring Capranica's testimony, (4) refusingto bar Taft's testimony, and (5) its determination of what the"whole" of the condemned property constituted. We consider thesearguments in turn.

The United States Constitution forbids private propertyfrom being "taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.Const., amend. V. Similarly, the Illinois Constitution prohibits theState from taking or causing damage to private property without justcompensation. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,