June 28, 2001

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JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:

In August 1999, plaintiff, the Illinois State Police,filed a three-count complaint for vacatur of an arbitration awardthat sustained the grievances brought by defendant, the FraternalOrder of Police Troopers Lodge No. 41. In April 2000, defendantfiled a motion for summary judgment, and in June 2000, plaintifffiled a cross-motion for summary judgment. After an August 2000hearing on the summary judgment motions, the trial court granteddefendant's motion for summary judgment and affirmed the arbitrator's decision.

On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erredin granting summary judgment to defendant because (1) the arbitrator exceeded his authority by (a) ruling that plaintiff cannotinterrogate its employees regarding criminal matters withoutfirst providing written notice and other protections afforded bythe parties' collective-bargaining agreement (contract), and (b)ignoring the plain language of the contract; and (2) the arbitrator's award violates the public policies favoring (a) effectivelaw enforcement and (b) equal protection. We reverse and remandwith directions.

Plaintiff maintains a division of internal investigation (Division) that is responsible for investigations, bothcriminal and noncriminal, of misconduct committed by plaintiff'semployees. The Division makes an initial assessment of theallegations and determines whether the case involves criminalconduct. If criminal conduct is involved, then the investigationproceeds as a criminal investigation. If no criminal conduct isinvolved, the Division investigates the case administratively.

In August 1994, plaintiff and defendant signed acontract that was effective from July 1, 1994, to June 30, 1997. According to the parties, that agreement remained in effect untilDecember 19, 1997, when the parties entered another collective-bargaining agreement. Article 7 of the contract, entitled"Officer's Bill of Rights," provided guidelines for conductinginvestigations of nonprobationary officers where the investigation could result in "discipline." Under article 7, an internalinvestigation cannot be conducted unless a file initiation reporthas been filed. Furthermore, at least 24 hours prior to aninterrogation, plaintiff must inform the officer of the following:

"(1) the identity of the officer conductingthe interrogation; (2) the identity of allpersons present during the interrogation; (3)the nature of the complaint and pertinentfacts alleged; (4) the names of the complainants known at the time of the interrogation;(5) his statutory administrative proceedingsrights if the allegation under investigationindicates that a recommendation for a discharge, demotion, or a suspension in excessof summary punishment is probable againstthat officer; and/or (6) his constitutionalrights concerning self-incrimination if theallegation under investigation indicates thatcriminal prosecution is probable against thatofficer."

The officer is also entitled to have counsel present or defendant's representative present during the interrogation.

In October 1997, Division officers interviewed TrooperPhil Krpan as part of a criminal investigation of allegationsthat Trooper Krpan and his wife were involved in an insurancefraud scheme. At the beginning of the interview, Trooper Krpansigned a statement of constitutional rights and waiver form,acknowledging that he had been advised of his rights underMiranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct.1602 (1966). Because the matter was a criminal investigation,the Division officers did not comply with article 7 of thecontract. At the conclusion of the investigation, the State didnot file charges against Trooper Krpan, and plaintiff did nottake any disciplinary action against Trooper Krpan. That samemonth, Trooper Krpan submitted a grievance, claiming plaintiffviolated the contract by interviewing him on October 8, 1997, aspart of a criminal violation without following the procedures insections 1 and 2 of article 7.

Also, in October 1997, Division officers interviewedTrooper Travis Jones in a criminal investigation regardinginappropriate sexual relations with a 14-year-old girl. TrooperJones signed the statement of constitutional rights and waiverform, but plaintiffs did not afford him his article 7 rights. During the interview, Trooper Jones made certain admissionsregarding his sexual conduct with the minor.

In March 1998, different Division officers againinterviewed Trooper Jones regarding his conduct with the minor. This time the investigation was an administrative matter, andplaintiff afforded Trooper Jones his article 7 rights. TrooperJones denied many of the allegations that he had admitted in theearlier interrogation. Thus, the Division held another administrative interview in compliance with article 7.

Plaintiff later recommended that Trooper Jones beterminated and instituted proceedings with the State Police MeritBoard (Merit Board). In the Merit Board proceedings, TrooperJones filed a motion to suppress his statements made during thecriminal interview, which the Merit Board denied. In February1999, the Merit Board hearing officer issued findings of fact andconclusions of law, agreeing with plaintiff's recommendation toterminate Trooper Jones' employment. The Merit Board adopted thehearing officer's decision.

Trooper Jones appealed the Merit Board's decision. InMarch 2000, the circuit court found that the Merit Board incorrectly denied Trooper Jones' motion to suppress, reversed thedecision of the Merit Board, and remanded the case for a newhearing without the evidence from the criminal interview. InJune 2000, we denied leave to appeal. Jones v. Illinois StatePolice, No. 4-00-0398 (June 27, 2000) (leave to appeal deniedorder unpublished under Supreme Court Rule 23). The record onappeal does not indicate the result of the rehearing.

In October 1997, Trooper Travis Jones submitted agrievance similar to Trooper Krpan's, as to Jones' October 2,1997, interview. Pursuant to article 8 of the contract, defendant submitted the grievances to arbitration. By agreement ofthe parties, the grievances were consolidated for a hearingbefore the arbitrator, Elliott Goldstein. The stipulated issuesbefore the arbitrator were as follows:

"1) Whether [plaintiff] violated[a]rticle 7 of the [contract] in conductingthe October 7, 1997[,] interview of TrooperPhil Krpan, and, if so, what is theappropriate remedy?

2) Whether [plaintiff] violated[a]rticle 7 of the [contract] in conductingthe October 2, 1997[,] interview of TrooperTravis Jones, and, if so, what is theappropriate remedy?"

On June 25, 1999, the arbitrator issued his opinion andaward, sustaining the grievances and ordering plaintiff to (1)abide by the contract provisions governing the investigation andinterrogation of officers pursuant to article 7 in allinvestigations and (2) compensate Trooper Jones for back pay andlost benefits from when he was placed on nonpay status until theMerit Board upheld the termination. In his opinion, thearbitrator noted that no party disputed that plaintiff failed tofollow the procedures set forth in sections 1 and 2 of article 7of the contract in interviewing Troopers Jones and Krpan.

On August 27, 1999, plaintiff filed a complaint forvacatur of the arbitration award. On October 1, 1999, defendantfiled a counterclaim to enforce the arbitration award. In April2000, defendant filed both a motion to dismiss the second countof plaintiff's complaint pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of theCode of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 1998)) anda motion for summary judgment. In June 2000, plaintiff filed across-motion for summary judgment. In August 2000, the trialcourt granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, deniedplaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and affirmed the arbitrator's decision. This appeal followed.

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings,depositions, admissions, and affidavits demonstrate that nogenuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitledto judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West1998); Rotzoll v. Overhead Door Corp., 289 Ill. App. 3d 410, 413,681 N.E.2d 156, 158 (1997). In ruling on a motion for summaryjudgment, the trial court must view all evidence in the lightmost favorable to the nonmovant. Malone v. American CyanamidCo., 271 Ill. App. 3d 843, 845, 649 N.E.2d 493, 495 (1995). Wereview grants of summary judgment de novo. Malone, 271 Ill. App.3d at 845, 649 N.E.2d at 495.

We recognize that judicial review of an arbitrationaward is extremely limited. American Federation of State, County& Municipal Employees v. Department of Central Management Services, 173 Ill. 2d 299, 304, 671 N.E.2d 668, 672 (1996) (AFSCMEI). Thus, a court is duty bound to enforce a labor-arbitrationaward if (1) the arbitrator acts within the scope of his or herauthority and (2) the award draws its essence from the parties'collective-bargaining agreement. AFSCME I, 173 Ill. 2d at 304-05, 671 N.E.2d at 672. In deciding whether an award draws itsessence from the agreement, a court determines whether thearbitrator limited himself to interpreting the collective-bargaining agreement. Water Pipe Extension, Bureau of EngineeringLaborers' Local 1092 v. City of Chicago, 318 Ill. App. 3d 628,637, 741 N.E.2d 1093, 1100 (2000).

Accordingly, any question regarding the interpretationof a collective-bargaining agreement is to be answered by thearbitrator. Because the parties have contracted to have theirdisputes settled by an arbitrator, rather than by a judge, theparties have agreed to accept the arbitrator's view of themeaning of the contract. We will not overrule that constructionmerely because our interpretation differs from that of thearbitrator. AFSCME I, 173 Ill. 2d at 305, 671 N.E.2d at 672. However, we will disturb an arbitral award if it fails to deriveits essence from the parties' collective-bargaining agreement. AFSCME I, 173 Ill. 2d at 306, 671 N.E.2d at 673.

Plaintiff argues that the arbitrator exceeded hisauthority by (1) ruling that plaintiff cannot interrogate itsemployees regarding criminal matters unless it complies with thecontract and (2) ignoring the plain language of the contract. Weagree.

While judicial review of an arbitration award islimited, the arbitrator's ruling that plaintiff must comply witharticle 7 when interrogating employees regarding criminal matterswas not drawn from the essence of the contract. In article 4 ofthe contract, plaintiff retained all powers, rights, duties, andresponsibilities traditionally recognized as belonging to it andvested in it by the laws and the Illinois Constitution, except aslimited by the express and specific terms of the contract. Plaintiff has a statutory duty to investigate the origins,activities, personnel, and incidents of crime and enforce thecriminal laws of the state. 20 ILCS 2605/55a(A)(4)(a) (West2000). Thus, plaintiff's power can only be limited "by theexpress and specific terms of [the contract]." Here, plaintiffdid not specifically and expressly agree that article 7 wouldapply to criminal investigations. In fact, the terms of article 7 suggest that they apply to disciplinary proceedings, notcriminal investigations.

Moreover, other language of the contract suggests thatarticle 7 does not apply to criminal investigations. Article 2of the contract recognizes that defendant is the exclusivebargaining representative for all matters relating to the termsand conditions of employment. Article 1 acknowledges that apurpose of the agreement is to provide "certain working conditions, rates of pay[,] and other terms and conditions of employment." Criminal matters are generally outside the employmentrelationship.

Additionally, an employer cannot by contract give itsemployees procedural rights and benefits regarding criminalinvestigations. The fact that the employer in this case is theIllinois State Police is immaterial. Clearly, when plaintiff isinvestigating an employee's criminal conduct, it is acting underits statutory duty to enforce the laws of the State of Illinois(20 ILCS 2605/55a(A)(4)(a) (West 2000)), not as an employer.

Accordingly, we find that the arbitrator exceeded hisauthority, and thus the trial court erred in granting defendant'smotion for summary judgment. In view of our resolution of thisissue, we need not address the remaining arguments, but we chooseto address the following.

Plaintiff next argues that the arbitration awardviolates the well-defined public policies of effective lawenforcement and equal protection. Even if an arbitration awardis derived from the essence of the collective-bargaining agreement, we will vacate the award if it is repugnant to the established norms of public policy. AFSCME I, 173 Ill. 2d at 306-07,671 N.E.2d at 673. Such vacatur is rooted in the common-lawdoctrine that a court may refuse to enforce contracts thatviolate law or public policy. Department of Central ManagementServices v. American Federation of State, County & MunicipalEmployees (AFSCME), 245 Ill. App. 3d 87, 93, 614 N.E.2d 513, 517(1993) (AFSCME II).

In determining if the arbitration award falls under thepublic policy exception, we apply a two-step analysis. AFSCME I,173 Ill. 2d at 307, 671 N.E.2d at 674. The first question iswhether a well-defined and dominant public policy can be identified. AFSCME I, 173 Ill. 2d at 307, 671 N.E.2d at 674. If so,then the court must determine whether the arbitrator's award, asreflected in his interpretation of the agreement, violated thepublic policy. AFSCME I, 173 Ill. 2d at 307, 671 N.E.2d at 674.

As to the initial inquiry, an established public policyunquestionably exists promoting effective law enforcement. Astate's public policy is found in its constitution, laws, andjudicial decisions. AFSCME II, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 94, 614N.E.2d at 517. The Supreme Court of Illinois has recognized aclear public policy favoring the investigation and prosecution ofcriminal offenses. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85Ill. 2d 124, 133, 421 N.E.2d 876, 880 (1981). Such a policy ofenforcing the State's criminal code is the most basic publicpolicy implied in the concept of ordered liberty. Palmateer, 85Ill. 2d at 132, 421 N.E.2d at 879.

Moreover, the public policy of effective law enforcement is demonstrated by the laws of this state. To carry out itsstatutory duties to investigate the origins, activities, personnel, and incidents of crime and enforce the criminal laws (20ILCS 2605/55a(A)(4)(a) (West 2000)), plaintiff is required toemploy skilled experts, scientists, technicians, and investigators, or otherwise specially qualified persons to aid in detecting crime and apprehending criminals. 20 ILCS 2605/2605-200(a)(3) (West 2000).

Inherent in effective law enforcement is the publicpolicy favoring the exposure of crime. See Velez v. Avis Rent ACar System, Inc., 308 Ill. App. 3d 923, 928, 721 N.E.2d 652, 656(1999) (Illinois has a public policy that favors the exposure ofcrime). As demonstrated by the statutes requiring skilledinvestigators, this public policy is well defined to protect thecitizens of this state.

We next determine whether the arbitrator's awardoffends the public policy of effective law enforcement. Asdemonstrated by the facts of Trooper Jones' case, thearbitrator's award, by requiring compliance with article 7 incriminal investigations, contravenes plaintiff's ability toinvestigate crimes. There, Trooper Jones made admissions regarding his wrongdoing during the criminal investigations. Wheninterviewed in accordance with article 7, Trooper Jones' retracted his earlier statements and denied any wrongdoing.

Moreover, at the arbitration hearing, plaintiff presented the undisputed testimony that the element of surprise isvery important in conducting criminal interrogation. Complyingwith the administrative procedures under article 7 would bedetrimental to conducting effective law enforcement.

In support of its argument that applying interrogationguidelines to criminal investigations is not against publicpolicy, defendant cites several statutes. All three of theseclearly apply, however, to interrogations as part of an administrative investigation, not a criminal one.

The first statute, section 14 of the State Police Act(20 ILCS 2610/14 (West 2000)), provides notice to employees priorto interrogations. However, the statute specifically refers tointerrogations serving as the basis for suspension, removal, ordischarge, not criminal charges. Section 10-1-18(b) of theIllinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/10-1-18(b) (West 2000))contains similar notice language and again refers to investigations serving the basis for removal or discharge. This statutedoes not refer to criminal investigations. The last statute,section 3.2 of the Uniform Peace Officers' Disciplinary Act (50ILCS 725/3.2 (West 2000)), again provides certain notice requirements prior to an interrogation of an employee. Section 2(d) ofthe same act expressly refers to an investigation in connectionwith an alleged violation of the agency's or unit's rules, notcriminal laws. 50 ILCS 725/2(d) (West 2000).

Thus, the arbitrator's award requiring compliance witharticle 7 for criminal investigations violates the public policyof effective law enforcement.

In light of our holding, we need not address plaintiff's argument that the arbitrator's award violates the publicpolicy of equal protection.

For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court'sgrant of summary judgment and remand with directions for thetrial court to grant plaintiff summary judgment and vacate thearbitration award.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

McCULLOUGH and TURNER, JJ., concur.