JUSTICE APPLETON delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondent, Carl Maxwell, appeals from the order of thetrial court, finding his son, C.M., age two, abused and dependent andmaking him a ward of the court. 705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(ii), 2-4(1)(a),2-22(1) (West 2002). Specifically, respondent argues the statutorysection that allowed the court to admit a minor's out-of-courtstatement to support its finding of abuse is unconstitutional. Weaffirm.

On December 11, 2003, Heather Forrest, a child-protectioninvestigator for the Department of Children and Family Services(DCFS), responded to a hotline report that C.M.'s half brother, D.C.,age six, had marks and bruises on his body. Forrest arrived atD.C.'s school and observed several bruises and scratches on his lowerback that appeared to have been recently inflicted and two loop markson each of his sides that appeared to be older. D.C., a specialneeds child, did not have the verbal skills to tell Forrest how themarks were inflicted. However, his teacher said D.C. had been very"clingy" that day and made gestures like he was hitting somethingwhile saying, "I'm going to whip your ass." Forrest and Alex Meyer,a Rantoul police officer, spoke with D.C.'s mother, Terria Perkins. Perkins initially told Forrest and Officer Meyer that D.C. had gotteninto a fight with his cousin the night before.

Forrest and Officer Meyer wanted to see Perkins's otherchildren, T.C., age four, and C.M. Perkins said they were at theirbaby-sitter's house in Champaign. Forrest went to the Champaignaddress given by Perkins, but no one answered the door. Forrestcalled Perkins's residence to verify the address. A man answered thephone and identified himself as Charles Lake, Perkins's boyfriend'scousin. Lake said he had been home with the children all day. Officer Meyer and Forrest went back to Perkins's house to speak withher. She told Forrest no one answered at the Champaign addressbecause they probably did not want to get involved with DCFS. Shesaid T.C. and C.M. had arrived home early, and the man that answeredthe phone was her friend, Michael Ward. Ward told Officer Meyer hegave the name Lake because he did not know what was going on and wasnervous.

Forrest spoke with T.C., who said that respondent hadgrabbed D.C. by his shirt and hit him. Officer Meyer discovered thatCharles Lake, a/k/a Michael Ward, was actually respondent. He wasarrested. Only then did Perkins admit that respondent had hit D.C.the night before, but she claimed it was a disciplinary measurebecause D.C. was trying to bite people. She said she saw respondenthit D.C. but did not think he hit him very hard. The children weretaken into protective custody.

On December 12, 2003, the State filed an adjudication ofwardship petition in Champaign County against Perkins, respondent,and Daniel C. (T.C. and D.C.'s father), alleging, inter alia, theminors were abused because Perkins and respondent created a substantial risk of physical injury to them. See 705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(ii)(West 2002). The State dismissed the other counts alleged in thepetition.

At the adjudicatory hearing, respondent stipulated to theevidence, which included Forrest's shelter-care report, OfficerMeyer's police report, photographs of D.C.'s injuries, and a reportby Dr. Buetow, the pediatrician who examined D.C. Dr. Buetow opinedthat D.C.'s injuries were consistent with physical abuse. Theshelter-care report and the police report set forth the eventssummarized above.

On March 15, 2004, the trial court held a dispositionalhearing. The court filed a dispositional order and found respondentunfit to care for C.M. for reasons other than financial circumstancesalone and made C.M. a ward of the court. This appeal followed.

All proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987(Juvenile Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 through 7-1 (West 2002)) are broughtin the best interests of the child involved and should not be undertaken lightly. In re S.S., 313 Ill. App. 3d 121, 126, 728 N.E.2d1165, 1169 (2000). At an adjudicatory hearing, a trial court mustdetermine whether a minor is abused, neglected, or dependent. TheState must prove its allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(1) (West 2002). A trial court's finding is afforded great deference and will not be disturbed unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. In re A.P., 179 Ill.2d 184, 204, 688 N.E.2d 642, 652 (1997).

Under the Juvenile Act, a child is abused if the childresides with a parent who creates a substantial risk of physical harmto him by other than accidental means. 705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(ii) (West2002). A parent's behavior toward one minor may be considered whendeciding whether a sibling is exposed to an injurious environment. In re M.D.H., 297 Ill. App. 3d 181, 189, 697 N.E.2d 417, 422 (1998).

Respondent claims the evidence presented at the adjudicatory hearing, which led to the trial court's finding of abuse, didnot sufficiently prove by clear and convincing evidence that heabused D.C. Especially, he argues, since the evidence included anout-of-court statement made by T.C., which, despite the provisions ofsection 2-18 of the Juvenile Act, should not have been admittedbecause it violated his sixth amendment right to confront witnessesagainst him (see U.S. Const., amend VI). Respondent claims section2-18 is unconstitutional in light of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.___, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).

Section 2-18(4)(c) of the Juvenile Act permits the trialcourt to consider and admit into evidence previous statements made bya minor relating to allegations of abuse. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(c)(West 2002). Citing Crawford, respondent claims this section belieshis right to confront witnesses and is therefore unconstitutional.

In Crawford, the Supreme Court held that out-of-courtstatements made by a witness, including preliminary hearing, formertrial, or grand jury testimony and statements made to police duringinterrogations, were barred by the sixth-amendment confrontationclause. Crawford, 541 U.S. at ___, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 203, 124 S. Ct.at 1374. Respondent urges this court to consider the appropriatenessof admitting a minor witness's out-of-court statements in light ofCrawford.

Respondent's argument fails. This court has previouslyheld that a proceeding under the Juvenile Act constitutes a civilproceeding--meaning that no sixth amendment right to confront witnesses is implicated. M.D.H., 297 Ill. App. 3d at 186-87, 697 N.E.2dat 421. Further, we find the record reveals that T.C.'s version ofthe events was corroborated by Dr. Buetow's report. In addition,Perkins finally admitted to Forrest that she saw respondent hit D.C. We find this evidence (to which respondent stipulated at theadjudicatory hearing) was sufficient to support the trial court'sfinding of abuse. Because we find no error in the court'sconsideration of T.C.'s out-of-court statement, we affirm the court'sjudgment.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

Affirmed.

TURNER and McCULLOUGH, JJ., concur.