June 26, 2001

NO. 4-00-0805

JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:

On August 24, 2000, the State filed a petition seekinginvoluntary admission of Sakin Demir to a mental health facility. After a hearing on August 28, 2000, the trial court ordered Demirto be admitted as an involuntary psychiatric patient to ZellerMental Health Center for up to 180 days. Demir appeals, arguingthe circuit court erred in denying his motions to dismiss for theState's alleged failure (1) to comply with statutory detentionprocedures and (2) to file the petition within the appropriatetime frame. We reverse.

On August 22, 2000, Demir, a 30-year-old resident ofChampaign, Illinois, was allegedly attacked by another man. According to Demir, the two men traded blows, and Demir thenpulled a knife and forced the man to retreat. Demir viewed hisactions as taken in self-defense.

Police later arrived at the scene, apprehended Demir,and took him to the Provena-Covenant Hospital emergency room. According to hospital records, Demir was admitted to the psychiatric unit of the hospital on August 22, 2000. The prosecutor attrial stated a petition for involuntary commitment under theMental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405ILCS 5/1-100 through 6-107 (West 1998)) was prepared on August22, 2000, but not filed with the court. The prosecutor further"recited that since the initial petition could not be filedwithin the 24-hour period, a second petition was prepared andfiled within 24 hours of the completion of the first certificate." On August 23, 2000, Rob Stewart, a licensed clinicalsocial worker, executed a second petition for involuntary commitment under the Code, asserting (1) respondent was mentally illand because of that mental illness was reasonably expected toinflict serious physical harm on himself or another in the nearfuture and (2) "the petition recited that within 12 hours ofadmission, Stewart gave respondent a copy of the petition onAugust 23, 2000, at 0930." The first certificate to the secondpetition was based on an examination of Demir by Dr. Albert Loheld at 10:30 a.m. on August 23, 2000. The second certificate tothe second petition was based on an examination of Demir by Dr.J.A. Gergen held at 9:30 a.m. on August 24, 2000. On August 24,2000, at 11:32 a.m., the prosecutor filed the petition andcertificates with the court, seeking emergency admission bycertificate. 405 ILCS 5/3-600 through 3-611 (West 1998).

On August 28, 2000, the circuit court conducted a benchtrial. Prior to hearing evidence on the petition, the courtheard respondent's motion to dismiss the petition based on afailure to file the petition within 24 hours of respondent'sentry to the mental health facility. The court stated it did notfind cause for dismissal.

The trial court then heard respondent's motion todismiss for failure to comply with the emergency petition procedures required by the Code. Demir argued the police officersshould have completed the petition upon their appearance at themental health facility to authorize the detention. 405 ILCS 5/3-606 (West 1998). The State responded any adult may file apetition to commit under the Code. 405 ILCS 5/3-601 (West 1998). The court denied the motion.

The trial court then heard evidence on the petition andfound the petition proved. Demir moved for dismissal based onthe State's failure to submit a treatment plan and dispositionalreport as required by the Code. 405 ILCS 5/3-810 (West 1998). The State submitted a two-page report entitled "ComprehensiveExamination and Social Investigation," four pages of progressnotes by Dr. Lo, and two pages of a crisis-screening form. Thecourt denied the motion and found the documents submitted alongwith the testimony of Dr. Lo were sufficient.

The circuit court found respondent to be a personsubject to involuntary admission and ordered him hospitalized inthe Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities.

Respondent appeals.

Involuntary commitment proceedings involve a person'sliberty interests and, thus, the statutory sections of the Codeshould be construed strictly in favor of the respondent. In reHoulihan, 231 Ill. App. 3d 677, 681, 596 N.E.2d 189, 192 (1992). "Inherent in the civil commitment proceeding are the distinctinterests of providing patients with necessary treatment as wellas protecting society from dangerous conduct." In re Williams,151 Ill. App. 3d 911, 919, 503 N.E.2d 816, 821 (1987). As thefacts are not in dispute on the issues and the questions are onesof law, de novo review is appropriate. In re Moore, 301 Ill.App. 3d 759, 764, 704 N.E.2d 442, 445 (1998).

Demir first argues the execution of the petition by astaff social worker at the hospital is not in compliance with theCode when the police actually brought him to Provena-CovenantHospital. The Code provides as follows:

"A peace officer may take a person intocustody and transport him to a mental healthfacility when, as a result of his personalobservation, the peace officer has reasonablegrounds to believe that the person is subjectto involuntary admission and in need of immediate hospitalization to protect such personor others from physical harm ***. *** Uponarrival at the facility ***, the peace officer shall complete the petition under[s]ection 3-601." 405 ILCS 5/3-606 (West1998).

Respondent argues since a police officer did not file the petition as contemplated by the stated provision, the trial courterred by granting the petition.

The State contends as follows:

"When a person is asserted to be subjectto involuntary admission and in such a condition that immediate hospitalization is necessary for the protection of such person orothers from physical harm, any person 18years of age or older may present a petitionto the facility director of a mental healthfacility in the county where the respondentresides or is present ***. *** The petitionmay be prepared by the facility director ofthe facility." 405 ILCS 5/3-601(a) (West1998).

In this case, Rob Stewart, a licensed clinical social worker,executed the petition. The State argues it thus complied withsection 3-601 in the involuntary admission of Demir.

However, Stewart's petition, in part, referenced thepolice bringing respondent to the hospital after "being in analtercation. He reportedly pulled a knife on [a] person. Hetold [a] crisis worker in [the emergency room] that he carriesthis knife for self[-]defense and is at risk for politicalreasons. He reported the Champaign police is [sic] involved witha CIA terrorist group." The petition names a police officer anda woman as witnesses to these facts. Stewart does not state heobserved any of the behavior upon which the assertion of respondent's dangerousness to himself or others was premised.

The hospital's records show police officers took Demirinto custody and transported him to the hospital after theirobservation of him. We can further extrapolate from the recordthe officers had reasonable grounds to believe Demir was subjectto involuntary admission and in need of immediate hospitalizationto protect himself or others from physical harm. The Code allowsfor this type of detention and transportation. 405 ILCS 5/3-606(West 1998).

The Code further provides, however, "[u]pon arrival atthe facility ***, the peace officer shall complete the petitionunder [s]ection 3-601." 405 ILCS 5/3-606 (West 1998). Here, theofficers involved failed to fill out the section 3-601 petitionas required. When an officer detains and transports a person inthis manner, i.e., the officer believes a person is in need ofinvoluntary commitment, the officer must then fill out thepetition as required by section 3-606, incorporating section 3-601, of the Code. The procedural safeguards in place are notmere technicalities to be sidestepped. Rather, the legislaturecreated them to protect people from the deprivation of a libertyinterest. In re Luttrell, 261 Ill. App. 3d 221, 230, 633 N.E.2d74, 81 (1994). Thus, we find the trial court committed reversible error by denying Demir's motion to dismiss on this basis.

Demir next argues the circuit court's order grantingthe petition for involuntary commitment must be reversed becausethe State failed to file the proper documents within 24 hours ofrespondent's admission. 405 ILCS 5/3-611 (West 1998).

Section 3-611 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3-611 (West1998)) provides as follows:

"Within 24 hours, excluding Saturdays,Sundays[,] and holidays, after the respondent's admission under this [a]rticle, thefacility director of the facility shall file2 copies of the petition, the first certificate, and proof of service of the petition[,]and statement of rights upon the respondentwith the court in the county in which thefacility is located." (Emphasis added.)

If a person is admitted on a Sunday, and the following Monday isnot a holiday, the 24-hour period during which the petition mustbe filed begins at 12:01 a.m. Monday and expires at 12:01 a.m.Tuesday. See In re Stone, 249 Ill. App. 3d 861, 865, 619 N.E.2d1345, 1347 (1993). The failure to timely file the petition is anerror that cannot be waived (In re La Touche, 247 Ill. App. 3d615, 618, 617 N.E.2d 844, 846 (1993); Stone, 249 Ill. App. 3d at866, 619 N.E.2d at 1348) or considered harmless (La Touche, 247Ill. App. 3d at 620, 617 N.E.2d at 848; Stone, 249 Ill. App. 3dat 866, 619 N.E.2d at 1348). Section 3-611 of the Code creates abright-line test with which the facility director must strictlycomply. Sassali v. DeFauw, 297 Ill. App. 3d 50, 53, 696 N.E.2d1217, 1219 (1998).

In this case, on August 22, 2000, the police broughtDemir to Provena-Covenant Hospital. According to hospital staffrecords, he was admitted to the psychiatric unit at Provena-Covenant Hospital on August 22, 2000, and held on petition andcertificate to await his court hearing. This court finds ittroubling that the record is unclear as to the exact time of dayDemir was admitted to the hospital or, more important, admittedto the psychiatric unit. However, even if we answer this question in the light most favorable to the State and hypothesize thehospital admitted Demir to the psychiatric unit at the latesttime possible on Tuesday, August 22, the time would be 11:59 p.m. The only petition filed with the court in this case was signed at"930" on Wednesday, August 23, and filed on August 24, 2000, at11:32 a.m. This would be several hours past the 24-hour deadlineif commenced on the signing of the second petition.

Moreover, the prosecutor admitted to the circuit courtthe original petition filled out for Demir could not be filedbecause it violated the 24-hour filing rule of section 3-611. Thus, the staff executed another petition. This is furtherevidence Demir was admitted on August 22, 2000.

The State argues it is too difficult to tell when Demirwas admitted to the mental health facility in light of Moore. InMoore, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 765-66, 704 N.E.2d at 446, the patientwas "admitted" for purposes of the involuntary admission statute's requirement a patient shall be examined by a psychiatristand a certificate executed within 24 hours after admission, whenhe entered the hospital's mental health unit, not when he wasadmitted to the hospital's emergency room. However, Moore isdistinguishable from this case. In this case, even taking theevidence favorably to the State concerning when the hospitalactually admitted Demir to the psychiatric unit as compared tomerely being at the emergency room, the 24-hour rule is violated.

The State asserts, alternatively, it substantiallycomplied with the statutory requirements as contemplated by thesupreme court in In re Robinson, 151 Ill. 2d 126, 137, 601 N.E.2d712, 718 (1992). The court in Robinson, 151 Ill. 2d at 134, 601N.E.2d at 717, decided, where the admittee in an involuntaryadmission proceeding fails to object to the absence of apredispositional report, strict compliance with statute requiringsuch report to be in writing is required only when legislativeintent cannot otherwise be achieved. Under the circumstancesthere, oral testimony containing information required by statutecould be adequately substituted for presentation of a formal,written report prepared by the facility director or some otherperson authorized by the court. Robinson, 151 Ill. 2d at 134,601 N.E.2d at 717.

However, in this case, Demir did object to the State'sviolation of the 24-hour filing rule, and the State cannototherwise achieve the legislative intent of the statute. Moreover, this court in Luttrell, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 229, 633 N.E.2dat 80, stated as follows:

"Given the important liberty interestsof the respondent, we do not believe we oughtto make a string of unsupported speculationsin order to reach the ultimate assumption theproper procedures were followed. The deadlines set forth in the Code are not meretechnicalities. They are bright lines created by the legislature to avoid decidingthese cases on an ad hoc basis and to preventabuse of the procedures involved."

The State failed to file the petition and paperworkwithin 24 hours of Demir's admission to the psychiatric unit ofthe hospital. Thus, the trial court committed an independentlyreversible error in denying Demir's motion on this point.

The Code provides a comprehensive set of requirementsto be followed by the State to commit an individual involuntarilyby certificate. They are intended to safeguard the importantliberty interests necessarily involved in mental health cases. Luttrell, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 230, 633 N.E.2d at 81. When suchimportant interests are at stake, the safer practice in thefuture would be to fully comply with such requirements ratherthan attempt to minimally comply.

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment.

Reversed.

STEIGMANN, P.J., and McCULLOUGH, J., concur.