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JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court: Defendant, Paul B. Bolton, appeals an April 16, 2002,jury verdict finding him to be a sexually violent person pursuantto Illinois's Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (Act) (725ILCS 207/1 through 99 (West 2000)). We reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 7, 1994, defendant pleaded guilty to criminalsexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-13(b) (West 1994)), a Class Xfelony, for molestation and oral sex upon a child, hisstepsister, which he admitted began when she was 6 years old andhe was 12 years old. (Defendant was born in 1976.) Defendantwas sentenced to four years' intensive probation. On June 19,1995, defendant was found in violation of his probation forattempting to lure a five-year-old girl to an area secluded by atarp for a sexual offense. He was accordingly sentenced to 12years' imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections(DOC). Defendant was scheduled for mandatory supervised releaseon February 27, 2001.

Prior to defendant's release, Dr. Jacqueline N. Buck, alicensed clinical psychologist working for the special evaluationunit of DOC, reviewed defendant's DOC file to determine whetherhe met the criteria for a sexually violent person under the Actand was therefore in need of a clinical interview. The purposeof a clinical interview is to identify sex offenders who areleaving DOC and have a high risk to reoffend in order to civillycommit them to the Department of Human Services for sex- offendertreatment.

On December 22, 2000, Dr. Buck interviewed defendantand decided not to refer defendant for commitment under the Actbecause he had completed almost two years of sex-offendertreatment at the Big Muddy Correctional Facility. In January2001, Amanda Swope, defendant's ex-girlfriend and mother of hischild, telephoned DOC and expressed concern for the safety ofherself and her child after defendant's release. Due to thiscall, Dr. Buck reevaluated defendant using information she didnot have when making her initial decision. Dr. Buck found thisinformation significant and referred defendant for commitment. On February 26, 2001, the State filed a petition seeking afinding that defendant was a sexually violent person and shouldbe committed pursuant to the Act.

At trial, the State presented Dr. Buck and Dr. PhilReidda, a licensed clinical psychologist working for AffiliatedPsychologists Limited, an organization independently contractedby the State to perform evaluations on persons for whom an Actprobable-cause determination has been made. Both Dr. Buck andDr. Reidda found defendant met the DSM-IV-TR (AmericanPsychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual ofMental Disorders DSM-IV-TR, at xxxiii (4th rev. ed. 2000))diagnostic criteria for (1) pedophilia, sexually attracted tofemales, nonexclusive type; (2) paraphilia, not otherwisespecified, sexually attracted to nonconsenting females,nonexclusive type; (3) voyeurism; (4) antisocial personalitydisorder, severe; and (5) narcissistic personality disorder,severe.

They testified defendant has a mental disorder suchthat he has a serious difficulty in controlling his behavior, andthere is a substantial probability defendant will engage in actsof sexual violence in the future unless significant interventionhas taken place. See 725 ILCS 207/5(f) (West 2000). They basedtheir opinions on the results of psychological tests andactuarial tools, as well as a clinical interview and a review ofdefendant's juvenile and adult criminal, sexual, and treatmenthistory.

Defendant presented Dr. Larry M. Davis, a licensedphysician specializing in psychiatry who had examined defendantfor the purpose of this litigation. Dr. Davis diagnoseddefendant with pedophilia, sexually attracted to females,nonexclusive type, and voyeurism. He did not believe there was asubstantial probability defendant would sexually reoffend. Hebased his opinion on evidence of defendant's treatment at the BigMuddy Correctional Facility. Due to defendant's highintelligence, further education activity, ongoing therapy, anddirect experience of DOC punishment, he felt that defendant'sbehavior is controllable. In addition, Dr. Davis contended thatthe experts in the field agree that the reoffense rate forincestuous sexual molesters is lower than nonincestuousmolesters. The fact that defendant's victims are female alsolowers his likelihood of reoffending. Dr. Davis did not rely onactuarial tools to assess defendant's risk for recidivism.

Defendant also presented Dr. Terence Campbell, alicensed clinical psychologist who reviewed defendant'spsychological evaluations. Dr. Campbell testified at lengthregarding the history and criticisms of the actuarial tools usedin this case. He based many of his opinions on two articlespublished after Dr. Buck and Dr. Reidda analyzed defendant. Dr.Campbell argued the correlation between the risk factors used byDr. Buck and Dr. Reidda and recidivism was not statisticallysignificant; the correlation could occur by chance alone. Oncross-examination, Dr. Campbell admitted that one of the articleshe relied on concluded that the VRAG (Violence Risk AppraisalGuide) and Static-99 tools were found to predict violent andsexual recidivism. He admitted that the actuarial tools used inthis case are the best available. He testified that although thetools are used all over the nation, they are not necessarilybeing used accurately.

The State called rebuttal witness Dr. Dennis Doren, alicensed psychologist, to testify regarding the actuarial tools.He testified that the concept of actuarial tools goes back inpsychology almost 100 years with the first intelligence test. In14 of the 15 states that have sex-offender civil-commitmentstatutes, at least some of the evaluators use actuarial tools aspart of their assessment process. The Association for theTreatment of Sexual Offenders (ATSA) has a policy that evaluatorsshould use validated actuarial risk-assessment tools. He did notconsider actuarial tools to be experimental because they arenationally and internationally well tested. Each instrument iscomplete, but the research continues to improve upon thatproduct.

A jury returned a verdict in favor of committingdefendant as a sexually violent person pursuant to the Act. OnJune 4, 2002, the trial court found commitment to institutionalcare in a secure facility, the Department of Human Services, tobe the least-restrictive treatment alternative and ordereddefendant committed accordingly. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

Defendant raises four issues on appeal: (1) whetherthe trial court erred in refusing defendant's proposed juryinstructions regarding his ability to control his sexualbehavior, (2) whether defendant's court-appointed counsel wasineffective for failing to object to the introduction of evidenceof prior sexual activity that did not consist of "sexuallyviolent offenses" as that term is defined in the Act (725 ILCS207/5(e) (West 2000)), (3) whether the Act is unconstitutional inthat it fails to require the Department of Human Services toprovide treatment designed to effect recovery from the pertinentmental disorder, and (4) whether the trial court erred in denyingdefendant's motion for a Frye hearing (see Frye v. United States,293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)) regarding expert testimony based onactuarial data. We reject defendant's first three issues, but weagree the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for aFrye hearing.

Defendant, in a supplemental brief, asks this court toconsider whether the trial court improperly denied defendant'smotion for a Frye evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of theactuarial tests relied upon or referred to by the State's expertwitnesses, Dr. Buck and Dr. Reidda. The trial court found thatthe proffered sexually-violent-person risk assessments were not"new" or "novel" scientific evidence subject to Fryeadmissibility standards. At trial, both doctors relied, in part,upon their scoring and evaluation of defendant on certainactuarial tools, including the Minnesota Sex Offender ScreeningTool (MnSOST), Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool--Revised(MnSOST-R), the VRAG, the Hare Psychopathy Checklist--Revised(PCL-R), the Static-99, and the Hanson and Bussiere Meta-analysis, to form an opinion regarding defendant's probability ofrecidivism.

Two recent Illinois cases have determined that anexpert's testimony predicated upon the MnSOST, MnSOST-R, RRASOR(Rapid Risk Assessment of Sexual Offense), and Static-99 testsdoes not satisfy the Frye test for admissibility. People v.Taylor, 335 Ill. App. 3d 965, 979-80, 782 N.E.2d 920, 932 (2002)(Second District); In re Detention of Hargett, 338 Ill. App. 3d669, 675, 786 N.E.2d 557, 562 (2003) (Third District).

In Illinois, the admission of expert testimony isgoverned by the Frye standard: whether the methodology orscientific principle upon which the opinion is based issufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in theparticular field in which it belongs. Donaldson v. CentralIllinois Public Service Co., 199 Ill. 2d 63, 77, 767 N.E.2d 314,323-24 (2002) (see also footnote 1 (199 Ill. 2d at 80 n.1, 767N.E.2d at 325-26 n.1, court has not yet considered adoption of anew standard consistent with Daubert v. Merrell DowPharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993)); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.1923). General acceptance of methodologies does not requireuniversal acceptance, and the trial judge applies the Frye testonly if the scientific principle, technique, or test offered bythe expert to support his or her conclusion is "new" or "novel." Donaldson, 199 Ill. 2d at 78-79, 767 N.E.2d at 324. Generalacceptance and reliability are not two separate questions. Thedetermination of the reliability of an expert's methodology isnaturally subsumed by the inquiry into its general acceptance inthe scientific community. Donaldson, 199 Ill. 2d at 81, 767N.E.2d at 326.

There is a preliminary question whether Frye applies atall to psychological testimony. See People v. Ward, 71 Cal. App.4th 368, 373, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 828, 831 (1999) (psychologicalevaluation is a learned professional art rather than the exactscience with which Frye is concerned). The Seventh Circuit,however, has held that Daubert "is applicable to social scienceexperts, just as it applies to experts in the hard sciences." Tyus v. Urban Search Management, 102 F.3d 256, 263 (7th Cir.1996); Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 480, 113 S. Ct.at 2795 (gatekeeping function applies to all forms of"scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge" (emphasisin original and omitted)); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S.137, 141, 143 L. Ed. 2d 238, 246, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1171 (1999)(Daubert applies not only to testimony based on "'scientific'"knowledge, but also to testimony based on "'technical'" and"'other specialized' knowledge").

The United States Supreme Court, without discussingFrye, has unenthusiastically declared that psychiatrists'predictions of future violence are admissible. "We are notpersuaded that such testimony is almost entirely unreliable andthat the factfinder and the adversary system will not becompetent to uncover, recognize, and take due account of itsshortcomings." Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899, 77 L. Ed.2d 1090, 1108, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3397-98 (1983) (the AmericanPsychiatric Association had filed an amicus brief stating thatpsychiatric predictions of long-term dangerousness wereunreliable).

As a result of Barefoot, it has been concluded that apsychologist's or psychiatrist's opinion as to an individual'sfuture dangerousness is generally admissible when that opinion isbased upon clinical observation or the evaluator's personalexperience. Taylor, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 976, 782 N.E.2d at 929. Some jurisdictions have gone on to conclude that actuarialinstruments are not subject to Frye analysis because they arepart of a psychologist's or psychiatrist's methodology to predictfuture dangerousness. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Superior Court, 85Cal. App. 4th 508, 543, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 214, 238 (2000), rev'd& remanded by Cooley v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 4th 228, 57 P.3d654, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177 (2002); 1 J. Strong, McCormick onEvidence