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JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a June 2002 bench trial, the trial courtfound defendant, John M. Erbe, to be a sexually violent personunder the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (Act) (725 ILCS207/1 through 99 (West 2000)). Following an August 2002dispositional hearing, the court ordered him committed to theDepartment of Human Services (DHS) for institutional care in asecure facility.

Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) he receivedineffective assistance of counsel when his initial appointedcounsel (a) failed to challenge personal jurisdiction, and (b)moved to continue the probable-cause hearing; (2) the trial courtabused its discretion by denying his motion for a Fryeevidentiary hearing on the admissibility of evidence regardingactuarial instruments used by the State's experts in assessingdefendant's risk of reoffending; (3) the court's finding that hewas a sexually violent person was against the manifest weight ofthe evidence; and (4) the court abused its discretion by orderinghim committed to institutional care in a secure facility. Weaffirm.

On June 14, 2000, the State filed a petition under theAct, seeking to have defendant committed as a sexually violentperson to DHS indefinitely. At that time, defendant was aninmate at the Centralia Correctional Center and was scheduled forentry into mandatory supervised release on June 20, 2000,following the completion of his sentence on 1988 convictions forhome invasion (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12-11) andaggravated criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38,par. 12-14(a)(1)). On that same day, the trial court entered anorder of detention in which the court (1) set a probable-causehearing for June 19, 2000; and (2) appointed McLean County publicdefender Amy Davis to represent defendant.

On June 16, 2000, Davis filed a motion to continue theprobable-cause hearing because she needed additional time toreview the materials the State had filed with its petition. Davis then telephoned the trial court's secretary and indicatedthat she and the assistant Attorney General had agreed that theprobable-cause hearing should be continued. The court informedcounsel that it would reschedule that hearing if both partiesagreed and requested that the attorneys agree upon a new hearingdate. The assistant Attorney General later telephoned thecourt's secretary and indicated that the parties had agreed toreschedule the probable-cause hearing for June 26, 2000.

At the June 26, 2000, probable-cause hearing, defendantappeared with his appointed counsel. After considering theevidence presented, the trial court found probable cause existedand ordered defendant transferred to DHS for an evaluation,pursuant to section 30(c) of the Act (725 ILCS 207/30(c) (West2000)).

In July 2000, defendant pro se filed a motion todismiss the State's petition, alleging, inter alia, that (1) hisprobable-cause hearing was not held within 72 hours of the filingof the State's petition, as required by statute (725 ILCS207/30(b) (West 2000)); and (2) he was not "properly served withprocess." That same day, defendant pro se filed a motion,seeking appointment of counsel other than a McLean County publicdefender on the ground that Davis moved to continue the probable-cause hearing without his consent.

At a July 2000 hearing on defendant's motion seekingappointment of other counsel, Davis informed the trial court thatshe requested a continuance (1) because she had other matters towhich she had to attend when she received the State's petition;and (2) in "an effort for [her] to be prepared for [the probable-cause] hearing." She acknowledged that because her officeusually receives the State's petitions under the Act "pretty muchat the last minute," she routinely seeks to continue probable-cause hearings to allow time to carefully review the petitions. After considering the arguments, the trial court denieddefendant's motion.

In January 2001, defendant filed a motion for a Fryeevidentiary hearing (see Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir. 1923)) to determine the admissibility of evidence regardingactuarial risk-assessment instruments used by the State's expertsin assessing defendant's risk of reoffending. In February 2001,the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant's motion andtook the matter under advisement. Later that month, the courtdenied the motion, upon finding that (1) the actuarial risk-assessment instruments did not constitute scientific evidencesubject to the Frye standard; and (2) even if the instrumentswere subject to the Frye standard, they had been generallyaccepted in the relevant scientific community.

From February 2001 through May 2002, the trial courtgranted several continuances. Also during that time, defendantpro se filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in which heraised some of the same issues raised in his July 2000 pro semotion to dismiss. In November 2001, the court dismisseddefendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus, and in May 2002,this court dismissed defendant's appeal from the November 2001order.

In June 2002, the trial court conducted a hearing ondefendant's pro se July 2000 motion to dismiss the State'spetition. At that hearing, defendant was represented by adifferent appointed counsel, who adopted and argued defendant'smotion. Although defendant's motion contained numerousallegations, defendant addressed only two allegations at thehearing--namely, that (1) his probable-cause hearing was not heldwithin 72 hours of the filing of the State's petition, asrequired by statute (725 ILCS 207/30(b) (West 2000)); and (2) thetrial court lacked jurisdiction because he was not "properlyserved with process." Defendant testified that he received theState's June 14, 2000, petition and the order of detention, whichindicated that (1) the court had appointed a McLean County publicdefender to represent him; and (2) the probable-cause hearing wasscheduled for June 19, 2000. However, he was not served withsummons. He later learned that his probable-cause hearing wasrescheduled for June 26, 2000. Defendant appeared at the June26, 2000, probable-cause hearing, where he was represented byDavis. At that hearing, he attempted to tell the court that hehad not been served with summons and had not asked for acontinuance, but the court did not give him permission to speak. Defendant stated that he did not authorize Davis to file a motionto continue his probable-cause hearing. After considering theevidence and counsels' arguments, the trial court denieddefendant's motion to dismiss.

At defendant's June 2002 bench trial, Dr. JacquelineBuck, a clinical psychologist and special evaluator for theIllinois Department of Corrections (DOC), testified that she hadreviewed defendant's DOC master file, which contained all of thecourt records related to defendant, including the writtenjudgment of sentence, the presentence investigation reports,psychiatric and psychological evaluations, DOC records, and hiscriminal history.

Buck's review of defendant's master file showed thatwhen defendant was 11 years old and living in California, hebegan engaging in criminal activity, including grand theft autoand shoplifting. He also began running away, fighting at school,and on one occasion, he attacked a teacher. When he was 13 yearsold, he was expelled from school after raping a 12-year-old girl. Around that time, defendant's mother moved from California toMcLean County, Illinois. Defendant stayed in California andlived either on the streets or with one of his formerstepfathers. In 1974, defendant was declared an "incorrigiblejuvenile" and was placed in juvenile hall and, later, severalgroup homes. Defendant admitted raping a young girl during thattime.

Later in 1974, when defendant was 15 years old, hemoved to McLean County to live with his mother. He had been inMcLean County for only three days when police arrested him forrape. They later released him to his mother. In 1975, defendantcommitted numerous offenses, including deviate sexual assault,armed robbery, home invasion, aggravated criminal sexual assault,and rape. In the rape case, he entered a woman's apartment, helda knife to her throat, and threatened to kill her. He raped herthree times and forced her to perform oral sex on him. He thentied her up and left the apartment. A baby was in the roomduring the rape. (Buck acknowledged that in her report, she hadmistakenly indicated that defendant had held a knife to thebaby's throat.) Later in 1975, while incarcerated at the McLeanCounty juvenile detention center, he sexually assaulted a maleinmate and was charged with deviate sexual assault.

Based on some of defendant's 1975 offenses, the Statefiled a petition seeking to have defendant declared a sexuallydangerous person. He was later found to be sexually dangerousbased on the 1975 rape offense. Defendant was initially sent toDOC's youth division, where he participated in treatment for afew months. A jury later convicted him as an adult for the 1975rape (McLean County case No. 75-CF-483), and the trial courtsentenced him to 4 to 10 years in prison. Defendant was paroledin 1980.

In 1981, defendant was charged with rape, homeinvasion, and (attempt) burglary (McLean County case No. 81-CF-430). During this incident, he entered a woman's apartment, tiedup the victim, and placed a sock in her mouth. He then removedthe sock and tried to place his penis in her mouth. Defendantleft after the victim convinced him that other people were in theapartment. A jury later convicted defendant of (attempt)burglary, and the trial court sentenced him to three years inprison.

Sometime following his 1983 parole in McLean Countycase No. 81-CF-430, defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful use of aweapon by a felon and was sentenced to five years in prison. Inthat case, defendant, armed with a gun, entered a woman'sapartment. When the woman saw him, she ran from the apartment.

In 1988, defendant was convicted of aggravated criminalsexual assault and home invasion (McLean County case No. 88-CF-148), and the trial court sentenced him to 25 years in prison. In that case, he entered the apartment of three young women andforced one of the victims to have sex with him at knifepoint. Healso dragged the knife across the victim's throat, stomach, andbreasts and threatened to kill her. Defendant then tied up thevictim and turned to a second victim, who fought him andscreamed. Defendant ran from the apartment naked after the firstvictim freed herself and the third roommate woke up andtelephoned police.

Defendant's master file also showed that he began usingdrugs when he was 11 years old. Over the next five years, heused marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and amphetamines. During thattime, he was diagnosed with polysubstance dependency. Several ofdefendant's criminal offenses involved alcohol or other drugs.

Defendant's master file further showed that defendantadmitted committing 11 or 12 rapes for which he was neverapprehended. He blamed most of those rapes on his then-wife (towhom he was married from 1980 until 1988) because she would notengage in certain sexual activities. During his incarcerations,defendant had not participated in any sex-offender treatment.

Buck attempted to interview defendant in April 2000;however, he refused to participate. Although Buck preferred toconduct clinical interviews, such an interview was not necessaryto formulate opinions regarding defendant.

Based on her review of defendant's master file andother information, Buck diagnosed defendant with sexual sadismand severe antisocial personality disorder. Three criteria existfor the diagnosis of sexual sadism, and defendant satisfied allthree. Seven criteria exist for the diagnosis of antisocialpersonality disorder, and the presence of any three warrant thediagnosis. Defendant satisfied six of the seven criteria. Buckdescribed antisocial personality disorder as "a violation of anddisregard for the rights of others." Sexual sadism andantisocial personality disorder are the types of mental disordersthat affect a person's emotional capacity and predispose a personto engage in future acts of sexual violence.

Buck also diagnosed defendant with "poly drugdependency without physiological dependency in a controlledenvironment," based on his long history of substance abuse. Buckexplained that substance abuse was a factor in determiningdefendant's probability of reoffending. Defendant had notparticipated in any substance abuse treatment.

In assessing defendant's probability of reoffending,Buck used three actuarial risk-assessment instruments, all ofwhich were the subject of defendant's January 2001 motion for aFrye evidentiary hearing: (1) the Minnesota Sex OffenderScreening Tool-Revised (Minnesota Screening Tool-Revised); (2)the Static-99; and (3) the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide. Shealso administered a personality inventory (the Hare PsychopathyChecklist-Revised) in evaluating defendant. Buck had receivedabout 150 hours of specialized training geared to the proceedingsunder the Act, including the administration of actuarial risk-assessment instruments and other evaluation tools. Defendant'sscores on the three actuarial risk-assessment instruments placedhim in "membership with a group of sex offenders who did sexuallyreoffend at a fairly high rate."

Buck described the Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revisedas a 20-item personality inventory. An individual who scores 30or more on the Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised is classifiedas a psychopath. Those individuals "are two to four times aslikely to reoffend with acts of violence when released to thecommunity, as someone who scores lower than 25." A score of 30is a "conservative" cutoff, and many researchers use a score of25 as a cutoff for psychopathy. Out of the 20 items on the HarePsychopathy Checklist-Revised, Buck was able to score 18 intesting defendant. The remaining two items she marked asomissions because she did not have enough data. The inventorywas designed to allow for omitted items to be scored. Beforefactoring in the two omissions, defendant's raw score totaled 29. After factoring in the omissions, his raw score totaled 32.2. Buck acknowledged that she used some of the same scoring factorson two different items of the Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised. She stated that such use of scoring factors involved "a differentway of looking at the behavior." Buck also acknowledged that shescored defendant as having a "flat affect" (meaning that he didnot show emotion) based on five minutes of interaction.

Based on (1) Buck's review of (a) defendant's masterfile, (b) the results of the Minnesota Screening Tool-Revised,the Static-99, and the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide, (c)defendant's score on the Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised, and(d) defendant's mental disorder diagnoses; and (2) Buck'sclinical judgment, Buck opined that it was "substantiallyprobable" that defendant would sexually reoffend with acts ofviolence if he were released into the community. She also opinedthat defendant was at a higher risk of reoffending than thegeneral prison population. Buck further opined that defendanthad serious difficulty in controlling his behavior outside of acontrolled environment.

Buck acknowledged that (1) defendant's sex offensesoccurred while he was in his teens and twenties; (2) he had beenincarcerated since then; and (3) his behavior in prison over thelast several years had been "pretty good." Buck alsoacknowledged that defendant's failure to participate in sex-offender treatment did not increase his risk of reoffending. Shefurther acknowledged that Carl Hanson, an authority in the fieldof sex- offender risk assessment, had stated in an article thatthe Violence Risk Appraisal Guide is a good predictor of generalviolence, but it has not been "particularly effective" inpredicting sex-offense reoffending. Buck described Hanson'scomment as a vague "cheap shot."

Barry Leavitt, a clinical psychologist and specialevaluator for DHS, testified that he reviewed defendant's DOCmaster file and Buck's report. In July 2000, he approacheddefendant to initiate a psychological evaluation, and defendantagreed to participate in psychological testing. Leavittadministered the following tests to defendant: (1) a generalaptitude measure for adults, which provides a baseline for anindividual's intellectual functioning; (2) the Millon MultiaxialPersonality Inventory Assessment (Millon Assessment); and (3) theMinnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MinnesotaInventory). The Millon Assessment and the Minnesota Inventoryprovide information regarding an individual's overall personalityfunctioning. Defendant's score on the general aptitude measurefor adults was in the "low average range."

When Leavitt approached defendant in August 2000 toconduct a clinical interview, defendant refused to participate. Leavitt stated that the preferred method for evaluating anindividual involves a clinical interview. However, Leavitt wasable to formulate an opinion regarding defendant based on otheravailable information.

Leavitt identified several "static" (unchanging)factors associated with an increased risk of reoffending, whichdefendant displayed. Those risk factors included the following: (1) refusal to participate in sex-offender treatment; (2) deviatesexual preferences; (3) multiple prior sex offenses; (4) offensesother than sex offenses; (5) early onset of sexually violentinterests and behavior; (6) unrelated victims; (7) lack ofmotivation for treatment; (8) resistance to change; (9) angerproblems; (10) low level of remorse; and (11) antisociallifestyle.

Based on his review of all available information,Leavitt diagnosed defendant with (1) sexual sadism; (2)polysubstance dependence without physiological dependence withina controlled environment; and (3) severe antisocial personalitydisorder. Sexual sadism and antisocial personality disorder arethe types of mental disorders that affect a person's emotionalcapacity and predispose a person to engage in future acts ofsexual violence.

Leavitt used two actuarial risk-assessment instrumentsin evaluating defendant: (1) the Minnesota Screening Tool-Revised; and (2) the Static-99. The results of those actuarialrisk-assessment instruments placed defendant in the category ofhighest risk of committing future acts of sexual violence. (Asearlier stated, both of these instruments were challenged indefendant's January 2001 motion for a Frye evidentiary hearing.)

Based on the available information, Leavitt opined thatdefendant "possesses an exceedingly high and substantialprobability of re[]offending at some time in the future." Healso opined that defendant had serious difficulty controlling hissexually violent behavior.

Defendant did not present any evidence on his ownbehalf.

Based on the evidence presented, the trial court foundthat defendant was a sexually violent person.

At defendant's August 2002 dispositional hearing,Leavitt testified that he conducted a separate evaluation toidentify defendant's treatment needs and the least-restrictivesetting available to meet those needs. In forming his opinions,Leavitt reviewed the following sources of information: (1)defendant's past participation in sex-offender treatment; (2)defendant's motivation to participate in sex-offender treatment;(3) defendant's sex-offense history; (4) defendant's mental-health status; and (5) relevant risk factors.

Based on his review of all available information,Leavitt opined that (1) defendant's mental-health status had notchanged; (2) defendant was not motivated to seek sex-offendertreatment; and (3) defendant remained at an "exceedingly highrisk" of reoffending in a sexually violent manner. He alsoopined that defendant needed to be placed in a secure-caretreatment setting. Leavitt explained that opinion as follows:

"[A]t the present time[,] [defendant]presents at an exceedingly high level of riskfor reoffending, needs the structure andsupervision and intensity andcomprehensiveness of treatment that would beavailable in a secure[-]care treatmentsetting."

Leavitt acknowledged that in his predispositionalreport, he mentioned a 1975 incident in which defendant allegedlyheld a knife to a baby's throat. That alleged incident suggestedthe level of violence to which defendant would resort to carryout his sexually violent behavior. However, Leavitt did notconsider that alleged incident as significant in forming hisopinions. (The record shows that it was defendant's brother whoheld a knife to a baby's throat in that incident, not defendant.) Leavitt also acknowledged that in forming his opinion regardingthe best treatment option, he had considered the fact that noevidence existed that defendant had a proper support system. However, even if defendant had an active social-support network,that fact would not alter his opinion that defendant needed to bein a secure treatment setting. Leavitt further acknowledged thathe had not interviewed defendant prior to completing hispredispositional report. He explained that (1) defendant hadrefused to participate in an August 2000 clinical interview; and(2) when he conducted his predispositional evaluation ofdefendant, he believed he had an abundance of information, whichdid not require him to again attempt to interview defendant.

Hollida Wakefield, a psychologist who primarily focusedher practice on sex offenders, testified on defendant's behalfthat she evaluated defendant twice--once to assess whether he wasa sexually violent person and a second time to prepare a pre-dispositional report. Based on her initial evaluation, Wakefielddiagnosed defendant with (1) sexual sadism; (2) polysubstancedependence without physiological dependence within a controlledenvironment; and (3) antisocial personality disorder.

During her second evaluation, Wakefield conducted aclinical interview of defendant, which indicated as follows. Defendant was "unusually candid," took responsibility for his sexoffenses, and expressed remorse. Defendant's motivation for sex-offender treatment in the "Joliet program" is "quite low" becausehe does not trust the treatment staff. (The record shows thatthe DHS secure-care treatment setting is located in Joliet.) Defendant's mother had expressed a desire to help him if he werereleased to the community, and his sister lived in Illinois andvisited him. Because defendant's sexual sadism was not thesevere type, he was "amenable to treatment."

Wakefield also administered the Hare PsychopathyChecklist-Revised in evaluating defendant. Defendant's score onthat personality inventory totaled 25. Based on that score,Wakefield opined that defendant was not a psychopath. Followingthe trial court's February 2001 denial of defendant's motion fora Frye evidentiary hearing, defendant introduced Wakefield'stestimony regarding several actuarial risk-assessmentinstruments, including the Minnesota Screening Tool-Revised, theStatic-99, and the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide. Based on heradministration of those instruments, Wakefield determined thatdefendant was at a high risk of reoffending.

Wakefield opined that the most appropriate and least-restrictive alternative treatment option for defendant wasoutpatient treatment with appropriate safeguards. She based heropinion on the following factors: (1) defendant was no longer adisciplinary problem in prison; (2) his sex offenses wereplanned, which suggested that he could "be managed better than aperson whose offenses are impulsive"; (3) defendant was able toidentify general situations that placed him at risk ofreoffending; (4) defendant was motivated to not return to prison;and (5) defendant's family support system.

Wakefield acknowledged that she was not aware of anyspecific sex-offender treatment programs that met her suggestedparameters for defendant. She also acknowledged that defendant'sdiagnosis of antisocial personality disorder meant that he wasmore likely to act impulsively and irresponsibly. She explainedthat although defendant's behavior had "greatly improved" overthe last few years, "you don't really know until he is out" howhe will behave. Wakefield further acknowledged that defendanthad never participated in sex-offender or substance-abusetreatment.

Denise Marshall, defendant's sister, testified that ifdefendant were released, she would provide support for him.Defendant had expressed remorse and shame regarding his sexoffenses. Based on her conversations with defendant, shebelieved that he would participate in sex-offender or substance-abuse treatment.

Based on the evidence presented, the trial courtordered defendant committed to DHS for institutional care in asecure facility. This appeal followed.

A. Defendant's Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Claim

Defendant first argues that he received ineffectiveassistance of counsel when Davis, his initial appointed counsel,(1) failed to appear at the June 19, 2000, probable-cause hearingand challenge personal jurisdiction based on the State's failureto serve him with summons, and (2) moved to continue theprobable-cause hearing. We disagree.

In People v. Rainey, 325 Ill. App. 3d 573, 586, 758N.E.2d 492, 502-03 (2001), this court held that defendants underthe Act are entitled to effective assistance of counsel measuredby the Strickland standard (see Strickland v. Washington, 466U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984)). Toestablish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant mustfirst demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient inthat "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was notfunctioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the[s]ixth [a]mendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2dat 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. In so doing, a defendant mustovercome the strong presumption that the challenged action orinaction of counsel was the product of sound trial strategy andnot of incompetence. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2dat 694-95, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. As the Strickland Court stated:

"Judicial scrutiny of counsel'sperformance must be highly deferential. Itis all too tempting for a defendant tosecond-guess counsel's assistance afterconviction or adverse sentence, and it is alltoo easy for a court, examining counsel'sdefense after it has proved unsuccessful, toconclude that a particular act or omission ofcounsel was unreasonable. [Citation.] Afair assessment of attorney performancerequires that every effort be made toeliminate the distorting effects ofhindsight, to reconstruct the circumstancesof counsel's challenged conduct, and toevaluate the conduct from counsel'sperspective at the time." Strickland, 466U.S. at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694, 104 S. Ct.at 2065.

Second, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonableprobability that, but for defense counsel's deficientperformance, the result of the proceeding would have beendifferent. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104S. Ct. at 2068. Both prongs of the Strickland test must besatisfied before a defendant can prevail on a claim ofineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill.2d 366, 397, 701 N.E.2d 1063, 1079 (1998).

Defendant first contends that he received ineffectiveassistance of counsel when Davis failed to appear at the June 19,2000, probable-cause hearing and challenge personal jurisdictionbased on the State's failure to serve him with summons. Wedisagree.

Even if Davis had appeared at the June 19, 2000,probable-cause hearing, objected to personal jurisdiction, andinsisted on service of summons, it is not reasonably probablethat the result of the probable-cause hearing would have beendifferent. Had Davis insisted on proper service of summons, thetrial court could have directed that technical service be thencomplied with in open court, and ordered that the preliminaryhearing be held that same day, which still would have been withinthe 72-hour requirement of section 30(b) of the Act. See 725ILCS 207/30(b) (West 2000). Thus, Davis may reasonably haveconcluded that appearing at the June 19, 2000, probable-causehearing and objecting to personal jurisdiction would have gainedher client nothing. See People v. Ivy, 313 Ill. App. 3d 1011,1018, 730 N.E.2d 628, 636 (2000) (counsel is not required toperform a futile act to avoid charges of ineffective assistanceof counsel).

2. Counsel's Motion To Continue

Defendant also contends that he received ineffectiveassistance of counsel when Davis moved to continue the June 19,2000, probable-cause hearing. Specifically, he asserts thatDavis's doing so was not a strategic decision because she soughtcontinuances in all proceedings under the Act. We disagree.

At the July 2000 hearing on defendant's motion seekingappointment of other counsel, Davis acknowledged that because heroffice usually receives the State's petitions under the Act"pretty much at the last minute," she routinely seeks to continueprobable-cause hearings to allow time to carefully review thepetitions. However, she also addressed the reasons she sought acontinuance in this particular case--namely, (1) because she hadother matters to which she had to attend when she received theState's petition; and (2) in "an effort for [her] to be preparedfor [the probable-cause] hearing."

Under these circumstances, we conclude that defendanthas failed to overcome the strong presumption that the challengedaction of counsel was the product of sound trial strategy and notof incompetence.

Although not set forth in a separate argument section,defendant contends that (1) the trial court's June 14, 2000,appointment of counsel is "arguably void" because "it was enteredat a time when the court did not have jurisdiction" overdefendant; and (2) he was denied due process and his statutoryright to be present at all hearings when the trial courtconducted an "informal hearing" on Davis's motion to continue theprobable-cause hearing. We disagree.

The trial court's June 14, 2000, appointment of counselis not "arguably void" because "it was entered at a time when thecourt did not have jurisdiction" over defendant, based on theState's failure to serve him with summons. When defendantappeared and participated at the June 26, 2000, probable-causehearing, he waived objection to the court's personal jurisdictionover him. See Rainey, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 581, 758 N.E.2d at 499(defendant under the Act submitted to the trial court'sjurisdiction when he appeared and participated at his probable-cause hearing).

Nor do we agree with defendant that the trial courtconducted an "informal hearing" on Davis's motion to continue theprobable-cause hearing. We are simply not persuaded that the twotelephone calls from Davis and the assistant Attorney General,respectively, regarding the status of Davis's motion to continue,constituted a "hearing" at which defendant had the right to bepresent, pursuant to the Act. See 725 ILCS 207/25(c) (West2000).

B. The Trial Court's Denial of Defendant's

Motion for a Frye Hearing

Defendant also argues that the trial court erred bydenying his motion for a Frye evidentiary hearing to determinethe admissibility of evidence regarding the actuarial instrumentsused by Buck and Leavitt in assessing defendant's risk of re-offending. We disagree.

1. Applicability of the Frye Standard to Actuarial

Risk-Assessment Instruments

a. Scientific Principle, Method, or Test

Initially, we hold that the actuarial risk-assessmentinstruments used in this case do not purport to involve ascientific principle, method, or test to which Frye applies. SeeFrye, 293 F. at 1014 (standard applies to deductions from apurportedly scientific principle, technique, or test). "Rather,they are simply actuarial tables--methods of organizing andinterpreting a collection of historical data." In re Commitmentof R.S., 339 N.J. Super. 507, 540, 773 A.2d 72, 92 (2001), aff'd173 N.J. 134, 801 A.2d 219 (2002). Actuarial risk-assessmentinstruments, like those used in this case, were developed byobserving those sex offenders who reoffend to determine which"risk factors" they have in common. See In re Detention ofIsbell, 333 Ill. App. 3d 906, 911, 916, 777 N.E.2d 994, 997-98,1002 (2002) (by observing what a large number of reoffenders havehad in common, one can compile a list of risk factors). One canthen calculate the relative frequency with which sex offenderswith those risk factors have reoffended and thus assess theprobability that other sex offenders with the same risk factorswill re-offend. Isbell, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 916, 777 N.E.2d at1002. The actuarial instruments merely help the professionaldraw inferences from historical data or the collective experienceof other professionals who have assessed sex offenders for risksof reoffending. In this regard, the instruments are akin toactuarial tables for life expectancy admitted as evidence to ajury for the determination of the gross amount awarded for futurepain and suffering or used by an economic expert to determine thepresent cash value of a pension. Such instruments simply do notconstitute a special scientific principle, method, or test towhich Frye applies.

We find support for our holding in the Supreme Court ofWashington's decision in State v. Russell, 125 Wash. 2d 24, 882P.2d 747 (Wash. 1994). In that case, the defendant had posed thebodies of his three murder victims (by placing a pinecone in eachvictim's hand and a book under each victim's arm, among otherthings). Russell, 125 Wash. 2d at 30-35, 882 P.2d at 756-58. Toprove that the murderer of the three victims was probably thesame person, the State's experts analyzed two computer databasesconsisting of "forms, filled out by local law enforcementofficers, listing the various characteristics of homicides inWashington and the nation." Russell, 125 Wash. 2d at 69, 882P.2d at 776. On the basis of that analysis, the expertstestified to "the rarity of posed murder victims." Russell, 125Wash. 2d at 69, 882 P.2d at 776. The defendant argued that thetestimony was inadmissible under Frye because the experts"improperly relied on unproven scientific methodologies indetermining that the same person committed all three murders." Russell, 125 Wash. 2d at 68, 882 P.2d at 776. The Supreme Courtof Washington disagreed, holding that Frye was "clearly ***inapplicable" because the computer programs were "nothing morethan sophisticated record-keeping systems." Russell, 125 Wash.2d at 70, 882 P.2d at 776. Like the experts in Russell, Buck andLeavitt essentially drew an inference of probability from asophisticated record-keeping system.

Even assuming that the sort of actuarial instrumentsused by Buck and Leavitt involve a scientific principle, method,or test (see People v. Taylor, 335 Ill. App. 3d 965, 977, 782N.E.2d 920, 930 (2002) (holding that such actuarial instrumentsconstitute a scientific methodology), pet. for leave to appealpending Nos. 95657, 95650 cons.; see also In re Detention ofTraynoff, 338 Ill. App. 3d 949, 964, 789 N.E.2d 865, 878 (2003)(same holding, reaffirming Taylor); In re Detention of Hargett,338 Ill. App. 3d 669, 675, 786 N.E.2d 557, 562 (2003) (sameholding, relying on Taylor)), those instruments do not involvethe kind of "new" or "novel" scientific principle, method, ortechnique to which Frye applies. See Donaldson v. CentralIllinois Public Service Co., 199 Ill. 2d 63, 78-79, 767 N.E.2d314, 324-25 (2002) ("The trial judge applies the Frye test onlyif the scientific principle, technique[,] or test offered by theexpert to support his or her conclusion is 'new' or 'novel'";noting that "a scientific technique is 'new' or 'novel' if it is'original or striking' or does 'not resembl[e] something formerlyknown or used.' [Citation.]"); Websters Third New InternationalDictionary 1546 (1981) (defining "novel" as "original orstrikingly in conception or style"); see also Bachman v. GeneralMotors Corp., 332 Ill. App. 3d 760, 779, 776 N.E.2d 262, 281(2002) (the process of recording and downloading data fromautomobile crash sensors did not constitute a novel technique ormethod). Our society uses actuarial methods to predict humanbehavior all the time (for example, in liability insurance andeconomics). In addition, actuarial instruments similar to theones used in this case have long been used in predictingrecidivism by released prisoners. See D. Faigman, D. Kaye, M.Saks & J. Sanders, Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law andScience of Expert Testimony