JUSTICE McCULLOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:

On May 6, 1998, the State filed a petition to have respondent, Harold Tiney-Bey, declared a sexually violent person, subject to the commitment provisions of the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (Commitment Act) (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West Supp. 1997)). After a hearing on May 11, 1998, probable cause to support the petition was found, and respondent was ordered to be evaluated by the Department of Human Services (DHS) pursuant to the Commitment Act (725 ILCS 207/30(c) (West Supp. 1997)). On May 11, 1998, the State filed a jury demand, pursuant to the Commitment Act (725 ILCS 207/25(d), 35(c) (West Supp. 1997)). On May 22, 1998, the trial court denied respondent's motion to strike the jury demand. The trial court granted respondent's motion for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308). We affirm.

Respondent argues the trial court violated his right to remain silent by requiring him to subject himself to an interview with DHS, and the trial court denied him his right to waive a jury trial by granting the State's jury demand.

The Commitment Act contains an apparent inconsistency with respect to the right to a jury trial. Section 35(b) of the Commitment Act provides a subject of a petition with all the constitutional protections given a criminal defendant. 725 ILCS 207/35(b) (West Supp. 1997). In Illinois, a criminal defendant has the constitutional right to waive a jury trial. People ex rel. Daley v. Joyce, 126 Ill. 2d 209, 222, 533 N.E.2d 873, 879 (1988). However, under the Commitment Act, the State may request a jury trial. 725 ILCS 207/25(d), 35(c) (West Supp. 1997).

A criminal defendant also has the constitutional right to remain silent. U.S. Const., amend. V. However, the Commitment Act provides a respondent may be evaluated by DHS after probable cause has been established to determine if he is a sexually dangerous person. 725 ILCS 207/30(c) (West Supp. 1997). Respondent argues this provision forces him to communicate with the State and provide it with incriminating information.

In resolving these conflicts, we first determine whether the statute is criminal or civil in nature. This is an issue of statutory construction, and we defer to the stated intent of the legislature unless the party challenging the statute provides the clearest proof that the statutory scheme is punitive. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361, 138 L. Ed. 2d 501, 515, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2082 (1997).

Respondent notes the Commitment Act provides for loss of his liberty. In Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 92 L. Ed. 2d 296, 106 S. Ct. 2988 (1986), the United States Supreme Court held similar commitment proceedings in the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (725 ILCS 205/0.01 et seq. (West 1996)) were not criminal for purposes of the fifth amendment. The United States Supreme Court held the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act (Kan. Stat. Ann.