1 June 2000

JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

In July 1998, the trial court adjudicated D.S. (born inDecember 1996), the minor child of respondent, Charlene Sherman,neglected pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Actof 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 1998)),and placed her in the custody of the Department of Children andFamily Services (DCFS). In October 1998, the court adjudicatedD.S. a ward of the court and appointed DCFS as her guardian withthe power to place her.

In May 1999, the State filed a petition to terminaterespondent's parental rights regarding D.S., alleging thatrespondent was an unfit parent because she (1) failed to makereasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basisfor the removal of D.S. and (2) failed to make reasonable progresstoward D.S.' return to her within nine months of the adjudicationof neglect (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1998)). In August 1999, thetrial court found respondent unfit on both of the grounds allegedand granted the State's petition.

Respondent appeals, arguing that the trial court'sunfitness and best interest findings were against the manifestweight of the evidence. We affirm.

In its April 1998 petition for adjudication of wardship,the State alleged that D.S. was residing in an environmentinjurious to her welfare in that her mother and stepfather, JosephSherman, had unresolved issues of domestic violence that placedD.S. at risk of harm. On July 30, 1998, respondent admitted theallegations of the petition, and the trial court adjudged D.S.neglected. On October 16, 1998, the court conducted adispositional hearing, made D.S. its ward, and appointed DCFS asD.S.' guardian. That same day, the court filed its formdispositional order.

In May 1999, the State filed its petition to terminaterespondent's parental rights, and in August 1999, the trial courtconducted a hearing on the petition. A brief summary of theevidence presented follows.

Respondent and her husband, Sherman, had a history ofdomestic violence. Respondent had been both a victim and anaggressor, and the couple's altercations required policeintervention on several occasions. In April 1998, after one suchincident, an order of protection was entered against Sherman. InJune 1998, that order was modified, and respondent and Shermanresumed living together. In July 1998, after the incident thatresulted in D.S.' removal, Sherman moved out again. In August1998, Sherman moved back in with respondent.

Gary Romansburger, a child protective investigator forDCFS, testified that pursuant to the original client service plan,respondent was required to (1) complete parenting classes; (2) getdomestic violence treatment; and (3) follow the visitation plan. Peggy Mayfield, a team supervisor at Catholic Social Services,testified that in December 1998, respondent was given twoadditional goals: (1) obtain suitable housing and (2) maintainstable employment.

Respondent completed parenting classes in the summer of1998 at the Institute for Human Resources in Pontiac.

On October 16, 1998 (coincidentally the date of thedispositional hearing on the State's petition alleging neglect), anapparent domestic violence incident occurred in the parking lot ofCatholic Social Services when respondent and Sherman arrived for avisitation with D.S. Respondent and Sherman entered the buildingseparately and in agitated states. Sherman had been scratched andindicated that respondent had done it. Staff members quicklyseparated them and escorted them out of the lobby. From then on,visitations with respondent and Sherman were scheduled separately.

In November 1998, respondent mother began attendingweekly counseling sessions with Cheri Miller, a clinicalpsychologist at a mental health facility referred to in the recordas "BroMenn." Respondent missed several sessions around theholidays, but otherwise attended regularly through March 1999. Atthe end of March 1999, respondent resumed her relationship withSherman and stopped attending sessions until July 1999, sometimeafter the State filed its petition seeking termination of herparental rights. By the time of the August 1999 hearing,respondent had attended four sessions. Miller testified thatrespondent's progress had been "minimal" for her goals.

Respondent also missed scheduled visitations with D.S. inMarch and early April 1999. She was late for a visit on April 13and missed a scheduled visit on April 20. Respondent called tocancel a visit in late April because of her work schedule.

During the fall or winter of 1998, respondent and Shermanseparated, and respondent's living arrangements were in flux. Atsome point, she lived with her mother. In February 1999,respondent lived with her grandmother for a short time. At the endof February, she moved in with her cousin (and her cousin's fiancéeand baby) and stayed there until the second week of March. Whenrespondent and Sherman reunited in March, they lived in Bloomingtonwith two other men until sometime in April. They next lived in amotel for a short time. In June 1999, they separated for twoweeks, during which respondent lived with Sherman's ex-girlfriend. Brenda Juhnke, a caseworker for Catholic Social Services, testifiedthat none of these arrangements constituted stable residencesappropriate for D.S.

Juhnke further testified that on June 16, 1999, shereviewed the client service plan as to respondent's progress sinceDecember 22, 1998. With respect to employment, respondent hadworked at several locations for several different companies. Juhnke rated respondent's progress on goals of counseling andvisitation unsatisfactory since respondent had not been incounseling since March 16, 1999, and visitation occurredsporadically. Juhnke testified that she rated respondent's overallprogress on the client service plan in June 1999 as unsatisfactory. Respondent testified that she intended to stay married toSherman and that she was pregnant with his child. She and Shermanhad not had any incidents of domestic violence since they reunitedin March 1999.

Respondent admitted that when she reunited with Shermanin March 1999, she lost her motivation to continue counseling. During the relevant time period, she was registered with temporaryemployment agencies and worked sporadically. At the time of thehearing, respondent had been working at an establishment referredto only as "Freedom" for about a month. She considered it to be agood job and she intended to keep it. Sherman had not attendeddomestic violence counseling or treatment of any kind.

The trial court found respondent unfit and immediatelyheard evidence regarding D.S.' best interests. Sherman's mother,Joy Sherman, testified that D.S. had been living with her and herhusband for about one year and that, if respondent's parentalrights were terminated, they intended to adopt D.S. D.S. hadbonded with the Shermans and was doing well in their care.

Dawn Webber, a child welfare specialist with DCFS,testified that research in domestic violence showed that issues ofdomestic violence remain unresolved between two people when onlyone of them participates in treatment.

The trial court terminated respondent's parental rightsregarding D.S. This appeal followed.

Respondent argues that the trial court's finding ofunfitness was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Wedisagree. A. Findings of Unfitness

Respondent first argues that the trial court's findingsof unfitness was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

"[R]eviewing courts give great deferenceto a trial court's finding of unfitness andwill not reverse such a finding unless it isagainst the manifest weight of the evidence. [Citations.] A trial court's finding isagainst the manifest weight of the evidenceonly if the opposite conclusion is clearlyapparent. [Citation.] Further, because eachcase involving parental unfitness is suigeneris, courts do not make factualcomparisons to other cases." In re C.M., 305Ill. App. 3d 154, 163, 711 N.E.2d 809, 815(1999).

1. Failure To Make Reasonable Progress

Section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act provides, in relevantpart, as follows:

"The grounds of unfitness are any *** of thefollowing:

(m) Failure by a parent *** to makereasonable progress toward the return of thechild to the parent within 9 months after anadjudication of neglected *** minor ***." (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West1998).

Reasonable progress is an objective standard, focusing onthe amount of progress toward the goal of reunification one canreasonably expect under the circumstances. In re J.G., 298 Ill.App. 3d 617, 625, 699 N.E.2d 167, 173 (1998), quoting In re Allen,172 Ill. App. 3d 950, 956, 527 N.E.2d 647, 652 (1988). Thestandard by which progress should be measured is parentalcompliance with the court's directives, the DCFS service plan, orboth. C.M., 305 Ill. App. 3d at 164, 711 N.E.2d at 815, quoting Inre L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d 444, 463-64, 577 N.E.2d 1375, 1388-89(1991).

"'Reasonable progress' *** exists when the[trial] court *** can conclude that *** thecourt, in the near future, will be able toorder the child returned to parental custody. The court will be able to order the childreturned to parental custody in the nearfuture because, at that point, the parent willhave fully complied with the directivespreviously given to the parent." (Emphasis inoriginal.) L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d at 461,577 N.E.2d at 1387.

In In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 10, ___ N.E.2d ___, ___(2000), the Supreme Court of Illinois held that, pursuant tosection 1(D)(m) of the Act, the only matters that are relevant toa reasonable progress analysis are those that occurred within theapplicable period, in this case nine months.

a. Statutory Nine-Month Period Starts on the File Date

of the Trial Court's Dispositional Order Completing

the Adjudication of Neglected, Abused, or Dependent Minor

Determining the date that starts this time period runningis, thus, of critical importance in our evaluation of all pendingappeals in termination cases under section 1(D)(m) of the Act andto the parties in cases before the trial courts. We recognize thatD.L. used the date that the trial court found D.L. neglected, thatis, apparently the date of the adjudicatory hearing, as commencingthe relevant time period. D.L., 191 Ill. 2d at 4, 13, ___ N.E.2dat ___, ___. A judicial opinion is, however, authority only forwhat is actually decided. Board of Governors of State Colleges &Universities v. Illinois Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 78 Ill.2d 143, 149, 399 N.E.2d 590, 593 (1979). The controversy beforethe supreme court in D.L. was whether the reasonable progress timeperiod specified in section 1(D)(m) should be construed "aslimiting the evidence that may be introduced on that ground tomatters occurring within the applicable 12-month span," as arguedby the minor's guardian (DCFS) to uphold the appellate court'sconstruction, or as "simply establish[ing] a minimum period of timebefore a petition alleging that ground may be filed and [not asprecluding] the parties from offering evidence of a parent'sactions after the expiration of the 12-month period," as argued bythe mother and the State. D.L., 191 Ill. 2d at 8-9, ___ N.E.2d at___. The supreme court agreed with the guardian and the appellatecourt that section 1(D)(m) "limits the evidence that may beconsidered under the provision to matters concerning the parent'sconduct in the 12 months following the applicable adjudication ofneglect, abuse, or dependency." D.L., 191 Ill. 2d at 10, ___N.E.2d at ___.

In D.L., respondent mother gave birth to the minor, D.L.,on July 8, 1992, and he then tested positive for both cocaine andopiates. DCFS filed its petition for adjudication of wardship onSeptember 15, 1992; on February 9, 1993, the trial court found theminor neglected due to exposure to an injurious environment; and onMarch 23, 1993, the court adjudicated D.L. a ward of the court andappointed DCFS as his guardian, whereupon DCFS placed the boy infoster care. In re D.L., 298 Ill. App. 3d 905, 907, 699 N.E.2d1062, 1064 (1998). On March 16, 1995, the State filed asupplemental petition for termination of the parents' parentalrights, alleging five distinct grounds of unfitness. The motherfailed to appear at the June 1995 hearing and the court found herin default. She appeared in court on September 27, 1995, however,and the judge vacated the default; she told the judge that shewanted to regain custody of D.L., and the court appointed counselfor her. On November 20, 1995, respondent mother entered a drugtreatment program. Between December 1995 and April 1996, themother cooperated with her supervisors, but they were not ready toreturn the boy to her. In August 1996, a psychologist conducted abonding assessment, and the boy did not even recognize her. Thecourt conducted evidentiary hearings on the termination petition inFebruary and June 1997, at the conclusion of which the court foundthe mother was not unfit, primarily because she had been drug-freefor nearly two years. D.L., 191 Ill. 2d at 5-6, ___ N.E.2d at ___.

Unsurprisingly, the appellate court concluded that therecord established that the mother was unfit because she (1) failedto maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, orresponsibility as to the minor's welfare; (2) failed to makereasonable progress toward the return of D.L. within 12 months ofthe adjudication of neglect; and (3) was addicted to drugs for atleast one year preceding the commencement of the unfitnessproceeding. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b), (D)(m), (D)(k) (West 1994). Theappellate court held that the parent's fitness must be based on hisor her actions within the first 12 months after the adjudication ofneglect, citing section 1(D)(m) of the Act. D.L., 298 Ill. App. 3dat 920, 699 N.E.2d at 1072. After reviewing the evidence, theappellate court concluded that the trial court erred by focusinginstead on the mother's recent improvement, and it reversed andremanded for a best interests hearing. D.L., 298 Ill. App. 3d at922, 925, 699 N.E.2d at 1073, 1075. The mother then appealed tothe supreme court, which affirmed the appellate court. D.L., 191Ill. 2d 1, ___ N.E.2d ___. In D.L., the mother first showedinterest in regaining custody in September 1995, 3 years after theminor was placed in foster care, 2 1/2 years after he wasadjudicated neglected, and 6 months after the State filed itssupplemental petition seeking termination. D.L., 298 Ill. App. 3dat 921, 699 N.E.2d at 1073. The court there was not called upon tospecifically determine whether the statutory 12-month, now 9-month,period commenced running upon (1) the trial court's February 9,1993, finding that the minor was neglected or (2) the filing of thedispositional order after the court adjudged D.L. a ward of courton March 23, 1993, rendering the adjudication of neglect complete.

We conclude that the issue framed by the parties in D.L.thus failed to focus on the precise question that we mustnecessarily resolve here: whether the term "adjudication" in thestatutory reference to "within 9 months after an adjudication ofneglected *** minor ***" (emphasis added) (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(West 1998)) refers to (1) the date that the trial court finds theminor neglected, abused, or dependent--that is, the date of theadjudicatory hearing; or (2) the date that the court files itsdispositional order on the State's petition for adjudication ofneglect, abuse, or dependency--that is, the date on which the trialcourt completes the adjudication of neglected, abused, or dependentminor. We conclude that it is the latter rather than the former.

At the dispositional hearing, if the trial courtdeclares the child a ward of the court, the court "shall admonishthe parents *** that [they] must cooperate with [DCFS], comply withthe terms of the service plans, and correct the conditions whichrequire the child to be in care, or risk termination of theirparental rights." 705 ILCS 405/2-22(6)(a) (West 1998).

We recognize that section 2-21(1) of the Juvenile CourtAct requires that if, after hearing evidence at the adjudicatoryhearing on the State's petition alleging neglect, abuse, ordependency, the court finds that the minor is neglected, abused, ordependent: "the court shall admonish the parents that they mustcooperate with [DCFS], comply with the terms of the service plan,and correct the conditions that require the child to be in care, orrisk termination of parental rights." 705 ILCS 405/2-21(1) (West1998). We note that the trial court here failed to give suchadmonitions at the July 30, 1998, adjudicatory hearing. That factis not, however, significant to our analysis.

The dispositional hearing on the adjudicatory petitionaffords the trial court the opportunity to hear further evidence todetermine the minor's best interests, consider the permanency goalset for the minor, the nature of the service plan for the minor andservices delivered and to be delivered under the plan (705 ILCS405/2-22(1) (West 1998)); adjourn for a reasonable period (but nomore than six months after the initial removal of the child fromhis or her home) to receive reports or other evidence, set the datefor first permanency hearing, admonish the parents (705 ILCS 405/2-22(4) through (6) (West 1998)); and determine where custody willlie, provide for protective supervision or an order of protection,and enter any other orders necessary to fulfill the service plan(705 ILCS 405/2-23(1)(a), (2), (3) (West 1998)). The filing of thedispositional order completes the adjudication, renders it final,and gives rise to the right to appeal the adjudication of neglect,abuse, or dependency.

We note further section 1(D)(m-1) of the Adoption Act,which states, in pertinent part, the following:

"For purposes of this subdivision (m-1), thedate of entering foster care is the earlierof: (i) the date of a judicial finding at anadjudicatory hearing that the child is anabused, neglected, or dependent minor; or (ii)60 days after the date on which the child isremoved from his or her parent, guardian, orlegal custodian." (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS50/1(D)(m-1) (West 1998).

The legislature here demonstrated its ability to distinguish thetrial court's finding of neglect at the adjudicatory hearing asdistinct from the "adjudication of neglected" (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(West 1998)) when it sees fit to do so.

b. Application

In this case, we conclude that the period ran from thecourt's October 16, 1998, filing of its dispositional order, whenD.S. was adjudged neglected, for nine months--that is, to July 16,1999. At the August 10, 1999, termination hearing, the trial courtheard evidence focused on this period.

At the close of the fitness portion of the hearing, thetrial court described respondent and Sherman as "unstable, [and]out of control in their relationship." The trial courtspecifically noted (1) the altercation between respondent andSherman at the October 1998 visitation; (2) that respondent hadabandoned counseling when she reunited with Sherman (and did notresume it until after the State filed the termination petition);and (3) both respondent and Sherman showed unwillingness tocomplete treatment. Respondent urges us to conclude thatbecause no incidents of domestic violence had occurred since sheand Sherman reunited in March 1999, respondent has adequatelyaddressed the domestic violence issue and has it "under control." Respondent's argument is irrelevant in light of the supreme court'sdecision in D.L. Respondent had nine months in which to makereasonable progress toward D.S.' return, and those nine monthsended on July 16, 1999. Although respondent completed parentingclasses and made sincere efforts, through counseling, to turn herlife around, three months passed after D.S.' removal before shebegan treatment, and she was unable to stay the course for morethan a few months. Respondent's progress slid backward when sheresumed her relationship with Sherman in March 1999. What happenedafter July 16 is beside the point. Considering the evidenceproperly before the trial court, the court was fully justified inconcluding that respondent would not be able to fully resumeparental responsibilities in the "near future." Accordingly, itsconclusion was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

2. Failure To Make Reasonable Efforts

Respondent also contests the court's finding that shefailed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions thatled to the child's removal. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1998). However, the trial court's determination of parental unfitness needonly be supported by proof sufficient to establish one of thestatutory grounds. In re J.T.C., 273 Ill. App. 3d 193, 198, 652N.E.2d 421, 424 (1995). Given our affirmance of the court'sreasonable progress finding, we need not address this additionalfinding of unfitness.

B. Best Interests Determination

Finally, respondent argues that the record did notcontain sufficient evidence to show that terminating her parentalrights was in D.S.' best interest. We disagree.

By the time that the trial court conducted thedispositional hearing on the State's petition to terminaterespondent's parental rights, D.S. was two years and nine monthsold and had been in foster care for over one year. Sherman'smother and father were D.S.' foster parents. They had bonded withD.S. and wanted to adopt her.

Joy Sherman testified that D.S. "acted out" at day careafter attending visitations with respondent and Sherman. D.S.'behavior improved after Sherman ceased to attend visitations. Joyand her husband had little contact with Sherman, and in the eventthey adopt D.S., they will not allow Sherman to be a part of herlife.

Respondent, on the other hand, testified that sheintended to stay with Sherman despite the on-again-off-again natureof their relationship, their history of domestic violence, andSherman's unwillingness to attend counseling or treatment. Respondent's own treatment was only minimally successful, and theevidence suggests that when respondent is involved with Sherman,she is unable to make D.S. a priority in her life. Thus, the trialcourt concluded that denying the State's petition would "continuethis matter indefinitely *** with limited chance of success."

We agree with the trial court. It was forced to choosebetween (1) the possibility of an immediate permanent placement and(2) an indeterminate period of continued wardship. Consideringrespondent's failure to make reasonable progress toward D.S.'return, the court's conclusion, that termination of respondent'sparental rights was in D.S.' best interest, was not against themanifest weight of the evidence.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

Affirmed.

GARMAN and KNECHT, JJ., concur.