Respondent, Qik N EZ Properties, L.L.C. (Qik N EZ),appeals from the trial court's judgment dismissing its claimagainst the estate of Douglas Harrison Lane as untimely. Weaffirm.

On or about December 30, 1999, the decedent, DouglasHarrison Lane, and his wife, Shirley Lane, entered into anindemnification agreement with the Joel A. Schneider 1996 Trust. The indemnification agreement was later assigned to Qik N EZ. Mr. Lane died on April 20, 2002. On May 21, his will was admitted to probate, and Mrs. Lane was appointed the executrix of theestate. Notice of the opening of the estate was properly published, first appearing on May 25. The publication gave noticethat the period in which to make claims against the estate wouldexpire six months from the date of first publication, i.e.,November 25, 2002. On December 16, Qik N EZ filed a claimagainst the estate in the circuit court. The estate filed amotion to dismiss the claim on December 18. The motion wasdenied, and an amended motion to dismiss was subsequently filed. The trial court granted the amended motion to dismiss the estateas untimely on March 7, 2003. Qik N EZ appeals this dismissal.

Qik N EZ argues that the December 16 filing of itsclaim in the circuit court was only a formality and that it hadactually presented its claim against the estate in a series ofletters beginning in May, well within the six-month statutorywindow to present claims against the estate. On May 6, 2002,counsel for Qik N EZ first wrote Mrs. Lane about the indemnification agreement. The letter was addressed to her personally andmade no mention of either her husband or his estate except tonote that he had signed the indemnification agreement along withher. On May 9, counsel for Mrs. Lane responded, making nomention of Mr. Lane except to note that he had signed the agreement also. On May 14, counsel for Mrs. Lane informed Qik N EZthat Mr. Lane had recently passed away, that a petition to openprobate was being prepared, and, "[s]hould you wish to file aclaim in that proceeding, please advise, and once probate hasbeen opened, we will provide you with the case number." Qik N EZdid not directly respond to this invitation to file a claim inthe probate proceeding. However, in its June 19 response, Qik NEZ did state, "[t]he Indemnification Agreement requires ShirleyLane and the Estate of Harrison Lane to clean up the fill thathas been placed on the property." Also, in subsequent letters,Qik N EZ no longer referred to Mr. Lane as being a responsibleparty under the agreement but began to reference his estateinstead. These references are the basis for Qik N EZ's contention that a claim was filed with the representative of theestate.

In dismissing the claim, the trial court found thecorrespondence relied upon by Qik N EZ to create a valid claim tobe insufficient since said correspondence was to Mrs. Laneindividually and not to her as the representative of the estate. We affirm.

First, under the Probate Act of 1975 (Act), a claimagainst the estate of a decedent may either be filed with thecourt, the representative of the estate, or both. 755 ILCS 5/18-1(a) (West 2002). The Act further provides "[e]very claim filedmust be in writing and state sufficient information to notify therepresentative of the nature of the claim or other reliefsought." 755 ILCS 5/18-2 (West 2002). The courts have held thattechnical legal form is not required to present a valid claim. Sheetz v. Morgan, 98 Ill. App. 3d 794, 424 N.E.2d 867, 868(1981). However, the claim must still be sufficient to notifythe representative of the nature of the claim.

In the instant case, the initial letter sent by Qik NEZ was addressed to Mrs. Lane in her individual capacity. Nothing indicates that the correspondence was also directedtoward her husband, his estate, or her as executrix of hisestate. When informed of Mr. Lane's death, Qik N EZ chose notto then file a claim with the court or to further inquire aboutthe probate case, even though it was openly invited to do so byMrs. Lane's counsel. Although not required by law, this wouldhave clearly shown Qik N EZ's intentions to pursue a claimagainst the estate. Instead, Qik N EZ continued in the manner ithad begun, which was to pursue the matter with Mrs. Laneindividually, as if the opening of probate had no effect upontheir dealings. We cannot say that one sentence in a letterstating that the indemnification agreement requires action by"Shirley Lane and the Estate of Harrison Lane" is sufficientinformation under the Act to notify the representative of thenature of the claim when previous correspondence had onlyreferred to Mrs. Lane in her individual capacity as a codebtor. Language of this nature could be construed as doing nothing morethan recognizing that an estate had been opened and Mrs. Lane'scodebtor had changed as a result. We must look at thesufficiency of the letter to notify the representative of theestate of a claim at the time the letter was received; we may notuse the benefit of hindsight.

Although the facts differ somewhat from the instantcase, we find the reasoning employed by the court in In re Estateof Beider, 268 Ill. App. 3d 1094, 645 N.E.2d 553 (1994), to beapplicable here. In Beider, the court held that lettersaddressed personally to the deceased rather than to his estatewere insufficient to state a claim against the estate. Inreaching its decision, the court first examined a Minnesota case,Harter v. Lenmark, 443 N.W.2d 537 (Minn. 1989). In Harter, theMinnesota court held that demand letters a creditor had sent to ahusband in his individual capacity as a codebtor wereinsufficient to constitute a claim against his wife's estate, ofwhich he was the executor. The Harter court noted,

"'[T]he two letters did not request or demand payment from the estate, but only from [the estate's representative] individually.

While it can be assumed that *** [the] personal representative *** was aware of [the decedent's] participation and obligations under at least one of the notes, no claim or demand for payment from the estate was asserted.'" Beider, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 1097, 645 N.E.2d at 555, quoting Harter, 443 N.W.2d at 539.

The ruling in Harter is basically that knowledge an administratorhas of a potential claim against an estate is not enough; thatfor a claim to have any effect, it must clearly and intentionallybe directed at the estate.

To supplement the decision in Harter, the Beider courtalso examined State v. Griffin, 171 Conn. 333, 370 A.2d 1301(1976). In Griffin, the Connecticut court found a letteraddressed to an individual, who had not yet been appointedadministratrix, was sufficient to state a claim against theestate because the letter made it clear that there was anintention that the letter serve as notice to the futureadministratrix of the claim against the estate. The court saidthat the intent was apparent because the letter conveyed theexact amount of the claimed indebtedness, identified thecreditor, stated an unequivocal intention to pursue the claim,and an expectation that the recipient would apply for letters ofadministration. Beider, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 1097-98, 645 N.E.2dat 555, citing Griffin, 171 Conn. at 338-39, 370 A.2d at 1304.

Essentially, by reading these two cases together, thecourt in Beider found that unless letters are addressed directlyto the estate or to an administrator of the estate in his or hercapacity as such, we cannot find that those letters state a claimagainst the estate. It is the intent to make a claim against anestate that is important, and as a rule, that intent must beclearly presented to the representative of the estate. Harterand Griffin outline the spectrum in which letters to arepresentative of an estate sufficiently show the intentnecessary to state a claim. In Griffin, the letter clearlyelucidated its intent to pursue a claim against the estate, eventhough the estate had not yet been opened. In Harter, the letterwas not clear about its intent to pursue a claim against theestate, even though that was a reasonable inference that couldhave been made by the recipient. Although a letter need notinclude every detail found in the letter in Griffin, at the veryleast a letter must state an unequivocal intention to pursue aclaim against the estate, and it must specify the grounds orbasis for the claim, along with identifying the creditor.

In the instant case, the facts are much more similar tothose in Harter than those in Griffin. Nothing in the letters toMrs. Lane suggests that Qik N EZ was writing to her in hercapacity as executrix of Mr. Lane's estate. There is no evidencethat Qik N EZ even knew that Mrs. Lane was the personalrepresentative of her husband's estate. On the contrary, theletters are addressed to her in her individual capacity, muchlike the situation in Harter. Although it may be a reasonableinference to make, we cannot equate a demand against Mrs. Lane asa codeb-tor with an intention to pursue a claim against theestate over which she was executrix. There is no unequivocalintention to pursue a claim against the estate in Qik N EZ'sletters to Mrs. Lane, and as such the trial court did not err indismissing Qik N EZ's claim against the estate.

Affirmed.

TURNER and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.