JUSTICE APPLETON delivered the opinion of the court:

Petitioners, Christopher and Craig Parr, a/k/aSnodgrass, allege they are the natural children of decedent,Marlin L. Snodgrass. Their mother, Kaye Parr, was never marriedto decedent. Carl E. Parr (not a party to this lawsuit) ispetitioners' adoptive father. Respondent, Larry Snodgrass, isdecedent's brother and the executor of his estate.

Petitioners filed an amended complaint contestingdecedent's will. As executor, respondent filed a motion forsummary judgment, arguing that because Carl Parr had adoptedpetitioners, they were not decedent's children within the meaningof section 2-4(d)(1) of the Probate Act of 1975 (Probate Act) (755 ILCS 5/2-4(d)(1) (West 2000)) and they therefore lackedstanding to contest decedent's will. After denying the motionfor summary judgment, the trial court granted respondent's motionto certify the following question for interlocutory reviewpursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 308(a)):

"When the mother of an illegitimatechild marries someone other than the fatherof the child, and the spouse of the motherthen adopts the illegitimate child, is thechild still the child of his or her naturalfather for purposes of inheritance under[section 2-4(d)(1)]?"

We answer yes to the question and remand this case for furtherproceedings.

Decedent executed his will on January 23, 1990, anddied on October 8, 2000. The will named neither of the petitioners as a beneficiary. On April 4, 2001, petitioners filed anamended complaint contesting the will, alleging they were decedent's natural children, he had lacked testamentary capacity, andthe beneficiaries of the will had unduly influenced him.

On December 14, 2001, respondent filed his motion forsummary judgment. In addition to affidavits averring thatdecedent had a sound mind and free will, respondent presentedcertified copies of petitioners' birth certificates as well asrecords of a paternity case and an adoption case from the De WittCounty circuit court. According to the birth certificates,Christopher Parr was born on September 25, 1967, and Craig Parrwas born on March 15, 1969, and Carl Parr was their father. Inthe paternity case, petitioners' mother, Kaye Pitchford (nowParr), had sought to establish that decedent was petitioners'father. The De Witt County circuit court had dismissed the casefor lack of prosecution. In the adoption case, Carl Parr adoptedpetitioners on September 21, 1972, with decedent's consent.

On January 7, 2002, petitioners filed a response to themotion for summary judgment. As part of their response, theysubmitted Kaye Parr's affidavit that she was petitioners' naturalmother, her grandparents were petitioners' great-grandparents,and she was married to Carl Parr when he adopted petitioners.

On April 10, 2002, the trial court denied respondent'smotion for summary judgment, because if petitioners proved theaverments in their mother's affidavit, they would have standingunder section 2-4(d)(1) of the Probate Act. We granted respondent's petition for leave to appeal.

This appeal requires us to interpret section 2-4(d) ofthe Probate Act. We interpret statutes de novo--that is to say,without any deference to the trial court's interpretation. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493,503, 732 N.E.2d 528, 535 (2000). When interpreting a statute, westrive to ascertain the legislature's intent. Paris v. Feder,179 Ill. 2d 173, 177, 688 N.E.2d 137, 139 (1997). The bestevidence of that intent is the language the legislature used inthe statute, and we should give the language its plain andordinary meaning. Paris, 179 Ill. 2d at 177, 688 N.E.2d at 139. If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we shoulddiscern the legislative intent from that language alone, withoutresorting to other tools of statutory construction, such aslegislative history. People v. Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d 250, 261,644 N.E.2d 1147, 1152 (1994).

Section 2-4(d)(1) of the Probate Act provides as follows:

"(d) For purposes of inheritance from orthrough a natural parent and for determiningthe property rights of any person under anyinstrument, an adopted child is not a childof a natural parent, nor is the child a descendant of a natural parent or of any linealor collateral kindred of a natural parent,unless one or more of the following conditions apply:

(1) The child is adopted by adescendant or a spouse of a descendant of a great-grandparent of thechild, in which case the adoptedchild is a child of both naturalparents." 755 ILCS 5/2-4(d)(1)(West 2000).

The parties agree that unless petitioners are childrenof decedent within the meaning of the statute quoted above,petitioners lack standing to contest decedent's will. Only an"interested person" has the right to contest the admission of awill to probate. 755 ILCS 5/8-1 (West 2000). An "interestedperson" includes "one who has *** a financial interest[] [or]property right *** which may be affected by the action ***,including[,] without limitation[,] an heir." 755 ILCS 5/1-2.11(West 2000). "Heirs" are those whom the law designates toreceive an intestate estate. Gridley v. Gridley, 399 Ill. 215,222, 77 N.E.2d 146, 150 (1948). Natural children of a decedentare descendants of the decedent and are, therefore, the decedent's heirs. 755 ILCS 5/2-1(a), (b) (West 2000). Only byvirtue of their alleged status as children of decedent wouldpetitioners have any interest in the estate.

Petitioners reason as follows. They are the naturalchildren of Kaye Parr and decedent. When Carl Parr adoptedpetitioners, he was the spouse of Kaye Parr. As their naturalmother, Kaye Parr was, of course, a descendant of a great-grandparent of petitioners (on their mother's side): her paternal andmaternal grandparents were petitioners' great-grandparents. Petitioners conclude they are decedent's children under theexception in section 2-4(d)(1). Respondent considers petitioners' interpretation and application of section 2-4(d)(1) to be"strained" and "convoluted." We disagree. The language of thestatute is clear and unambiguous, and if petitioners prove thefacts in their rationale, they will fit neatly within the termsof the statute.

Respondent interprets the statute to mean that theadopted child remains a child of both natural parents only if theadopting parent is a descendant, or spouse of a descendant, of agrandparent of the parent who no longer is a legal parent. Thus,under respondent's interpretation, if Carl Parr were decedent'sbrother or brother-in-law, petitioners would remain children ofboth natural parents--but not if Carl Parr were merely the spouseof petitioners' mother. Respondent interprets the statute asfollows:

"The child is adopted by a descendant or aspouse of a descendant of a paternal great-grandparent of the child, in which case theadopted child is a child of both naturalparents."

If the legislature intended the statute to mean what respondentargues it means, the legislature could have easily said so byinserting a single but highly significant qualifying word: "paternal." The statute does not so read, however, and we willnot insert conditions or limitations into a statute that areabsent from the text (Davis v. Toshiba Machine Co., America, 186Ill. 2d 181, 184-85, 710 N.E.2d 399, 401 (1999)).

While denouncing petitioners' interpretation as a"clever sleight of hand," respondent concedes their interpretation "falls within the letter of the statute." Quoting In reEstate of Abell, 395 Ill. 337, 346, 70 N.E.2d 252, 256 (1946), heurges us, however, to accept his own interpretation as being"'within the object, spirit[,] and meaning of [the] statute[,]*** although not within the letter.'" He argues: "Given thenumber of children who are adopted by the spouse of a naturalparent, [petitioners'] interpretation would have the absurdresult of preserving the inheritance rights of adopted childrenfrom their natural parents in a staggering number of cases."

The supreme court said, in Abell, 395 Ill. at 347, 70N.E.2d at 257: "If the language of a statute employed admits oftwo constructions, one of which makes the enactment mischievous,if not absurd, and the other renders it reasonable and wholesome,the construction leading to an absurd result should be avoided." (Emphasis added.) As we explained, respondent's interpretationhas no basis in the plain and unambiguous language of section 2-4(d)(1), and therefore the statute does not "admit of" hisinterpretation.

Moreover, unlike respondent, we perceive no "absurdity"in an adopted child's inheriting from both of the parents whobrought him or her into the world. Traditionally, courts regarded "the adoption statute [as leaving] the rights of inheritance between the adopted child and his natural parent the sameas though no adoption had taken place." In re Estate ofTilliski, 323 Ill. App. 490, 499, 56 N.E.2d 481, 485 (1944),aff'd, 390 Ill. 273, 61 N.E.2d 24 (1945). As the supreme courtsaid, in a passage that petitioners quote:

"The statute authorizing adoption ofchildren is remedial. It was unknown to thecommon law. Primarily, it is beneficial tothe adopted child. It gives to it rights itdid not have before. It does not purport tolessen any of its natural rights, but givesadditional rights. The same right of heirship from blood parents enjoyed by a naturalchild should not be taken from an adoptedchild unless clearly required by statute." In re Estate of Tilliski, 390 Ill. at 285, 61N.E.2d at 29.

On its face, section 2-4(d)(1) does not "clearly require" us tohold that petitioners have no right of heirship from decedent. Rather, it "clearly requires" us to hold they are his heirs, ifindeed they are his natural children and the averments in KayeParr's affidavit are true.

Even if we agreed with respondent that section 2-4(d)(1), as petitioners literally interpret it, is inconsistentwith sound public policy, we would not interpret it as sayingsomething other than what it plainly says. We will not effectively amend the clear and unambiguous language of statutes toeliminate what we consider bad public policy (convenientlylabeled as "absurdities the legislature could not haveintended"). If the statute, as written, seems a bad idea, theappeal is to the legislature, not to us. People v. Garner, 147Ill. 2d 467, 476, 590 N.E.2d 470, 474 (1992).

Just as we should not allow considerations of publicpolicy to lure us away from the clear language of the statute, weshould not allow legislative history to do so, either. Thereforewe decline the parties' invitation to consider the legislativehistory of section 2-4(d)(1). As the supreme court recentlysaid:

"Only if the statutory language is ambiguousmay we consider extrinsic aids for construction, such as legislative history, to determine legislative intent. In the absence ofambiguity, we must rely on the plain andordinary meaning of the words chosen by thelegislature." (Emphasis added.) Land v.Board of Education of the City of Chicago,202 Ill. 2d 414, 426, ___ N.E.2d ___, ___(2002).

Because the statutory language is clear, we will rely on itsplain and ordinary meaning, without an unnecessary foray intolegislative history.

For the foregoing reasons, we answer the certifiedquestion in the affirmative and remand this case for furtherproceedings.

Question answered; cause remanded.

KNECHT and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.