PRESIDING JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH delivered the opinion ofthe court:

In May 2000, claimants, Carol Coffey and ChristineChambers Graves, filed separate claims against the estate oftheir deceased aunt, Zoe Templeton, for services provided duringZoe's life. Bonnie Gibbs, Zoe's daughter and executrix of herestate, denied the claims in June 2000. In May 2001, the trialcourt conducted a bench trial, and in October 2001, the trialcourt entered judgment in favor of the estate and against Caroland Christine. Carol and Christine appeal, arguing that thetrial court erred in holding that they failed to overcome thepresumption that their services for their aunt Zoe were gratuitous. We reverse and remand with directions.

Zoe Templeton was born in 1912. She had three children, Bonnie Gibbs, Betty Mann, and William Templeton, all ofwhom resided in Mount Vernon, Indiana. Zoe had two sisters,Thelma Bayes and Wanda Furman, who was Carol and Christine'smother. Zoe separated from her husband in late 1982 and movedfrom Indiana to Thelma's home in Charleston, Illinois.

In 1994, Wanda moved in with Zoe and Thelma. The threesisters split expenses equally until February 1997, when Thelmaconveyed the home to Christine and Christine's husband, Steven,for them to remodel the house. Christine and Steven moved intothe home shortly thereafter. As consideration, Christine andSteven agreed to allow Thelma and Wanda to live in the homewithout rent as long as they wanted and were able. Thelma diedin July 1997.

Wanda testified that Zoe was not a party to the transaction because Zoe was in a better financial situation. Zoe hadthe means to provide for herself, and she continued to own herformer Indiana home, in which Bonnie lived. In March 1998, Wandabecame Zoe's power of attorney because Zoe's hand tremors madewriting difficult. Wanda was responsible for paying Zoe'sexpenses. Zoe paid one-half of the monthly utility bill. Zoealso helped pay for Wanda's medication on a few occasions, andshe paid approximately $20,000 to get Wanda a new car.

Christine and Steven sold their former home and usedthe proceeds to make several renovations with a total cost ofapproximately $60,000. Christine and Steven considered Zoe'sneeds in making the renovations. Zoe had difficulty breathingfrom heavy smoking, and she was unable to get into a bathtub.Christine and Steven converted a half bath into a handicapped-accessible large bath. They also bought air purifiers andinstalled zoned heating and air conditioning.

From July 1997 until Zoe's death in November 1999,Christine provided Zoe with a place to live, three meals a day,and clean laundry. Zoe needed assistance to move around, and sheused a walker or furniture to steady herself. Bonnie, a certified nursing assistant, instructed Christine on caring for Zoeand provided her with a blood-pressure cuff, a stethoscope, and asuction machine. Christine sat with Zoe for an estimated 24hours per week because Zoe did not like to be alone.

From 1995 until 1999, Carol also assisted Zoe. Carolestimated that she sat with Zoe for 24 hours per week as well. Carol frequently helped Zoe with her contact lens, which oftenbothered Zoe. Carol would remove the lens and reinsert it afterrinsing or replacement. Carol also drove Zoe on errands because Zoe could no longer drive. Carol and Christine did not set feesfor these services or bill Zoe while she was alive. Zoe neverpaid Carol or Christine for services.

In December 1999, the trial court admitted to probateZoe's April 1998 will and April 1999 codicil. Zoe's will leftall of her property to her three children. In May 2000, Caroland Christine filed claims against Zoe's estates totaling$70,037.66 and $33,328.57, respectively. In June 2000, Bonnie,acting as Zoe's executrix, denied both claims. In October 2000,Bonnie filed an inventory in this case showing that Zoe diedpossessing various Illinois farm properties in Gallatin and WhiteCounties and $103,466 in personal property. The inventory didnot list any of the Indiana farm properties that Zoe specificallydevised to each of her three children in her will.

In May 2001, the trial court conducted a bench trial. Carol and Christine entered the evidence deposition of JoanneBarbee, Zoe's sister-in-law, into evidence. She had a conversation with Zoe several months after June 1999 but some monthsbefore Zoe's death. In her deposition, Joanne testified that Zoeindicated that she wanted Carol and Christine to be compensatedfor all they had done for her. According to Joanne, Zoe saidthat all they needed to do was file a claim against her estate. Joanne testified that Zoe had received compensation by filing aclaim against the estate of Zoe's cousin, Doris Berry.

The trial court took judicial notice of In re Estate ofBerry, No. 91-P-91 (Coles Co. Cir. Ct.), in which Zoe filed anuncontested claim for $9,945. Thelma was the executrix. Therecord shows that Zoe claimed the sum for "[s]ervices to decedentfor cooking, home care, washing, ironing, [t]ransportation[,] andshopping[,] all performed with expectation of payment. Servicesrendered from December 19, 1988[,] to March 16, 1991[,] [at] 8hours per day, 7 days per week at $85 per week for 117 weeks."

Wanda testified that she had a conversation with Zoe inlate 1998 or 1999, wherein Zoe said that she wanted Carol andChristine to be compensated. On the day of Zoe's death, Zoepatted the hospital bed and said, "'I don't want the girls to gowithout.'" Wanda, Carol, and Christine were present. Wandatestified that, as Zoe's power of attorney, she never received aninvoice from either Carol or Christine for any services.

Carol and Christine submitted accountings of theirrespective claims. However, they did not provide any records oftheir services, nor did they bill Zoe for services or rent whileshe was alive. Christine claimed $54,600 for rent from July 1997to October 1999, derived from the monthly charge of $1,950 for asingle person in a double-occupancy room at Hammond Lane, a localnursing home. Christine also sought $16,704 in sitting feesbased on an estimated 24 hours per week from July 1997 throughOctober 1999 at $6 per hour.

Carol claimed a $16,704 sitting fee based on the sameestimates. Carol further requested $10,693.44 for assistancewith Zoe's contact lens an estimated 144 times; she valued eachtime at $74.26, based on what Zoe's doctor's office would chargefor the service. She next wanted compensation of $500 fordriving Zoe on an estimated 100 errands, plus mileage of $180. Finally, Carol claims $2,467.13 for missing 112.5 hours from workwhile caring for Zoe, based on her average hourly salary of$21.93.

Judy Lane, owner of Hammond Lane, testified at trial asto the monthly fees at her facility. However, Lane never met Zoeand was not familiar with her needs. Her staff did not administer treatments, monitor medications, or sit with residents. Shecould arrange sitters for an extra fee of $5.15 per hour, andsitters could provide services such as cleaning a contact lens.

In October 2001, the trial court issued an order andletter opinion finding in favor of the estate and denying Carol'sand Christine's claims. Specifically, the court found as follows:

"Carol and Christine have not provedthat an express contract ever existed. It isclear that Zoe, Carol[,] and Christine sharedthe knowledge that Zoe had successfully madea claim against her cousin's estate in 1991. There is credible evidence that Zoe felt thatChristine and Carol should be compensated forwhat they had done for her. However[,] thereis no evidence that she took any step tocompensate them. She made no promise to paywhile she was alive. No promissory expression can be found in anything she said ordid.

Carol and Christine made no effort tokeep a record of the services performed while[Z]oe was alive. They never billed Zoe forthe services. Their claims are based onestimates put together after Zoe died.

The evidence presented does not overcomethe presumption that the services were rendered gratuitously. A contract implied infact has not been proved.

Based on the evidence, a contract implied in law should not be imposed by thecourt. This equitable remedy is imposed toavoid unjust enrichment. It rests on a presumption that a person accepting servicesshould pay the reasonable value of thoseservices to the person providing them. Theevidence establishing that the services wereperformed and the reasonable value of themmust be clear and convincing. The evidencepresented does not meet that standard. Inthis case the presumption that a person accepting services should pay for them does notovercome the presumption that a family memberwho furnishes services does so gratuitously."

This appeal followed.

Carol and Christine argue that the trial court'sdecision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Wedefer to the trial court's finding that the evidence was insufficient to overcome the presumption of gratuitous service unlessthat finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. See In re Estate of Miller, 334 Ill. App. 3d 692, 699, 778 N.E.2d262, 268 (2002).

In awarding judgment against Carol and Christine ontheir claims, the trial court applied the presumption that aperson who furnishes services to a family member does so gratuitously. See In re Estate of Devoy, 231 Ill. App. 3d 883, 889,596 N.E.2d 1339, 1343 (1992). The presumption may be rebutted bysufficient evidence of a contract, express or implied, to negateany presumption that the services were performed gratuitously. Estate of Jesmer v. Rohlev, 241 Ill. App. 3d 798, 803, 609 N.E.2d816, 820 (1993). The amount of evidence sufficient to rebut thepresumption of gratuity depends on the facts of each case; thepresumption diminishes in direct proportion to the remoteness ofthe degree and character of the family relationship and thecharacter of the duties performed. In re Estate of Dal Paos, 118Ill. App. 2d 235, 240, 254 N.E.2d 300, 303 (1969).

Carol and Christine each claimed that they sat withtheir aunt Zoe for an estimated 24 hours a week over a 27-monthperiod. Christine asserted that she also provided Zoe withhousing, meals, and laundry. Carol claimed that she frequentlycleaned Zoe's contact lens and drove Zoe on errands. The recordcontains evidence that (1) Zoe stated that she intended Carol andChristine to be compensated for their caregiving and (2) Caroland Christine were to file a claim in Zoe's estate as Zoe haddone in Doris Berry's estate.

Considering the evidence of Zoe's statements along withthe degree of the family relationship involved and the characterof the duties performed, we determine that Carol and Christinepresented sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that theservices that they performed for their aunt Zoe were gratuitous. Illinois generally follows the Thayer "bursting-bubble" hypothesis on presumptions. See Franciscan Sisters Health Care Corp. v.Dean, 95 Ill. 2d 452, 462-63, 448 N.E.2d 872, 877 (1983). Thetrial court should have decided whether Carol and Christineproved by clear and convincing evidence facts giving rise to animplied contract (In re Estate of Teall, 329 Ill. App. 3d 83, 89,768 N.E.2d 124, 130 (2002)), without resort to any presumption. Therefore, the trial court's decision was against the manifestweight of the evidence.

As guidance on remand, we note that the presumption ofexpectation of compensation for services knowingly and voluntarily accepted by a decedent during the decedent's lifetime doesnot apply because it concerns only nonfamily claimants. In reEstate of Brittin, 247 Ill. App. 3d 756, 760, 617 N.E.2d 877, 880(1993).

For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court'sjudgment and remand with directions for the trial court toconsider whether either claimant proved an implied contract and,if so, the reasonable value of the services rendered.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

COOK, J., concurs.

TURNER, J., specially concurs.

JUSTICE TURNER, specially concurring:

The majority concludes Carol and Christine presentedsufficient evidence to rebut the presumption the services theyperformed were gratuitous. I agree. I write separately toemphasize that should the trial court ultimately determineclaimants are entitled to recover, their recovery should belimited to the reasonable value of the services performed.