JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondent, Jill R., appeals the March 2002 order ofthe trial court finding her subject to involuntary admission to amental health facility pursuant to section 3-600 of the MentalHealth and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/3-600 (West 2000)) and involuntary administration of psychotropicmedication pursuant to section 2-107.1(a-5) of the Code (405 ILCS5/2-107.1(a-5) (West Supp. 2001)). Respondent contends (1) thetrial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, (2) the trialcourt lacked personal jurisdiction, (3) the trial court abusedits discretion in denying her motion for a two-day continuance,(4) she was prejudiced when neither she nor her attorney receivednotice of the hearing, (5) the trial court's order for involuntary administration of psychotropic medication was against themanifest weight of the evidence, (6) the trial court should nothave authorized medical tests, and (7) the petition did not statethe petitioner made a good-faith effort to determine whetherrespondent had executed a health care power of attorney or adeclaration for mental health treatment. We reverse.

On March 17, 2002, respondent was admitted to St.Mary's Hospital (St. Mary's) in Decatur, Illinois. The next day,Jon Scharfenberg, respondent's brother, filed a petition foremergency involuntary admission of respondent to a mental healthfacility. The petition alleged respondent had been hospitalizedin February 2002 after she heard God tell her to set fire to herhome in St. Charles, Missouri. Two certificates were attached tothe petition. Stephen Rathnow of St. Mary's filed a petition foradministration of psychotropic medication.

In a March 20, 2002, order filed on April 4, 2002, thetrial court (1) set a hearing on the involuntary admissionpetition for 8:30 a.m. on March 20, 2002, (2) ordered the clerkto send notice to all required persons, and (3) appointed counselto represent respondent. Respondent received actual notice ofthe hearing and appeared with counsel, who did not object to anylack of formal notice in the record.

The trial court first held a hearing on the petitionfor involuntary admission. At the outset, respondent's attorneymade an oral motion for a two-day continuance to file a motion todismiss and obtain supporting affidavits. He represented thefollowing to the trial court: respondent's parents, Don andPeggy Scharfenberg, invited respondent to visit them in Macomb,Illinois, and they drove to visit Jon in Decatur, where Jonpetitioned for respondent's admission. The trial court deniedthe motion for a continuance.

Respondent's counsel then made an oral motion todismiss. Respondent testified she was arrested after her homeburned and was out on bond. Respondent had an auto accidentwhile en route to visit her parents at their invitation. Don andPeggy drove respondent to Decatur to pick up Jon, and they toldrespondent they were taking her to the hospital to see if she wasokay after the accident. Respondent also stated she had beentaking her medications after being discharged in Missouri. Respondent's attorney argued respondent was lured to Macon Countyand could not obtain evidence from Missouri. The trial courtdenied the motion to dismiss because respondent was present inMacon County.

The State then presented testimony from Peggy, Don, andJon, as well as Dr. Rohi Patil. Respondent quit her job as anurse to work at home through the Institute for Global Prosperityafter receiving a message from God. Respondent stopped takingher medication. Peggy and Don supported respondent for about amonth after her release from a mental health facility. She thenleft the motel in which she was staying and was moving home whenshe wrecked her truck. Respondent told Peggy she would "dosomething off a high place" if God asked her. Respondent alsoinformed Peggy she stares at the sun and keeps her eyes open in atanning salon to converse with God. Respondent told Jon "she hadtried to blow up her house before and she would do it again ifthat is what it took to get her message out."

Dr. Patil, a psychiatrist, examined respondent anddiagnosed her with a bipolar disorder. If untreated, respondent's prognosis would be very poor because she goes into spellsof psychotic symptoms, paranoia, and delusions. Dr. Patil opinedrespondent could harm herself or others. Respondent told Dr.Patil she stopped taking medicine because she wanted to be freeagain. The trial court relied only on Dr. Patil's testimony andfound by clear and convincing evidence respondent was in need ofinvoluntary admission. The trial court ordered her hospitalizedin the Department of Human Services (Department) for a period notto exceed 90 days.

The State next proceeded on the petition for administration of psychotropic medication. Dr. Patil again testifiedrespondent refused to comply with medication because she said shewas free by not taking it. Dr. Patil recommended up to 20milligrams per day of Zyprexa, an antipsychotic and mood stabilizer, 25 milligrams per day for two weeks of Prolixin Decanoate,an antipsychotic, 500 milligrams twice per day of Depakote, amood stabilizer, and up to 450 milligrams per day of Wellbutrin,an antidepressant. Dr. Patil discussed only Wellbutrin andZyprexa with respondent. He was concerned about respondent'scompliance with medication because she has refused in the past. Respondent was psychotic and her ability to function had deteriorated without the medication, which would allow her to be aproductive human being. Her mental illness existed for a periodof time marked by the continuing deterioration of her ability tofunction. Dr. Patil believed the benefits of the medicationwould outweigh the harm. Dr. Patil had tried other less restrictive services without success, and he believed respondent lackedthe capacity to make a reasoned decision about the treatment. The trial court granted the petition.

This appeal followed.

Respondent first argues the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because, according to her multidisciplinarytreatment plan, she had been charged with a felony. We note therecord does not specify which jurisdiction charged her with afelony, although respondent had been jailed in Missouri andreleased on bond. Respondent does not contend she had an Illinois felony charge, and nothing in the record suggests otherwise. Therefore, we consider whether respondent's out-of-state felonycharge deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction under section3-100 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3-100 (West 2000)), which provides:

"The circuit court has jurisdictionunder this [c]hapter over persons not chargedwith a felony who are subject to involuntaryadmission. Inmates of penal institutionsshall not be considered as charged with afelony within the meaning of this [c]hapter. Court proceedings under [a]rticle VIII ofthis [c]hapter may be instituted as to anysuch inmate at any time within 90 days priorto discharge of such inmate by expiration ofsentence or otherwise, and if such inmate isfound to be subject to involuntary admission,the order of the court ordering hospitalization or other disposition shall become effective at the time of discharge of the inmatefrom penal custody." (Emphasis added.)

The primary rule of statutory construction is toascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent, and wefirst look to the statute's language, according that language itsplain and commonly understood meaning. People v. Ellis, 199 Ill.2d 28, 39, 765 N.E.2d 991, 997 (2002). We may also properlyconsider the reason and necessity for the law, the evils soughtto be remedied, and the purpose to be achieved. In re Detentionof Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 308, 776 N.E.2d 218, 223 (2002).

Although we may not ordinarily depart from the statute's plain language by reading into it exceptions, limitations,or conditions the legislature did not express (Ellis, 199 Ill. 2dat 39, 765 N.E.2d at 997), we also presume the General Assemblydid not intend absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice in itsenactment of legislation (Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d at 309, 776N.E.2d at 224). Where the spirit and intent of the GeneralAssembly in adopting an act are clearly expressed and its objectsand purposes are clearly set forth, we are not bound by theliteral language of a particular clause that would defeat theobvious intent of the legislature. Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d at312, 776 N.E.2d at 225-26. In those exceptional situations whereadherence to the literal language of the statute would produce aresult clearly and demonstrably at odds with the obvious intentof the General Assembly, we may disregard, modify, or supplylanguage to give effect to the legislative design. Lieberman,201 Ill. 2d at 320, 776 N.E.2d at 230.

In enacting civil involuntary admission procedures, theGeneral Assembly attempted to further society's interests inprotecting itself from dangerous mentally ill persons and caringfor those who are unable to care for themselves. In reRovelstad, 281 Ill. App. 3d 956, 964, 667 N.E.2d 720, 725 (1996). However, when the State charges a mentally ill person with afelony, that person comes within the authority of the Illinoiscriminal justice system. People v. Zahn, 71 Ill. App. 3d 585,589, 390 N.E.2d 93, 96 (1979). Section 3-100 of the Code reflects the General Assembly's decision to initially assertcriminal jurisdiction over mentally ill felony defendants. SeeZahn, 71 Ill. App. 3d at 589, 390 N.E.2d at 96. Felony defendants who are found unfit to stand trial may be treated by theDepartment under the procedures in the Code of Criminal Procedureof 1963 (see 725 ILCS 5/104-13 through 104-31 (West 2000)).

We recognize the trial court would be without jurisdiction to involuntarily admit respondent if section 3-100 of theCode is construed according to the plain meaning of its language. However, we find the clearly expressed intent of the GeneralAssembly would be frustrated and injustice would result if, as aresult of an out-of-state felony charge, the trial court weredeprived of jurisdiction to involuntarily admit a person such asrespondent. Until the person has committed an offense subject toprosecution in this state, Illinois would have no criminaljurisdiction, either. See 720 ILCS 5/1-5 (West 2000). The Statewould then have no power to protect its citizens from suchdangerous mentally ill persons and no authority to assert itssignificant parens patriae interest in providing for those whoare unable to take care of themselves. This result would beclearly and demonstrably at odds with the obvious intent of theGeneral Assembly to assert civil commitment jurisdiction over allpersons present in this state who are subject to involuntaryadmission unless this state asserts felony criminal jurisdiction. Therefore, we supply language to give effect to the legislativedesign and interpret section 3-100 to grant the trial court civilcommitment jurisdiction over persons who are present and subjectto involuntary admission and who are not charged by this statewith a felony.

Respondent does not contend this state has charged herwith a felony, and she was subject to involuntary admissionbecause she had a mental illness and because of her illness wasreasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon herselfor another in the near future and/or was unable to provide forher basic physical needs so as to guard herself from seriousharm. See 405 ILCS 5/1-119 (West 2000). Therefore, the trialcourt had subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to section 3-100of the Code.

Respondent asserts the trial court lacked personaljurisdiction over her because she was a Missouri resident and herfamily lured her into Illinois to get treatment. Respondent alsocontends the trial court abused its discretion in denying hermotion for a two-day continuance to prepare a motion to dismissand obtain supporting affidavits. The grant or denial of amotion for a continuance is within the trial court's sounddiscretion. In re Bert W., 313 Ill. App. 3d 788, 793, 730 N.E.2d591, 596 (2000).

Illinois courts may exercise jurisdiction in any actionarising within or without this state against any natural personpresent within this state when served with process. 735 ILCS5/2-209(b)(1) (West 2000). However, a party may not be inducedby artifice, trick, or fraud to enter the state for the solepurpose of being served with process. See In re Marriage ofPridemore, 146 Ill. App. 3d 990, 993, 497 N.E.2d 818, 820 (1986).

Although the trial court entertained an oral motion todismiss based on a lack of personal jurisdiction, the trial courtlimited respondent's ability to fully present her claim bydenying her counsel's request for a two-day continuance toprepare and obtain affidavits. The trial court proceeded withthe hearing only two days after the petition for involuntaryadmission was filed, and respondent's counsel had limited time toprepare a motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds. Inruling, the trial court simply stated, "the respondent is here. It is alleged she is a seriously ill person." In the unusualfacts of this case, the trial court abused its discretion indenying respondent's motion for a continuance.

Respondent next contends she was prejudiced whenneither she nor her attorney received notice of the hearing, asrequired by section 3-611 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3-611 (West2000)).

We recognize a compelling need for strict compliancewith statutory requirements in mental health cases becausecommitment is involuntary and liberty interests are involved. Inre Lanter, 216 Ill. App. 3d 972, 974, 576 N.E.2d 1219, 1220(1991). However, when the respondent does not object and doesnot show prejudice, the State's failure to strictly comply withprovisions of the Code may be excused if the record establishesthe purposes of the statute have been achieved. In re Robinson,151 Ill. 2d 126, 131, 601 N.E.2d 712, 715 (1992). The purposesbehind the notice requirement are to afford respondent time toprepare for the hearing and an opportunity to be heard. In reNau, 153 Ill. 2d 406, 418, 607 N.E.2d 134, 140 (1992).

In this case, respondent and her counsel were presentat the hearing, participated in the proceedings, and failed toraise any challenge to the notice of the proceeding. Therefore,the purposes of the notice provision were fulfilled, and respondent was not prejudiced by the lack of an affirmative indicationin the record she was properly served with formal notice of thetime and place of the proceeding. We consider this error to beharmless. In re McMahon, 221 Ill. App. 3d 383, 387, 581 N.E.2d1208, 1211 (1991).

Respondent argues the trial court's order for involuntary administration of psychotropic medication was against themanifest weight of the evidence. Respondent contends the Statefailed to prove by clear and convincing evidence she lacked thecapacity to make a reasoned decision about medication because theState failed to present any proof she was informed of the risksand benefits of the medication in writing. We disagree.

Rathnow's signed petition for involuntary administration of psychotropic medication alleged respondent had beendelivered a written statement advising her of the benefits andside effects of the medication. The multidisciplinary treatmentplan, which the trial court admitted into evidence as People'sexhibit No. 2, contains the following signed statement: "I havediscussed benefits and potential side effects of medications withpatient and/or family as appropriate and have provided writteninformation to them. I have also informed patient his/her rightto refuse medication."

At the hearing, Dr. Patil testified respondent lackedthe capacity to make a reasoned decision about medication. Respondent was psychotic, and she refused medication because shesaid she wanted to be free and God told her not to take themedicine. The trial court's finding respondent lacked thecapacity to make a reasoned decision about medication was notagainst the manifest weight of the evidence.

Respondent claims the trial court should not haveauthorized medical tests when the petition did not requesttesting and no testimony showed testing was essential for thesafe and effective administration of medication.

The trial court had authority to order medical testingeven though not requested in the petition for involuntary admission of psychotropic medication. Under the doctrine of parenspatriae, courts have the implied authority to order periodicblood testing to ensure the safe administration of psychotropicdrugs, provided the requirements of section 2-107.1 of the Codeare met by clear and convincing evidence. In re Floyd, 274 Ill.App. 3d 855, 864, 655 N.E.2d 10, 15 (1995).

F. Form of Petition for Administration
of Psychotropic Medication

Finally, respondent asserts the petition did not statethe petitioner made a good-faith effort to determine whetherrespondent had executed a health care power of attorney or adeclaration for mental health treatment. As we decided in In reMiller, 301 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 1071, 705 N.E.2d 144, 151 (1998),the error is harmless because neither the record before us norrespondent in her brief indicates such instruments actuallyexisted in this case.

Because the trial court abused its discretion indenying respondent's motion for a continuance, we reverse thetrial court's judgment.

Reversed.

COOK and APPLETON, JJ., concur.