NO. 4-02-0800

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In July 2002, the trial court adjudicated respondent,Joel L., a delinquent minor and found Joel in violation of hisprobation. In September 2002, the court held a dispositionalhearing and ordered Joel committed to the Juvenile Division ofthe Department of Correction (DOC). Joel appeals, alleging thatthe State failed to prove that a police officer engaged in official duties was battered and that the charging instrument wasvoid as a matter of law. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 16, 2001, the trial court adjudicated Joel adelinquent minor and placed him on probation for two years. OnMarch 6, 2002, the State filed a petition to revoke Joel's probation. On May 24, 2002, the State filed a supplemental petitionto revoke probation. The supplemental petition alleged battery(720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(2) (West 2000)) and aggravated battery (720ILCS 5/12-4(b)(6) (West 2000)). Also on May 24, 2002, the Statefiled another petition for adjudication of delinquency, makingthe same allegations. On July 12, 2002, the State filed anothersupplemental petition to revoke probation, alleging additionalprobation violations.

On July 29, 2002, the trial court held a hearing on theMay 24, 2002, supplemental petition to revoke probation allegingbattery and aggravated battery, and the May 24, 2002, petitionfor adjudication of delinquency alleging the same grounds. TheState chose to proceed only on the aggravated battery count alleging bodily harm to Jason Lewis, asserted to be a peace officerengaged in the execution of his official duties.

At the time of this incident, Joel was 15 years old anda student at an area special education district facility. Hisrecord indicates depression and anxiety with particular disability to control acting out as a result of panic. There is furtherindication that only a highly structured and controlled environment has provided any modification in Joel's behavior.

On May 21, 2002, Joel was attending Sangamon Area Special Education District (SASED), which he had attended sinceapproximately the end of April 2001. Lewis testified that he wasa police officer with the Springfield police department (SPD). He further testified that SASED hires police officers to providesecurity for the school, and SASED had hired him as security forthe school. He was in his third school year at SASED. Whenworking as security at SASED, he did not wear a uniform, but worea Springfield police shirt (which he described as a polo shirtwith an SPD logo) and carried a badge, a firearm, and handcuffs.

Lewis testified that he was asked to deal with a disturbance involving Joel. He escorted Joel to the principal'soffice. The principal began talking to Joel about the incident,and that was when Joel started making threats toward anotherstudent and yelling about the situation. At that point, Lewisput Joel in handcuffs. Lewis testified that "I felt for everyone's safety, myself[,] and hisself [sic], the principal, anybodythat was in that area--." After placing Joel in handcuffs, Lewisforcibly placed Joel in the chair because Joel refused to complywith Lewis's request to sit down. Lewis testified that he hadnot told Joel he was under arrest.

After Joel was placed in the chair, Lewis seated himself in another chair and began to complete paperwork. Almostimmediately thereafter, Joel kicked the table, which was pushedagainst a second table. Lewis was sitting at the intersection ofthe two tables, and his arm was pinched between the tables, causing a cut and bruise. Lewis testified that he cleaned the cut atthe school and did not go to the hospital.

The trial court found Joel committed aggravated batterythereby violating his probation. The court adjudicated Joel adelinquent minor and set the matter for a dispositional hearing.

In September 2002, the trial court committed Joel toDOC. The trial judge indicated that Joel has "emotional/mentalhealth problems, which nobody has ever put their finger on *** Ireally don't understand what Joel's emotional problems are ***. My biggest problem with Joel is he's got some sort of underlyingpsychiatric or mental health or severe emotional problems that Idon't really understand what they are." The common-law record isreplete with numerous incidents of "acting out" behavior, manifesting itself in batteries and burglaries. This appealfollowed.

II. ANALYSIS

Joel argues that the State failed to prove an essentialelement of aggravated battery of a police officer in the courseof performing his official duties, namely, that a police officerwas battered, and, second, that the charging instrument was voidas a matter of law in that the alleged battery was not committedupon a police officer during the course of his official dutiesbut on an off-duty police officer "moonlighting" as a securityguard. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

"When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of theevidence, the relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing theevidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, anyrational trier of fact could have found the essential elements ofthe crime beyond a reasonable doubt." In re J.A., 336 Ill. App.3d 814, 816, 784 N.E.2d 373, 375 (2003), citing Jackson v.Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct.2781, 2789 (1979).
 

B. The State Proved the Battery Was Committed Upon
a Peace Officer Performing Official Duties

In this case, to establish aggravated battery against apeace officer the State must prove that (1) Joel intentionally orknowingly caused bodily harm (2) knowing the individual harmed tobe a peace officer (3) who was performing official duties. SeePeople v. Barrett, 54 Ill. App. 3d 994, 370 N.E.2d 247 (1977);People v. Brown, 18 Ill. App. 3d 1049, 310 N.E.2d 498 (1974).

The testimony demonstrates that Joel knowingly kickedthe table. Lewis testified that Joel's kick would have hit himif the table legs had not been between them. Joel testified thathe knew he kicked the table, but that he did not see that itwould hit Lewis. When viewed most favorably to the prosecution,one must conclude that Joel's conduct in kicking the table wasintentional and the bodily harm from that intentional actnaturally resulted.

The second element of aggravated battery of a policeofficer engaged in official duties is that the respondent knowsthe individual is a police officer. Although Lewis was not inuniform, he wore a polo shirt with an SPD insignia and had hisbadge, his weapon, and handcuffs. The record indicates thatLewis had worked at the school for three years. Even though notestimony shows Joel's knowledge of Lewis's status, the recordindicates that Joel had attended SASED since the end of April2001.

In support of his argument, Joel cites People v. Bush,4 Ill. App. 3d 669, 281 N.E.2d 734 (1972), where the appellatecourt reversed the conviction of a 63-year-old citizen who hadbeen acquitted of public indecency but convicted of resistingarrest based upon testimony that the younger, larger, casuallydressed police officer was not credible. The court, whileemphasizing the numerous inconsistencies in the police officer'stestimony and the jury's acquittal on the underlying charge,noted that it was reasonable for the defendant to have questionedwhether the police officer was really a police officer given hiscasual attire and the fact that the defendant was beingapproached in a public rest room. Bush, 4 Ill. App. 3d at 673,281 N.E.2d at 737.

In contrast, here, Joel would have no reason toquestion Lewis's position and purpose at his school. Although notestimony in the record shows whether Joel knew Lewis was a peaceofficer engaged in the execution of his official duties ofproviding security to the school, testimony showed that SASEDhires police officers to provide security for the school. At thetime of the incident involving Joel, Lewis was on his third yearat SASED. While on duty, Lewis was wearing a polo shirt thatdisplayed the SPD logo and had his badge, firearm, and handcuffs. In addition, Joel had attended SASED for over a year at the timeof the incident. When viewed in the light most favorable to theprosecution, we conclude that Joel knew of Lewis's status as apolice officer.

The third element to be established is whether OfficerLewis was engaged in official duties. In Barrett, the courtconcluded that "an officer's duties are not constrained byspecific time or place limitations." Barrett, 54 Ill. App. 3d at997, 370 N.E.2d at 249.

In People v. Weaver, 100 Ill. App. 3d 512, 514, 426N.E.2d 1227, 1228 (1981), this court concluded that "a policeofficer has the duty to maintain public order wherever he may be,as long as he is within the State. His duties are not confinedto a specific time and place."

We find no "police-officer-as-school-security-guard"cases in Illinois. However, in State v. Duvall, No. 95-P-0140(Ohio Ct. App. 11 Dist. June 6, 1997) (1997 WL 360695), the OhioAppellate Court considered a claim that a police officer who was"moonlighting" as a security guard for a school district at afootball game was in performance of his official duties when hewas assaulted by the defendants. The Ohio court concluded thatthe issue was not whether an officer was "on duty" or "off duty"or being paid by the police employer or by a school system butwhether the officer was engaged in official duties. "[I]t isclear to this court that [the officer] was performing an officialduty by patrolling or monitoring the crowd and by attempting to'preserve the peace.'" Duvall, slip op. at ___ (1997 WL 360695 at*5). (We note Duvall is an unpublished opinion issued in 1997,prior to the Ohio Supreme Court's rule change that stated suchopinions issued "after the effective date of these rules may becited as legal authority and weighted as deemed appropriate bythe courts" (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Rep. R. 4(B) (West 2003))(adopted eff. May 1, 2002); prior to adoption of that rule,unpublished opinions were not controlling except as specified andwere persuasive only in the judicial district in which rendered(3 Ohio St. 3d Rep. Rs. 2(G)(1), (G)(2) (eff. March 1, 1983)).

When viewed in the light most favorable to theprosecution, we must accept the trial court's conclusion that thetestimony established that Joel knew that Lewis was a peaceofficer and that Lewis was engaged in official duties for thepurposes of the elements of the criminal statute (720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(6) (West 2000)). Consequently, the State proved beyond areasonable doubt Joel was guilty of aggravated battery of a peaceofficer in the course of official duties.
 

C. The Charging Instrument

Joel also argues that the charging instrument was voidas a matter of law because Lewis was off-duty, working as asecurity guard and not a police officer during the course ofofficial duties. Because we have determined that Lewis's dutiesas a police officer were not confined to a specific time andplace and, therefore, extended to wherever he may be, as long ashe is within the state (Weaver, 100 Ill. App. 3d at 514, 426N.E.2d at 1228), we conclude that the charging instrument was notdefective, and we need not address Joel's argument further.
 

III. CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

Affirmed.

COOK and McCULLOUGH, JJ., concur.