In re John C.M.

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In re John C.M.

State: Illinois

Court: 4th District Appellate

Docket No: 4-07-1030 Rel

Case Date: 05/12/2008

Preview:NO.

4-07-1030

Filed 5/12/08

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT In re: JOHN C.M., Alleged to be a Neglected Minor, THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS Petitioner-Appellee, v. ASHLEIGH MEGINNES, Respondent-Appellant. ) Appeal from ) Circuit Court ) of McLean County ) No. 07JA23 ) ) Honorable ) Donald D. Bernardi, ) Judge Presiding _________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH delivered the opinion of the court: In February 2007, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship of respondent, Ashleigh Meginnes's son, John C.M. (born December 14, 2005), alleging he was abused. August 2007, the trial court entered an adjudicatory order finding John to be neglected and placed him in the custody of his father, Alan Carter. On November 13, 2007, the court entered a The court found In

dispositional order finding respondent unfit.

Carter fit, placed John in Carter's custody, and closed the case. Carter is not a party to this appeal. Respondent appeals, contending (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to proceed at the dispositional hearing, which took place more than six months after John was removed from respondent's home; the court's dispositional order finding her unfit was against the manifest weight of the evidence; and (3) the court abused its discretion in finding Carter fit. We

disagree and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND On the afternoon of February 5, 2007, respondent took John to his pediatrician. John had bruising to the back of his Respondent told the pediatri-

head, extending from ear to ear.

cian that she placed John in bed the previous night at approximately 8 or 8:30 p.m. On February 5, at approximately noon,

respondent asked Andrew Mack, her then paramour, to wake John and change his diaper, at which time the bruising was discovered. Respondent and Mack denied causing the injury. Respondent could

provide no explanation to the pediatrician as to how John sustained the injuries. The pediatrician referred John to BroMenn John was immediately trans-

Hospital in Bloomington, Illinois.

ferred to St. Francis Hospital in Peoria, where a computerized tomography (CT) scan showed a subdural hematoma to the brain. On February 13, 2007, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship, alleging (1) John was abused, in that respondent or someone she entrusted inflicted on him physical injury by other than accidental means, which caused disfigurement, impairment of emotional health, or loss of impairment of any bodily function, in that John had bruising and swelling across the back of his head from ear to ear with no plausible explanation for the injury (705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(i) (West 2066)), - 2 -

and (2) John was neglected in that he was residing in an environment injurious to his welfare as respondent had unresolved issues of domestic violence creating a risk of harm for John (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2006)). On February 14, 2007, a shelter-care hearing was held. The trial court found probable cause that John was abused as respondent had (1) no plausible explanation for the bruising and swelling to John's head and (2) unresolved issues of domestic violence. A temporary custody order was issued placing guardian-

ship of John with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). John was placed by DCFS with Carter, who lived

apart from and was not involved in a current relationship with respondent. Respondent had no prior involvement with DCFS and a

law-enforcement-agencies-data-system (LEADS) check was negative. Carter had no prior involvement with DCFS, but a LEADS check was positive for residential burglary-criminal trespass to a residence in 2005, and the manufacture or delivery of cannabis in 2002. Respondent's paramour, Mack, had no prior involvement with DCFS, but he had several charges with no convictions for assault and drug possession. involved respondent. At a pretrial hearing on March 15, 2007, all parties waived the requirement that the adjudicatory hearing be held - 3 Two of those assault charges

within 90 days of the child being taken into custody. pretrial hearings were held in April and May.

Additional

In August 2007, the State amended the petition for adjudication of wardship, alleging (1) John was neglected and residing in an environment injurious to his welfare in that he suffered injuries to his head, (2) respondent acknowledged she was the primary caretaker for the minor, and (3) respondent had no plausible explanation consistent with the medical evidence to explain the injuries (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2006)). August 2, 2007, the adjudicatory hearing was held. On

Respondent

admitted the allegation in the amended petition, and the trial court entered an adjudicatory order finding John neglected. At

the adjudicatory hearing, the parties waived the right to hold the dispositional hearing within 30 days of the adjudicatory hearing. 12, 2007. On October 17, 2007, the State filed a notice that the dispositional hearing had been reset for November 13, 2007. Nothing in the record indicates why the dispositional hearing was continued from September 12 to November 13, 2007, or whether it was agreed to by respondent. In November 2007, DCFS filed a dispositional report that recommended guardianship of John be placed with Carter, the court find respondent unfit and Carter fit, and the case be - 4 The dispositional hearing was scheduled for September

closed.

In the dispositional report, DCFS outlined the parties' Respondent's goals included the

progress with service plans.

following: (1) successful completion of domestic-violence assessment and counseling, (2) maintenance of stable housing for herself and John, (3) counseling, (4) successful completion of parenting classes, and (5) obtaining and maintaining employment. As part of her domestic-violence assessment, respondent reported a history of domestic violence in her relationship with Carter, including that Carter physically abused her and was manipulative and controlling. While respondent was cooperative with services

and deemed to have achieved or was satisfactory in her serviceplan goals with the exception of housing, the report stated respondent did not seem to understand or apply the lessons from counseling as represented by her relationship with Mack. At the

time of the dispositional report, respondent no longer resided with Mack but was living with Michael Barnes, a new paramour. Carter's goals included the following: (1) successful completion of outpatient treatment for drugs and alcohol, (2) cooperation with DCFS, and (3) successful completion of parenting classes. No domestic-violence or anger-management goals were Carter was cooperative with services,

established for Carter.

and he was deemed to have achieved all of his service-plan goals. John was reported as having adjusted well to living with Carter. A psychological evaluation of respondent was conducted, - 5 -

and the report was filed with the court as part of the service plan. The psychologist, Joel Eckert, noted that the alleged

perpetrator remained unknown and that caused him great concern as to respondent's ability to protect John or any other child from abusive or nonnurturing men. Eckert recommended that if John

were returned to respondent's care, it be done slowly and be monitored to ensure "such a process proceeds safely." On November 13, 2007, a dispositional hearing was held. Respondent did not object to proceeding with the hearing. At the

hearing, the State recommended that respondent be found unfit, Carter be found fit, the minor remain in Carter's custody, and the court close its file on the matter without proceeding to a best-interests hearing. Respondent requested the court keep the

file open for additional time to prove her fitness to parent. The trial court denied respondent's request for additional time to prove her fitness, entered an order finding respondent unfit, found Carter fit, and granted custody and guardianship of John to Carter. The court closed the file. This appeal followed. II. ANALYSIS A. The Trial Court Had Subject-Matter Jurisdiction at the Dispositional Hearing 1. Requirements of Statutory Scheme Limit Time To Hold Dispositional Hearing to Six Months Respondent argues that the trial court lacked subject- 6 -

matter jurisdiction to proceed to disposition as more than six months elapsed after the removal of the minor from respondent's home, and as such, the trial court's order was void. The tempo-

rary custody order was entered on February 14, 2007, the adjudicatory hearing was held August 2, 2007, and the dispositional hearing was held November 13, 2007. Respondent

argues that because section 2-22(4) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-22(4) (West 2006)) limits the time to hold a dispositional hearing to a maximum of six months after removal of the minor from the home, the court was required to hold the dispositional hearing no later than August 14, 2007. Under the Act, the adjudicatory hearing must be commenced within 90 days of the date of service upon the minor, parents, or guardian. 705 ILCS 405/2-14(b) (West 2006). Upon

motion of the parties and a finding by the trial court that a continuance is in the child's best interests, the adjudicatory hearing may be continued for up to 30 days. (West 2006). 705 ILCS 405/2-14(c)

There is no question that the parties waived the

90-day time period to hold the adjudicatory hearing and the court found it in the child's best interests to do so, although the hearing was continued for more than 30 days. Respondent did not

object to the adjudicatory hearing being continued for more than 30 days. The dispositional hearing must be set within 30 days - 7 -

after an adjudicatory order is entered. st 2006).

705 ILCS 405/2-21(2)(We-

By consent of the parties and with approval of the

court consistent with the health, safety and best interests of the minor, the 30-day time period may be waived. 21(3) (West 2006). 705 ILCS 405/2-

Here, the parties waived the 30-day time

period and the court found it in the child's best interests to continue the hearing. Nothing indicates why the dispositional

hearing was continued from September 12 to November 13, 2007. Respondent did not object to proceeding with the dispositional hearing on November 13, 2007. The Act provides that the dispositional hearing shall be held within six months of the child being removed from his home: "[T]he court may adjourn the hearing for a reasonable period to receive reports or other evidence, if the adjournment is consistent with the health, safety[,] and best interests of the minor, but in no event shall continuances be granted so that the dispositional hearing occurs more than 6 months after the initial removal of [the] minor from his or her home." 22(4) (West 2006). Respondent argues this provision of the Act was not complied - 8 705 ILCS 405/2-

with, which dispossessed the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction. 2. Standard of Review Is De Novo Whether the circuit court properly exercised jurisdiction is reviewed de novo. In re Marriage of Chrobak, 349 Ill. A judgment

App. 3d 894, 897, 811 N.E.2d 1248, 1252 (2004).

entered by a court that lacked subject-matter jurisdiction is void and may be attacked at any time and in any proceeding. re Marriage of Adamson, 308 Ill. App. 3d 759, 764, 721 N.E.2d 166, 172 (1999). feited. (1992). 3. Respondent Argues Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Renders Order Void Respondent argues that the trial court's dispositional order was void for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. "Whether Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be forIn

Currie v. Lao, 148 Ill. 2d 151, 157, 592 N.E.2d 977, 979

a judgment is void or voidable presents a question of jurisdiction." People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 155, 619 N.E.2d 750, A voidable judgment is one entered erroneously by a Davis, 156 Ill.

754 (1993).

court and is not subject to collateral attack. 2d at 155-56, 619 N.E.2d at 754.

"'Judgments entered in a civil

proceeding may be collaterally attacked as void only where there is a total want of jurisdiction in the court which entered the judgment, either as to the subject matter or as to the parties.'" - 9 -

In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174, 692 N.E.2d 281, 284 (1998), quoting Johnston v. City of Bloomington, 77 Ill. 2d 108, 112, 395 N.E.2d 549, 550 (1979). "Once a court has acquired jurisdiction, an order will not be rendered void merely because of an error or impropriety in the issuing court's determination of the law. [Citations.] 'Accordingly, a court may not lose jurisdiction because it makes a mistake in determining either the facts, the law[,] or both.' [Citation.]" Marriage of Mitchell,

181 Ill. 2d at 174-75, 692 N.E.2d at 284. If respondent is correct and the trial court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction, the dispositional order is void; if respondent is incorrect and the trial court had jurisdiction, the only issue on appeal is whether the trial court's findings of fitness were against the manifest weight of the evidence. 4. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Before Belleville Toyota Requires Courts To Follow Strictures of Statute Respondent relies on In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 619 N.E. 2d 702 (1993), in support of the position that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. In M.M., the Illinois

Supreme Court concluded the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction under the Act when it restricted the guardianship administrator's - 10 -

authority to consent to adoption when the trial court required adoptive parents to agree to continued contact of the minors with their biological families. at 710. In M.M., appellants argued that changes to the Illinois Constitution in 1964 and 1970 fundamentally changed the power of the trial court to invoke subject-matter jurisdiction and that subject-matter jurisdiction could not be limited by the legislature. M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 64, 619 N.E.2d at 709. While recogM.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 66, 619 N.E.2d

nizing that subject-matter jurisdiction was conferred on courts by the constitution (with the exception of administrative review actions), the supreme court held the change made to the constitution did not give courts the power to proceed in derogation of a statute, as the effect of such a holding would render any statutory law a nullity. 10. M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 65, 619 N.E.2d at 709-

The legislature could define a "justiciable matter" so as to M.M., 156 Ill.

preclude or limit the circuit court's authority. 2d at 65-66, 619 N.E.2d at 710.

When a court's power to act is

controlled by statute, the court has limited jurisdiction and must proceed within the strictures of that statute. Ill. 2d at 66, 619 N.E.2d at 710. M.M., 156

As juvenile court proceedings

were special statutory proceedings, the scope and application of the Act were solely defined by the legislature. 2d at 66, 619 N.E.2d at 710. M.M., 156 Ill.

If a circuit court acts outside of - 11 -

the strictures of the statute, the court exceeds its statutory authority. M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 66, 619 N.E.2d at 710. There-

fore, when the trial court acted to limit, restrict, or condition the power of a guardian without specific statutory authority, the court exceeded its jurisdiction under the Act. at 66, 619 N.E.2d at 710. M.M., 156 Ill. 2d

Here, respondent argues the trial

court exceeded its jurisdiction under the Act when the dispositional hearing took place nine months after John was removed from respondent's home. The State argues that M.M. is

inapplicable to this case as the issue there was whether the trial court could restrict the guardian's power to consent to adoption; the supreme court did not even address the failure to comply with the time periods of the Act. Respondent also relies on In re S.G., 175 Ill. 2d 471, 677 N.E.2d 920 (1997), to support her position that the time periods of section 2-22 are mandatory. In S.G., the supreme

court ruled that the time periods outlined in section 2-14 of the Act that required an adjudicatory hearing within 90 days of service of process upon the parties were mandatory and the court was obligated to dismiss a petition for adjudication of wardship that was not completed in the prescribed time frame. Ill. 2d at 483, 677 N.E.2d at 926. S.G., 175

In arriving at its conclu-

sion, the court reviewed section 2-14 of the Act, which stated, in part: - 12 -

"(a) Purpose and policy.

The legisla-

ture recognizes that serious delay in the adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency cases can cause grave harm to the minor and the family and that it frustrates the best interests of the minor and the effort to establish permanent homes for children in need. The purpose of this [s]ection is to

insure that *** the State of Illinois will act in a just and speedy manner to determine the best interests of the minor ***. (b) When a petition is filed alleging that the minor is abused, neglected, or dependent, an adjudicatory hearing shall be held within 90 days of the date of service of process upon the minor, parents, any guardian[,] and any legal custodian." 405/2-14(a), (b) (West 1994). Section 2-14(c) allowed for a continuance upon good cause shown, not exceeding 30 days, if the continuance was in the best interests of the child. S.G., 175 Ill. 2d at 480-81, 677 N.E.2d at The section also 705 ILCS

924-25; 705 ILCS 405/2-14(c) (West 1994).

allowed for a waiver of the time limits by consent of all the parties and on approval of the court. - 13 S.G., 175 Ill. 2d at 481,

677 N.E.2d at 925; 705 ILCS 405/2-14(d) (West 1994). In S.G., the court concluded that the legislature intended a mandatory construction of section 2-14 and upheld dismissal of the petition. at 925. S.G., 175 Ill. 2d at 482, 677 N.E.2d

The court distinguished an earlier decision, In re

Armour, 59 Ill. 2d 102, 104, 319 N.E.2d 496, 498 (1974), which read the term "shall" in the Act as directory, rather than mandatory. S.G, 175 Ill. 2d at 481, 677 N.E.2d at 925. In the

Armour decision, the supreme court construed a provision requiring that a petition "shall be set for an adjudicatory hearing within 30 days." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 37, par. 704-2. In

reaching the decision that the language was directory, the supreme court considered the intent of the legislature and concluded that dismissing a petition would not further the goals of the Act to rehabilitate and protect minors. S.G., 175 Ill. 2d

at 481, 671 N.E.2d at 925, citing Armour, 59 Ill. 2d at 104-05, 319 N.E.2d at 498. The Armour court also concluded that the

language of the statute did not evince the legislative intent necessary for a mandatory construction as it did not include a consequence for failure to set the adjudicatory hearing within the time period. 498. In S.G., the court explained that the Armour decision was distinguishable because section 2-14 of the Act had an - 14 Armour, 59 Ill. 2d at 104-05, 319 N.E.2d at

explicit statement of policy that delay could cause harm to minors and the section gave direction as to how time periods were calculated and the manner of granting continuances. Ill. 2d at 481, 677 N.E.2d at 925. S.G., 175

The court highlighted that

section 2-14 contained a specific provision for dismissal without prejudice of any petition where an adjudicatory hearing was not timely held, evidencing legislative intent to make the time period of section 2-14 mandatory. 677 N.E.2d at 925. The State argues S.G. is distinguishable from the case sub judice as S.G. interpreted section 2-14 of the Act which provides for dismissal of the petition for failure to comply with the time periods. The State argues that, as in Armour where the S.G., 175 Ill. 2d at 481-82,

supreme court found the 30-day hearing requirement as directory rather than mandatory, section 2-22(4) does not have dismissal language. The State argues the trial court retains subject-

matter jurisdiction even when it fails to hold a hearing within the statutory time frames. In support thereof, the State relies on In re C.S., 294 Ill. App. 3d 780, 786, 691 N.E.2d 161, 165 (1998), where this court held that when a trial court fails to proceed "'within the strictures of the statute'" the court does not lose its constitutionally conferred subject-matter jurisdiction, but, instead, proceeds in error because it lacks statutory authority. In C.S.,

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this court stated any error a trial court commits by not holding the adjudicatory and dispositional hearings prior to the statutory deadlines of sections 2-14 and 2-21 of the Act did not render the order void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. C.S., 299 Ill. App. 3d at 786, 691 N.E.2d at 165. Statutory authority and compliance with mandates of the Act were required for trial courts to obtain and maintain subject-matter jurisdiction. 748 N.E.2d 183, 189 (2001). In re A.H., 195 Ill. 2d 408, 416, In A.H., the supreme court again

recognized that statutory authority must be contained in the Act before a court may order removal of a child from a foster home. DCFS challenged the trial court's authority to order a placement change for a child in foster care, arguing that power lay only with the guardianship administrator of DCFS. The court noted

that removal of a child from a parent's care because of abuse, neglect, and dependency was not known at common law or equity. A.H., 195 Ill. 2d at 415-16, 748 N.E.2d at 188-89. As that grant

of authority to remove an abused child was purely statutory in nature, the trial court had to "'proceed within the strictures of the statute.'" A.H., 195 Ill. 2d at 416, 748 N.E.2d at 189, The court

quoting M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 66, 619 N.E.2d at 710.

found that the juvenile court had jurisdiction in that particular instance to order the removal of a child from a foster placement, as the language of the Act expressly granted that authority to

- 16 -

circuit courts.

A.H., 195 Ill. 2d at 420, 748 N.E.2d at 191. "In particular, section 2-10(2) autho-

rizes the court to 'enter such other orders related to the temporary custody [of the minor] as it deems fit and proper, including the provision of services to the minor or his family to ameliorate the causes contributing to the finding of probable cause or the finding of the existence of immediate and urgent necessity.' tion.] *** (Emphasis in original.) [Cita-

We believe, however, that the

phrase 'such other orders' contemplates the authority to enter an order to remove a minor from his temporary foster care because the order is related to the minor's temporary custody." A.H., 195 Ill. 2d at 419-20, 748

N.E.2d at 191. While the statutory language did not explicitly grant the trial court authority to order removal of a child, the appellate court found sufficient authorization in the general language of the statute to confer jurisdiction on the court to order removal of the child. 5. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Reexamined in Belleville Toyota The supreme court reexamined subject-matter jurisdic-

- 17 -

tion in a series of cases sometimes referred to as the "Belleville Toyota" cases. Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514,

759 N.E.2d 509 (2001); Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 770 N.E.2d 177 (2002); People ex rel. Graf v. Village of Lake Bluff, 206 Ill. 2d 541, 795 N.E.2d 281 (2003). The cases cited by respondent, M.M. and

S.G., as well as A.H., reiterate that trial courts must strictly adhere to limitations set forth in statutes in order to possess subject-matter jurisdiction. In Steinbrecher, issued five months

after A.H., the court recognized the effect amendments made to the Illinois Constitution in 1964 and 1970 had on the power of courts to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction. The amendments

expanded circuit courts into courts of general jurisdiction, no longer restricted by statutory limitations. provided: "'Circuit Court[s] shall have unlimited original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters." Ill. Const. 1870, art. VI,

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