JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:

In December 1998, the State sought to terminate theparental rights of respondent, Walter (Bert) McDonald, to hischildren, K.A. and C.McD. In November 1999, the trial courtgranted the motion. In December 1999, Bert filed a posttrialmotion seeking to vacate the November judgment. After thehearing, the court took the motion under advisement, stating itwould bring the parties back into court to orally announce itsruling. Instead, the court entered a written order in March 2000but the parties were not advised of the entry of the order.

In June 2000, the trial court conducted a permanencyreview hearing on the progress of respondent mother, MelissaAdkins, in the same case numbers. The parties then learned ofthe March 2000 order and the court purported to toll the timelimitation for filing an appeal of its termination of Bert'sparental rights until that date, June 8, 2000. Respondentparents appealed; but in November 2000, we dismissed the appealon appellee's motion, which argued the trial court was withoutjurisdiction to toll the time for filing the notices of appeal. In re K.A., Nos. 4-00-0617, 4-00-0618 cons. (November 15, 2000)(dismissed on appellee's motion), appeal denied, 194 Ill. 2d 568,747 N.E.2d 352 (2001) (denied on April 4, 2001).

In March 2002, respondent parents filed a petitionunder section 2-1401 of the Civil Practice Law (735 ILCS 5/2-1401(West 2000)) to vacate the March 2000 termination of Bert'sparental rights. In May 2002, the trial court granted thepetition, vacated the March 2000 order, and reentered the sameorder. Respondent parents appeal, challenging the trial court'sunfitness and best interests findings as against the manifestweight of the evidence and claiming the trial court violatedMelissa's due process rights. We dismiss the appeal.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 15, 1996, the trial court adjudicated K.A.(born August 30, 1995), the minor child of respondents, Melissaand Bert, neglected pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the JuvenileCourt Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 1996)). OnNovember 26, 1996, the court adjudicated K.A. a ward of the courtand appointed the Department of Children and Family Services(DCFS) as her guardian with the power to place her. K.A. wasinitially placed in relative foster care and then returned toMelissa's care on November 25, 1998.

On January 28, 1998, C.McD. (born December 10, 1997),another minor child of Melissa and Bert, was adjudicated neglected also pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Act (705 ILCS405/2-3(1)(b) (West 1996)). That same date, C.McD. was made award of the court with DCFS appointed as his guardian with thepower to place him. DCFS left C.McD. in the custody of Melissaand never removed him.

On December 12, 1998, the State filed a petition toterminate Bert's parental rights, alleging he was unfit becausehe failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of K.A.and C.McD. within 12 months of the adjudication of neglectpursuant to section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act. 750 ILCS50/1(D)(m) (West 1998). On January 4, 1999, Bert filed a petition for substitution of judge. A new judge was assigned to hearthe petition for termination of parental rights on January 5,1999. On November 10, 1999, the trial court found Bert unfit onthe grounds alleged and granted the State's petition.

On December 9, 1999, Bert filed a posttrial motion tovacate the order of termination previously entered. On February2, 2000, the trial court heard the motion, took the motion underadvisement, and stated it would notify all parties and bring themback to court to announce its ruling orally. The court did notdo so. Instead, on March 24, 2000, the court issued a writtenorder denying the posttrial motion. No notice was given to anyof the parties the order had been entered, nor was a copy of theorder sent to any of the parties.

Melissa's parental rights had not been terminated, andDCFS still held guardianship of K.A. and C.McD. On June 8, 2000,a review hearing was held before the original judge assigned tothis case, regarding her progress in caring for the children. The parties then discovered an order denying Bert's posttrialmotion had been entered on March 24, 2000. At the review hearing, in an attempt to provide appeal rights for Bert, the judgeentered the following order:

"The court hereby finds that custom and practice of this [c]ounty that the [c]ircuit[c]lerk would provide copies of orders entered to all parties was not followed inregards to the [o]rder [d]enying [the][posttrial] [m]otion filed on March 24, 2000. The [c]ourt hereby orders that the time limitations for filing an appeal begin to toll onJune 8, 2000[,] as the order was not finaluntil June 8, 2000[,] when all parties becameaware of said order."

On July 6, 2000, Melissa appealed (No. 4-00-0617) andon July 10, 2000, Bert appealed (No. 4-00-0618). The appealswere consolidated. Upon appellee's motion, which argued respondents' notices of appeal were untimely, because the trial courtwas without jurisdiction to toll the period for filing the noticeof appeal, this court dismissed the appeal. In re K.A., Nos. 4-00-0617, 4-00-0618 cons. (November 15, 2000) (dismissed onappellee's motion).

On March 5, 2002, over 16 months after the appeal wasdismissed, Melissa, later joined by Bert, filed a petitionpursuant to section 2-1401 of the Civil Practice Law (735 ILCS5/2-1401 (West 2000)) to vacate the order of March 24, 2000,because the trial court was to have entered the order orally inthe parties' presence and no notice of the written order was evergiven to the parties until they discovered the entry of theorder. This discovery occurred after the 30-day period forfiling a notice of appeal had expired, and the additional 30-dayperiod for filing a late notice of appeal had also expired. Ahearing was held on this motion on May 15, 2002, at which timethe petition was allowed. The trial court vacated its order ofMarch 24, 2000, and then reentered the same order denying theposttrial motion to vacate its order terminating Bert's parentalrights.

On June 5, 2002, Melissa filed a notice of appeal withthe trial court and on June 12, 2002, Bert did so (No. 4-02-0488). Their appeals have been consolidated, and they filed ajoint brief.

II. ANALYSIS

They argue, first, the trial court erred in construingsection 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act and finding Bert was unfitdue to failure to make reasonable progress toward the return ofthe child, where K.A. was returned to Melissa's custody prior tothe filing of the petition to terminate and C.McD. was neverremoved from Melissa's custody. Second, they contend the trialcourt's findings that Bert was unfit and termination was in thebest interest of K.A. and C.McD. were against the manifest weightof the evidence. Finally, they contend Melissa's due processrights were violated when the State pursued the petition toterminate Bert's parental rights because of her private interestin making decisions concerning the care, custody, and control ofher children.

The State argues, first, this court need not addressthe termination of Bert's parental rights because Bert andMelissa are not entitled to any relief under section 2-1401 andmay not challenge the trial court's termination order in thisappeal because notice of appeal was untimely filed. Bert andMelissa argue the State has waived any argument regarding thevalidity of the trial court's action in granting the section 2-1401 petition by failing to file a cross-appeal or a separateappeal. Lagen v. Balcor Co., 274 Ill. App. 3d 11, 14, 653 N.E.2d968, 970 (1995).

We acknowledge the general rule an appellee may notraise any issues on appeal that have not been raised in a cross-appeal. However, the waiver rule is a principle of administrative convenience, an admonition to the parties; it is not ajurisdictional requirement or any limitation upon the jurisdiction of a reviewing court. Dillon v. Evanston Hospital, 199 Ill.2d 483, 504-05, 771 N.E.2d 357, 371 (2002). We conclude waiverdoes not preclude us from considering the issue because section2-1401 petitions may not be used as a means of obtaining a newtime period in which to appeal from a trial court order. A trialcourt lacks the authority to extend the time for filing a noticeof appeal. Mitchell v. Fiat-Allis, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 143, 149,632 N.E.2d 1010, 1012 (1994).

The facts in Mitchell are similar to those in thiscase. In Mitchell, a claimant filed a worker's compensationcomplaint, which was dismissed as not being proved. The determination was upheld on administrative review. Mitchell, 158 Ill.2d at 145-46, 632 N.E.2d at 1010. The claimant's attorney didnot discover the order had been entered until more than 30 dayshad elapsed. Then, upon the suggestion of the circuit court, hefiled a section 2-1401 petition to vacate the order, which thetrial court granted, after which the court reentered the sameorder. The claimant then filed a notice of appeal. Mitchell,158 Ill. 2d at 146-47, 632 N.E.2d at 1011. The appellate courtfound a section 2-1401 petition was inappropriate for extendingthe time for filing an appeal beyond the 30-day period providedin Supreme Court Rule 303(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)); but foundit could exercise jurisdiction on grounds of equity, finding thelitigant should not be penalized by his attorney's actions. Mitchell, 158 Ill. 2d at 149-50, 632 N.E.2d at 1012.

On appeal, the supreme court noted it previously held atrial court lacked the authority to extend the time for filing anotice of appeal. Mitchell, 158 Ill. 2d at 149, 632 N.E.2d at1012. As for the claim of equity, the court stated it was notinsensitive to the concern of penalizing the litigant for hisattorney's actions, but the court noted its responsibility toadminister its own rules and stated "neither the trial court northe appellate court has the 'authority to excuse compliance withthe filing requirements of the supreme court rules governingappeals.'" Mitchell, 158 Ill. 2d at 150, 632 N.E.2d at 1012,quoting In re Smith, 80 Ill. App. 3d 380, 382, 399 N.E.2d 701,702 (1980). The court held the appellate court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal. Mitchell, 158 Ill. 2d at 151, 632N.E.2d at 1013.

Rule 303(a)(1) provides notice of appeal from finaljudgments in civil cases must be filed with the clerk of thecircuit court within 30 days after entry of final judgment. 155Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1). Subsection (d) of Rule 303 provides for anextension of this time period for an additional 30 days "[o]nmotion supported by a showing of reasonable excuse for failure tofile a notice of appeal on time." 155 Ill. 2d R. 303(d). Atrial court loses jurisdiction over the matters resolved in itsorders after 30 days have elapsed from entry of the orders.Mitchell, 158 Ill. 2d at 149, 632 N.E.2d at 1012.

It is tempting to attempt to distinguish Mitchell. Thetrial judge told the parties the order disposing of the posttrialmotion would be orally entered in their presence. It was not,and they had no actual notice of its entry for well over 60 days. This is also a case involving parental rights, and such casesshould be disposed of on their merits. It is also tempting tocomment upon the issues and the evidence so the parties wouldknow whether the judgment would have been affirmed. We are alsointerested in whether Melissa has standing to appeal from anorder terminating Bert's parental rights. We will, however,resist temptation and decline the opportunity to address issuesnot properly before us.

Mitchell, 158 Ill. 2d at 151, 632 N.E.2d at 1013,refers to such a dismissal as a harsh result. This descriptionis meant, I suppose, to ameliorate what has happened--we shrugand impliedly suggest we sympathize with the parties, but we areconstrained by the rules. And so we are.

III. CONCLUSION

Appeal dismissed.

APPLETON, J., specially concurs.

MYERSCOUGH, P.J., dissents.

JUSTICE APPLETON, specially concurring:

I concur with the decision reached by Justice Knechtbut write separately to state that I do so only because oursupreme court has commanded this result by its decision inMitchell, 158 Ill. 2d 143, 632 N.E.2d 1010. While I feel boundto adhere to that decision, I would, if free to do so, concurwith Justice Myerscough's dissent in this case.

The procedural facts of this case are not unique. Through human error by those in the court system, the partieswere deprived of their appellate rights. These kinds of errorsoccur in every one of the 30 counties in this district. In thisinstance, the error was committed by the trial court. In mostother instances, the errors are committed by the employees of thecircuit clerk's office. In both instances, the aggrieved partyhas no recourse because of the immunities bestowed upon eachofficial.

Our supreme court's admonition to counsel for vigilancein frequent checking with the trial court or the clerk as to thestatus of an awaited order is, I believe, misplaced. An attorneyis rightfully wary of making a pest of himself or herself withthe trial court for fear of creating prejudice in the mind of thetrial court. It is also unrealistic for counsel to rely on clerkpersonnel with regard to the status of an order, as those personnel are the same persons who were supposed to have mailed anorder in the first place. If they cannot be trusted to mail theorder, they probably cannot be trusted to correctly advise as tocase status.

A better rule would be to provide a safety valve forthe preservation of a party's appellate rights, such as to allowthe 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal to run from theactual notice of the entry of an order, where that time is laterthan its entry and is supported by an affidavit from the trialcourt or clerk to the effect that an error of omission preventedan appealing party from knowing of the order being appealedwithin the 30-day period.

PRESIDING JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. It is not just tempting todistinguish Mitchell. We are bound to distinguish Mitchell. Inthis case, the trial court specifically indicated that it wouldrule in the parties' presence, leading the parties to believethey had no Mitchell obligation to check for court rulings. Toadd insult to injury, the circuit clerk failed to follow theusual and customary practice of providing copies of the court'sorder to the parties. If the court had not conducted a reviewhearing on June 8, 2000, the parties still would not know thecourt had ruled.

The trial court was correct when it set aside the March24, 2000, order and entered it June 8, 2000. The court set asidenot only a ministerial error (Graves v. Pontiac Firefighters'Pension Board, 281 Ill. App. 3d 508, 516, 667 N.E.2d 136, 141(1996)), but also a judicial error. See Needham v. White Laboratories Inc., 639 F.2d 394, 398 (7th Cir. 1981). The courtclearly never expressed its order publicly in words at the situsof the proceeding as required. See Granite City Lodge No. 272,Loyal Order of the Moose v. City of Granite City, 141 Ill. 2d122, 127, 565 N.E.2d 929, 931 (1990).

For these reasons, this court should address the issuesand the evidence herein.