NOS. 4-02-0977, 4-03-0079 cons.

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondent, Arian Keon Clark, appeals the trial court'sorder (1) setting child support at $8,500 a month, (2) orderinghim to pay all uncovered medical expenses for Keon C., bornFebruary 29, 2000, (3) ordering him to pay attorney fees, and (4)finding him in indirect civil contempt. We affirm as modifiedand remand with directions.

I. BACKGROUND

In February 2001, petitioner, Jamie Hall, filed apetition to establish a parent and child relationship on behalfof Keon C., alleging that respondent was the minor's naturalfather. In July 2001, respondent admitted the allegation ofpaternity. In August 2001, the trial court entered a temporaryorder, granting petitioner custody of Keon C. subject to respondent's visitation rights, ordering respondent to pay $3,000 amonth in temporary child support to be due by the first day ofeach month beginning in July 2001, and ordering respondent to payall medical expenses on behalf of Keon C.

In October 2002, the trial court held a hearing on allissues. The record demonstrates that the parties lived togetherfrom March 1999 to September 2000, six months of which were afterKeon C. was born. When respondent played professional basketballwith the Denver Nuggets, the parties lived in Denver, Colorado,in a four- or five-bedroom apartment that respondent purchasedand for which he paid approximately $2,200 per month. At thetime of the hearing, petitioner was 25 years old and rented athree-bedroom apartment in Indianapolis, Indiana, where sheresided with Keon C. and her eight-year-old son. Petitionerworked part-time at Methodist Hospital, earning $9.93 per hour,and attended Ivy Tech State College in its graphic design program, expecting to graduate in December 2003. Petitioner'sfinancial affidavit revealed that her net monthly income was$731.64, her expenses were $4,220.97, $282.65 of which wereeducational expenses. She estimated that she spent "maybe"$1,000 a month for Keon C., but admitted that she was estimating,and she really did not "have any idea." Petitioner admitted thatrespondent does have health insurance for Keon C., and respondenthad paid to date all the uncovered medical expenses for Keon C.

In his financial affidavit, respondent listed$16,246.32 in monthly expenses ($3,000 of which was for childsupport) and $58,404.75 in net monthly income. The recordreveals that in 2001, respondent earned $1.4 million. Respondenttestified that as of October 1, 2002, he was moving to Sacramento, California, where he would be employed as a professionalbasketball player with the Sacramento Kings. Effective November1, 2002, his salary would increase to $4.5 million. He incurredapproximately $45,000 in business expenses per year. He rented afour-bedroom house with a basement in California for which hepaid approximately $2,000 in monthly rent.

On October 18, 2002, the trial court entered an orderestablishing, in part, child support at $8,500 a month, whichamounted to a downward deviation from the full 20% set forth bystatute. The court directed the parties to calculate the arrearage owed back to March 1, 2001. The court ordered the calculation to be submitted to the court within five days from entry ofits order, and the arrearage was to be "figured up to the firstpayment of support under this [o]rder, which is the first Fridayin November 2002." The court further ordered the resultingarrearage to be paid within 30 days of the entry of the order. Both parties submitted their own child-support computations basedon respondent's gross income of $1.4 million, as reported on his2001 income-tax return.

On November 1, 2002, petitioner filed a request forattorney fees of $4,387, which the trial court granted. OnNovember 15, 2002, respondent filed his notice of appeal, appealing that part of the court's order (1) establishing child supportat $8,500 per month retroactive to March 1, 2001, and (2) ordering him to pay petitioner's attorney fees. On November 18, 2002,petitioner filed a notice of hearing for status and set thematter for hearing for December 5, 2002.

On December 5, 2002, neither respondent nor his attorney appeared for the status hearing. After the hearing, thatsame day, petitioner filed a petition for rule to show cause,requiring respondent to show why he should not be held in contempt of court for failing to obey the court's October 18, 2002,order, specifically, failing to (1) make his December 2002 childsupport payment of $8,500, (2) pay the $125,000 arrearage byDecember 2, 2002, and (3) provide an insurance card to petitionerfor Keon C. The petition further alleged that a hearing had beenscheduled for 8:30 a.m., December 5, 2002, and respondent'sattorney failed to appear. On December 5, 2002, the trial courtissued a rule to show cause, ordering respondent and his attorneyto appear before the court on December 11, 2002, or be subject toa body attachment.

Respondent filed a response to the petition for rule toshow cause, arguing that (1) his notice of appeal automaticallystayed the trial court's October 8, 2002, order; (2) at the timethe notice for hearing on the status and the hearing on thestatus was held, the trial court no longer had jurisdictionbecause of the notice of appeal he filed; and (3) the rule toshow cause issued December 5, 2002, was done without notice torespondent's attorney and, therefore, violated respondent's dueprocess rights. Respondent argued that his attorney received thepetition for rule to show cause and the rule to show cause byordinary mail late Monday afternoon, December 9, 2002, less than48 hours before the scheduled hearing at 2:45 p.m., December 11,2002.

In January 2003, the trial court entered an order onthe rule to show cause, finding (1) that the notice of appeal didnot stay the enforcement of money judgment because no appeal bondaccompanied it and no motion for stay of enforcement was filed,and (2) respondent in contempt for his failure to abide by thecourt's October 18, 2002, order. In addition, the court provideda purge provision. In January 2003, respondent filed a motionfor leave to file an amended notice of appeal, which this courtgranted.

This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Child Support

Respondent first complains that the trial court did notsufficiently deviate downward from the statutory guideline (see750 ILCS 5/505(a)(1) (West 2000)) in setting child support. Specifically, respondent argues that the trial court erred inestablishing child support at $8,500 per month, such an amountresults in a windfall to both petitioner and her other child, andis excessive. Respondent posits petitioner "should certainly beable to provide Keon [C.] with a comfortable life-style at $3,000per month." Respondent acknowledges that he earns a largeincome; however, he contends that his large income does notjustify awarding a child support obligation 8 1/2 times greaterthan Keon C.'s needs, especially because petitioner is alsosupporting another child from a different relationship. Respondent argues that the $3,000-per-month amount he proposed takesinto account the standard of living Keon C. would have enjoyedhad the parties' relationship not ended, as well as the otherfactors outlined in section 505(a) of the Illinois Marriage andDissolution of Marriage Act (Marriage Act) (750 ILCS 5/505(a)(West 2000)). We disagree.

Section 505(a)(1) of the Marriage Act sets forthguidelines for determining the percentage amount of child support. 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(1) (West 2000). Section 505(a) of theMarriage Act (750 ILCS 5/505(a) (West 2000)) creates a rebuttablepresumption that a specified percentage of a noncustodial parent's income represents an appropriate child-support award. Inthe case of one child, the minimum amount of child support thatthe trial court should order is 20% of the noncustodial parent'snet income. "Compelling reasons must exist in order to overcomethat presumption and permit the court to deviate from the guidelines." In re Marriage of Stanley, 279 Ill. App. 3d 1083, 1085,666 N.E.2d 340, 341 (1996); see also In re Marriage of Ackerley,333 Ill. App. 3d 382, 396, 775 N.E.2d 1045, 1057 (2002). Thequestion of whether to deviate downward from the statutoryguidelines when dealing with above-average incomes presents adilemma, and the court must balance competing concerns. In reMarriage of Lee, 246 Ill. App. 3d 628, 643, 615 N.E.2d 1314, 1326(1993). A determination on the appropriate amount of childsupport will be reversed only if the trial court abused itsdiscretion. In re Marriage of Takata, 304 Ill. App. 3d 85, 96,709 N.E.2d 715, 723 (1999).

1. Windfall and Keon C.'s Needs

Respondent complains that the child support is awindfall to petitioner and is more than is necessary to meet KeonC's needs. We disagree. This court in In re Marriage of Bush,191 Ill. App. 3d 249, 261, 547 N.E.2d 590, 597 (1989), emphasizedthat a child-support award is not intended as a windfall to thecustodial parent. In that case, however, the facts involved asituation where both parents' individual incomes were more thansufficient to meet the child's needs and allow him the lifestylehe would have enjoyed if the parties had not divorced. Thecourt's holding was clearly limited to such circumstances. Thecourt stated:

"We now hold that where the individual incomes of both parents are more than sufficient to provide the reasonable needs of theparties' children, taking into account thelife-style the children would have absent thedissolution, the court is justified in setting a figure below the guideline amount." Bush, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 260, 547 N.E.2d at596.

In contrast, here, petitioner's net monthly income of $731.64 isnominal compared to respondent's approximate net income of$58,404 and clearly could not be considered sufficient to providethe reasonable needs of Keon C. taking into account his lifestylebefore the parties separated and the lifestyle Keon C. would haveenjoyed had the parties not separated. A child is not expectedto have to live at a minimal level of comfort while thenoncustodial parent is living a life of luxury. In re Marriageof Bussey, 108 Ill. 2d 286, 297, 483 N.E.2d 1229, 1234 (1985).

Petitioner's affidavit of monthly living expenses forher household totaled approximately $4,220. The child supportestablished by the trial court totals $8,500 per month, which nowexceeds the monthly expenses for the entire household, but achild's entitlement to a level of support is not limited to hisor her "shown needs." Respondent's argument that the amount ofchild support exceeds the amount petitioner testified that shespent monthly on Keon C.--approximately $1,000--is but one factorto be considered. The Supreme Court of Illinois in Bussey, 108Ill. 2d at 297-98, 483 N.E.2d at 1234, "decline[d] to acceptpetitioner's argument that a child is only entitled to receivesupport for his 'shown needs' when the noncustodial parent isobviously 'enjoying' a standard of living far above that of thechild." In Ackerley, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 396, 775 N.E.2d at1057, the trial court awarded $3,000 per month for one child. Even though the award was below the statutory minimum, the ex-husband appealed, claiming that it was greater than the needs ofthe child. In affirming, the appellate court pointed out thatneeds are just one of the factors to consider. The court went onto state:

"[I]t is inferrable that, if the marriage had not dissolved, petitioner's sonwould have been enjoying a higher standard ofliving. Had he been enjoying the same standard of living while residing withpetitioner, it is apparent that the family'smonthly expenses would have been higher." Ackerley, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 395-96, 775N.E.2d at 1057.

Another court stated it slightly differently:

"[W]here a noncustodial parent has the ability to pay support in excess of the statedneeds of the child, a court may order childsupport in excess of the needs to enable thechild to enjoy the standard of living hewould have had if the marriage had not beendissolved." In re Marriage of Rogliano, 198Ill. App. 3d 404, 412, 555 N.E.2d 1114, 1119(1990).

At the time of trial, respondent had only one child. Therefore, under the guidelines, he would be responsible to paymonthly child support based on 20% of his income. 750 ILCS5/505(a)(1) (West 2000)). The parties based their calculationson respondent's 2001 income. Petitioner calculated that 20% ofrespondent's net monthly income would result in a child-supportpayment of approximately $13,946. Respondent calculated 20% ofhis net monthly income and arrived at approximately $12,905 permonth. Based upon the relative financial needs and resources ofthe parties and the standard of living respondent's son wouldhave enjoyed had the parties not separated, the trial courtdetermined that $8,500 per month was adequate. The court did notabuse its discretion.

We recognize that the support of a child is the jointobligation of the parents; however, when one parent earns adisproportionately greater income than the other, that parentclearly should bear a larger share of the support. See In reMarriage of Singleteary, 293 Ill. App. 3d 25, 38, 687 N.E.2d1080, 1089 (1997). The record shows that the financial resourcesof respondent are considerable, and the trial court could inferthat they are more than ample to meet his needs. 750 ILCS5/505(a)(2)(e) (West 2000). In 2001, respondent earned approximately $1.4 million. He testified that his income for 2002 hadincreased approximately 10 to 20%, and effective November 2003,he would begin earning approximately $4.5 million. Given respondent's considerable income, the trial court was entitled to inferthat respondent's son would have enjoyed a high standard ofliving had the parties not separated. 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(2)(c)(West 2000). The resources of petitioner, conversely, are muchsmaller. 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(2)(b) (West 2000).

2. Child From a Different Relationship

Respondent argues the child support exceeds the needsof petitioner and Keon C. and, therefore, petitioner's otherchild from a different relationship would ultimately receive abenefit from the child support he provides to Keon C. Respondentrelies on People ex rel. Graham v. Adams, 239 Ill. App. 3d 643,646, 608 N.E.2d 614, 616 (1993), which held no duty existed onthe part of the respondent to support either the petitioner orher other children. However, Graham is not analogous to thepresent case.

In Graham, the trial court actually deviated downwardfrom the guidelines, ordering the noncustodial father to pay $400a month in child support. The court recognized that the custodial mother not only cared for respondent's son, but also twoother children from other relationships, and was expectinganother child, also from another relationship. In addition, shehad received public aid payments for much of the time since thebirth of the first child and supported her family on approximately $1,600 per month. Under the guidelines, the father shouldhave been required to pay approximately $1,600 per month. If theguidelines were strictly followed, the court found respondentwould either be supporting other members in the family, or hisson, for expenditure purposes, would be treated differently fromthe other family members. Graham, 239 Ill. App. 3d at 646, 608N.E.2d at 616. The court concluded that when confronted with acase such as that, a balancing test must be employed. Graham,239 Ill. App. 3d at 647, 608 N.E.2d at 617. The trial court isbest suited to make this type of determination. Graham, 239 Ill.App. 3d at 647, 608 N.E.2d at 617. The appellate court specifically stated that it was not determining whether the child-support payments of $400 per month were sufficient. Rather, itdecided that the issue needed to be remanded for further hearingand application of the balancing test. The court noted that thetrial court did not make an "express" finding of reasons fordeviation from the guidelines, but the trial court determinedthat "'child support should be awarded in a sum less than [theminimum guidelines] due to the needs of the minor and the substantial income of [respondent].'" Graham, 239 Ill. App. 3d at647, 608 N.E.2d at 617.

Graham did not "stress" that the standard-of-livingfactor should receive less emphasis than other child-supportfactors in a case where the custodial parent has another child,as respondent contends. The court simply stated that the "balancing test requires consideration of all factors as set forth insection 505(a)(2) of the Marriage Act, with an adjustment to andpossibly less emphasis on section 505(a)(2)(c) [(standard ofliving)] [citation]." (Emphasis added.) Graham, 239 Ill. App.3d at 647, 608 N.E.2d at 617. Graham simply recognizes that whenthe custodial parent has another child, a balancing test isnecessary on a case-by-case basis, some cases "possibly" requiring less emphasis on the standard of living.

In the present case, the trial court specificallydiscussed the guidelines outlined in section 505(a) (750 ILCS5/505(a) (West 2000)) and followed Graham in reaching its decision, in fact deviating substantially downward from the guidelines. The court acknowledged that it had minimized the importance of subsection (c) (standard of living) of the guidelines inmaking its decision but, nonetheless, recognized that the amountordered also took into consideration the standard of living KeonC. enjoyed while living with his father. The court stated, inpart:

"Taking into consideration the affidavitof income and expenses filed by the[p]etitioner, particularly as it relates toKeon, and further taking into considerationall of the factors set forth in [s]ection505(a)(2) ***, the [c]ourt finds it reasonable that [r]espondent pay to the[p]etitioner the sum of $8,500 a month support. This sum will allow [p]etitioner topay for day[-]care expenses, clothing[,] andentertainment events, as well as towardsdaily living expenses for Keon. *** Keonwill be afforded individual opportunities dueto the support paid by his father, such asthe child care and perhaps pre[]school educational and curricular opportunities that henow does not have access to. While item (c)of the guidelines (standard of living) hasbeen minimized in the [c]ourt's decision, theamount ordered takes into consideration thestandard of living Keon enjoyed while livingwith his father for that brief period oftime. It also takes into account the financial resources and needs of his custodialparent, and the fact that for approximatelytwo months out of every year he will live inhis father's care."

The court found the current support of $3,000 was insufficient,but the full 20% would be a windfall. See Bush, 191 Ill. App. 3dat 261, 547 N.E.2d at 596-97 (the court is "not required toequate large incomes with lavish life-styles. Neither are thecourts required to provide opulence and excess as an award forchild support simply because it exists for one of the parties"). Here, clearly, the trial court recognized that awarding petitioner 20% of respondent's 2001 income would amount to an excessand to "some" windfall to petitioner and her son from anotherrelationship, and the court appropriately deviated downward fromthe 20% guidelines. Under these circumstances, the trial courtdid not abuse its discretion in setting child support at $8,500 amonth.

B. Medical Expenses

Respondent next argues that the trial court erred inrequiring him to pay all of his son's uncovered medical expenses. We disagree.

The trial court has discretion to order payment of ahealth insurance premium, and the trial court's ruling will notbe disturbed on review absent an abuse of discretion. In reMarriage of Raad, 301 Ill. App. 3d 683, 688, 704 N.E.2d 964, 967(1998); In re Marriage of Schroeder, 215 Ill. App. 3d 156, 162,574 N.E.2d 834, 838 (1991). Similarly, despite discernableguidelines on contingent medical expenses not covered by insurance, the trial court also has discretion to order the payment ofuncovered and extraordinary medical expenses. Raad, 301 Ill.App. 3d at 688, 704 N.E.2d at 967; Schroeder, 215 Ill. App. 3d at162, 574 N.E.2d at 838.

In the present case, the trial court was fully aware ofthe financial position of both parties. The court orderedrespondent's insurance coverage to be primary and petitioner'ssecondary and also ordered respondent to be responsible for alluncovered medical expenses. In view of the parties' disparatefinancial circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretionin ordering respondent to pay all uncovered medical expenses.

C. Attorney Fees

Respondent also argues that the trial court erred inrequiring him to pay all of petitioner's attorney fees. Wedisagree.

Section 17 of the Parentage Act of 1984 (Parentage Act)(750 ILCS 45/17 (West 2000)) authorizes the trial court to orderrespondent to pay some or all of petitioner's attorney fees andcosts after considering the factors specified in section 508 ofthe Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/508 (West 2000)). The propriety ofan award of attorney fees is dependent upon a showing by theparty seeking the award of an inability to pay and a demonstration of the ability of the other party to do so. In re Parentageof Janssen, 292 Ill. App. 3d 219, 225, 685 N.E.2d 16, 20 (1997). An award of attorney fees will not be reversed absent an abuse ofdiscretion. Janssen, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 225, 685 N.E.2d 16 at20.

In the present case, the trial court ordered respondentto pay petitioner's attorney fees of $4,387. Respondent admitsthat he has the ability to pay petitioner's attorney fees, but hesubmits that his ability to pay the fees is not the issue. Rather, the issue is whether petitioner lacks the ability to payher own attorney fees. Respondent argues that she has theability and predicates his position on the fact that she receiveda lump-sum payment for the child-support arrearage ($125,000) andon the amount of monthly child support the trial court orderedhim to pay her ($8,500). However, these monies were for childsupport for the parties' son, not for her personal use or paymentof attorney fees.

In 2001 respondent earned $1.4 million per year,approximately $58,404 a month as compared to petitioner's incomewhich was $731.64. In addition, respondent's income was predicted to increase to $4.5 million effective November 1, 2002, asa result of a contract he signed with the Sacramento Kings. Inaddition, the record demonstrates that respondent providesapproximately $15,000 to $20,000 monthly to his financial adviserto invest on his behalf. In contrast, petitioner is currentlyattending college in a graphic design program and working part-time, earning approximately $9.93 per hour, and petitioner ownsno real estate. Under the circumstances here, we cannot say thatthe trial court abused its discretion in ordering respondent topay petitioner's attorney fees.

D. Contempt Finding

1. Due Process

Respondent argues that his due process rights wereviolated when he was not properly served with the petition forrule to show cause.

In an indirect civil contempt hearing, respondent isonly entitled to minimal due process, which consists of noticeand an opportunity to be heard. In re Marriage of Betts, 200Ill. App. 3d 26, 53, 558 N.E.2d 404, 421 (1990). In the presentcase, when the trial court issued the rule, the burden shifted torespondent to show cause why he should not be held in contempt. 134 Ill. 2d R. 296(l)(2).

Respondent was provided sufficient due process. TheDecember 11, 2002, hearing was not held on the rule to showcause. The court gave the parties until December 16, 2002, tosubmit briefs on the issues, which is actually 11 days from thedate the rule to show cause was mailed, thereby providing respondent the opportunity to show compliance with the court's order oran acceptable reason for noncompliance. In re Parentage ofMelton, 321 Ill. App. 3d 823, 829, 748 N.E.2d 291, 296-97 (2001). Moreover, respondent filed his documents by December 16, 2002. Therefore, we conclude that respondent was given an opportunityto brief his arguments and present them to the court. We findrespondent's due process rights were not violated.

2. Indirect Civil Contempt

Respondent argues that the trial court erred in findinghim in indirect civil contempt of the court's October 18, 2002,order. He contends that at the time the petition for rule toshow cause was entered, neither the monthly child-support payment, nor the arrearage was due. In addition, respondent arguesthat the issue of the insurance card was moot because he hadalready provided it to petitioner.

The record indicates that respondent paid the fullarrearage on January 14, 2003. In addition, the record indicatesthat respondent provided a copy of what was represented to be aninsurance card for Keon C. on January 22, 2003, and respondent'sattorney represented that the actual card was expected within 30days. Paying the entire arrearage and providing a copy of theinsurance card purged these issues and rendered the contemptissue moot.

The other purge provision in the trial court's contemptorder was "[m]aintenance of the current support order consistentwith the October 18, 2002, order." The trial court's writtenOctober 18, 2002, order does not specifically state what day thechild-support payment is due. However, the record is clear thatthe trial court intended the support to be due the first day ofeach month. When the court ordered the parties to calculate thearrearage, it directed them as follows: "[figure] up to thefirst payment of support under this [o]rder [of October 18,2002], which is the first Friday in November 2002." The firstFriday in November 2002 was actually November 1, 2002. Thetemporary child support order entered August 1, 2001, had likewise ordered child-support payments to be due on the first day ofeach month.

The court clearly intended the child-support paymentsbe due the first of the month. The trial court actually foundthat respondent's argument that he did not know when childsupport was due was "incredulous[.] The support payments in thiscase have always been due on the first (1st) of each month." We,therefore, remand and direct the trial court to modify its orderto specifically provide that the child support payments are duethe first day of each month.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment as modified and remand for the trial court to modify itsorder consistent with this opinion.

Affirmed as modified and remanded with directions.

MCCULLOUGH, J., concurs.

COOK, J., dissents.

JUSTICE COOK, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent and would reverse and remand thedecision of the trial court. No reasonable person could take theposition that $8,500 per month is an appropriate child-supportaward for a one-year-old child.

I have no problem with the proposition that a child-support award is not limited to the child's minimum needs, that acourt may also consider the standard of living the child wouldhave enjoyed if the marriage had not been dissolved. Bussey, 108Ill. 2d at 297, 483 N.E.2d at 1234. Nor do I have any problemwith the proposition that when one parent earns a dispropor-tionately greater income than the other, that parent should beara larger share of the support. In re Marriage of Garrett, 336Ill. App. 3d 1018, 1023, 785 N.E.2d 172, 176 (2003). Neverthe-less, a child-support award should not be a windfall to thecustodial parent. Bush, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 261, 547 N.E.2d at597; Singleteary, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 36, 687 N.E.2d at 1088. This award cannot be justified by any standard of living argument. The needs of a one-year-old child are simple. It matterslittle to a one-year-old whether he rides around in a Mercedes orin a Chevrolet.

How can this award be justified? We are given tworesponses: (1) the father makes $4.5 million a year, and (2)this award is less than the 20% guidelines amount. The fact thatthe father can afford it does not justify a windfall to thecustodial parent. In Bussey, a windfall to the custodial parentcould perhaps have been justified as a maintenance award. Maintenance, however, cannot be awarded in this Parentage Actcase. See Graham, 239 Ill. App. 3d at 645-46, 608 N.E.2d at 616(noting that Bussey was a marriage dissolution case). As far asthe guidelines are concerned, it is recognized that they do notwork well in cases of very high or very low income. See Department of Public Aid ex rel. Nale v. Nale, 294 Ill. App. 3d 747,754, 690 N.E.2d 1052, 1057 (1998) (utility of the statutorychild-support guidelines decreases as the incomes of the partiesincrease); In re Marriage of Kern, 245 Ill. App. 3d 575, 579, 615N.E.2d 402, 405 (1993); In re Marriage of Scafuri, 203 Ill. App.3d 385, 392, 561 N.E.2d 402, 406 (1990). The limiting factor onchild support in this case is not the income of the noncustodialparent, as it is in most cases. In this case the limiting factoris the reasonable needs of the child, taking into account thestandard of living he would have enjoyed. The award in thiscase, apparently the largest child-support award ever mentionedin an Illinois published opinion, is far beyond the reasonableneeds of the child and serves only to provide an improper windfall for the mother.

The careers of professional athletes are notoriouslyuncertain. It may have been possible for the trial court toestablish a "separate fund or trust for the support, maintenance,education, and general welfare of any minor, dependent, orincompetent child of the parties." 750 ILCS 5/503(g) (West2002). That has been done in other cases involving professionalathletes. See Finley v. Scott, 23 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 51, 707So. 2d 1112 (1998), discussed in 1 Gitlin on Divorce