JUSTICE TURNER delivered the opinion of the court: On December 27, 2004, a petition for the involuntaryadmission of respondent, Louis S., was filed pursuant to section3-701 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code(Mental Health Code) (405 ILCS 5/3-701 (West 2004)). After aJanuary 21, 2005, hearing, the trial court ordered respondenthospitalized in a Department of Mental Health and DevelopmentalDisabilities (Department) facility for 90 days.

Respondent appeals, contending (1) his procedural due-process rights were violated, (2) the State failed to prove byclear and convincing evidence that his involuntary admission waswarranted, (3) the report required by section 3-810 of the MentalHealth Code (405 ILCS 5/3-810 (West 2004)) (a) did not complywith statutory requirements and (b) was not considered by thetrial court, and (4) the court's hospitalization order wasmanifestly erroneous. We reverse.

Peggy S., respondent's wife and guardian, signed theDecember 27, 2004, petition and asserted respondent was mentallyill and due to his mental illness was reasonably expected toinflict serious physical harm upon himself or another in the nearfuture. The same day the petition was filed, the trial courtentered an order, requiring respondent to submit to an examination at Memorial Medical Center (Memorial) that day. The courtalso entered an order for a peace officer to take respondent toMemorial for the examination. The circuit clerk entered a writin compliance with the court's order. A peace officer did takerespondent to Memorial, and respondent was examined on December27, 2004.

On December 28, 2004, a medical certificate by Dr.Turner was filed that stated he or she believed respondent wassubject to involuntary admission and in need of immediate hospitalization. On December 29, 2004, Dr. Richard B. Alexander'smedical certificate that reached the same conclusion was filed. That same day, the trial court set a hearing on the petition forJanuary 7, 2005.

On January 6, 2005, a notice of change in status wasfiled, indicating respondent had been transferred to AndrewMcFarland Mental Health Center (McFarland) on January 5, 2005. On January 7, 2005, the trial court entered an order, settingrespondent's hearing for January 14, 2005. The docket entryindicates the continuance was by agreement of the parties. Thatsame day, Dr. Juan Medina filed a medical certificate. OnJanuary 11, 2005, Dr. Brad Hughes filed a medical certificate. On January 14, 2005, the trial court entered an order, settingrespondent's hearing for January 21, 2005. The record does notindicate why the hearing was continued to January 21, 2005.

At the January 21, 2005, hearing, Dr. Hughes testifiedhe had evaluated respondent on January 5 and 10, 2005. At theJanuary 5 evaluation, respondent demonstrated paranoid andgrandiose delusions, which are signs of mental illness. Some ofthe delusions Dr. Hughes noted were respondent indicated (1) heworked for the secret service and the Navy, (2) Peggy had herdaughter raped, and (3) the McFarland staff had raped him duringa previous admission. Besides evaluating respondent, Dr. Hughesexamined Peggy's statements in her petition and respondent's pastmedical records from Memorial, a prior stay at McFarland fromNovember 19 to December 9, 2004, and a hospitalization at St.John's Hospital. Based on all of the above information, Dr.Hughes diagnosed respondent with bipolar disorder. In hisopinion, respondent posed a significant risk of harm to Peggybased on the level of paranoid delusions involving her. Dr.Hughes found respondent to be in need of treatment and formulateda plan for him. Dr. Hughes opined McFarland was the least-restrictive alternative for respondent and recommended a commitment period of 90 days.

During Dr. Hughes' testimony, the trial court admittedfor dispositional purposes only a comprehensive physical, psychiatric, and social investigation report for respondent.

Peggy, respondent's wife of 24 years, testified thatthe day before she signed the December 27, 2004, petition,respondent informed her that he was having trouble controllinghimself. When she asked him what that meant, he stated "murder." He then got up and got a paring knife and began walking slowlytoward her. Peggy stated respondent did not have the knifepointed at her, but he was "like a zombi almost" with rage in hiseyes. He did the same thing with a butcher knife and then held afireplace poker at her. She called the police because she feltthreatened by his statement.

Peggy further testified that respondent was paranoidagainst her. He accused her of having affairs, murdering his"girlfriend," and having her daughter raped. According to Peggy,respondent had stopped taking his medication because he did notbelieve he needed it anymore. If respondent was returned home,she would be fearful to return home. She described respondent as"unpredictable."

Respondent testified he did not threaten Peggy. Headmitted he had kicked her in the past but that was because shewas "scratching his eyes out."

After hearing all of the evidence, the trial courtfound (1) respondent suffered from a mental illness, (2) he was arisk of harm to Peggy, (3) he needed treatment, and (4) hospitalization was the least-restrictive alternative at that time. Thecourt then committed respondent for 90 days. This appeal followed.

The State asserts respondent's arguments are moot sincethe 90 days of commitment have expired. Respondent agrees the 90days are over but asserts we should consider his arguments underan exception to the mootness doctrine.

Our supreme court has recognized an exception to themootness doctrine when the case involves an event of shortduration that is "'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'" In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 491, 702 N.E.2d 555, 559(1998), quoting In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 258, 537 N.E.2d292, 296 (1989). To qualify for this exception, the challengedaction must be (1) too short in its duration to be fully litigated prior to becoming moot and (2) the cause must demonstrate areasonable expectation the same complaining party would besubjected to the same action again. Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d at491, 702 N.E.2d at 559.

For an initial involuntary hospitalization order, themaximum commitment is 90 days, after which a new petition must befiled, a new hearing held, and a new order entered by the court. See 405 ILCS 5/3-813(a) (West 2004). Here, respondent's 90-daycommitment order expired prior to our review. Further, respondent does have a long history of mental illness and a history ofprior involuntary hospitalizations, and thus it is reasonable toexpect the same action that was taken against him here might beundertaken again. Thus, we will address those issues that aresusceptible to repetition. See In re Maher, 314 Ill. App. 3d1088, 1097, 734 N.E.2d 95, 102 (2000) (where this court appliedthe probable-repetition exception in an involuntary hospitalization case).

Respondent, through the Guardianship and AdvocacyCommission (GAC), asserts his right to "due process" was violatedbecause (1) he was not given 36 hours' notice before his initialpsychiatric examination, (2) he was improperly transferred toMcFarland, (3) his commitment hearing was not timely held, and(4) his guardian did not receive notice of his commitment hearing. We do not address the GAC's apparent position that anyinstance of statutory noncompliance constitutes a due-processviolation. We note the GAC cites no authority for its position,and we limit our analysis to determining whether statutoryviolations requiring reversal occurred.

In involuntary commitment proceedings, strict compliance with statutory procedures is required since such proceedingsaffect important liberty interests. However, reversal is notrequired unless the respondent is in some way prejudiced by thefailure to comply with statutory requirements. In re Watts, 250Ill. App. 3d 723, 726, 620 N.E.2d 640, 642 (1993).

Citing In re Luttrell, 261 Ill. App. 3d 221, 229, 633N.E.2d 74, 80 (1994), the State asserts respondent has forfeitedthese issues by failing to raise them in the trial court. However, this court is only addressing these issues under anexception to the mootness doctrine, and thus it would be illogical for us to now apply forfeiture and refuse to address respondent's claims. See Smith v. Menold Construction, Inc., 348 Ill.App. 3d 1051, 1056, 811 N.E.2d 357, 362 (2004) (noting the ruleof forfeiture is a limitation on the parties, not the reviewingcourt).

Section 3-705 of the Mental Health Code (405 ILCS 5/3-705 (West 2004)) provides as follows:

"At least 36 hours before the time ofthe examination fixed by the court, a copy ofthe petition, the order for examination, anda statement of rights as provided in[s]ection 3-205 shall be personally deliveredto the person and shall be given personallyor sent by mail to his attorney and guardian,if any. If the respondent is admitted to amental health facility for examination under[s]ection 3-704, such notices may bedelivered at the time of service of the orderfor admission."

Section 3-704(a) of the Mental Health Code (405 ILCS 5/3-704(a)(West 2004)) allows a person to remain in his or her residencepending any examination. However, if the trial court determinesit is necessary to complete the examination, the court may orderthe person admitted to a mental-health facility pendingexamination and may order a peace officer or another individualto transport the person there. 405 ILCS 5/3-704(a) (West 2004). Under section 3-704(a), no person may be detained for examinationfor more than 24 hours. 405 ILCS 5/3-704(a) (West 2004).

The State asserts section 3-705 does not apply becauserespondent was admitted to a mental-health facility pending hisexamination under section 3-704.

Here, the trial court ordered the clerk to issue a writdirecting a peace officer to transport respondent to Memorial onDecember 27, 2004, for an examination. The order did not providefor respondent's admission or detention pending the examination. In compliance with the court's order, the clerk of the courtprepared a writ that only directed the peace officer to transportrespondent to Memorial for examination. Since the court did notorder respondent admitted or detained for the examination atMemorial, respondent was entitled to notice of the examination atleast 36 hours before the time of examination pursuant to section3-705. In this case, respondent was received and examined atMemorial on December 27, 2004, which was the same day theexamination order was entered.

Accordingly, we find the 36-hour-notice requirement ofsection 3-705 of the Mental Health Code (405 ILCS 5/3-705 (West2004)) was not complied with. However, respondent does notassert how he was prejudiced by the noncompliance.

On January 6, 2005, a notice of change in status wasfiled, indicating respondent had been transferred to McFarland onJanuary 5, 2005. The record does not indicate the reason for thetransfer.

Sections 3-908 through 3-910 of the Mental Health Code(405 ILCS 5/3-908 through 3-910 (West 2004)) address the transferbetween Department facilities of a person receiving treatment orhabilitation. However, our supreme court has found a privateinstitution may not invoke the above provisions of the MentalHealth Code. See In re Hays, 102 Ill. 2d 314, 320, 465 N.E.2d98, 101 (1984); see also In re James E., 207 Ill. 2d 105, 112,797 N.E.2d 622, 626 (2003). Thus, it appears the only means bywhich respondent could have been transferred to McFarland was (1)in a dispositional order after he was found to be a personsubject to involuntary commitment (see 405 ILCS 5/3-811 (West2004)) or (2) by a discharge from Memorial and the institution ofemergency involuntary commitment proceedings under article VI ofthe Mental Health Code (405 ILCS 5/3-600 through 3-611 (West2004)) (see James E., 207 Ill. 2d at 113, 797 N.E.2d at 626(addressing the transfer of a person who was voluntarilyadmitted)). Since respondent's transfer was not by either of theabove means, his transfer to McFarland was improper.

The State asserts respondent did not suffer anyprejudice because he had agreed to a transfer to McFarland in aprior proceeding. Respondent responds his transfer waspresumably prejudicial since it was to a more restrictive statefacility and before his hearing. We need not address whetherthis issue prejudiced respondent since the next error wasprejudicial.

Under section 3-706 of the Mental Health Code (405 ILCS5/3-706 (West 2004)), the trial court must hold a hearing on apetition for involuntary admission within five days, excludingSaturdays, Sundays, and holidays, after (1) its receipt of thesecond medical certificate or (2) the respondent's admission to amental-health facility, whichever is earlier. Under section 3-800(b) of the Mental Health Code (405 ILCS 5/3-800(b) (West2004)), the trial court may continue the hearing with therespondent continuing to be detained, but the continuance cannot"extend beyond 15 days except to the extent that continuances arerequested by the respondent."

In this case, respondent was admitted to a mental-health facility after his December 27, 2004, examination. Thus,excluding the holiday and weekend from the five-day period, thetrial court had to hold a hearing on or before January 4, 2005,pursuant to section 3-706. However, on December 29, 2004, thetrial court set a hearing date of January 7, 2005. Thus, we findthe trial court failed to comply with section 3-706, resulting inrespondent's hearing being untimely. The fact respondent agreedto a continuance on January 7, 2005, does not render his hearingtimely, as the statutory period had already passed at the time ofthe continuance.

The State argues respondent did not suffer anyprejudice because, excluding the seven-day continuance thatrespondent agreed to, he was tried within 20 days of hisadmission as allowed by section 3-800(b). However, respondentwas on his third day of unlawful detention when the continuanceprovisions of section 3-800(b) were invoked. Thus, respondentwas prejudiced by the noncompliance with section 3-706.

Section 3-706 of the Mental Health Code (405 ILCS 5/3-706 (West 2004)) also requires that notice of the time and place of the hearing must be served upon the respondent's guardian, ifthe respondent has one. In this case, none of the three ordersthat set the hearing dates were served on Peggy, respondent'sguardian. Thus, section 3-706 was again violated. However, weagree with the State that this violation would not warrantreversal since Peggy was present at the January 21, 2005,hearing. See In re Splett, 143 Ill. 2d 225, 231-32, 572 N.E.2d883, 886 (1991) (finding reversal was not warranted despite lackof formal notice to the respondent since respondent's actualnotice of the proceedings satisfied the purposes of section3-706).

Respondent argues the State's report failed to complywith section 3-810 of the Mental Health Code (405 ILCS 5/3-810(West 2004)), and the trial court erred by not considering thereport before ordering respondent hospitalized for 90 days.

Section 3-810 provides as follows:

"Before disposition is determined, thefacility director or such other person as thecourt may direct shall prepare a writtenreport including information on theappropriateness and availability ofalternative treatment settings ***. *** Ifthe respondent is found subject toinvoluntary admission, the court shallconsider the report in determining anappropriate disposition." 405 ILCS 5/3-810(West 2004).

In this case, the State submitted a report, whichindicated no alternative-treatment setting was appropriate forrespondent at that time. This court has found that section 3-810 does not require a "detailed report" on treatment alternatives. See In re Meek, 131 Ill. App. 3d 742, 747, 476 N.E.2d 65, 69(1985).

Moreover, the report in its entirety supported theconclusion no alterative-treatment setting was appropriate. Thecomprehensive psychiatric evaluation portion of the reportindicated respondent (1) was noncompliant with his medication,(2) had threatened Peggy with a knife and a fireplace poker, and(3) was paranoid and delusional. Additionally, Peggy, with whomhe lived, feared for her safety. The State's evidence at thehearing supported the above statements. Accordingly, we find thereport sufficiently complied with section 3-810.

Even assuming the report was noncompliant, respondentcannot establish prejudice where he did not question the adequacyof the report in the trial court and offered no suggestion as toa less-restrictive alternative than that made by the State bothin the report and at the hearing. See Meek, 131 Ill. App. 3d at747, 476 N.E.2d at 69 (applying the doctrine of waiver undersimilar circumstances).

Respondent also contends the trial court did notconsider the report before disposition as required by section 3-810 of the Mental Health Code (405 ILCS 5/3-810 (West 2004)). Here, the record indicates the trial court admitted the reportfor dispositional purposes only at respondent's hearing, and therecord on appeal contains the report. Moreover, respondent doesnot cite any pages of the record indicating the court failed toconsider the report. Thus, we find respondent has failed to showthe trial court did not consider the report mandated by section3-810.

Last, we have examined the other issues raised byrespondent and decline to address them, finding an exception tothe mootness doctrine does not apply.

For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court'sjudgment. However, remand is not necessary since respondent's90-day admission has expired.

Reversed.

STEIGMANN, J., concurs.

MYERSCOUGH, J., specially concurs in part and dissentsin part.

JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH, specially concurring in part anddissenting in part:

I respectfully specially concur in part and dissent inpart. I strongly suspect documents and/or docket entries aremissing from the record in this case but, at worst, technicalprocedural mistakes occurred due to a holiday weekend and perhapsagreements of defense counsel. Regardless, I concur in part withthe majority, but I disagree with the majority's finding aviolation of the 36-hour notice provision.

Perhaps the chief judge who signed the order wasunfamiliar with the form and arguably checked the wrongprovision. However, the order did provide for detention andexamination. The order's very title is "Order for Detention,Examination, Diagnostic Evaluation." The court also orderedrespondent be taken to Memorial by a police officer as set forthin the statute. Respondent must be admitted to the facility tobe examined:

"(a) *** If, however, the court findsthat it is necessary in order to complete theexamination[,] the court may order that theperson be admitted to a mental healthfacility pending examination and may order apeace officer or other person to transportthe person there. The examination shall beconducted at a local mental health facilityor hospital or, if possible, in therespondent's own place of residence. Noperson may be detained for examination underthis [s]ection for more than 24 hours." 405ILCS 5/3-704(a) (West 2004).

Under any circumstances, respondent must be released unless thenecessary findings are made.

"(a) *** The person shall be releasedupon completion of the examination unless thephysician, qualified examiner[,] or clinicalpsychologist executes a certificate statingthat the person is subject to involuntaryadmission and in need of immediatehospitalization to protect such person orothers from physical harm. Upon admissionunder this [s]ection[,] treatment may begiven pursuant to [s]ection 3-608." 405 ILCS5/3-704(a) (West 2004).

To find a violation of this 36-hour notice is applyinghypertechnical rules to the mental-health arena. Logically, howcan a police officer transport and a physician examine withoutdetaining the person pursuant to section 3-704?

The 36-hour notice provision is intended to apply tosituations where respondent remains in his home prior toexamination and appears voluntarily, by necessity a provisionseldom utilized in commitment proceedings. Whether a respondentis admitted under section VI of the Code, emergency admission bycertification, or under section VII, admission by court order,the respondent may be detained only 24 hours without examination. This is an emergency situation, which permits service of thenotice of examination, the petition, and the statement of rightsat the same time as the service of admission:

"If the respondent is admitted to a mentalhealth facility for examination under[s]ection 3-704, such notices may bedelivered at the time of service of the orderfor admission." 405 ILCS 5/3-705 (West2004).

In fact, these notices of examination and admission are includedon the same form in Sangamon County.

For these reasons, I would find no violation of the 36-hour provision, and I concur in part and dissent in part.