In re Nathan A.C.

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In re Nathan A.C.

State: Illinois

Court: 4th District Appellate

Docket No: 4-07-0098 Rel

Case Date: 10/31/2008

Preview:NO. 4-07-0098 IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT In re: NATHAN A.C., a Minor, THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. NATHAN A.C., Respondent-Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

Filed 10/31/08

Appeal from Circuit Court of Champaign County No. 06JD89 Honorable Harry E. Clem, Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH delivered the opinion of the court: In November 2006, the trial court revoked the probation of respondent, Nathan A.C. (born March 14, 1990). In December

2006, the court committed respondent to an indeterminate term in the Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). Respondent appeals, arguing (1) the failure to serve respondent's parents with the petition for adjudication of wardship deprived the circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction and rendered probation-violation and commitment orders void and (2) the trial court erred by not considering respondent's best interests before committing him to DJJ. The failure to serve respondent's parents did not deprive the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction and only affected the court's personal jurisdiction over the respondent parents. Because the respondent father ultimately appeared

without objecting to personal jurisdiction, the issue was forfeited. In addition, the record demonstrates the court did

consider respondent's best interests when committing him to DJJ, but the preprinted commitment order must be amended to so reflect. Therefore, we affirm as modified and remand with direc-

tions to correct the commitment order. I. BACKGROUND On April 21, 2006, the State filed a petition for the adjudication of wardship of respondent. The petition alleged

that respondent was a delinquent minor because he committed forgery (720 ILCS 5/17-3(a)(2) (West 2006)) on April 20, 2006. The petition named Linda C. as respondent mother and Ricky C. as respondent father. The record indicates that Linda and Ricky are The petition contained The

respondent's married, adoptive parents.

the same address in Urbana for respondent, Linda, and Ricky.

record contains no indication, however, that summonses were ever issued or served on Linda or Ricky. However, an April 21, 2001,

detention report indicated several unsuccessful attempts were made to contact respondent's parents by telephone. Also on April 21, 2006, the trial court held the admonition hearing. Respondent was present with appointed

counsel, but neither of respondent's parents attended the hearing. The court advised respondent of the contents of the petiRespon-

tion, the possible penalties, and his rights to a trial. - 2 -

dent entered a general denial. detained.

The court ordered respondent

In May 2006, respondent admitted the allegations in the petition for adjudication of wardship. The trial court declared

respondent a delinquent minor and made respondent a ward of the court. Neither of respondent's parents was present, but respon-

dent was represented by appointed counsel. In June 2006, the trial court held the sentencing hearing. Again, neither of respondent's parents was present.

Respondent's appointed counsel requested probation, noting: "Your Honor, I would recommend that [respondent] be sentenced to a term of probation. I think it's pretty clear from the

reports that [respondent] does not have a great deal of support at this time. parents are not here today, clearly." The court ordered respondent committed to an indeterminate term in DJJ that would terminate in five years or upon respondent attaining the age of 21, whichever occurred first. On August 7, 2006, the trial court held a review hearing. time. Respondent's father, Ricky, appeared for the first His

The court vacated respondent's order of commitment based

on the July 21, 2006, DJJ institutional-adjustment report showing respondent had displayed good behavior and the proper attitude - 3 -

while in DJJ. months.

The court placed respondent on probation for 24

On September 27, 2006, the State filed a petition to revoke probation alleging that respondent violated his probation by committing aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(3) (West 2006)). The State alleged that respondent struck an employee of The petition named Ricky and Linda as respon-

CIRCLE Academy.

dent's parents and listed the same address as contained in the petition for adjudication of wardship. The petition to revoke

did not reflect whether a copy was mailed to respondent's parents. Also on September 27, 2006, the trial court held the admonition hearing. Ricky appeared at the hearing and acknowl-

edged in open court receiving a copy of the petition to revoke probation. The court admonished respondent of the allegations of

the petition, his right to trial, and the possible penalties. The court found probable cause to believe respondent was a delinquent minor and that it was a matter of immediate and urgent necessity that respondent be detained. On October 4 and October 11, the cause was continued at respondent's request. hearing. Ricky attended the October 4, 2006,

On October 18, 2006, on respondent's motion and over

the State's objection, the court released respondent to the custody of his father, although it appears from the record that - 4 -

Ricky was not present at the hearing.

On November 13, 2006, with

Ricky and appointed counsel present, respondent admitted the allegations contained in the petition to revoke probation. On December 4, 2006, the State filed a supplemental petition to revoke alleging that respondent had again committed aggravated battery by pushing and throwing to the ground a CIRCLE Academy teacher (720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(3) (West 2006)). The peti-

tion does not reflect whether a copy was mailed to respondent's parents. The December 4, 2006, detention report indicated that

Ricky was advised by telephone that respondent had been taken into custody. Neither Ricky nor Linda attended the admonition

hearing on the supplemental petition to revoke held that same day. The trial court ordered respondent detained. On December 14, 2006, the trial court held the resentencing hearing. Ricky attended the hearing. The court

granted the State's oral motion to withdraw and dismiss the supplemental petition to revoke, and the case proceeded to resentencing. The State and defense counsel acknowledged receipt and review of the updated sentencing report prepared by the probation and court services department. No inaccuracies were noted. The

sentencing report provided, in relevant part, as follows: "The respondent minor has an eerie history in the juvenile justice system. - 5 In

Champaign County case [No.] 2003-JD-68[,] which was eventually dismissed, the respondent minor had an outstanding warrant of apprehension for over two years before he was arrested on the warrant. In Champaign County

case [No.] 2006-JD-38, the respondent minor was arrested a mere five hours after being placed on a community[-]based sentence. new case was filed (Champaign County case [No.] 2006-JD-89) and the respondent minor was committed to the [DJJ]. However, that A

commitment was vacated and the respondent minor was given the opportunity of another community[-]based sentence. But a mere two

mo[n]ths later, the respondent minor was once again arrested for striking a staff member of CIRCLE Academy in the face." The sentencing report noted that respondent showed aggressive and threatening behavior toward staff at CIRCLE Academy and continued to "flout the directives" of the court. The report also noted

that in November 2006, respondent was referred to Prairie Center for an assessment but that respondent called to reschedule. Neither the State nor defense counsel presented any evidence. Respondent did not address the trial court, although - 6 -

given the opportunity to do so.

Ricky addressed the court.

Ricky requested intensive probation for respondent and stated his desire to take respondent home. After hearing the recommenda-

tions of counsel, the court found respondent's parents unable, for reasons other than financial circumstances alone, to care for, protect, train, and discipline respondent, and found that the best interests of the public would not be served by placement "under section 5-7 of the Juvenile Court Act [of 1987]" (apparently referring to section 5-740). See 705 ILCS 405/5-750 (1)(a)

(West 2006) (setting forth the standard for committing a minor to DJJ, including the requirement that the best interests of the minor and the public would not be served by placement under section 5-740); 705 ILCS 405/5-740 (West 2006) (providing for placement of the minor outside the home, such as placement with a relative, other person, or residential placement). The court

ordered respondent committed to DJJ for an indeterminate term to terminate in five years or when respondent reaches the age of 21, whichever comes first, unless sooner discharged. The trial court explained its ruling by noting that respondent had previously been given the opportunity to address his issues in the community through a community-based sentence but had failed to do so. The court acknowledged respondent's

anger and feelings of hurt and abandonment related to his adoption. (The record indicates the adoption occurred approximately - 7 -

11 years earlier but that respondent had recently begun having contact with his biological mother and her other children.) court noted that despite efforts by respondent's family and school personnel to help respondent, respondent continued to display defiance and disregard those efforts. The trial court concluded that based on respondent's conduct, respondent would likely not benefit from people trying to help him absent a confined setting. The court noted that in a The

confined setting, respondent would participate in the programs that would help him. The court admonished respondent that prior

to filing a notice of appeal, he must either file a written motion asking the court to reconsider the sentence or seek leave to withdraw his admission to the petition to revoke probation. On January 9, 2007, respondent filed a motion to reconsider asserting that the sentence was excessive. Following

a hearing on February 2, 2007, at which Ricky appeared, the court denied the motion to reconsider. This appeal followed.

In August 2007, the office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) moved to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967). This

court denied the motion to withdraw and directed OSAD to file a brief addressing two issues: (1) whether the failure to serve respondent's parents implicated the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction and rendered the court's - 8 orders void and (2)

whether the court considered respondent's best interests when committing him to DJJ where the preprinted commitment order failed to contain the statement that the court considered the minor's best interests. Respondent's counsel has now addressed

those issues, and the State filed a response. II. ANALYSIS A. Failure To Serve Respondent's Parents Did Not Deprive the Trial Court of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, and Respondent Forfeited Any Objection to the Failure To Serve His Parents The Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) requires a delinquency petition contain the name and residences of the minor's parents, guardian, and legal custodian. ), (2)(d) (West 2006). 705 ILCS 405/5-520(2)(c-

When a delinquency proceeding is com-

menced, a summons must be issued and served on the minor's parent, guardian, or legal custodian. (West 2006). See 705 ILCS 405/5-525

Sections 5-525(1)(a) and (4) of the Act provide, in

relevant part, as follows: "(1) Service by summons. (a) Upon the commencement of a delinquency prosecution, the clerk of the court shall issue a summons with a copy of the petition attached. The summons shall be di-

rected to the minor's parent, guardian[,] or legal custodian and - 9 -

to each person named as a respondent in the petition, except that summons need not be directed (i) to a minor respondent under [eight] years of age for whom the court appoints a guardian ad litem if the guardian ad litem appears on behalf of the minor in any proceeding under this Act, or (ii) to a parent who does not reside with the minor, does not make regular child support payments to the minor, to the minor's other parent, or to the minor's legal guardian or custodian pursuant to a support order, and has not communicated with the minor on a regular basis. * * * (4) The appearance of the minor's parent, guardian[,] or legal custodian, or a person named as a respondent in a petition, in any proceeding under this Act shall constitute a waiver of service and submission to the jurisdiction of the court. - 10 A copy of the

petition shall be provided to the person at the time of his or her appearance." 405/5-525(1)(a), (4) (West 2006). See also In re Tyrone W., 326 Ill. App. 3d 1047, 1049, 762 N.E.2d 1159, 1161 (2002) (noting that "due process requires adequate notice of the proceedings to a minor and his parents"). In this case, although the petition for adjudication of wardship contained the name and address for respondent's parents, the record contains no indication that summons was ever issued or served on them. Respondent argues that the failure to strictly 705 ILCS

comply with the statutory provision requiring service of summons on respondent's parents deprived the trial court of subjectmatter jurisdiction, thereby rendering the court's orders void. 1. The Evolution of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction in the Illinois Supreme Court "[S]ubject[-]matter jurisdiction is the power of the court to adjudicate ***." In re L.E.J., 115 Ill. App. 3d 993, Any order rendered by a court

997, 451 N.E.2d 289, 292 (1983).

lacking subject-matter jurisdiction is void and subject to attack at any time. N.E.2d , In re John C.M., 382 Ill. App. 3d 553, 558, (2008).

This court set forth a detailed analysis of subjectmatter jurisdiction in John C.M., 382 Ill. App. 3d at 558-67, N.E.2d at . To summarize, the Illinois Supreme Court, in a

series of cases referred to as the Belleville Toyota cases, - 11 -

recognized the effect the 1964 and 1970 amendments to the Illinois Constitution made to the power of court to exercise subjectmatter jurisdiction. See Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill.

2d 514, 529-31, 759 N.E.2d 509, 518-19 (2001) (rejecting the dissent's assertion that the circuit court's order was void for failure to comply with article 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/17-101 through 17-127 (West 1994)); Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 340-41, 770 N.E.2d 177, 188 (2002) (rejecting the argument that the limitation period contained in the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act (815 ILCS 710/1 through 32 (West 2000)) was a jurisdictional, nonwaivable prerequisite to suit affecting the subjectmatter jurisdiction of the circuit court); see also People ex rel. Graf v. Village of Lake Bluff, 206 Ill. 2d 541, 558, 795 N.E.2d 281, 290 (2003) (noting that once the trial court was presented with a petition and annexation ordinance, it had subject-matter jurisdiction to determine the matter). Prior to that series of cases, the Illinois Supreme Court had held that when the legislature enacted legislation creating rights and duties not existing at common law, the legislature could limit the jurisdictional authority of the circuit courts. See In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 66, 619 N.E.2d

702, 710 (1993) (recognizing that a circuit court's jurisdiction is constitutionally derived but noting that a "legislature may - 12 -

define the 'justiciable matter' in such way as to preclude or limit the authority of the circuit court"); In re A.H., 195 Ill. 2d 408, 416, 748 N.E.2d 183, 189 (2001) (noting that when the circuit court's power is controlled by statute, the court only has subject-matter jurisdiction as provided in the statute). Therefore, when a court acted outside the strictures of the statute, the court exceeded its statutory authority, and the resulting judgment was void. See, e.g., M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 66,

619 N.E.2d at 710 (finding the court exceeded its jurisdiction under the Act when it limited, restricted, or conditioned the power of the guardian without specific statutory authority). However, in the Belleville Toyota cases, the supreme court recognized that the 1964 and 1970 amendments to the Illinois Constitution vested the circuit courts with the authority to adjudicate all controversies and that the failure to follow the language of a statute did not divest a court of jurisdiction. See Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d at 530, 759 N.E.2d at 519 (noting that pre-1964 circuit courts were powerless to act without statutory authority but that circuit courts are now courts of general jurisdiction); Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 335, 770 N.E.2d at 185 (holding that the legislature's creation of a new justiciable matter did not mean the legislature conferred jurisdiction on the circuit courts); Graf, 206 Ill. 2d at 554, 795 N.E.2d at 288 (holding that once the circuit court had a justi- 13 -

ciable matter before it, the court has the power to decide the issues whether "rightly or wrongly"). In Belleville Toyota, the Illinois Supreme Court made clear that, "except in the area of administrative review, the jurisdiction of the circuit court flows from the constitution." (Emphasis in original.) Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 335,

770 N.E.2d at 185; see also Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI,

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