JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondent, O.C., appeals the trial court's June 2002order finding him subject to involuntary admission to a mentalhealth facility pursuant to section 3-700 of the Mental Healthand Developmental Disabilities Code (Mental Health Code) (405ILCS 5/3-700 (West 2000)) and involuntary administration ofpsychotropic medication pursuant to section 2-107.1(a-5) of theMental Health Code (405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5) (West Supp. 2001)). Respondent contends (1) no clear and convincing evidence warranted respondent's involuntary admission, (2) hospitalizationwas not the least-restrictive treatment alternative, (3) respondent's procedural due process rights were violated, and (4) noclear and convincing evidence warranted an order for involuntaryadministration of psychotropic medication. We reverse.

On June 21, 2002, Amy Mundwiler, a supervisor atHeritage Behavioral Health Center (Heritage), filed a petitionfor involuntary admission of respondent by court order. Thepetition alleged respondent was a person who was mentally ill andwho, because of his illness, was reasonably expected to inflictserious physical harm upon himself or another in the near future. Specifically, the petition stated respondent was observed the daybefore dancing in the middle of a street and then yelling forsomeone to "get away from me or I'll beat your f---ing ass" whenno one was around him. Further, respondent allegedly made aphone call stating he is a Green Beret and he will draw "firstblood." The trial court ordered the clerk to issue a writdirecting the sheriff to take custody of respondent. Two doctorsexamined respondent and filed certificates finding respondent wassubject to involuntary admission and in need of immediate hospitalization.

On June 24, 2002, Stephen Rathnow signed a petition foradministration of authorized involuntary treatment. However, thepetition was not file-stamped, and the docket sheets in therecord do not indicate the petition was formally filed. Also onJune 24, the trial court appointed counsel for respondent and seta hearing for June 25 on Mundwiler's petition. The trial courtdirected the clerk to send notice of the hearing, and a sheriff'sdeputy delivered notice to respondent on that day.

On June 25, 2002, the trial court held a hearing on thepetition for involuntary admission. Mundwiler testified she wasfamiliar with respondent through Heritage for about five years. Respondent's diagnosis went between bipolar disorder and schizo-affective disorder during that time. Mundwiler overheard respondent talking to a case manager, and respondent discussed how hewas walking around Decatur telling people off to release hisfrustrations. Mundwiler heard respondent say he did not want tohave to hurt anyone.

Dr. Patil testified he saw respondent in the eveningafter his admission. Patil characterized respondent as beingvery paranoid, suspicious, delusional, agitated, extremely loud,boisterous, and grandiose. Patil diagnosed respondent withbipolar disorder. Respondent had not been completely compliantwith medications. Patil believed respondent was a person who wasmentally ill and, because of his illness, was reasonably expectedto inflict serious physical harm upon himself or another. Patilnoted, "With paranoia, suspiciousness, and grandiosity, he islikely to misperceive what other people's motives are and he maywork [sic] out unknowingly, not knowingly." Patil highly recommended McFarland at the least-restrictive placement. On cross-examination, Patil noted respondent's loud and boisterous behavior on the unit required intervention but respondent did not"come across to threaten anybody."

Lynn Schollenbruch, a case manager at Heritage, observed respondent screaming and cussing on a park bench whileholding a guitar. She heard respondent threatening to hurtpeople, but no one in the area seemed to be responding to him. On cross-examination, she testified respondent had headphonesaround his neck. Schollenbruch heard respondent speak, "I'mgoing to kill you," although she did not witness respondentthreaten any particular person who was nearby.

Schare Antoniou testified on respondent's behalf. Shehad dated respondent for three years. She visited him on June20, 2002, and he did not seem unusual. She never saw respondentdo anything like cussing on the street. Respondent consistentlytook his medications. Respondent listens to rap music, amongstother varieties, and he likes to sing to the words. BrendaAntoniou, Schare's mother, also testified for respondent. Sheknew respondent for three years. She stated she saw respondenton June 19 or June 20 and he was not delusional or threatening.

Respondent's counsel argued respondent had never harmedanyone and he was merely singing along to rap music. The trialcourt found the State's witnesses to be more credible. The trialcourt found the allegations proved by clear and convincingevidence and found respondent to be a person subject to involuntary admission. The trial court ordered respondent to be hospitalized in the Department of Mental Health and DevelopmentalDisabilities for up to 90 days.

After the trial court admonished respondent of hisappeal rights, Mary Bolton, the assistant State's Attorney, notedthe petition for involuntary treatment. The trial court inquiredwhether that hearing was set for that day, and Bolton replied, "Ithink it should be." The trial court then stated, "You'recorrect," and proceeded.

Dr. Patil prescribed lithium and Depakote to stabilizemood. Zyprexa treats psychotic symptoms such as delusions andparanoia. Respondent's Depakote levels were below normal, whichis inconsistent with taking medication on a regular basis. Patilexplained the safety of the medicines and the need for periodicblood testing. Respondent agreed to cooperate with Patil butrefused when the nurses gave him the medicine. Patil statedrespondent's mental state would tremendously improve with themedications and respondent would likely act out without themedications. On cross-examination, Patil noted dryness of mouthand excess urination as short-term side effects of lithium. Haldol would be administered if respondent did not cooperate. Haldol can cause stiffness, which would be taken care of withCogentin. However, artificial muscular movements could developin the long term.

Respondent testified he would take Depakote but heobjected to lithium. Respondent earlier took lithium with Haldoland Cogentin, and he developed gynecomastia, requiring liposuction on his chest. The trial court then recalled Patil, whostated Haldol could produce gynecomastia but lithium would neverhave that effect. The trial court then granted the petition forinvoluntary treatment.

Respondent initially argues no clear and convincingevidence supported the trial court's finding he was reasonablyexpected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or anotherin the near future. The State claims respondent's involuntarycommitment was proper because his verbal outbursts are dangerousand harm is reasonably likely to occur. We agree with respondent.

A person is subject to involuntary admission if he ismentally ill and because of his illness is reasonably expected toinflict serious physical harm upon himself or another in the nearfuture. 405 ILCS 5/1-119 (West 2000). A person may not beconfined against his will merely because he is mentally ill if heis dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom. In reSchumaker, 260 Ill. App. 3d 723, 727, 633 N.E.2d 169, 172 (1994). The State has the burden of showing the need for confinement byclear and convincing evidence (Schumaker, 260 Ill. App. 3d at727, 633 N.E.2d at 172), and the trial court's decision will notbe reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of theevidence (In re Robinson, 287 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 1097, 679 N.E.2d818, 824 (1997)).

We find the trial court's decision to order respondent's involuntary commitment was against the manifest weight ofthe evidence because insufficient evidence supported the trialcourt's finding of a reasonable likelihood of future harm. Therecord contains no evidence respondent ever physically harmedhimself or another. After respondent had been receiving outpatient treatment through Heritage for "a number of years," a casemanager witnessed him on a park bench "screaming, cussing, andthreatening to hurt people." However, respondent was not threatening anyone in particular, and no one seemed to respond to him. A supervisor at Heritage overheard respondent state he wastelling people off to relieve his frustrations. Respondent'streating psychiatrist noted respondent's boisterous and loudbehavior in the unit required staff intervention, but respondentdid not physically threaten or harm anyone. Put together, theforegoing did not reach the level of clear and convincing evidence needed to find respondent to be "reasonably expected toinflict serious physical harm upon himself *** or another in thenear future." 405 ILCS 5/1-119(1) (West 2000).

We recognize the State submitted explicit medicaltestimony respondent was reasonably expected to be a seriousdanger to himself or others as a result of his mental illness. However, the expert's opinion was not supported by evidencerespondent intended to harm himself or another. See Schumaker,260 Ill. App. 3d at 728, 633 N.E.2d at 173. Although respondentexpressed statements such as "I'm going to kill you," respondentwas also overheard stating he was going to relieve his frustrations by telling people off.

Further, an expert's opinion is only as valid as thereasons for it. In re Winters, 255 Ill. App. 3d 605, 609, 627N.E.2d 410, 413-14 (1994). Patil's testimony revealed the basisof his opinion. Patil stated respondent "may" unknowingly actout by likely misperceiving other people's motives as a result ofhis mental illness. Patil's testimony never referred to anyincident leading to respondent's involuntary admission, and hefailed to opine whether respondent was likely to act consistentwith the witnessed "threats" as a result of his mental illness. See Schumaker, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 728, 633 N.E.2d at 173. Noevidence showed respondent was reasonably expected to "act out"by inflicting serious physical harm upon himself or another as aresult of his bipolar disorder.

Therefore, we reverse the trial court's order ofinvoluntary commitment, and we need not address respondent'sargument regarding least-restrictive treatment alternative.

Respondent next asserts the trial court erred inentering an order for authorized involuntary treatment. We willreverse the trial court's decision only if it is manifestlyerroneous. In re Jones, 285 Ill. App. 3d 8, 13, 673 N.E.2d 703,706 (1996).

Section 2-107.1(a-5)(4) of the Mental Health Code (405ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(4) (West Supp. 2001)) requires proof of sevenfactors by clear and convincing evidence before authorizedinvoluntary treatment can be administered to a respondent. Thesecond factor states, "That because of said mental illness ordevelopmental disability, the recipient exhibits any one of thefollowing: (i) deterioration of his or her ability to function,(ii) suffering, or (iii) threatening behavior." 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(4)(B) (West Supp. 2001). Dr. Patil's testimony failedto state respondent presently exhibited either deterioration ofhis ability to function, suffering, or threatening behavior. Rathnow's report refers only to respondent's psychiatric historyand past behavior. Because the State did not present clear andconvincing evidence regarding the second factor, we need notaddress respondent's contentions regarding the other factors.

The trial court's decision was against the manifestweight of the evidence, and we reverse the trial court's orderfor involuntary administration of psychotropic medication.

Respondent finally claims he was denied procedural dueprocess. The record shows respondent was not served with noticeof the petition for administration of authorized involuntarytreatment prior to the June 25, 2002, hearing. Under section 2-107.1(a-5)(1) of the Mental Health Code (405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(1) (West Supp. 2001)), a respondent has a right to have atleast three days' notice prior to a hearing on a petition forauthorized involuntary treatment. The record also reveals thepetition was never formally filed.

We take this opportunity to reiterate the followingadmonishment:

"The procedural safeguards enacted by thelegislature are not mere technicalities. Rather, they are intended to safeguard theimportant liberty interests of the respondentwhich are involved in mental health cases.***

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*** The total disregard for the legislatively established procedures is contrary tothe balancing of interests established by the[Mental Health] Code and should not be condoned." In re Luttrell, 261 Ill. App. 3d221, 230-31, 633 N.E.2d 74, 81-82 (1994).

For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court'sorders of involuntary commitment and administration of psychotropic medication.

Reversed.

TURNER and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.