JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

In December 2001, the State filed a petition, allegingthat R.B. (born October 2, 1999), the minor child of respondent,Gaston Butler, was a neglected minor under section 2-3(1)(b) of theJuvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West2000)) because her environment was injurious to her welfare whenshe resided "with [her parents] Sonja Caston and/or Gaston Butlerin that said environment exposes" R.B. to the risk of domesticviolence. Following adjudicatory hearings in February and March2002, the trial court found that R.B. was a neglected minor. Following a May 2002 dispositional hearing, the court adjudicatedR.B. a ward of the court, appointed the Department of Children andFamily Services (DCFS) as her guardian, and ordered her removedfrom the custody of both Caston and Butler.

Butler appeals, arguing that the trial court (1)improperly accepted Caston's stipulation as evidence against him;(2) violated his fourteenth amendment right to fundamentally fairprocedures; and (3) made a decision that was contrary to themanifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.

R.B. was the two-year-old daughter of Butler and Castonwhen the State filed its December 2001 neglect petition. Inresponse to that petition, the trial court appointed counsel forR.B., directed the circuit clerk to issue summons for all parties,and allotted the case for a January 22, 2002, admonition hearing. The court also set the case for an adjudicatory hearing on February26, 2002.

At the January 22, 2002, admonition hearing, Castonappeared personally, but Butler did not. The trial court (1)received a new address for Butler, (2) amended the neglect petitionaccordingly, (3) allotted Butler's admonition hearing for February21, 2002, and (4) directed new summons to issue for Butler with thenew admonition hearing date. The court also granted Caston'smotion for appointed counsel and reaffirmed February 26, 2002, asthe date for the adjudicatory hearing.

On February 21, 2002, the trial court called the case forButler's admonition hearing, but neither Butler nor anyone on hisbehalf appeared. The court directed alias summons to issue forButler and reaffirmed the February 26, 2002, date for theadjudicatory hearing.

On February 26, 2002, when the trial court called thecase for adjudicatory hearing, the following people were present:Caston, Caston's counsel, R.B.'s counsel, the prosecutor, andButler, who appeared for the first time. The court's discussionwith Butler revealed that one of the notices sent to him at hisaddress in Matteson, Illinois, successfully reached him. The courtinformed Butler of the allegations in the State's neglect petitionand appropriately explained the State's burden of proof andButler's rights during the proceedings. The court also informedButler that he had the right to be represented by counsel and thatone would be appointed for him if he could not afford to hire anattorney of his own choice. Butler stated that he was not able tohire an attorney and would like to have one appointed for him. Thecourt granted his request and appointed an assistant publicdefender to represent him. However, that counsel was not thenpresent in court.

The following discussion then occurred between the trialcourt, Butler, and some of the other parties:

"THE COURT: Mr. Butler, you did notappear previously, and so this is the firsttime that you are here. This is the date setfor that adjudicatory hearing for the presentation of evidence; you understand that?

[BUTLER]: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Are you able to go forwardtoday even though your counsel cannot be herebecause I've just appointed him, he had noadvance notice of this?

[BUTLER]: I don't believe that I couldbecause I don't know what rights or anythingthat I do have, and I would like to speak withsomebody to get counsel.

[THE PROSECUTOR]: People object to themotion to continue.

THE COURT: And--

[CASTON'S COUNSEL]: For the record Iwould also object[, noting] that [Caston] iseight months pregnant and she's come from theChicago area, notwithstanding the weather.

* * *

THE COURT: I note the somewhat unusualcircumstances in this [case]. I note thatextensive efforts were made to try and contactMr. Butler so that he could be here previously.

And in fact the court had ordered summonsto issue, also ordered notice by publicationearly on in case that notice, in case thesummons could not be served.

I take note of the circumstances. Thecourt is going to deny the motion for a continuance, and I rely particularly on theefforts of [Caston] to be present today, inspite of what was close to blizzard-likeconditions, the court taking note of theweather conditions outside. Mr. Butler, atthis point I'm going to proceed. The courtwill treat liberally any motions your attorneymay feel are necessary after the fact, and Inote also the subpoenaed witnesses are present. I'm going to allow [the prosecutor] toproceed at this time."

Later during the adjudicatory hearing, Caston offered toadmit and stipulate to the neglect allegation in the State'spetition. In support of Caston's offer, the prosecutor presentedas a factual basis People's exhibit No. 1, which consisted of thereports of two Champaign police officers regarding an incident theyresponded to on September 17, 2001. The State offered that exhibitto demonstrate that the environment in which R.B. resided when shelived with Caston and Butler exposed her to the risk of domesticviolence. The prosecutor noted that the officers whose reportsmade up People's exhibit No. 1 were present in court and ready totestify if needed. The prosecutor also indicated that to furthershow a factual basis, the parties agreed that the trial court couldconsider the verified petition Caston signed following theSeptember 17, 2001, incident, in which she sought an order ofprotection against Butler. The court accepted Caston's admissionand stipulation and accepted as a factual basis for it the policereports in People's exhibit No. 1 and Caston's sworn statement inthe order of protection case. (We note that although the courtreferred to Caston's sworn statement, it is not contained in therecord on appeal.)

The first police report stated that on the date inquestion, Champaign police officer Randy Beech responded to adomestic disturbance call at Caston and Butler's residence. Castonstated that she, R.B., and J.A., who was Caston's 10-year-olddaughter by another man, were watching television when Butlerwalked into the back bedroom and asked where his belongings were. She told him that she had packed them up because she wanted him tomove out. He said he was not going to leave, started to argue withher, and then choked her until she blacked out. She did not awakenuntil the police were present. Caston informed the officers thatshe feared for her life and was afraid of Butler. The officers sawscratches and marks on her neck. When Beech arrived, J.A. was inthe apartment and "crying uncontrollably."

The report of Champaign police officer Russell Beck wassubstantially similar to Beech's report, but it contained someadditional details. It noted that (1) Caston was then six to eightweeks pregnant; and (2) the police were called when J.A. went to aneighbor's house at Caston's direction to call the police. WhenBeck arrived, Caston was still unconscious, and he called formedical personnel.

After accepting Caston's admission and stipulation, thetrial court addressed Butler, who remained present throughout theproceedings relating to Caston's admission and stipulation, andstated the following:

"THE COURT: Mr. Butler, you just heardMs. Caston admit and stipulate to *** thispetition. Earlier you made a motion to continue this matter, do you recall?

[BUTLER]: Yes.

THE COURT: And at this time the court isgoing to reconsider, and I am going to continue [the case] so that you can consult withyour lawyer as to how you wish to proceed.

If you wish to proceed with an evidentiary hearing as to you, then your lawyer willinform me. I'm going to give you [a] date andtime, and I'm also going to set it fordispositional hearing as to Ms. Caston.

Do you understand what I'm doing?

[BUTLER]: Yes."

The trial court allotted the dispositional hearing forApril 5, 2002, and directed DCFS to conduct an investigation andmake a report for that hearing. The court then informed Butlerthat it was setting the adjudicatory hearing as to him for March 1,2002.

On March 1, 2002, the court reconvened with all partiespresent, including Butler and his counsel, and the followingdiscussion took place:

"THE COURT: *** When we were in courton [February 26, 2002,] [Caston] admitted andstipulated to count I of the petition, and thecourt continued this so that [Butler] couldhave the advice of counsel as to how he wishedto proceed.

[BUTLER'S COUNSEL]: We're ready, yourHonor.

THE COURT: *** Anything that you wish totell the court in terms of Mr. Butler's wishesto proceed.

[BUTLER'S COUNSEL]: He would like atrial on this matter.

THE COURT: Then the court does call thisfor hearing on the petition, seeking a findingof neglect as to the respondent minor, [R.B.]"

The prosecutor then asked the trial court to takeadditional notice of Caston's stipulation at the February 26hearing, as well as People's exhibit No. 1, the police reports,which were part of that stipulation, and Caston's verified petitionfor an order of protection. Butler's counsel objected, arguingthat matters Caston stipulated to should not be considered by thecourt against Butler, nor should any sworn statement she made aboutthe order of protection. Butler's counsel pointed out that becauseCaston did not pursue the matter, the order of protection case wasdismissed.

The trial court overruled Butler's objections, explainingas follows:

"The allegation in this petition is notwhether or not one person or the other causedthe domestic violence; the question is wasthere any domestic violence and were thechildren exposed to it, and that is count [I][on] which the State is proceeding ***. It'simportant that Mr. Butler understand that,there was a stipulation, and the stipulationso far as the two police reports go, was notas to any legal conclusion as to whether whatthe officers were saying was the truth or not,the stipulation offered was that the officers,if called to testify, would testify consistentwith the contents of the report.

The contents of the report describingwhat they report as to an episode of domesticviolence, the court took note of those policereports as a factual basis for accepting[Caston's] stipulation to the petition.

Two separate questions.

The court today takes note of [Caston's]stipulation to the petition acknowledging thatthere was an episode of domestic violence. Please note again for [Butler's] benefit, notassigning who was responsible for what in thatepisode, that stipulation acknowledges thatthere was an episode of domestic violence towhich the children were exposed.

*** The court takes note of her *** swornstatement as to the petition for the order ofprotection. [Butler's counsel] raises thequestion of being able to examine those witnesses as it pertains to her client. And thatis the nut of it and [Butler's counsel] iscorrect in that sense, and the court will giveher leave and in fact the court will, ifnecessary, continue this if [Butler's counsel]wishes to call witnesses.

I think I am compelled to perhaps simplify all that verbiage. [Butler's counsel],what I've said in brief is that I take note of[Caston's] stipulation. I take note of thefactual basis on which she rested, tendered itfor her purposes as it pertained to [her].

As to [Butler,] what is relevant is[Caston's] stipulation that yes, there was anincident of domestic violence, as would havebeen testified to by the police officers ifthey were called to testify."

The State then rested, relying on Caston's admission andstipulation and accompanying factual basis, and Butler offered noevidence. The State argued that (1) it had the burden to provethat R.B. was a neglected child because her environment wasinjurious to her welfare in that she had been exposed to the riskof domestic violence when living with her parents, Caston andButler; and (2) Caston's admission and stipulation, coupled withits factual basis, was sufficient to prove that R.B. was aneglected child. Butler's counsel argued that the evidence was notsufficient to prove his client "guilty" of child neglect. Duringher argument on Butler's behalf, his counsel twice referred to theevidence being insufficient "to find him guilty."

The trial court initially responded to Butler's counselby explaining that in this proceeding, "it is not a question ofguilt, this is not a criminal trial, this is a civil proceeding,and the essence of the proceeding is whether or not [R.B.] is aneglected minor." The court further pointed out that the allegation of child neglect did not require proof that the domesticviolence was against R.B., nor did the allegation specify whocommitted the domestic violence. Thus, the court explained, theState was not required to specify or prove who was responsible forthe domestic violence, as would be required in a criminal case, butsimply to establish whether or not the environment is one in whichdomestic violence places R.B. at risk. The court further explainedas follows:

"In this matter[,] the court previouslyaccepted [Caston's] stipulation that yes,there was domestic violence in the environmentwhen [R.B.] was residing with her and/ or withGaston Butler. As a factual basis for accepting [Caston's] stipulation, the court acceptedthe stipulation to the police reports, andalso took judicial notice of sworn statementsentered in another proceeding."

The trial court concluded its remarks by noting that itcould rely on Caston's admission and stipulation, which wassufficient for the State to sustain its burden of proof that R.B.was a neglected minor by reason of being a minor under 18 years ofage whose environment is injurious when she resides with Caston"and/or Butler" because she is exposed in that environment to therisk of domestic violence.

In May 2002, the trial court conducted a dispositionalhearing, formally adjudicated R.B. a ward of the court, andappointed DCFS as her guardian. The court also ordered her removedfrom the custody of both Caston and Butler.

This appeal followed.

Butler argues that the trial court (1) improperlyaccepted Caston's stipulation as evidence against him; (2) violatedhis fourteenth amendment and statutory rights to fundamentally fairproceedings; and (3) made a decision that was contrary to themanifest weight of the evidence because, absent Caston's stipulation, the record contained no evidence against him. In support, hecites (1) section 2-18(6)(b) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2-18(6)(b)(West 2000)), which prohibits a court from taking judicial noticeif doing so would result in admitting hearsay evidence at a hearingwhere it would otherwise be prohibited; (2) People v. Long, 316Ill. App. 3d 919, 928, 738 N.E.2d 216, 222 (2000), which holds thatpolice reports are generally inadmissible hearsay; and (3) section1-5(1) of the Act, which provides that a respondent has a right tobe present at all judicial court proceedings and to cross-examineany witnesses (705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 2000)). Although Butlerpurports to raise three issues on appeal, in essence he raises justone: the procedural inappropriateness of the adjudicatory hearingthe trial court conducted as to him. That inappropriatenessallegedly occurred when the court considered Caston's stipulationas evidence, thereby violating Butler's statutory and constitutional rights.

In response, the State asserts the following:

"The sole admission of a custodial parent, [(Caston)], as to the allegation of theneglect petition was sufficient to sustain thefinding of neglect. Therefore, whether thecourt considered hearsay evidence at therespondent father's adjudicatory hearing isirrelevant; reversal is not required. Thetrial court's finding of neglect was basedupon the stipulation of facts entered into bythe minor's mother, a custodial parent. Herstipulation alone is sufficient to support thefinding of neglect by the court and its adjudication of wardship. Furthermore, the issueat the adjudicatory hearing was whether [R.B.]was neglected and not the fitness of herparents to care for her. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(1)(West 2000)."

We agree with the State.

To address Butler's argument, we must analyze the purposeof the adjudicatory hearing and the issue it is intended toresolve.

Initially, we agree with the trial court that Butler'sargument--that the evidence was not sufficient "to prove himguilty" of child neglect--does not apply to juvenile courtproceedings in which the issue is whether the respondent minor wasneglected. Instead, Butler's argument would apply if he werestanding trial on a criminal charge that he had injured R.B. Inthat situation, the State would have to prove beyond a reasonabledoubt Butler's criminal culpability. At the adjudicatory hearingstage in the present case, his criminal culpability is no issue atall.

Section 1-2(1) of the Act declares that the Act's purpose"is to secure for each minor subject hereto such care and guidance*** as will serve the safety and moral, emotional, mental, andphysical welfare of the minor." 705 ILCS 405/1-2(1) (West 2000). To achieve this purpose, the Act empowers juvenile courts tointervene on behalf of a child when that child's condition warrantsintervention, not when the conduct or "guilt" of a parent orguardian warrants it. Accordingly, section 2-1 of the Act,entitled "Jurisdictional facts," states that "[p]roceedings may beinstituted under the provisions of the [the Act] concerning boysand girls who are abused, neglected[,] or dependent, as defined in[s]ection[] 2-3 or 2-4 [of the Act]." 705 ILCS 405/2-1 (West2000). Section 2-1 contains no mention of conduct or "guilt" of aparent or guardian.

Thus, the purpose of juvenile court proceedings is to determine the status of the child on whose behalf the proceedingsare brought, not to determine any particular person's criminal orcivil liability. Specifically, at an adjudicatory hearinginvolving an allegation of neglect or abuse, the issue before thetrial court is whether the particular child is neglected or abusedas alleged in the State's petition and as defined in section 2-3 ofthe Act. 705 ILCS 405/2-3 (West 2000).

Section 2-3 of the Act defines neglected children asthose who live under certain conditions, such as, in the presentcase, a minor under 18 years of age "whose environment is injuriousto his or her welfare" (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2000)), or, inanother case, a minor "who is not receiving the proper or necessarysupport" (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(a) (West 2000)). These definitionsdo not address the question of who may be responsible for suchadverse conditions because, in the first instance, that questiondoes not matter. What matters initially is only whether the childis neglected because these conditions exist. After all, the Act'smandate is to protect children, not to assign blame to parents. Ifthe State proves the neglect allegation, then causation--andremediation--can and should be addressed by the trial court at thedispositional hearing.

The reason that causation is irrelevant at theadjudicatory hearing, where the trial court determines whether achild is neglected, becomes clear when the following hypotheticalscenarios are considered. First is the case in which the State hasalleged that a child was neglected because he was not receivingproper medical care. 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(a) (West 2000). No courtwould recognize as a defense to that charge the State's inabilityto prove precisely which parent or guardian should have beenproviding the proper medical care but failed to do so. Assumingtotal uncertainty regarding where the blame may lie, the childwould be no less neglected if he, in fact, were not receivingproper medical care.

Consider another case in which the State alleged that athree-year-old child was neglected because his environment wasinjurious to his welfare in that he was found on multiple occasionswandering about at night in a partially clothed condition. Thechild would be no less neglected if the State had difficultyproving precisely which parent or guardian was at fault forpermitting the child to wander about in such a condition. Not onlywould the State not have to prove who was at fault, it would not bea relevant inquiry.

Last, consider the case in which the State alleges thata 1 1/2-year-old child is abused because she suffered physicalinjury, by other than accidental means, which caused impairment ofher physical health. The State's petition alleges the childsuffered multiple and deep bruises, as well as welts, over severalmonths, indicative of excessive corporal punishment. Assumefurther that because the State does not know who inflicted thispunishment, its abuse petition merely alleges that it was inflicted"by a parent or immediate family member or any other person who isin the same family or household as the child." See 705 ILCS 405/2-3(2) (West 2000). Further, assume at the adjudicatory hearing thatthe State is able to prove, through medical testimony, theallegation that this 1 1/2-year-old child suffered multiple anddeep bruises and welts over several months but is not able to provewho caused the child's injuries. Each parent and the other membersof the household testify that they were not responsible for thechild's injuries. Consistent with Butler's argument in this case,the respondent parents in this hypothetical could argue to thetrial court at the adjudicatory hearing that they should not befound "guilty" of child abuse. Yet, on these facts, the Statewould have proved to a moral certainty that this child was anabused minor under section 2-3(2)(i) of the Act because (1) thechild suffered the injuries as alleged and (2) someone who is aparent, immediate family member, or other member of the child'shousehold is responsible for these injuries.

Surely, the legislature that drafted section 2-3 of theAct--as well as the public--would be outraged and view as bizarrea trial court's ruling at the conclusion of the adjudicatoryhearing in this hypothetical case that the child involved was notan abused minor because the State had not proved who was responsible for the abuse. The fact that the State cannot prove causationmakes the child no less abused and no less needful of courtintervention to both protect her and assure that the abuse stop.

At issue in this case was the State's claim that R.B. wasa neglected minor as defined in section 2-3(1)(b) of the Actbecause her environment was injurious to her welfare. 705 ILCS405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2000). Under the foregoing analysis, Caston'sadmission and stipulation properly addressed the only issue pendingat the adjudicatory hearing stage of this juvenile courtproceeding--namely, the status of R.B. The trial court appropriately ruled that Caston's admission and stipulation, with itsaccompanying factual basis, was admissible on this issue. In soruling, the court did not admit Caston's admission and stipulationas "evidence against Butler," as Butler contends. Instead, thecourt ruled that the admission and stipulation of Caston, thecustodial parent, coupled with the underlying factual basis, wassufficient to prove R.B.'s status--namely, that R.B. was aneglected minor as the State alleged--given the absence of anypersuasive evidence to the contrary. The court properly consideredthe factual basis in determining the weight to be given to Caston'sadmission and stipulation.

A custodial parent's admission and stipulation, byitself, may be sufficient to support a finding of abuse or neglect. However, a trial court must consider the factual basis thereforbecause a situation could arise in which neither the custodialparent nor any other credible person has personal knowledge of thecircumstances alleged in the State's petition, thereby renderingthat parent's admission and stipulation less persuasive than theadmission and stipulation of Caston, who was present and an activeparticipant in the incident alleged in the State's petition.

Although it is true that Butler possessed variousprocedural rights, such as the right to be present during theproceedings, to present evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses,these procedural rights did not change the nature of the proceedings from one concerned about the status of R.B. to one in whichButler was an accused party and the State bore the burden ofproving him responsible for R.B.'s neglect.

We also note that Butler never offered any evidencechallenging the information regarding the domestic violence thatwas before the court through Caston's admission and stipulation andwas the basis of the State's neglect petition. Butler was giventhe opportunity to attack the reliability of Caston's admission andstipulation and its factual basis by either testifying himself orcalling Caston or the police officers to testify, but he failed todo so. And, if Butler had requested, the trial court might havepermitted him to cross-examine all of these witnesses anew as ifthe State had called them as its witnesses. Butler's positionappears to be that he was deprived of his procedural right tocross-examine the police officers (who were present in court whenCaston made her admission and stipulation), but he provides nosuggestion as to how that cross-examination might have impeachedthe officers' reports about the serious domestic violence thatoccurred in the presence of R.B. and J.A. in their home on the datein question.

Assuming arguendo that such cross-examination might havedemonstrated that (1) Butler's behavior was not as bad as itappeared in the officers' reports and (2) Caston seriously provokedhim in some way so as to mitigate (at least in Butler's eyes) hisviolent acts, neither of those points would be relevant to thequestion before the court: whether R.B. was a neglected minor forthe reasons set forth in the State's petition. Accordingly, weconclude that the trial court's error, if any, in proceeding as itdid and not again requiring the police officers to appear to becross-examined by Butler, was a mere procedural error that did notprejudice Butler because no change in the ultimate outcome wouldhave occurred.

The trial court found that the State had proved by apreponderance of the evidence that R.B. was a neglected minor. Weconclude that its decision was not contrary to the manifest weightof the evidence. See In re A.P., 179 Ill. 2d 184, 204, 688 N.E.2d642, 652 (1997) ("The circuit court's finding on whether abuse orneglect occurred will not be disturbed on appeal unless contrary tothe manifest weight of the evidence").

Our holding in this case is hardly unique. In In reJohnson, 102 Ill. App. 3d 1005, 1014, 429 N.E.2d 1364, 1372 (1981),the court wrote the following: "The sole admission of thecustodial parent as to the allegations of the neglect petition maybe sufficient to sustain a finding of neglect by the trial court." In Johnson, the court concluded that the trial court's error at theadjudicatory hearing--of appointing for the respondent father anattorney who had a conflict of interest--did not require reversalof the trial court's adjudication that the child was a neglectedminor. The court held that the respondent mother had stipulated tothe charge of neglect and "[h]er stipulation alone is sufficient tosupport the finding of neglect by the court and its adjudication ofwardship." Johnson, 102 Ill. App. 3d at 1014, 429 N.E.2d at 1372.

More recently, in In re April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d 225,242-43, 760 N.E.2d 85, 99 (2001), the First District addressed thesituation in which one of the respondent parents in a case in whichthree children were alleged to be abused (705 ILCS 405/2-3(2) (West2000)) argued on appeal that the trial court erred by accepting heradmission and stipulation to the State's abuse allegations. Theappellate court rejected that argument on various grounds, one ofwhich was to note that the respondent father entered into the samestipulation of facts, and his "stipulation alone would haveprovided a sufficient factual basis for the trial court to make itsfindings of abuse." April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 242, 760 N.E.2dat 99. In so concluding, the court cited Johnson for the proposition that a respondent parent's stipulation of facts can provide asufficient basis by itself for a trial court's finding of neglect. April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 242-43, 760 N.E.2d at 99.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

Affirmed.

KNECHT and McCULLOUGH, JJ., concur.