In July 1999, the State filed a petition to terminatethe parental rights of respondent, Michael Bose, regarding hisminor children, G.B. (born October 13, 1989), M.B. (born June 3,1991), and S.B. (born November 11, 1993). In January 2000, thetrial court conducted a hearing on the termination petition andfound respondent unfit. The court later determined that it wouldbe in the children's best interests to terminate respondent'sparental rights. Respondent appeals the trial court's termination of his parental rights, arguing that the trial court exceeded its statutory authority under section 2-29 of the JuvenileCourt Act of 1987 (Juvenile Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-29 (West1998)). We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Because the parties are familiar with the evidence, andrespondent neither challenges the sufficiency of the evidence norcontends that it was not in the best interests of the minorchildren that his parental rights be terminated, we will discussonly the facts relevant to our determination of the issue onappeal.

Respondent and Kimberly Butts were married, and twochildren were born of the marriage, M.B. and G.B. The partiesdivorced but shared joint custody of the minors with physicalcustody remaining with respondent. Respondent later marriedDarci Poppe, and one child, S.B., was born of the marriage. Subsequently, respondent and Poppe separated. Physical custodyof S.B. remained with Poppe.

In January 1999, the State filed a petition for theadjudication of wardship of respondent's minor children, allegingthat the minor children were (1) abused because respondentcreated a substantial risk of injury to S.B. (705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(ii) (West 1998)); (2) neglected because their environmentwas injurious to their welfare due to (a) respondent's unresolvedissues of anger control and (b) the fact respondent subjectedS.B. to acts constituting emotional abuse (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b)(West 1998)); and (3) dependent because respondent was unable toprovide safe and proper care for them due to suffering fromvarious mental disorders. The State sought shelter care of M.B.and G.B. but did not seek shelter care of S.B. Poppe, though,requested the court to place S.B. under the shelter-care orderalso. The trial court, without objection from respondent,awarded temporary custody and guardianship of the minor childrento their respective mothers and placed all three minor childrenunder the shelter-care order.

In May 1999, the trial court held a hearing whererespondent stipulated to the allegation of neglect concerning hisunresolved issues of anger control and the allegation that theminors were dependent. The State dismissed the remaining allegations. The trial court entered an adjudicatory order adjudicating the minor children neglected and dependent pursuant tosections 2-3(1)(b) and 2-4(1)(b) of the Juvenile Act. 705 ILCS405/2-3(1)(b), 2-4(1)(b) (West 1998).

On July 1, 1999, the court held a dispositional hearing, adjudged the minors wards of the court, and ordered guardianship and custody to remain with the mothers of the minorchildren. On July 12, 1999, the State filed a petition undersections 1(D)(h), (D)(p), and (D)(i) of the Adoption Act toterminate respondent's parental rights, alleging that respondentwas unfit because (1) he committed acts of misconduct againstS.B., (2) he has an inability to discharge his parental responsibilities due to mental impairment, mental illness, or mentalretardation, and (3) he is depraved. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(h),(D)(p), (D)(i) (West 1998).

In January 2000, at the fitness hearing, the trialcourt granted the State's request to dismiss the unfitnessallegations pursuant to sections 1(D)(h) and (D)(i). Respondentstipulated to the State's exhibit No. 1, Dr. French's psychological evaluation of respondent, wherein Dr. French indicated thatrespondent's clinical scale elevations were similar to thosepossessed by persons diagnosed with paranoid personality orparanoid delusional disorder. Additional test results suggestedthat respondent experiences an anxiety disorder and a somatoformdisorder. After considering this evidence, the trial court foundrespondent to be unfit because of his inability to discharge hisparental responsibilities due to mental illness. 750 ILCS50/1(D)(p) (West 1998).

At the subsequent dispositional hearing, i.e., the bestinterests hearing, the trial court, without objection, tookjudicial notice of the file and respondent's criminal convictionsin case Nos. 99-CF-106 (residential burglary and criminal trespass), 99-CF-169 (violation of an order of protection in connection with S.B.'s mother), and 99-CM-200 (violation of an order ofprotection regarding another woman). At the time of the hearing,respondent was incarcerated, serving a nine-year sentence for hisconvictions of residential burglary and criminal trespass.

The trial court conducted in camera interviews with thechildren and heard testimony from several witnesses, includingthe mothers of the minors and the respondent. Respondent testified that he is incarcerated in the Department of Corrections inJacksonville, Illinois, which has no programs to help him addressthe concerns Dr. French raised in his evaluation. After considering the evidence and arguments of counsel, the trial courtfound it was in the children's best interests to terminaterespondent's parental rights. The trial court terminated respondent's parental rights and ordered that the mothers of the minorchildren had the power to consent to the adoption of theirrespective children.

This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

Terminating parental rights is a two-step process. First, the trial court must find a parent unfit. Second, thecourt must consider whether termination is in the best interestsof the children. See In re A.P., 277 Ill. App. 3d 592, 597-99,660 N.E.2d 1006, 1010-11 (1996). In the present case, the trialcourt found respondent unfit and terminated his parental rights. Respondent does not appeal the trial court's finding of unfitness. Respondent appeals only the trial court's order terminating his parental rights, arguing that the trial court exceededits statutory authority under section 2-29 of the Juvenile Act. 705 ILCS 405/2-29 (West 1998). Specifically, respondent arguesthat section 2-29 does not permit a court to terminate theparental rights of one parent, where the minor child was neverplaced in substitute care, but continuously resided with theother parent. The State argues that section 2-29 neither requires, as a condition to the termination of parental rights,that the court place a child in substitute care, nor specifiesthat a court cannot appoint a child's parent as guardian.

Section 2-29(2) provides:

"If a petition or motion alleges and thecourt finds that it is in the best interestof the minor that parental rights be terminated and the petition or motion requeststhat a guardian of the person be appointedand authorized to consent to the adoption ofthe minor, the court, with the consent ofthe parents, if living, or after finding,based upon clear and convincing evidence,that a parent is an unfit person ***, mayterminate parental rights and empower theguardian of the person of the minor, in theorder appointing him or her as such guardian,*** to consent to the adoption." 705 ILCS405/2-29(2) (West 1998).

The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain andgive effect to the true intent of the legislature. People v.Latona, 184 Ill. 2d 260, 269, 703 N.E.2d 901, 906 (1998). Thissection sets forth the process by which the juvenile courtterminates parental rights and frees the minors for adoption. Respondent acknowledges that section 2-29 authorizes the trialcourt to appoint a guardian with the power to consent to theadoption of the minor, but argues that it does so only when theminor child is or has been in substitute care. In support of hisargument, respondent relies on In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 619N.E.2d 702 (1993), and In re A.K., 250 Ill. App. 3d 981, 620N.E.2d 572 (1993), and argues that those courts construed theintent of section 2-29 as addressing the need for permanence forminors "who might otherwise languish in substitute care."

Based on our reading of those cases, neither courtaddressed the issue before this court, namely, whether section 2-29 prohibits a trial court from terminating the parental rightsof a parent who has previously been found unfit, when the minorchildren are not in substitute care. In M.M., the issue waswhether the juvenile court, pursuant to the Juvenile Act, mayplace conditions on the court-appointed guardian's power toconsent to adoption. The supreme court found that the JuvenileAct makes no provision for the court to limit, restrict or in anyway condition the guardian's power; therefore, the juvenile courtexceeded its authority. Respondent's reliance on A.K. stems fromthe following language found in that case:

"In a proceeding under section 2-29 ofthe [Juvenile] Act [citation] ***, the objectand purpose to be obtained is a determinationas to whether the child's parents have givenup their parental rights or have been foundto be unfit parents and, if so, whether thebest interests of the minor are served byappointment of a guardian with power to consent to adoption of the child. [Citation.] The evil to be remedied is that which a childsuffers when it is not in an adequate permanent home setting with adequate parent figures." A.K., 250 Ill. App. 3d at 988, 620N.E.2d at 577.

In A.K., the petition alleging abuse was directed at both themother and the "presumed" father. In contrast, here, the allegations were directed solely against respondent. In addition, inA.K., the minor's biological father surrendered his parentalrights and the court found the minor abused, made the minor award of the court, and placed him in the custody and under theguardianship of the Illinois Department of Children and FamilyServices (DCFS). Here, the trial court found respondent unfitbut found the mothers of the minors fit and ordered that custodyand guardianship remain with the mothers. Therefore, the evil tobe remedied--a child's suffering when he is not in an adequatepermanent home setting with adequate parent figures--was not anissue in the case at bar. Accordingly, we find respondent'sreliance on these cases misplaced.

In addition, respondent does not explain how the trial court lacked authority to terminate his parental rights undersection 2-29 simply because the minors' mothers had custody. Thestatute does not prohibit a trial court from terminating anoncustodial parent's rights when a child is residing with theother parent or when an outside guardian has not been appointed.

Here, the trial court did not need to appoint a separate guardian of the children because it ordered that custody andguardianship remain with the mothers of the minor children. SeeIn re T.R., 135 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1021, 482 N.E.2d 372, 376(1985) (it was unnecessary for the court to appoint a guardian,since the mother retained her parental rights with respect to thechild). Notwithstanding, in its order terminating respondent'sparental rights, the trial court included language that empoweredthe mothers, as guardians, with the right to consent to theadoption. See also M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 61, 619 N.E.2d at 708(under the Juvenile Act, the order empowering the guardian toconsent to adoption terminates parental rights (705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 1998))).

The record shows that the trial court fully compliedwith section 2-29. At the dispositional hearing, the trial courtfound that the mothers of the minor children were fit, that DCFSguardianship was not necessary, and that the mothers were toretain guardianship and custody of their respective children. The State's petition to terminate respondent's parental rightsprayed that the mothers, as guardians of the minors, be authorized and empowered to consent to the adoption of their children. The trial court, in its order to terminate respondent's parentalrights, found that it was in the children's best interest thattheir mother have the right to consent to the adoption of theirrespective children and ordered that the mothers had the power toconsent to the adoption of their children. Accordingly, thetrial court did not exceed its authority when it terminatedrespondent's parental rights. Moreover, even though respondent'sparental rights were terminated, if a petition to adopt the minorchildren were filed, respondent would be entitled to notice ofthe adoption proceedings so that he could appear "to presentevidence to the court relevant to the best interests of thechild[ren]." 750 ILCS 50/7 (West 1998).

We note that respondent does not argue on appeal thatit was not in the minors' best interests to have his parentalrights terminated. Nonetheless, upon review of the record, weconclude that the trial court's finding that it was in the minorchildren's best interests to terminate respondent's parentalrights was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Inre S.H., 284 Ill. App. 3d 392, 401, 672 N.E.2d 403, 409 (1996) (areviewing court will not overturn a trial court's decision toterminate parental rights after a finding of unfitness unless itis against the manifest weight of the evidence). The evidencepresented at the best interests hearing established that (1)respondent had several criminal convictions, was currentlyincarcerated serving a nine-year sentence, suffered from a mentalillness for which he was currently unable to obtain services and,as a result, would not be able to adequately discharge hisparental responsibilities in the near future; (2) the minors werehappy, doing well in school, and liked their stepfathers; (3) itwas not in the children's best interests to leave them in "limbo"for the time respondent was incarcerated; and (4) the childrenwere with their respective mothers, both of whom have remarriedand whose husbands were willing to adopt the children.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

Affirmed.

GARMAN and KNECHT, JJ., concur.