JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a February 2003 hearing, the trial courtentered a dispositional order adjudging Timothy T. (born October6, 1996) and Hannah L. (born September 26, 1999), the minorchildren of respondent, Michelle Todd, wards of the court andplacing them in the custody and guardianship of the Department ofChildren and Family Services (DCFS).

Respondent appeals, arguing that the trial court erredby (1) conducting the dispositional hearing without first entering a written adjudicatory order and (2) unifying theadjudicatory and dispositional hearings. We affirm.

In August 2002, the State filed a petition for theadjudication of wardship of Timothy T. and Hannah L., allegingthat (1) they were neglected minors because respondent and herboyfriend, Timothy Lisby (who was the biological father of HannahL.), had abandoned them without a proper plan of care (count I);and (2) they were neglected minors because respondent created anenvironment injurious to their welfare in that the children wereexposed to the risk of sexual abuse while residing with respondent and Lisby (count II).

In October 2002, the State dismissed count I of itspetition. Between October 2002 and January 2003, other proceedings took place that are not pertinent to this appeal. In earlyJanuary 2003, the trial court scheduled the State's petition fora February 5, 2003, hearing.

At the beginning of the February 5, 2003, adjudicatoryhearing, the State filed an amended petition for the adjudicationof wardship of Timothy T. and Hannah L. The petition reallegedcount I and further alleged that Timothy T. was a neglected minorbecause respondent created an environment injurious to hiswelfare in that he was exposed to risks of physical harm andsubstance abuse while residing with respondent and Lisby. Thetrial court then conducted the adjudicatory hearing and made anoral finding that Timothy T. and Hannah L. were "neglected,"within the meaning of section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Actof 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2002)), in that theylived in an environment injurious to their welfare.

Immediately following the adjudicatory hearing, thetrial court held a dispositional hearing. The court had not yetentered a written adjudicatory order setting forth its findingsof neglect--and would not do so until February 27, 2003. At theconclusion of the dispositional hearing, the court made TimothyT. and Hannah L. wards of the court and placed them in thecustody and guardianship of DCFS.

This appeal followed.

A. Conducting the Dispositional Hearing

Without First Entering the Written Adjudicatory Order

Respondent first argues that the trial court erred byconducting the dispositional hearing without first entering awritten adjudicatory order, as is required by section 2-21(2) ofthe Act (705 ILCS 405/2-21(2) (West 2002)). We disagree.

Section 2-21(2) of the Act provides, in pertinent part,as follows:

"If *** the court determines[,] and putsin writing the factual basis supporting thedetermination[,] that the minor is *** neglected ***, the court shall then set atime[,] not later than 30 days after theentry of the finding[,] for a dispositionalhearing ***." 705 ILCS 405/2-21(2) (West2002).

We review de novo issues of statutory construction. "The primary purpose of statutory construction is to determineand give effect to the legislature's intent, while presuming thelegislature did not intend to create absurd, inconvenient, orunjust results." In re B.L.S., 202 Ill. 2d 510, 514-15, 782N.E.2d 217, 220-21 (2002). Examining the language of the statuteis "the most reliable indicator of the legislature's objectivesin enacting a particular law." Michigan Avenue National Bank v.County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504, 732 N.E.2d 528, 535 (2000). If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, no needexists to resort to other aids of construction. B.L.S., 202 Ill.2d at 515, 782 N.E.2d at 221. A statute is ambiguous if it iscapable of more than one reasonable interpretation. In re B.C.,176 Ill. 2d 536, 543, 680 N.E.2d 1355, 1359 (1997); see B.L.S.,202 Ill. 2d at 517, 782 N.E.2d at 222 ("A statute is ambiguouswhen it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses").

Respondent interprets section 2-21(2) of the Act tomean that "[t]he entry of a written adjudicatory order is acondition precedent to the entry of a dispositional order." Incontrast, the State interprets that section to mean that thetrial court may schedule a dispositional hearing at the conclusion of the adjudicatory hearing. According to the State,timeliness was the legislature's concern in section 2-21(2), notmaking the entry of a written adjudicatory order indispensable tothe dispositional hearing.

Both respondent and the State offer reasonable interpretations of section 2-21(2) of the Act. We thus conclude thatthe statutory language is subject to more than one reasonableinterpretation and is ambiguous. Accordingly, we must employstatutory construction aids to determine legislative intent,while avoiding absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results. SeeB.L.S., 202 Ill. 2d at 517, 782 N.E.2d at 222 (when a statute isambiguous, it is appropriate to examine legislative history orother statutory aids). In addition, when a statute is ambiguous,"a court may properly consider the consequences of alternativeconstructions, as well as the nature and objects of the statuteitself." People v. Easley, 119 Ill. 2d 535, 539, 519 N.E.2d 914,915 (1988).

Respondent advocates an interpretation of section 2-21(2) that would (1) hinder one of the underlying policies of theAct, and (2) eviscerate the overarching goal of section 2-21(2),which is to speed up the judicial process when the custody ofchildren is at stake. In section 1-2(4) of the Act, the legislature instructs courts to liberally construe the Act to carry outits underlying purpose and policies (705 ILCS 405/1-2(4) (West2002)). One of those policies is found in section 1-2(2) of theAct, which states as follows:

"In all proceedings under this Act[,]the court may direct the course thereof so aspromptly to ascertain the jurisdictionalfacts and fully to gather information bearingupon the current condition and future welfareof persons subject to this Act." (Emphasisadded.) 705 ILCS 405/1-2(2) (West 2002).

Further, in enacting and amending section 2-21(2) ofthe Act, the legislature was addressing this promptness concern. As originally enacted, that section provided that "[i]f the courtfinds and notes in its findings that the minor is either abusedor neglected or dependent, the court shall then set a time for adispositional hearing." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 802-21(2). Effective July 1, 1991, the legislature amended section2-21(2) to provide that the court should schedule a dispositionalhearing "not later than 30 days after the entry of the finding"of abuse, neglect, or dependency. See Pub. Act 86-1293,