JUSTICE APPLETON delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondent, Rena Wright, appeals from the trial court'sorder reinstating neglect proceedings relating to her minorchildren, T.W. (born April 3, 1992) and B.J.W. (born January 21,1989). Respondent contends the court was without jurisdictionand was therefore without authority to enter the reinstatementorder when no appeal from the order closing the case was taken. We reverse and remand with directions.

I. BACKGROUND

On November 4, 2002, upon the State's petition, thetrial court entered an order for shelter care as to T.W. andB.J.W. The petition alleged the minors were neglected pursuantto section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (JuvenileAct) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2000)) due to respondent'sunresolved issues of substance abuse. At the time, all partiesresided in McLean County. B.J.W. was in residential treatment asa condition of juvenile probation from a De Witt County criminalconviction.

On November 8, 2002, the trial court entered an orderfor both minors to reside with their maternal grandmother,Janelle Reid. The same order named Reid and the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) as temporarycocustodians. By December 10, 2002, the date of a pretrialhearing, respondent had moved to Bastrop, Louisiana, and Reid wasliving in Granville, Ohio. At the hearing, DCFS informed thecourt that B.J.W. was not living with either cocustodian but wasbelieved to be living with respondent in Louisiana. The courtissued a juvenile warrant for B.J.W.'s return.

On January 31, 2003, the State filed a motion to vacatethe trial court's order entered on November 8, 2002, claiming thecourt had no authority by order to permit the minors to residewith Reid in Ohio. On January 31, 2003, the court (1) entered anadjudicatory order finding the minors neglected, (2) vacated itsNovember 8, 2002, order, and (3) appointed DCFS as temporaryguardian of both minors. The warrant for B.J.W. remainedoutstanding.

On March 7, 2003, the trial court entered adispositional order, finding respondent unfit and unable to carefor the minors because of her unresolved substance abuse. DCFSwas appointed guardian of the minors. T.W. was placed with Reid,who then resided in Tennessee. DCFS believed B.J.W. resided withrespondent in Louisiana.

At the permanency hearing on May 20, 2003, the trialcourt entered the following order:

"Court appoints Janelle Reid as guardianof minor [T.W.]. Court dismisses case as itrelates to minor [B.J.W.] because mothercontinues to harbor [B.J.W.] and refuses toreturn him to this jurisdiction; Louisianaauthorities have refused to honor the warrantfor minor. No services offered or performedby mother as she left the jurisdiction[,] andnothing has been resolved."

The order further stated: "DCFS is discharged as bothminors' guardian. Court, over State's objection, closes case." The docket entry stated: "Over State's objection, case dismissedas to [B.J.W.]. Guardianship of [T.W.] awarded to [grandmother]Janelle Reid. DCFS discharged, wardship terminated[,] and caseclosed. See order. Closed." The State did not appeal the trialcourt's order.

On January 22, 2004, eight months later, the Statefiled a petition for adjudication of wardship as to B.J.W. in anew case, No. 04-JA-15. The trial court took judicial notice ofthe previous case (No. 02-JA-78) and entered a shelter-care orderappointing DCFS as temporary custodian. According to thepetition, B.J.W. was detained in the McLean County juveniledetention facility for delinquency matters pending in De WittCounty.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss or transfer venueon April 5, 2004, in case No. 04-JA-15, seeking to have the casedismissed or transferred to De Witt County, where she and B.J.W.resided. While a copy of respondent's motion does not appear inthe record, all parties agree the same was filed.

On April 20, 2004, the trial court conducted a pretrialhearing and a hearing on respondent's motion to dismiss ortransfer venue in case No. 04-JA-15. The court concluded, "Itwas a mistake to dismiss the [p]etition in [No.] 02-JA-78." Thefollowing exchange occurred:

"THE COURT: The court notes it has beenless than a year since the [No.] 02-JA-78case was dismissed over both [T.W.] and[B.J.W.] and reinstates this case. Wardshipof the minors resides with the court. DCFSis reinstated as guardian of the minors. AndI will set a hearing on whether the minorsshould be left in their current placement orplaced somewhere else.

MR. McPHEE [(respondent's attorney)]:Just so I understand, you are reinstating acase on the court's motion and this new casein the original [No.] 04-JA-15?

THE COURT: That is correct. I will seta hearing on whether the minors will residein their current placement ***.

MR. McPHEE: Giving DCFS guardianshipover the minors?

THE COURT: Yeah. I am reinstating itwhere it was before. If you reinstate it[,]don't go back and prove the [p]etition. Theonly issue is where the custody of the minorsshould be. ***

MR. McPHEE: I am sorry, judge, I amhaving trouble following. I need to beclear. Are you reinstating an old case thatwas dismissed on the court's motion?

THE COURT: No. I am reinstating a fairly new case. That is on the court's motion. Yeah. It is [No.] 02-JA-78. It was a yearago.

MR. McPHEE: Just wanted to be sure.

THE COURT: Thank you. Those are goodquestions."

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court entered the followingorder:

"This cause came on for hearing on mom'smotion to dismiss or transfer venue. Peopleby [Assistant State's Attorney] S. Thompson,minor by [guardian ad litem] A. Novick, momRena Wright by [Assistant Public Defender] J.McPhee. After hearing argument and takingjudicial notice of [No.] 02[-]JA[-]78 and[No.] 03[-]JA[-]44 [(neglect proceedingwherein B.J.W. is the putative father of analleged neglected minor)] (orders and pleadings only)[,] court denies motion to dismissor transfer, sua sponte reinstates [No.] 02[-]JA[-]78 as it was improvidently dismissed over the State's objection, and reinstates wardship of both [B.J.W.] and [T.W.]and reinvests guardianship of both boys withDCFS. Further permanency and a decision asto shelter for [T.W.] set for June 1, 2004[,][at] 10:30."

On May 20, 2004, respondent filed a motion to dismiss,alleging the trial court lacked jurisdiction to reinstate thecause more than 30 days after the order of dismissal, a finalorder, on May 20, 2003.

On June 1, 2004, the trial court conducted a hearing onpermanency and on respondent's motion to dismiss. At the beginning of the hearing, the court noted the cases to be heard wereNo. 04-JA-15 (B.J.W.'s new case) and No. 02-JA-78 (originalcase). Respondent's counsel argued that the court was withoutauthority to reinstate No. 02-JA-78 after it had been dismissedand 30 days thereafter had passed. In its comments, the courtstated: "So far as [No.] 02-JA-78 is concerned[,] the courtaccepts the argument that the case was dismissed and closed,cannot be reinstated as to [B.J.W.], but rules the case was neverdismissed as to [T.W.]." Thus, the court determined that No. 02-JA-78 was dismissed as to B.J.W. but remained pending as to T.W. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

Respondent claims the trial court had no authority orjurisdiction to reinstate case No. 02-JA-78 on its own motion. She argues the orders reinstating the case, transferring guardianship from Reid to DCFS, and addressing permanency goals shouldbe vacated.

In her argument, respondent relies on the SecondDistrict's opinion in In re M.M., 337 Ill. App. 3d 764, 773, 786N.E.2d 654, 661 (2003), which held that a trial court's orderclosing a juvenile case is a final order for purposes of appeal. She contends, because the State did not appeal that final order,the trial court lost jurisdiction of the case and thus had noauthority to enter the order on June 1, 2004.

In opposition, the State argues the trial court's orderof June 1, 2004, was "wholly consistent" with the terms of itsMay 30, 2003, order. The State claims T.W.'s case could bereinstated because it was closed, but was never formally dismissed, and a new case was filed against B.J.W. because his casewas formally dismissed. The State claims respondent's appeal iswithout merit.

First, we agree with respondent that by closing thecase, the trial court absolutely and finally determined therights of the parties and terminated the litigation (see M.M.,337 Ill. App. 3d at 773, 786 N.E.2d at 661), making the May 20,2003, order final for purposes of appeal under Supreme Court Rule301 (155 Ill. 2d R. 301). However, unlike M.M., that is not theissue here. The issue is whether the court can regain jurisdiction of a closed case pursuant to the terms of section 2-33 ofthe Juvenile Act (705 ILCS 405/2-33 (West 2000)). Unfortunately,neither party argues the applicability of this section, butbecause it specifically allows the reinstatement of previouslyclosed cases, we find it cannot be ignored.

Section 2-33 of the Juvenile Act sets forth as follows:

"(1) Any time prior to a minor's 18thbirthday, pursuant to a supplemental petitionfiled under this [s]ection, the court mayreinstate wardship and open a previouslyclosed case when:

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(b) the minor is not presentlya ward of the court under [a]rticleII of this Act nor is there a petition for adjudication of wardshippending on behalf of the minor; and

(c) it is in the minor's bestinterest that wardship bereinstated.

(2) The supplemental petition must befiled in the same proceeding in which theoriginal adjudication order was entered." 705 ILCS 405/2-33 (West 2000).

This section, which became effective on June 30, 1998,allows the trial court to reinstate a case under certaincircumstances. The question before us then is whether thosecircumstances exist in this case.

Both the trial court and the State made a distinctionbetween dismissing the case pertaining to B.J.W. and closing thecase pertaining to T.W. We find the Juvenile Act does notcontemplate a distinction between the two under the circumstanceshere.

In interpreting the Juvenile Act, our task is toascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature,while presuming the legislature did not intend to createabsurdity, inconvenience, or injustice. M.M., 337 Ill. App. 3dat 773, 786 N.E.2d at 662. The starting point for determininglegislative intent is always the language of the statute becauseit is the most reliable indicator of the legislature's objectivesin enacting the particular law. M.M., 337 Ill. App. 3d at 773-74, 786 N.E.2d at 662.

Sections 2-31 and 2-33 use the terms "closed,""terminated," and "discharged" when referring to an action takenby the trial court when it determines that wardship is no longerrequired or necessary. See 705 ILCS 405/2-31, 2-33 (West 2000). A strict reading of the statutory sections suggests they do notcontemplate or apply to a "dismissal" of the case.

We look to the language the trial court used inordering the "dismissal" to better determine its intent. Thecourt said it "dismissed" the case as it related to B.J.W.because respondent harbored him and refused to return him to thecourt's jurisdiction. The court, over the State's objection,closed the case. The court also ordered "DCFS discharged,wardship terminated."

Because the trial court did not "dismiss" the casebased upon anything the State did or did not do, we find thecourt's "dismissal" was the equivalent of "closing" the casewithin the meaning of the Juvenile Act. The petition was notdefective, and the State did not fail to prove certainallegations or fail to take certain actions. "Dismissal" waswhat the court saw as its last resort when the offered serviceswere not being utilized and not helping remedy the family'ssituation. Respondent was out of the court's jurisdiction. Because T.W., unlike B.J.W., remained with Reid as ordered, hisprogress could be monitored; but because respondent left thecourt's jurisdiction and had not taken advantage of the servicesoffered, there would likely be no demonstrable progress on hercase and thus no change in T.W.'s status. For the time being,the court found T.W.'s best interest would be served byappointing Reid as his guardian and terminating wardship.

We find terminating wardship with regard to B.J.W. wasdone for the same purpose. At the time, no progress was beingmade. Until respondent and/or B.J.W. took affirmative stepstoward progress, there was little the trial court could do tohelp remedy the situation. Although the court used the word"dismiss," the court closed the case until further notice. Wefind no distinction between "dismissing" B.J.W.'s case and"closing" T.W.'s case.

We find that section 2-33 (705 ILCS 405/2-33 (West2000)) gives the trial court authority and jurisdiction toentertain reinstatement of the case upon the filing of asupplemental petition. Subsection (2) requires the supplementalpetition to be filed in the same proceeding in which the originaladjudication was entered. 705 ILCS 405/2-33(2) (West 2000). Wetherefore reverse the trial court's orders entered in case No.04-JA-15, remand the action and direct the State to file asupplemental petition as to both minors in case No. 02-JA-78 incompliance with section 2-33 (705 ILCS 405/2-33 (West 2000)) forthe court's consideration, and dismiss case No. 04-JA-15 withprejudice.

III. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, we reverse the trial court'sorders entered in case No. 04-JA-15, remand and direct the Stateto file a supplemental petition to reinstate wardship as to bothminors in case No. 02-JA-78 in compliance with section 2-33 (705ILCS 405/2-33 (West 2000)) for the trial court's consideration,and dismiss with prejudice case No. 04-JA-15.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

COOK and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.