JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

In March 2000, plaintiff, Dennis K. Johnson, filed acomplaint for declaratory judgement and breach of contract againstdefendant, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company. Johnson allegedthat State Farm breached its contract to provide him coverage under apersonal liability umbrella policy for a prior judgment against himin favor of a third party, Safeco Insurance Company of America, whicharose out of an indemnity contract between Johnson and Safeco. InOctober 2000, State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the umbrella policy did not cover Johnson's contractualliability to Safeco. In October 2001, Johnson filed a motion forsummary judgment, asserting that (1) facts alleged in an underlyingcomplaint and counterclaim from which his liability to Safeco arosetriggered his right to coverage under the umbrella policy, and (2)State Farm was estopped from asserting noncoverage.

Following a November 2001 hearing, the trial court grantedJohnson's summary judgment motion and denied State Farm's motion forsummary judgment. The court later awarded Johnson $43,975.92 indamages, plus costs.

State Farm appeals, arguing that (1) it was not estoppedfrom asserting its claim that no duty to indemnify existed under theumbrella policy when it provided Johnson's defense in the underlyinglawsuit; (2) it had no duty to indemnify Johnson for the priorjudgment in Safeco's favor, where that judgment arose out of Johnson's breach of his contractual indemnity agreement with Safeco; and(3) because the underlying complaint and counterclaim did not allegeany event that would qualify as an "accident," they failed to triggerthe umbrella policy and State Farm's duty to defend Johnson. Becausewe agree with State Farm's first and second arguments, we reverse thegrant of summary judgment to Johnson.

In January 1988, the trial court appointed Johnson andDouglas White as coexecutors of the estate of Adella Vallerius. White was Vallerius's grandson. In June 1988, Johnson and Whitefiled a bond with the court that jointly and severally bonded them asprincipals to faithfully discharge their duties. Safeco was thecorporate surety on the bond. In consideration of Safeco'ssuretyship, Johnson agreed to indemnify Safeco (hereinafter theindemnity agreement). In September 1988, White was arrested formurdering Vallerius. In January 1989, the court removed Johnson andWhite as coexecutors and appointed the Alton Bank and Trust Companyas successor administrator of Vallerius's estate.

During his term as a coexecutor, White misappropriatedfunds from the estate and damaged Vallerius's residence and vehicle. In January 1990, Alton Bank filed a complaint against Johnson, White,and Safeco (as surety), alleging that Johnson and White breachedtheir fiduciary duty to Vallerius's estate. In March 1990, Safecofiled a counterclaim against Johnson, seeking recovery under theindemnity agreement. Johnson had both a homeowner's policy and anumbrella policy issued by State Farm. In August 1990, Johnson fileda claim under his homeowner's policy regarding the then-pendinglawsuit. State Farm provided Johnson's defense under a reservationof rights, allowed Johnson to select his own attorney, and paid theattorney fees. In October 1994, the trial court approved asettlement agreement between Alton Bank and Safeco, in which AltonBank assigned Safeco its claims against Johnson and White.

In January 1997, the trial court found in Safeco's favoron its counterclaim against Johnson and awarded Safeco $43,975.92,plus costs. The court's judgment was based, in pertinent part, onJohnson and Safeco's indemnity agreement. Johnson appealed thatjudgment, and in April 1998, the Fifth District affirmed. AltonBanking & Trust Co. v. White, No. 5-97-0235 (April 17, 1998)(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

In September 1999, State Farm informed Johnson that he hadno right to indemnification of the January 1997 judgment against himand denied coverage under both the homeowner's policy and theumbrella policy. In March 2000, Johnson filed a complaint fordeclaratory judgment and breach of contract against State Farm. Johnson sought a declaration that State Farm had a duty to indemnifyhim under his umbrella policy and alleged that by denying him suchcoverage, State Farm breached its contract with him. (Johnson doesnot dispute State Farm's denial of coverage under his underlyinghomeowner's policy.)

In October 2000, State Farm filed a motion for summaryjudgment, asserting, in pertinent part, that (1) it did not have aduty to defend Johnson in the underlying lawsuit; and (2) it did nothave a duty to indemnify Johnson for the January 1997 judgment. InOctober 2001, Johnson filed a motion for summary judgment, assertingthat (1) the facts alleged in the underlying complaint andcounterclaim showed that the umbrella policy provided coverage forhis liability; and (2) State Farm was estopped from assertingnoncoverage.

In January 2001, following a hearing, the trial courtgranted Johnson's summary judgment motion and denied State Farm'ssummary judgment motion. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

State Farm argues that the trial court erred by grantingsummary judgment in Johnson's favor. Specifically, it contends that(1) State Farm was not estopped from asserting its claim that no dutyto indemnify existed under the umbrella policy when it providedJohnson's defense in the underlying lawsuit; (2) it had no duty toindemnify Johnson for the prior judgment in Safeco's favor, wherethat judgment arose out of Johnson's breach of his contractualindemnity agreement with Safeco; and (3) because the underlyingcomplaint and counterclaim did not allege any event that wouldqualify as an "accident," they failed to trigger the umbrella policyand State Farm's duty to defend Johnson. Because we agree with StateFarm's first and second contentions, we reverse the grant of summaryjudgment to Johnson.

In appeals from summary judgment rulings, we conduct denovo review. The reviewing court must construe all evidence strictlyagainst the movant and liberally in favor of the nonmoving party. Where the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits show no genuineissue of material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as amatter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2000). If reasonablepersons could draw different inferences from undisputed facts,summary judgment should be denied. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v.American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 315 Ill. App. 3d 552, 559,734 N.E.2d 50, 56 (2000).

State Farm first contends that it was not estopped fromasserting its claim that it had no duty to indemnify Johnson underthe umbrella policy. We agree.

When an insurer's position is that a complaint potentiallyalleging coverage is not covered under a policy that includes a dutyto defend, the insurer may not simply refuse to defend the insured. Instead, the insurer must either (1) defend the lawsuit under areservation of rights or (2) seek a declaratory judgment that nocoverage exists. An insurer is estopped from raising a policydefense to coverage only if it fails to take either of these twoactions. Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust,186 Ill. 2d 127, 150-51, 708 N.E.2d 1122, 1134-35 (1999).

In this case, after receiving notice of Johnson's claimunder his homeowner's policy, State Farm provided a defense in theunderlying lawsuit under a reservation of rights. Further, a separate duty to defend does not arise under the umbrella policy if StateFarm provided a defense to the insured under a separate State Farmpolicy, such as Johnson's homeowner's policy. Under these circumstances, we conclude that State Farm was not estopped from assertingthat it had no duty to indemnify Johnson under the umbrella policy.

State Farm next contends that it had no duty to indemnifyJohnson for the prior judgment in Safeco's favor. We agree.

The umbrella policy provided in pertinent part, as follows:

"COVERAGES

1. Coverage L:- Personal Liability. If youare legally obligated to pay damages for aloss, we will pay your net loss minus theretained limit ***.

2. Defense and Settlement

    ***

        a. we will defend that suit against you;

* * *

DEFINITIONS

6. '[L]oss' means an accident that results inpersonal injury or property damage duringthe policy period. This includes injurious exposure to conditions."

A duty to indemnify is not as broad as a duty to defend. The duty to indemnify arises only when the insured becomes legallyobligated to pay damages in the underlying action that gives rise toa claim under the policy. Travelers Insurance Co. v. Eljer Manufacturing, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 278, 293, 757 N.E.2d 481, 491 (2001). Oncean insured has incurred liability as a result of the underlyingclaim, an insurer's duty to indemnify arises only if "the insured'sactivity and the resulting loss or damage actually fall within the*** policy's coverage." (Emphasis in original.) Outboard MarineCorp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 128, 607N.E.2d 1204, 1221 (1992).

The supreme court has provided guidance on how to construean insurance policy:

"In construing an insurance policy, the primaryfunction of the court is to ascertain and enforce the intentions of the parties asexpressed in the agreement. [Citation.] Toascertain the intent of the parties and themeaning of the words used in the insurancepolicy, the court must construe the policy as awhole, taking into account the type ofinsurance for which the parties havecontracted, the risks undertaken and purchased,the subject matter that is insured and thepurposes of the entire contract. [Citation.]If the words in the policy are plain andunambiguous, the court will afford them theirplain, ordinary meaning and will apply them aswritten." Crum & Forster Managers Corp. v.Resolution Trust Corp., 156 Ill. 2d 384, 391,620 N.E.2d 1073, 1078 (1993).

The umbrella policy defines the term "loss" as "anaccident that results in personal injury or property damage duringthe policy period" (emphasis added). Because the policy does notexpressly define the term "accident," "we must interpret this term byaffording it its plain, ordinary, and popular meaning." (Emphasis inoriginal.) Outboard Marine Corp., 154 Ill. 2d at 115, 607 N.E.2d at1215. "Accident" is defined as "an unforseen and unplanned event orcircumstance" or "an unfortunate event resulting esp. fromcarelessness or ignorance." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary7 (10th ed. 2000).

In this case, the underlying allegation was that Johnsonis liable to Vallerius's estate because he and White breached theirfiduciary duties as coexecutors when White misappropriated estatefunds and damaged Vallerius's residence and vehicle. Affording theword "accident" its plain, ordinary, and popular meaning, we concludethat it does not encompass the events described above. Although anaccident is an "unfortunate event," not all unfortunate events are"accidents." Johnson may have been a victim of White's misdeeds;however, that does not render the character of those misdeeds"accidental."

Moreover, if we view the underlying judgment as arisingout of Johnson's contractual indemnity agreement with Safeco, wereach the same result. Johnson signed an agreement indemnifyingSafeco for "any loss and expense" for which Safeco "shall becomeliable by reason of such suretyship." Johnson's complaint allegesthat his liability rose out of this contractual obligation. Suchliability, by its very nature, is not an "accident." We thusconclude that State Farm had no duty to indemnify Johnson for hisliability to Safeco. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court'sgranting of Johnson's summary judgment motion and remand for furtherproceedings.

For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court'sjudgment and remand for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

APPLETON, J., concurs.

MYERSCOUGH, J., dissents.

JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. I disagree that defendant StateFarm owed no duty of indemnification to plaintiff. The majoritysimply concludes that the word "accident" does not encompass theevent alleged in plaintiff's complaint but provides no reasoning tosupport that conclusion. Plaintiff Johnson has alleged in hiscomplaint an "accident" that falls within the relevant coverageprovisions of the insurance policy in question and triggersdefendant's duty to indemnify.

As the majority observed, the insurance contract itselfdoes not define the term "accident" and to determine whether theevent alleged by defendant is an "accident," we need to give the term"accident" its plain, ordinary, and popular meaning. Outboard MarineCorp., 154 Ill. 2d at 108, 607 N.E.2d at 1212. According to itsdictionary definition, "accident" means "an unforseen and unplannedevent or circumstance" or "an unfortunate event resulting esp. fromcarelessness or ignorance." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary7 (10th ed. 2000). Such a definition is consistent with the policy'sexclusionary provision, which states: "we will not provide insurancefor personal injury or property damage which is either expected orintended by you." The parties have agreed in their briefs that an"accident" occurs when something "unexpected, unintended, and unusualhappens."

Plaintiff clearly alleged an event that was bothunexpected and unintended. Such an event qualifies as an "accident." As plaintiff alleged in his complaint, his coexecutor, White, causedproperty damage to the estate; the estate's successor administrator,Alton Bank, settled and assigned its claim for the damages to Safeco;and plaintiff is required to indemnify Safeco for these losses. Defendant State Farm admitted that it did not investigate the loss,and it did not allege in its motion for summary judgment thatplaintiff expected, planned, or intended for his coexecutor to causesuch a loss. Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded that,based on the above allegation, plaintiff only became liable under atheory of vicarious liability and his action was "clearly notintended or willful." Accordingly, plaintiff's complaint allegedfacts that constitute an "accident," and these facts fall within thecoverage of the policy and trigger defendant's duty to indemnify.

Moreover, as the Supreme Court of Illinois pointed out, inconstruing an insurance policy, any ambiguity should be resolvedagainst the insurer. Outboard Marine Corp., 154 Ill. 2d at 108-09,607 N.E.2d at 1212. Therefore, even if we find that the term"accident" in the umbrella policy is susceptible to more than onereasonable interpretation and one such interpretation would excludethe facts alleged by plaintiff from coverage under the policy inquestion, we are still required to construe the term "accident" inplaintiff's favor and consider only the interpretations providingcoverage. Accordingly, I would find that plaintiff alleged factsthat fall within the coverage of the umbrella policy and affirmsummary judgment in plaintiff's favor.

Defendant State Farm argues that it had no duty toindemnify plaintiff for the judgment in Safeco's favor because thatjudgment arose out of plaintiff's breach of a contractual indemnityagreement. I disagree. First I note that, even though defendantbased its argument on the contractual indemnification theory, it didnot supply this court with the indemnification agreement in question,nor did defendant provide a copy of the surety bond.

I further note that, contrary to defendant State Farm'sassertion in its brief, Madison County circuit court, the trial courtin the underlying lawsuit, did not specifically find plaintiff'sliability to Safeco based solely on the contractual indemnityagreement, but the court also found liability on an implied indemnitytheory. In other words, plaintiff was liable whether the indemnityagreement existed or not.

Plaintiff sufficiently so alleged in his complaint. As plaintiff alleged, he was appointed the coexecutor of the estate andwas required by law to file a surety bond (755 ILCS 5/12-2 (West2000)). Plaintiff signed the indemnity agreement with Safeco so thatSafeco would become the corporate surety on the bond (755 ILCS 5/12-3(West 2000)). Regardless of the indemnity agreement, plaintiff wasresponsible for any damage that his coexecutor, White, caused to theestate because of joint and several liability. Plaintiff'sresponsibility to the estate led to his alleged breach of theindemnification agreement, and his liability to Safeco arose out ofhis liability to the estate. In other words, absent a contractualrelationship between plaintiff and Safeco, plaintiff would still beliable to the estate and plaintiff would still be seekingindemnification from defendant under the umbrella policy. Therefore,the existence of the indemnification agreement does not impactdefendant's duty to plaintiff as the insurer. Accordingly, as thetrial court concluded, the basis of plaintiff's liability is not hiscontractual obligation to Safeco but his vicarious liability as acoexecutor. This is also why Alton Bank, the successoradministrator, not only sued Safeco but also both plaintiff and Whitein its initial action. The fact that Safeco settled with Alton Bankand claimed damages against plaintiff under the indemnity agreementdoes not change the nature and cause of the damage. Therefore, Idisagree with defendant State Farm's contention that plaintiff'sliability was based on plaintiff's breach of contract with Safeco.

Defendant State Farm also asserts that plaintiffintentionally breached a contractual indemnity clause and a findingin plaintiff's favor would "transform the insurance policy into abond that guarantees the performance of fiduciary duties andcontractual obligations." This is also not accurate. As alleged inhis complaint, plaintiff did not intentionally or willfully breachthe indemnity agreement. Plaintiff is liable to Safeco solelybecause of White's action, which was neither "intended" nor"expected" by plaintiff. Further, the insurance policy in questionhad many exclusions, and, as listed above, two of the provisionsspecifically exclude any expected losses and any losses caused by theinsured's intentional or willful acts. These and any other exclusionprovisions operate to ensure that the policy does not become aperformance-guarantee bond.

Therefore, I conclude plaintiff Johnson had sufficientlyalleged an "accident" that triggers defendant State Farm's duty todefend and to indemnify. Accordingly, I would affirm the trialcourt.