JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

Following an April 2002 hearing, defendant, IllinoisSecretary of State Jesse White, denied plaintiff, Robert F. Jones,Jr.'s petition for reinstatement of his full driving privileges. InJuly 2002, Jones filed a complaint for administrative review; andfollowing an August 2003 hearing, the circuit court reversed theSecretary's denial of Jones' petition to reinstate his full drivingprivileges.

The Secretary appeals the circuit court's order, and wereverse.

In June 1987, Jones was arrested for driving under theinfluence of alcohol or drugs or both (DUI) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987,ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-501) after he submitted to a Breathalyzer testthat disclosed a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.17. In August1987, Jones' driver's license was summarily suspended for a period ofthree months (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-501.1). InDecember 1987, Jones received court supervision for the June 1987 DUIoffense.

In February 1992, Jones' Illinois driver's license wassurrendered to another state. (The record does not show to whichstate Jones surrendered his license.) In July 1992, Jones was againarrested for DUI (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(4) (West 1992)) after he wasstopped and refused to complete a Breathalyzer test. In February1993, Jones was convicted of DUI and driving while his license wassuspended.

In February 2002, Jones, who was then 47 years old andlived in Michigan, filed a petition, seeking reinstatement of hisfull driving privileges in Illinois and a formal hearing on hispetition.

The evidence presented at the April 2002 hearing on Jones'petition showed the following. Jones testified that he received hisfirst DUI after he drank "a lot" of 16-ounce beers at the ChicagoBlues Festival. Prior to that arrest, Jones typically consumed"maybe a 12-pack [of beer] a week or a little more."

At the time of his second DUI arrest, Jones had beendrinking beer and had taken Xanax (a benzodiazepine), which a physician had prescribed for him in 1998 for anxiety related to his self-described "horrible" marriage and work-related stress. Jones explained that his then-wife was violent and controlling, and he hadbeen arrested 12 or 15 times for domestic abuse, although he wasnever convicted.

Jones also testified that from 1988 through July 1992, hetook Xanax in increasing amounts and beyond the prescribed dosage. His prescribed dosage was one milligram, three times per day, butJones was "probably taking somewhere between six and nine milligrams." At some point during that four-year period, he became awarethat his Xanax use was going to affect him, and he did not want it tointerfere with his work. (Since 1990, Jones had worked as an environmental health and safety manager for Washington Group or one ofits predecessors.) Jones made numerous unsuccessful attempts to stopusing Xanax on his own. He explained that he would stop taking Xanaxon a Friday morning, and by the end of the day, he would become "veryirritable and jumpy." By Saturday, he would be "bouncing off thewall," and by Sunday, he "would have some hallucinations and actuallylose motor control." For instance, if Jones wanted to pick up a cupof coffee, he could not make his arm pick up the cup even though hecould see it sitting on the table. When that occurred, he had histhen-wife go to the pharmacy, where the "doctors always had plenty ofrefills on the books" for him, and get a prescription refilled. Jones acknowledged that he "knew [he] couldn't get off of [Xanax],"and he eventually realized he had a problem and wanted to get treatment.

One or two weeks prior to his July 1992 DUI arrest, Joneshad arranged to complete inpatient alcohol- and drug-abuse treatmentat Hazelden Foundation in Center City, Minnesota. Because Jones wasgoing to be at Hazelden for about one month, he and his then-wifetook a weekend trip before he was to be admitted. Jones explainedthat they were on their way home from a casino in the "Quad cities"when he was arrested for his second DUI.

Later in July 1992, Jones was admitted to Hazelden, wherehe completed a 28-day inpatient alcohol- and drug-abuse treatmentprogram. His treatment program addressed both his alcohol and Xanaxabuse. When he was first admitted to Hazelden, Jones did not seehimself as a substance abuser because Xanax was a prescribed medication. After completing the treatment program, he realized that hewas a substance abuser. For about one year following his successfulcompletion of the program, Jones attended aftercare meetings with acounselor. His then-wife urged him to drink and became angry when hedid not. Jones also discovered that she had "quite the cocaineproblem," and she wanted him to use cocaine with her. Jones refused,and they later divorced.

In September 1992, Jones' driver's license was summarilysuspended for two years (625 ILCS 5/11-501.1 (West 1992)). InFebruary 1993, Jones was convicted of both DUI and driving with asuspended Illinois driver's license (625 ILCS 5/6-303(a) (West1992)).

In March 1993, the Secretary revoked Jones' Illinoisdriver's license and driving privileges, pursuant to section 6-205(a)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/6-205(a)(2)(West 1992)).

Jones also testified that he had not taken Xanax sinceJuly 1992. From late July 1992 until sometime in 1995 or 1996, hedid not drink alcohol because he had taken the Hazelden treatmentprogram "very seriously." Around 1996, he began drinking "socially." His drinking had not interfered with his driving or ability to work. Jones explained that his current wife does not drink, and they spendtheir time on non-drinking- related activities. He acknowledged thathe currently drinks about a six-pack of beer per week, but notconsistently. Occasionally when Jones gets home from work, he drinkstwo or three beers.

Jones further testified that he suffered ailments afterworking as a demolition safety manager at the World Trade Center"ground zero" site. He had taken "as many as ten or fifteen medications at a time" for the ailments. He currently was taking fourprescribed medications for a reactive airway disorder and one blood-pressure-regulating medication.

The hearing officer considered an "alcohol and drugevaluation uniform report" regarding Jones that was prepared in mid-March 2002 by Jamie Link, a substance-abuse evaluator employed bySolutions Counseling and DUI Services in Springfield. The uniformreport indicated, in pertinent part, as follows. Jones told Linkthat in the year prior to his 1992 DUI arrest, he shared a 12-pack ofbeer per week and a six-pack of beer per weekend. On the day of hisJuly 1992 DUI arrest, which occurred at 5 p.m., he had consumed fourdraft beers between noon and 4 p.m. He also had taken six to eightmilligrams of Xanax that day. Link noted that Jones' consumption ofbeer and Xanax led to his 1992 DUI arrest. Link also noted thatduring the 12-month period prior to his 1992 DUI arrest, Jones hadrepeatedly used substances "in situations in which it [was] physically hazardous." Link also noted that during that same 12-monthperiod, Jones had the following symptoms of substance dependency: (1) tolerance--that is, either (a) a need for markedly increasedamounts of a substance to achieve intoxication or the desired effector (b) a markedly diminished effect with continued use of the sameamount of a substance; and (2) withdrawal--that is, either (a) thecharacteristic withdrawal symptoms for a substance or (b) the takingof the same or a closely related substance to relieve or avoidwithdrawal symptoms. Jones also told Link that he had not used drugssince beginning treatment at Hazelden in July 1992.

Link classified Jones as a Level II (significant risk forrelapse). She recommended that Jones (1) complete a minimum of 10hours of DUI-risk education and a minimum of 20 hours of substance-abuse treatment and (2) participate in recommended aftercare activities.

Later in March 2002, Link sent the Secretary a letter,indicating, in pertinent part, as follows: (1) Jones' Level IIclassification was based on (a) his destructive personal life,including a violent relationship with his former wife, and (b) astressful job that led to Jones' increased use of Xanax over a four-year period; (2) his inpatient treatment at Hazelden satisfied Link'srecommendation that Jones complete DUI-risk education and substance-abuse treatment; (3) since his inpatient treatment, Jones had exhibited self-control and more healthy decision making and life skills;(4) Jones had "continued to use alcohol since 1992, in a safe andresponsible manner"; and (5) in Link's opinion, Jones did not "appearto show signs of being dependent on substances" and the Secretarymight consider restoring Jones' driving privileges.

Jones further testified that he did not know why Linkclassified him as a Level II (significant risk). He also stated that"a year or so back," he completed a substance-abuse evaluation inOregon. According to Jones, after consulting with the Secretary, theOregon evaluator stated as follows: "'Well, we are going to classifyhim this [(a Level III high risk dependent)]. That I have to classify him this, but I don't feel that it is a problem, but accordingto [Illinois] rules, this is what I have to put down.'" The following colloquy then took place between Jones, his attorney, and theattorney for the Secretary:

"[JONES' ATTORNEY]: It's my--my understanding from talking to the [Oregon] evaluatorabout it is that potentially--and I alluded tothis earlier, you know, [Jones] should be a[L]evel [III (high risk dependent)]. Her pointis, he's not dependent because he's had thislong period of non-problematic use of alcohol. And I don't know enough about this to be ableto--.

[SECRETARY'S ATTORNEY]: But [Jones] ischemically dependent.

Q. [SECRETARY'S ATTORNEY:] You are chemically dependent[?]

[JONES' ATTORNEY]: No, he's not.

Q. [SECRETARY'S ATTORNEY:] You are notchemically dependent[?]

[JONES' ATTORNEY]: No.

Q. [SECRETARY'S ATTORNEY:] You are notchemically dependent on [X]anax?

A. [JONES:] Yes, I was.

Q. [SECRETARY's ATTORNEY:] That's chemically dependent?

A. [JONES:] Yes."

Jones then acknowledged that during his inpatient treatment atHazelden, he had not learned that a person can be cured of a chemicaldependency. Instead, at Hazelden, he was taught that "there is nosuch thing as a cure." Jones further acknowledged that if he were touse Xanax or another benzodiazepine, he would "almost definitely endup having a problem similar to the one he had before." AlthoughJones did not believe that alcohol use can be totally segregated fromthe use of other chemical substances, he believed that he suffered anactual addiction to Xanax.

The hearing officer also considered Jones' January 1998affidavit, which he had submitted as part of an out-of-state application to reinstate his full driving privileges. In that affidavit,Jones averred, in pertinent part, that prior to his 1992 DUI arrest,he usually drank six cases of beer per month. The hearing officerfurther considered a November 10, 2000, letter from the Hazeldenhealth information department, which indicated that from July 21,1992, through August 18, 1992, Jones was treated as an inpatient for"chemical dependency."

Following the April 2002 hearing, the hearing officerissued a written decision, recommending that Jones' petition forreinstatement of his full driving privileges be denied. The hearingofficer specifically found that the evidence submitted at the April2002 hearing did not support Link's classification of Jones as aLevel II (significant risk) for the following reasons: (1) Jones'treatment documentation indicated that he received inpatient treatment for "chemical dependency"; (2) Jones testified that he did notknow why he was classified as a Level II (significant risk) when hepreviously had been classified as a Level III (high risk dependent);(3) Jones admitted his chemical dependency upon, and inability toquit taking, Xanax; and (4) Jones himself clearly identified threesymptoms of substance abuse that would classify him as a Level III(high risk dependent)--namely, (a) a marked tolerance, in that Jones(i) had a need for markedly increased amounts of the substance toachieve intoxication or the desired effect or (ii) experienced amarkedly diminished effect with continued use of the same amount ofthe substance; (b) characteristic withdrawal symptoms; and (c) basedon Jones' testimony as to his several attempts to quit his Xanaxabuse, the persistent desire or one or more unsuccessful efforts tocut down or control substance use. The hearing officer recommendedthat Jones return to his evaluator to address his proper classification and present such evidence at his next requested hearing.

The hearing officer found that Jones should have beenclassified as a Level III (high risk dependent), and as a person whoshould have been so classified, Jones was required to (1) remainabstinent from both alcohol and drugs for a minimum of 12 months anddocument that abstinence and (2) have an established support system. The hearing officer further found that Jones had failed to provideevidence of his abstinence and prove that he had an establishedsupport system.

The hearing officer also found that Jones failed to provethat he would (1) be a safe and responsible driver and (2) notendanger the public safety and welfare. In so finding, the hearingofficer noted inconsistencies in Jones' reported alcohol use prior tohis 1992 DUI arrest. In particular, during the March 2002 evaluation, Jones told Link that he typically shared a 12-pack of beerduring the week and a six-pack of beer over the weekend. However,Jones' January 1998 affidavit indicated that prior to his 1992 DUIarrest, he typically drank six cases of beer per month (36 beers perweek). The hearing officer recommended that Jones should return tohis evaluator to address the inconsistency and present an accurateand complete chronological history of his drug and alcohol use at hisnext requested hearing.

In May 2002, the Secretary adopted the hearing officer'sfindings and recommendations and denied Jones' requested relief.

In July 2002, Jones filed a complaint in the circuitcourt, seeking administrative review of the Secretary's May 2002decision. Following an August 2003 hearing, the court reversed theSecretary's denial of Jones' petition to reinstate his full drivingprivileges. The court later granted the Secretary's request to stayenforcement pending appeal.

This appeal followed.

The Secretary argues that its May 2002 decision denyingJones' petition was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We agree.

Driving a motor vehicle on public roads is a privilege andnot a right. "The public interest in curbing the epidemic number ofdeaths and injuries attributable to drunk driving by keeping unsafedrivers off the streets outweighs the interests of convicted drunkdrivers in regaining their driving privileges." Grams v. Ryan, 263Ill. App. 3d 390, 395, 635 N.E.2d 1376, 1380 (1994). "Once drivingprivileges are revoked, their restoration is not automatic." Mohr v.White, 324 Ill. App. 3d 643, 647, 756 N.E.2d 434, 437 (2001).

Under section 6-208(b) of the Code, the Secretary shallnot reinstate full driving privileges until he is satisfied thatdoing so will not endanger the public safety or welfare (625 ILCS5/6-208(b) (West 2002)). The Secretary has promulgated regulationsthat set forth the requirements that a petitioner must meet beforehis driving privileges are reinstated. 92 Ill. Adm. Code