JUSTICE TURNER delivered the opinion of the court:

In September 1998, plaintiff, Harry A. Kinzinger, Jr.,filed suit against defendant, Robert A. Tull, alleging defendantnegligently operated his vehicle causing an automobile accidentthat resulted in injuries to plaintiff. After defendant confessed liability, the trial court held a September 2000 jurytrial on the sole issue of damages, and the jury awarded plaintiff $900,000.

Defendant appeals, asserting (1) plaintiff's counselmade improper comments during voir dire and opening statementsimplying defendant's admission of liability restricted plaintifffrom presenting certain evidence to the jury, (2) plaintiff'scounsel in his closing argument improperly commented on defendant's failure to call opinion witnesses, (3) the trial courterred by allowing plaintiff to testify regarding an injury thatwas not causally connected to the accident, and (4) the damagesaward was excessive and unsupported by the evidence. We affirmas modified.

On November 2, 1996, plaintiff was driving his pickupwith his wife, Susie Kinzinger, when defendant in his pickupstruck the back of plaintiff's pickup. At the time of theaccident, defendant was going about 70 miles per hour and stillaccelerating, while plaintiff's speed was between 30 and 35 milesper hour.

In September 1998, plaintiff filed a complaint againstdefendant, and in September 2000, defendant admitted liability.

At the September 2000 trial on the issue of damages,plaintiff and his wife testified, and the evidence depositions offour witnesses who provided health-care treatment to plaintiffwere read to the jury. Plaintiff also read portions of defendant's evidence deposition to the jury because defendant was notpresent at the trial.

Dr. Richard Foellner, an osteopathic physician and oneof plaintiff's primary physicians, testified he examined plaintiff on November 19, 1996. During that examination, plaintiff,who was 47 years old at the time of the accident, told Foellnerthat following the November 2, 1996, accident he was taken toCarle Foundation Hospital (Carle). He was released that same daybut returned the next day. Neck X rays performed at Carle werenormal. Plaintiff reported immediately after the accident, heexperienced pain in his head, neck, left knee, and left eye, andhad difficulty focusing his vision. The day after the accident,plaintiff experienced some memory loss and was unable to walk ina straight line. Foellner completed a neurological examinationand found plaintiff was "unsteady" on his feet. Because he wasconcerned about possible internal bleeding, he ordered a computerized axial tomography (CAT) scan. The CAT scan was normal.

During a November 21, 1996, follow-up appointment,plaintiff told Foellner he was still experiencing some dizziness. Foellner diagnosed plaintiff as having a concussion and a cervical spine strain, with some underlying age-related arthritis. Foellner explained cervical strain results from a sudden forcebeing exerted upon inelastic tissue. To treat that condition, heperformed osteopathic manipulative therapy on plaintiff's neckand shoulders. Foellner also opined plaintiff's concussion andcervical strain were causally connected to the November 2, 1996,accident.

Foellner next saw plaintiff on November 26, 1996, atwhich time plaintiff was still experiencing some head pain butfelt better overall. When Foellner saw plaintiff again onFebruary 5, 1997, plaintiff reported he had been experiencingdaily headaches over the past four or five days. Foellnerreferred plaintiff to another osteopathic physician, Dr. Kappler,who examined plaintiff on March 11, 1997, and noted significantrestriction in plaintiff's skull, neck, upper back, and ribareas.

On May 21, 1997, plaintiff reported to Foellner he wasstill having some mid-back pain, which Foellner opined could havebeen related to the automobile accident. At that time, Foellnerreferred plaintiff to Dr. Youngerman, an ear, nose, and throatspecialist, because plaintiff had numbness around his left ear. The last time Foellner saw plaintiff for injuries related to theaccident was in September 1997. Foellner stated plaintiff'sdisability from the accident appeared to last through March 1997. From the date of the accident through September 1997, Foellnerbilled plaintiff a total of $727. At the end of 1997, Foellnerreferred plaintiff to Dr. Eric Kivisto, an osteopathic generalsurgeon, because plaintiff had a breast mass.

Kivisto testified he first examined plaintiff inSeptember 1998. During that examination, plaintiff reported thatabout two months after the accident, he developed a painfulswelling in his right breast. Kivisto removed the mass andperformed a biopsy, which revealed the lump was a benign, fattygrowth. The surgery resulted in a two-centimeter-long permanentscar. Kivisto opined that striking a seat belt or a steeringwheel during a car accident could cause such a growth. However,he noted other possible causes for the mass existed as well. Healso stated no permanent disability was associated with thegrowth or its removal and no follow-up treatment was expected.

Dr. Joseph Alper, a neuropsychologist, testified heevaluated plaintiff on two occasions during November and December1999, following a referral from plaintiff's counsel. Accordingto Alper, neuropsychology is a board-certified speciality withinthe field of psychology that "deals with the treatment andassessment of the cognitive, emotional, [and] social influencesof central nervous system dysfunction." During the evaluation,plaintiff reported that in the November 2, 1996, accident, he hitthe back and top of his head and suffered a cut on the corner ofhis eye. He did not lose consciousness but became dizzy and fellover. He also did not suffer any memory loss regarding theevents surrounding the accident. Plaintiff also told Alper thatfollowing the accident, he had problems with (1) his memory (inparticular, difficulty remembering tasks), (2) memory attention(losing his train of thought), (3) communicating his thoughts andideas, including "word[-]finding difficulties," (4) writing withhis dominant right hand, and (5) balance. He also describedsubtle difficulties with his speech, and his wife described somesubtle personality changes in plaintiff. At the time of theNovember 1999 evaluation, plaintiff and his wife felt all ofplaintiff's difficulties had been "subjectively resolved."

Alper later administered several neuropsychologicaltests to assess plaintiff's sensory, perceptual, motor, visual,and spatial skills, his intellectual, memory, and languageabilities, and his executive functions. ("Executive functions"refers to a cognitive system within the brain that regulates andutilizes one's intellectual resources.) Alper testified plaintiff had some very mild relative impairments with the upper-rightextremity and "slightly lower performances on some sensory,motor[,] and cognitive functions that are associated with theleft hemisphere" of the brain. Alper stated the results wereconsistent with the symptoms plaintiff experienced following theaccident. Plaintiff's cognitive abilities were within the broadrange of average, and the only testing that fell in the borderline range was a portion of the test relating to "executivefunctions," specifically dysfunction in cognitive and motorfunctioning associated with the left hemisphere and languageprocessing. Those dysfunctions might affect plaintiff's abilityto plan, persevere, and accomplish goals in his farming occupation. Alper opined plaintiff would permanently remain in thesame condition he was in at the time of the 1999 evaluation. Healso opined plaintiff's problems could be related to the November2, 1996, accident.

Dr. Jack Walz, a dentist who specializes in treatingoral facial pain and both temporomandibular (jaw) joint and sleepdisorders, testified that on April 27, 2000, he examined plaintiff. During that examination, plaintiff complained of jawshifting when he was chewing, jaw fatigue after chewing, and jawjoint noises. Plaintiff reported he did not know how long hisjaw had been shifting, but he had noticed it over the past threeto five months. Plaintiff also reported a "plugging" sensationin his left ear, which he had been experiencing since shortlyafter the accident. Walz's examination revealed a grinding noisein plaintiff's left jaw joint, tenderness of his left jaw joint,unusual wear patterns on his teeth indicating grinding of histeeth, and a nodule on his lip (caused by biting his lip duringuncoordinated jaw movements). Walz diagnosed plaintiff assuffering from degenerative jaw joint disease. Walz prescribedan oral appliance to reduce pressures applied to the jaw joint. He suggested plaintiff wear the appliance at night for the restof his life. The appliance, which costs approximately $1,000,generally lasts between four and six years; however, they sometimes last as long as eight years or as short as two years. Walzalso stated he will need to follow up with plaintiff once a year,at a cost of about $50 per annual visit.

Walz opined the most likely cause of plaintiff's jawproblems was the November 2, 1996, accident. Walz stated thatalthough it was unusual for problems to manifest several yearsafter an occurrence, it was possible that plaintiff had beenexperiencing some, if not all, of his symptoms for quite a whilebefore he noticed them. Walz also stated plaintiff's jaw jointdisease may cause him pain in the future and render him moresusceptible to arthritis and injury. Walz acknowledged that a1998 incident, in which plaintiff was hit in the face with apiece of wood, was a possible cause of his degenerative jaw jointdisease.

Plaintiff testified he had been a farmer since 1975. Before that time, he obtained a bachelor of arts degree ineconomics and attended three semesters of law school. Plaintiffstated the impact of the automobile accident caused his head tobreak the back window and dent the back window frame. His leftelbow, left knee, left eye, and chest hit other parts of histruck during the crash. After the accident, he experienceddifficulty with his vision, difficulty writing with his dominantright hand, difficulty walking in a straight line, and a pluggingsensation in his left ear.

Plaintiff also testified Foellner referred him to Dr.Kenneth Renner, who examined a painful knot on his left elbow. Prior to the accident, he had no problems with his jaw or growthson his body. Plaintiff stated he did not recall telling Alperhis problems had been resolved at the time of his November 1999evaluation. He acknowledged he no longer had any vision problems, but he has to "hyperfocus" to retain information. Plaintiff also acknowledged he was able to conduct his day-to-daybusiness and personal affairs and, other than Alper, he had notseen a specialist for his head injury.

Plaintiff's wife testified she was in the truck withplaintiff at the time of the accident in question. Althoughplaintiff did not lose consciousness, he fell over onto her lap. After the accident, plaintiff had a lot of difficulty rememberingthings he had known his entire life. He had a hard time expressing himself and making decisions. He still had difficultyprocessing information quickly and remembering directions. Shealso noticed plaintiff's personality had changed since theaccident in that he was more quiet. She recalled telling Alperplaintiff's more serious problems had been resolved at the timeof the November 1999 evaluation.

Plaintiff's exhibit No. 1 showed past medical expensestotaling $15,347.83.

Based on this evidence, the jury awarded plaintiff$900,000, as follows: $100,000 for past and future medicalexpenses, $500,000 for pain and suffering, and $300,000 fordisability.

Defendant filed a motion for a new trial or aremittitur, which the trial court denied following a January 2001hearing. This appeal followed.

Defendant first argues plaintiff's counsel made improper comments during voir dire and opening statements implyingthat defendant's admission of liability restricted plaintiff frompresenting evidence to the jury.

During voir dire, the following colloquy took place:

"[PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL]: [Prospectivejuror], because the [d]efendant has admittedliability in this case, the--there are restrictions on what evidence can be offeredabout the occurrence. As the [p]laintiffwith the burden of proof[,] we are limited inthat respect. One of the things I'm concerned about is since we are limited as amatter of law and cannot present certainevidence, would that leave questions in yourmind that might leave us at a disadvantage?

[DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL]: Judge, I'm goingto object to the form of the question. Thereis an inference [sic] that there is somethingthis jury is not going to hear. They'regoing to hear all the evidence in this case.

THE COURT: I'll permit you to rephrase,[plaintiff's counsel].

[PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL]: Because the[d]efendant has admitted liability in thiscase[,] the plaintiff is restricted in theevidence that he can offer as to the circumstances, all the background and circumstances. And one of the things I'm concernedabout is from, you know, what you mentionedearlier is that since we cannot offer thatevidence would we be at a disadvantage?

[DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL]: Same objection,Judge. The suggestion that somehow--

THE COURT: May I see counsel here,please. (Whereupon a [side bar] conferencewas held.)

[PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL]: [Prospectivejuror], relative to this case[,] since the[d]efendant has admitted liability[,] wewon't be able to present any evidence on theissue of liability. We can only presentevidence on the issue of damages and injuries. And in that posture[,] would thatleave unanswered questions in your mind thatyou might hold against us relative to theliability issue?"

Plaintiff's counsel then made the following commentduring opening statements:

"As you know, and [h]is Honor has toldyou, the attorneys have told you, the defendant has admitted liability. Now what thatdoes as far as evidence that you will hear,that restricts the plaintiff--both parties inwhat evidence they can show and they canpresent. So, unfortunately, there may besome evidence that you might want--wish tohave heard, but because the admission ofliability would prevent us from doing so--

[DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL]: Judge, I amgoing to object to the inference [sic] thatthis jury is not going to hear all of theevidence in this case.

THE COURT: Well, not necessarily adopting the rationale articulated, but I sustainthe objection."

While we agree with defendant that plaintiff's counsel's statements were improper, we, however, find nothing inthose statements constitute reversible error.

Defendant cites Crutchfield v. Meyer, 414 Ill. 210,214, 111 N.E.2d 142, 144 (1953), Skelton v. Chicago TransitAuthority, 214 Ill. App. 3d 554, 582, 573 N.E.2d 1315, 1334(1991), and L.D. Brinkman & Co. Midwest v. National SpongeCushion Co., 76 Ill. App. 3d 683, 695, 394 N.E.2d 1221, 1229(1979), for the proposition that reversible error exists whencounsel suggests he wished to present some information but couldnot because his opponent somehow prevented him from doing so.

However, in Skelton, 214 Ill. App. 3d at 582, 573N.E.2d at 1334, after the court noted the above proposition, itfound counsel's comments were not sufficiently improper as torequire a new trial. There, the defense counsel in his closingargument referred to the fact that the plaintiff had neveroffered certain evidence, and the jury had never been toldprecisely what happened and why it happened. Skelton, 214 Ill.App. 3d at 582, 573 N.E.2d at 1334.

In Crutchfield, 414 Ill. at 213-15, 111 N.E.2d at 143-44, the court found the plaintiff was denied a fair trial becauseof statements the defense counsel made in his closing argument. While the court noted both counsel acted improperly, the defendant's counsel called the jury's attention to the fact the trialcourt did not permit defendant to testify to an issue because ofthe plaintiff's objection. Crutchfield, 414 Ill. at 213-14, 111N.E.2d at 143-44. Such conduct suggested the counsel was attempting to convey to the jury the defendant had material andvaluable evidence to give but was denied the opportunity by theplaintiff's technical objection. Crutchfield, 414 Ill. at 214,111 N.E.2d at 144.

In L.D. Brinkman, 76 Ill. App. 3d at 694, 394 N.E.2d at1229, the defense counsel in his opening statement stated hecould not talk about certain conversations, and in closingargument, he commented on certain tests that were not in evidence. The court noted such statements were improper. L.D.Brinkman, 76 Ill. App. 3d at 695, 394 N.E.2d at 1229. The courtthen found based on the closeness of the evidence and the combination of several errors, including the improper statement bydefense counsel, the plaintiff was denied a fair trial. L.D.Brinkman, 76 Ill. App. 3d at 695, 394 N.E.2d at 1229-30.

Here, plaintiff's counsel was conveying to the jurythat because no issue of liability existed, no evidence to provedefendant's liability would be presented. Further, the improperstatements were made in voir dire and near the very beginning ofplaintiff's opening statement. As pointed out by plaintiff, theobjections made to counsel's voir dire questions were as to formand the questioned individual was not selected to hear the case. Moreover, when plaintiff's counsel posed the question for a thirdtime in a different form, defendant did not object. As to theremark in plaintiff's opening statement, defendant objected, andthe trial court sustained the objection. Thereafter, direct andcross-examination of all the witnesses in the case took place,followed by closing arguments by both attorneys and full Illinoispattern jury instructions from the trial court. The record doesnot reflect any disagreement on or objection to the instructionssubmitted to the jury.

Accordingly, we find plaintiff's counsel's remarksduring voir dire and in his opening statement do not constitutereversible error.

Defendant next argues plaintiff's counsel made impropercomments during his closing argument that constituted reversibleerror.

In his initial statement, plaintiff's counsel commentedas follows:

"[Defendant's counsel's] medical opinion, he is a lawyer like me. That's not anopinion. It is not evidence. It may besomething that is generated to try to confuseyou or to try to say, oh, you should substitute your opinion for the doctors'. Believeme, if there were doctors available to contradict the opinions that you heard, they--would have--he would have presented them." (Emphasis added.)

Later, during rebuttal, plaintiff's counsel argued "[i]f therewould have been an orthodontist, another dentist, someone whocould come in and say Walz is full of it, [defendant's counsel]would have had them here." Defendant's attorney objected to bothcomments. The trial court overruled his first objection. As tothe second objection, the trial court stated the following:"Folks, consider only the evidence. The arguments are to assistyou."

Generally, a party may not comment upon his opponent'sfailure to call a witness who is not under the opponent's controlor who is equally available to both parties. The danger fromsuch comments is the jury will presume the testimony would havebeen unfavorable to the noncalling party. Nevertheless, counselmay argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences from it. Lebrecht v. Tuli, 130 Ill. App. 3d 457, 484, 473 N.E.2d 1322,1341 (1985).

As in Lebrecht, 130 Ill. App. 3d at 484, 473 N.E.2d at1341, plaintiff's counsel's statements were made in the contextof comparing and contrasting testimony presented on the cause ofplaintiff's ailments. Here, plaintiff's counsel pointed out thatplaintiff presented the only testimony as to the cause of plaintiff's claimed injuries. Such comment was proper. See Lebrecht,130 Ill. App. 3d at 484, 473 N.E.2d at 1341.

Defendant next argues the trial court erred in allowingthe jury to consider plaintiff's testimony about a knot on hisleft elbow because plaintiff did not present any medical testimony establishing a causal connection between the November 2,1996, accident and the knot.

Plaintiff testified he saw Renner because he had "somekind of a knot on [his left elbow,] and it was painful." Defendant objected when plaintiff's counsel asked when plaintiff firstnoticed the knot. Defendant argued plaintiff had not presentedan expert opinion establishing a causal connection between thecollision and the knot. The trial court overruled the objection,and plaintiff testified the knot had not been present before theNovember 2, 1996, accident. Plaintiff did not state the knotresulted from the accident.

In support of his argument, defendant cites Stevensonv. Nauton, 71 Ill. App. 3d 831, 390 N.E.2d 53 (1979), a medicalmalpractice case. In professional malpractice cases, experttestimony is generally necessary to establish both (1) thestandard of care expected of the professional and (2) the professional's deviation from the standard caused the plaintiff'sinjury. Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Illinois, 191 Ill. 2d 278,295, 730 N.E.2d 1119, 1130 (2000). In ordinary negligence cases,no general rule requiring expert testimony exists. See Jones,191 Ill. 2d at 295, 730 N.E.2d at 1130. The alleged damages inthis case arose out of ordinary negligence. Moreover, we findthe facts of this case pertaining to plaintiff's elbow did notrequire expert testimony.

Accordingly, we find the trial court did not err inallowing the plaintiff to testify about the knot on his elbow.

Defendant contends the jury's verdict of $500,000 forpain and suffering and $300,000 for disability was excessive andagainst the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.

In considering whether a verdict is excessive, a courtmust look at such factors as "(1) the permanency and extent ofthe injuries suffered, (2) the plaintiff's age, (3) the possibility of deterioration in the future, (4) the medical expensesincurred, (5) past and future lost wages, and (6) any restrictions that the injury may have placed on the plaintiff's dailyactivities." Snelson v. Kamm, 319 Ill. App. 3d 116, 131, 745N.E.2d 128, 142 (2001), appeal pending, Nos. 91232, 91239 cons.

Plaintiff testified to a number of physical ailmentsthat occurred after the accident. He stated he had problems withhis jaw, he was grinding his teeth while sleeping, and now wearsan appliance on his teeth at night. Plaintiff also testified toa lump on his chest that was removed and a knot on his elbow bothof which were not present before the accident. Plaintiff indicated he had vision problems and a plugged sensation in his ear. He also stated he has had difficulty communicating, has to"hyperfocus" to retain information from conversations, andplanning crops and making crop sales are stressful and requiresdecisions to be broken up. Additionally, his life expectancy wasestablished at 26 years.

Plaintiff's wife testified that since the accident,plaintiff has had difficulty remembering, trouble expressinghimself, and has a hard time making decisions. She also statedplaintiff never had any growths or lumps on his body or anytrouble with his elbow prior to the accident.

Alper testified plaintiff's cognitive and motor function impairments could have been related to the injuries sustained in the accident. Further, plaintiff's condition wouldremain the same as his 1999 evaluation. Alper also testifiedthat plaintiff's executive function difficulties could affect hisability to plan and meet the demands of farming.

Walz, a dentist specializing in treating jaw jointproblems, testified the most likely cause of plaintiff's ailmentswas the auto accident. Walz stated plaintiff will have somelong-term impairment with the possibility of developing arthritisin the jaw joint area and being more susceptible to futureinjury.

A jury's award of damages is entitled to substantialdeference on review. Snover v. McGraw, 172 Ill. 2d 438, 447, 667N.E.2d 1310, 1315 (1996). A personal injury award for damages"'must be examined in the light of the particular injury involved, with humble deference to the discretion of the jury andthe judgment of the trial court.'" Epping v. Commonwealth EdisonCo., 315 Ill. App. 3d 1069, 1073, 734 N.E.2d 916, 919 (2000),quoting Kopczick v. Hobart Corp., 308 Ill. App. 3d 967, 979, 721N.E.2d 769, 779 (1999). Based on the evidence, we find thejury's $500,000 award for pain and suffering and $300,000 awardfor disability was not excessive.

Defendant also argues the jury's $100,000 award forplaintiff's past and future medical expenses was excessive andunsupported by the evidence. On review, courts will not interfere with the jury's damage assessment unless the "award bears noreasonable relationship to the loss suffered." Gill v. Foster,157 Ill. 2d 304, 315, 626 N.E.2d 190, 195 (1993). However, thejury enjoys a certain degree of latitude in awarding compensationfor medical costs that, as shown by the evidence, are likely toarise in the future but are not specifically itemized in theevidence. Richardson v. Chapman, 175 Ill. 2d 98, 112, 676 N.E.2d621, 628 (1997).

Plaintiff claimed his past medical expenses totaled$15,347.83. As to future medical expenses, Walz testifiedplaintiff's oral device would require replacement every four tosix years (although it could require replacement from as littleas two years to as many as eight years). Based on Walz's two-year figure and the approximate $1,000 cost of the device, themaximum amount the jury could award plaintiff, based on his lifeexpectancy of 26 years, would be $13,000. Further, dentalappointments at $50 per year would translate into $1,300 forfuture medical expenses. Therefore, plaintiff's future medicalexpenses would total $14,300 which, along with the medicalexpenses of $15,347.83 already incurred, would total $29,647.83.

The jury's award of $100,000 for past and futuremedical expenses was over three times the amount established inthe trial court and not supported by the evidence. Thus, we findthe appropriate figure for past and future medical expenses is$29,647.83, reducing plaintiff's total damages to $829,647.83. Accordingly, remittitur is required, and consistent with ourpowers under Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(1) (155 Ill. 2d R.366(a)(1)), we reduce the jury's damage award in plaintiff'sfavor against defendant to $829,647.83.

For the reasons stated, the trial court's judgment isaffirmed as modified.

Affirmed as modified.

McCULLOUGH, P.J., concurs.

STEIGMANN, J., dissents.

JUSTICE STEIGMANN, dissenting:

Because I believe the improper remarks of plaintiff'scounsel during voir dire and opening statements constitutereversible error, I respectfully dissent.

Although the majority appropriately concludes thatplaintiff's counsel's statements were improper, it does not findthose statements constitute reversible error. In my judgment,these statements were highly prejudicial and, due to theirrepetition, deprived defendant of the fair trial to which he wasentitled.

Courts have consistently held that counsel commitsreversible error when he suggests that there was information hewished the jurors to know but could not present to them, thusimplying that the opposing party somehow denied the jury theopportunity to consider that information. Crutchfield, 414 Ill.at 214, 111 N.E.2d at 144; Skelton, 214 Ill. App. 3d at 582, 573N.E.2d at 1334; L.D. Brinkman & Co.-Midwest, 76 Ill. App. 3d at695, 394 N.E.2d at 1229; see also Cancio v. White, 297 Ill. App.3d 422, 431, 697 N.E.2d 749, 755 (1998) (counsel's improperargument or misconduct may be a sufficient basis for a newtrial).

In this case, the comments of plaintiff's counselduring voir dire and opening statements implied that by admittingliability, defendant was restricting plaintiff's ability topresent evidence to the jury. Counsel's comments, which invitedthe jurors to speculate regarding the nature of the evidence theywere denied the opportunity to hear, were prejudicial, improper,and wholly avoidable. I agree with defendant that plaintiff'scounsel's repetition of essentially the same question three timesduring voir dire, over defendant's objections, reinforced theinference that defendant was attempting to prevent the jury fromhearing evidence. See Geisberger v. Quincy, 3 Ill. App. 3d 437,441, 278 N.E.2d 404, 406 (1972) ("the continued effort to introduce immaterial evidence requiring opponent to make innumerableobjections creates in the juror's mind an impression that anobjecting party is attempting to conceal evidence").

The situation this case presents is akin to that incriminal cases where a prosecutor makes comments about evidencethat the trial court specifically suppressed or excluded. Thesupreme court has held that a prosecutor exceeds the bounds ofpermissible argument when he suggests that evidence of guiltexisted which the jury could not hear because of its inadmissibility. People v. Emerson, 97 Ill. 2d 487, 497, 455 N.E.2d 41,44-45 (1983); see People v. Ray, 126 Ill. App. 3d 656, 661, 467N.E.2d 1078, 1082-83 (1984) (prosecutor committed reversibleerror when he told the jury in closing that "I have all of thisthat says" the defendant lied, and "I wish I could give you myfile as you sit there to go back in there, but I'm not allowed tobecause that is the law"). Such comments are highly prejudicial. As the supreme court noted in Emerson, 97 Ill. 2d at 497, 455N.E.2d at 45, "an insinuation which leaves the jury to speculatemay be more prejudicial than erroneously admitted specificproof." Similarly, in this case, plaintiff's counsel's insinuation that defendant's admission of liability prevented the juryfrom hearing evidence left the jury to speculate about the natureof that evidence and was extremely prejudicial.

I recognize that the trial court sustained defendant'sobjection to plaintiff's counsel's comment during opening statement. However, the court did not--as it should have--instructthe jury to disregard the remark. In addition, the evidenceconnecting many of plaintiff's injuries to the November 2, 1996,accident was not overwhelming, and the jury may well have returned a different verdict had counsel not made the impropercomments during voir dire and opening statements. SeeCrutchfield, 414 Ill. at 214, 111 N.E.2d at 144 (judgments may bereversed because of prejudicial comments by counsel "even thoughthe trial court sustained objections to such statements, rebukedcounsel[,] and directed the jury to disregard the statements"). Under these circumstances, I conclude that counsel's commentsprejudiced defendant and denied him a fair trial.

The majority mentions that plaintiff's counsel'simproper statements were made in voir dire and near the verybeginning of plaintiff's opening statement, implying that becausethese improprieties occurred at the beginning of the jury trial,their prejudicial effect may have dissipated by the time the casewas over and the jury began its deliberations. However, this wasa one-day jury trial; thus, the improper statements would stillbe fresh in the jury's mind as it considered the case.

Further, given that this was a one-day jury trial andaddressed only the issue of damages, this court should hesitateto accept a verdict which lacks our full confidence because ofthe improper behavior of the prevailing attorney. The majority'sconclusion, reducing the jury's damage award but affirming thejudgment, still awards plaintiff over $829,000. Surely, we oughtto insist upon a repeat of this one-day jury trial so that beforea multi-hundred-thousand-dollar judgment is imposed on defendant,we can be confident that he received a fair trial. On thisrecord, that confidence does not exist.