JUSTICE APPLETON delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs, David J. and Patricia F. Kleczek, sueddefendants, Robert Jorgensen, Jr., and Anne Marie Jorgensen, forallegedly inducing them, through fraudulent misrepresentations,to buy a house and for breaching express and implied warranties. After a bench trial, the trial court entered a judgment inplaintiffs' favor on their claims of common-law fraud, statutoryfraud under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business PracticesAct (Consumer Fraud Act) (815 ILCS 505/1 through 12 (West 1996)),and breach of the implied warranty of habitability. The courtalso declared a rescission of the contract and ordered defendantsto refund the purchase price. The court granted plaintiffs'prayer for attorney fees under the Consumer Fraud Act but deniedtheir prayer for punitive damages and their motion for prejudgment interest.

Afterward, some third parties offered to buy the housefrom plaintiffs. Defendants had not yet refunded the purchaseprice. The trial court granted plaintiffs' petition to modifythe judgment to allow them to sell the house, but refused tomodify the judgment to award them money damages equal to thedifference between the rescission amount and the sale price. Torecover those money damages, the trial court said, plaintiffswould have to amend their complaint and present evidence in a newtrial. Plaintiffs never did so.

Defendants appealed, arguing the trial court erred by(1) entering a judgment against them under the Consumer Fraud Actand (2) awarding plaintiffs their attorney fees. They do notchallenge the trial court's finding of a breach of the impliedwarranty of habitability. Plaintiffs cross-appealed, arguingthat the trial court erred in (1) denying punitive damages, (2)denying prejudgment interest, and (3) refusing to modify thejudgment so as to award them the difference between the rescission amount and the sale price. We affirm in part, vacate inpart, and remand for further proceedings.

In July 1994, defendant Robert Jorgensen (Jorgensen)and his wife, defendant Anne Marie Jorgensen (Anne Marie),purchased a 42-acre parcel of real estate in Pike County, Illinois. Defendants had been in the business of building new housesunder the name "Jorgensen Homes." They subdivided the parcelinto nine lots and called the subdivision "Deer Run Estates,"intending to make it a housing development. In an effort to lurebuyers for the lots and houses, Jorgensen placed a "For Sale"sign near the entrance of the subdivision.

In August 1995, Jorgensen began building a house on lotnumber 2 (Deer Run No. 2). According to Jorgensen, when construction of Deer Run No. 2 began, he and his wife intended tomake the house their primary residence. Jorgensen installed muchof the plumbing himself, although he had no plumbing license. OnMay 7, 1996, two plumbing inspectors from the Illinois Departmentof Public Health (Department), Robert Schafer (Schafer) and JohnPopov, came to Deer Run No. 2, looked at the plumbing, verballyidentified for Jorgensen some of the plumbing defects, and toldhim that if he were building the house for sale, a licensedplumber would have to install the rest of the plumbing. At thistime they gave him nothing in writing.

Plaintiff David Kleczek visited Deer Run Estates on May15, 1996. He met with Jorgensen at Deer Run No. 2 and asked himif the house were for sale. (Construction of the house wasalmost complete.) Jorgensen said yes and, according to Kleczek,gave him a "spec sheet" outlining the house's features. Jorgensen denied giving the "spec sheet" to Kleczek and testifiedthat the "spec sheet" had been created for an open house thatdefendants held or intended to hold at Deer Run No. 2 in March1996. The "spec sheet" said that the house had a "1[-][y]ear[w]orkmanship [g]uarantee."

On May 22, 1996, plaintiffs and defendants signed acontract, whereby defendants agreed to buy Deer Run No. 2 fromplaintiffs. The contract was a form document that Anne Marie hadobtained, and it stated:

"[P]rior to the execution of this instrument[,] neither [seller] nor [seller's] agenthas received any notice issued by any city,village[,] or other government authority of adwelling code violation in the dwellingstructure upon the premises herein described."

Prior to the execution of the contract, defendantsnever told plaintiffs of the plumbing inspectors' visit. According to Jorgensen, he first mentioned the inspectors' visit onJune 15, 1996, when he told Patricia Kleczek that the plumbinginspectors had been to the house and that as a consequence someof the plumbing needed to be changed. Patricia Kleczek testified, however, that she was unaware that the Department had "beeninvolved" until April 29, 1997, several months after the closing,when Schafer reinspected the plumbing at plaintiffs' request. On June 27, 1996, Jorgensen received a certified letterfrom the Department memorializing the inspectors' visit of May 5,1996, and providing a detailed list of the repairs that needed tobe made. He did not disclose this letter to the Kleczeks. Instead, he hired a licensed plumber, who, according to Jorgensen, installed the rest of the plumbing and corrected allof the defects that the Department listed in its June 27 letter. The closing occurred on July 26, 1996, for a total purchase priceof $182,300.

Over the next several months, the plumbing sprang someminor leaks and then some major leaks, causing water damage tothe interior of the house. Plaintiffs discovered that one of thetoilets was fed by a hot-water line instead of a cold-water line,and they testified that a strong odor of sewage emanated from thebasement. They also noticed cracks in interior walls. They toldJorgensen of these defects (except for the cracks in the walls)and demanded that he repair them in accordance with his"1[-][y]ear [w]orkmanship [g]uarantee." Initially Jorgensen madesome repairs, but in February 1997 he refused to make any morerepairs.

In April 1997, plaintiffs asked the Department toinspect the plumbing. Schafer returned to Deer Run No. 2 andinformed plaintiffs that he had been there before and had notified Jorgensen of plumbing defects. Schafer found that many ofthe plumbing defects that he noted earlier had been corrected,but he found additional plumbing defects. After the reinspection, plaintiffs hired a plumber to correct the defects.

On July 25, 1997, plaintiffs filed an initial complaintagainst defendants for breach of contract. Plaintiffs amendedtheir complaint several times. The parties completed discoveryon a fifth-amended complaint, which alleged the following: (1)breach of the implied warranty of habitability, (2) violation ofthe Consumer Fraud Act, (3) common-law fraud, and (4) breach ofexpress warranty. In their prayer for relief, plaintiffs requested rescission of the contract to purchase Deer Run No. 2, assessment of attorney fees and costs, and punitive damages underthe Consumer Fraud Act.

On January 18, 2000, after a bench trial, the trialcourt entered a partial judgment in plaintiffs' favor on thebreach of the implied warranty of habitability, the ConsumerFraud Act, and common-law fraud. Specifically, the court foundthat defendants had violated the Consumer Fraud Act by (1)falsely representing that they had received no notice of anyviolations of the plumbing code and (2) making a warranty andthen disavowing it. The court granted rescission of the purchasecontract, ordering plaintiffs, within 30 days, to quitclaim DeerRun No. 2 back to defendants in exchange for $182,300 and entering a money judgment in favor of plaintiffs in the amount of$4,216.11 for plumbing repairs. The court afterward deniedpunitive damages and prejudgment interest but awarded plaintiffs$38,896.05 in attorney fees and costs.

The order of rescission was never implemented. On July24, 2000, Dan and Anita Mefford (Meffords) offered to buy DeerRun No. 2 from plaintiffs. Plaintiffs petitioned the court for amodification of the judgment to allow them to sell the house tothe Meffords for $135,000 and for an award of the differencebetween the rescission amount, $182,300, and the sale price,$135,000. Defendants had no objection to the proposed sale.

The trial court granted plaintiffs' petition to modifythe judgment so as to allow the sale but denied their request tosummarily award them the difference between the rescission amountand the sale price. Instead, the trial court allowed plaintiffs,if they wished, to file a sixth-amended complaint by a certaindate and to "reopen [the] evidence." Plaintiffs closed the saleof the property to the Meffords but never filed a sixth-amendedcomplaint. Accordingly, the trial court entered its finaljudgment on March 8, 2001, incorporating the terms of its previous dispositive orders.

In summary, the trial court found in favor of plaintiffs on count I (breach of the implied warranty of habitability), count II (violation of the Consumer Fraud Act), and countIII (common-law fraud) of the fifth-amended complaint. The courtawarded plaintiffs $4,216.11 for plumbing repairs and $38,896.05in "fees and litigation expenses" but denied punitive damages andprejudgment interest.

This appeal and cross-appeal followed.

Essentially, defendants make two arguments against thejudgment on count II of the fifth-amended complaint (the countalleging violations of the Consumer Fraud Act): (1) the ConsumerFraud Act does not apply to their sale of Deer Run No. 2 toplaintiffs; and (2) they did not violate the Consumer Fraud Act.

1. Does the Consumer Fraud Act Apply
to the Sale of Deer Run No. 2?

In attempting to take the sale outside the scope of theConsumer Fraud Act, defendants rely on two sets of authorities. The first is the statute itself, specifically section 10b(4) (815ILCS 505/10b(4) (West 1996)), which defendants quote as follows: "Nothing in this Act shall apply to *** the communication of anyfalse misleading or deceptive information provided by the sellerof real estate located in Illinois ***." That is not whatsubparagraph (4) says, however. By leaving out a comma and aclause, defendants have distorted the meaning. Subparagraph (4)actually says:

"Nothing in this Act shall apply to ***

(4) [t]he communication of any false,misleading[,] or deceptive information, provided by the seller of real estate located inIllinois, by a real estate salesman or brokerlicensed under 'The Real Estate Brokers License Act [(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 111,pars. 5701 through 5743 (repealed) (now 225ILCS 454/1-5 through 999-99 (West 2000)))],'unless the salesman or broker knows of thefalse, misleading[,] or deceptive characterof such information. This provision shall beeffective as to any communication, wheneveroccurring." (Emphasis added.) 815 ILCS505/10b(4) (West 1996).

When read as written (punctuation, clauses, and all), the statute refers only to a "communication" by a licensed"salesman" or "broker." Section 10b(4) applies only to innocentmisrepresentations by a real-estate professional to a prospectivebuyer, when the only person who knows of the falsity is theseller, who gave the information to the real-estate professional. Defendants cite Strauss v. Cruz, 259 Ill. App. 3d 608,609-10, 631 N.E.2d 468, 469 (1994), for the proposition thatsection 10b(4) exempts all false, misleading, or deceptivecommunications by any seller of Illinois real estate. Althoughwe agree with the result in Strauss, we do not agree with itsinterpretation of section 10b(4). See Scarsdale Builders, Inc.v. Ryland Group, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 337, 339 n.6 (N.D. Ill.1996). In Strauss, the court effectively splits the exception insubparagraph (4) into two exceptions: one for communicationsmade in connection with the sale of real estate and the other forcommunications by a real estate professional. Strauss, 259 Ill.App. 3d at 609-10, 631 N.E.2d at 469. We interpret the statutede novo. Yang v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 2d 96, 103, 745N.E.2d 541, 545 (2001). When giving section 10b(4) its plain andordinary meaning and considering all of its parts (see Paris v.Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177, 688 N.E.2d 137, 139 (1997); Kraft,Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189, 561 N.E.2d 656, 661 (1990)),we understand it to refer only to innocent misrepresentations bylicensed real-estate professionals. Section 10b(4) is patentlyinapplicable to defendants.

Defendants also rely on a line of cases holding theConsumer Fraud Act inapplicable to homeowners' sale of theirsingle-family residence to private buyers. See Carrera v. Smith,305 Ill. App. 3d 1079, 1081-82, 713 N.E.2d 1282, 1284-85 (1999),citing Zimmerman v. Northfield Real Estate, Inc., 156 Ill. App.3d 154, 168-69, 510 N.E.2d 409, 417-18 (1986), and Anderson v.Stowell, 183 Ill. App. 3d 862, 863-64, 539 N.E.2d 852, 853(1989). Defendants maintain that they built Deer Run No. 2 withthe intention of living in it. The trial court did not have tobelieve them. Jorgensen was in the business of building andselling houses, and he was developing the subdivision in thecourse of that business. Defendants either held or intended tohold an open house at Deer Run No. 2 in March 1996 and hadwritten a "spec sheet" for prospective buyers. When Kleczekasked whether defendants' alleged personal residence was forsale, it was instantly available. The trial court could reasonably have found that this was a commercial sale rather than aprivate sale and that Zimmerman and its progeny were distinguishable.

Defendants next argue that even if the sale comeswithin the Consumer Fraud Act, they did nothing to violate thestatute. According to the trial court, "[d]efendant's [sic]statement that no notification of Plumbing Code violations hadbeen received was a clear violation of the [Consumer Fraud] Act." In count II of their fifth-amended complaint (the count soundingin the Consumer Fraud Act), plaintiffs allege only one misrepresentation of the plumbing: the representation that defendantsmade on May 22, 1996, in the contract. Again, that representation was as follows:

"[P]rior to the execution of this instrument[,] neither [the sellers] nor [the sellers'] agent have [sic] received any noticeissued by any city, village[,] or other governmental authority of a dwelling code violation in the dwelling structure upon the premises described herein."

Defendants argue that this representation was true because theDepartment did not issue the notice until after the execution ofthe contract. They argue that the "issuance" of a notice isordinarily understood as giving an official notice in writing. When someone merely says something orally, one does not characterize the communication as an "issuance." Only written documents are "issued," in the common usage of the term. On May 22,1996 (the date of the representation), the Department had not yetissued its notice, and the Department did not do so until June27. Schafer had merely told Jorgensen orally that there wereplumbing violations. Defendants' interpretation of this provision of the contract is quite plausible.

"[A] statement which is technically true as far as itgoes may nevertheless be fraudulent, where it is misleadingbecause it does not state matters which materially qualify thestatement as made." St. Joseph Hospital v. Corbetta ConstructionCo., 21 Ill. App. 3d 925, 952-53, 316 N.E.2d 51, 71 (1974). InSt. Joseph Hospital, for example, General Electric Companyrepresented to a contractor that some paneling, Textolite, was"not flame rated"--that is to say, not rated for its ability tocatch on fire. St. Joseph Hospital, 21 Ill. App. 3d at 951-52,316 N.E.2d at 69-71. By representing simply that the panelingwas "not flame rated," General Electric might have given theimpression that it had no data at all on the paneling's combustibility. General Electric never told the contractor or anyoneelse why the paneling was "not flame rated." The contractorpaneled the inside of a hospital with the Textolite. As itturned out, the technicians at Underwriters Laboratory had foundthe paneling to be so combustible that they did not bother torate it because it was too dangerous to use in construction. St.Joseph Hospital, 21 Ill. App. 3d at 951, 316 N.E.2d at 69-70. The paneling failed the Chicago building code, and GeneralElectric was liable for fraud. Like General Electric's representation, the Jorgensons' representation might have been quiteliterally true, but it left out a material qualifying fact: thatthe Department had found violations of the plumbing code. Without the addition of that highly germane fact, the representation in the contract was misleading (or the trial court couldreasonably have considered it so) in that it created the falseimpression that no governmental authority had informed Jorgensenof any violations of a dwelling code, including the plumbingcode.

Thus, contrary to defendants' contention, there wasindeed evidence of a deceptive act or practice on which defendants intended plaintiffs to rely. See 815 ILCS 505/2 (West1996); Siegel v. Levy Organization Development Co., 153 Ill. 2d534, 542, 607 N.E.2d 194, 198 (1992). If the representation wasimportant enough to recite it in the contract as a "warranty,"defendants arguably intended plaintiffs to rely on it.

Plaintiffs also must prove that the deception proximately caused the damages they seek. See Zankle v. Queen AnneLandscaping, 311 Ill. App. 3d 308, 312, 724 N.E.2d 988, 992(2000). Defendants point out that when the parties signed thecontract, Jorgensen already had repaired the plumbing defectsthat Schafer had pointed out to him. Nevertheless, the trialcourt still could have found proximate cause. The court couldhave concluded that if defendants had told plaintiffs that agovernmental inspector had found plumbing defects, plaintiffswould have suspected that whoever had installed the plumbing hadnot done a competent job. Then they could have hired a licensedplumber of their choice to perform a comprehensive inspection ofthe plumbing and to identify the defects that they ended uphaving to fix later (regardless of whether the Department hadidentified all of the defects or not). We conclude thatJorgenson's repairing (or allegedly repairing) the plumbingdefects that Schafer had identified did not necessarily renderthe deception harmless, considering that, at the end of the day,some apparently major plumbing defects remained.

Jorgensen testified that when Patricia Kleczek firstcame to look at the house, after the execution of the contractbut before the closing, he told her that the plumbing inspectorhad come and that as a result of the inspection, some plumbinghad to be changed. The trial court need not have believedJorgensen. The trial court could instead have believed PatriciaKleczek, who testified that the first time she realized that theDepartment had "been involved" was on April 29, 1997, severalmonths after the closing, when Schafer reinspected the plumbingin Deer Run No. 2 at plaintiffs' request.

We will not disturb the trial court's finding unlessthe finding was manifestly erroneous. Breckenridge v. CambridgeHomes, Inc., 246 Ill. App. 3d 810, 822, 616 N.E.2d 615, 623(1993). The finding that defendants violated the Consumer FraudAct is not manifestly erroneous, and we affirm the judgment inthat respect.

We disagree with the trial court, however, that thebreach of the "1[-][y]ear [w]orkmanship [g]uarantee" was aviolation of the Consumer Fraud Act. As the Second Districtrecently explained, a deceptive act or practice "involves morethan the mere fact that a defendant promised something and thenfailed to do it. That type of 'misrepresentation' occurs everytime a defendant breaches a contract." Zankle, 311 Ill. App. 3dat 312, 724 N.E.2d at 993; see also Price v. Highland CommunityBank, 722 F. Supp. 454, 459-60 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (Posner, J.,holding that "[a] change of mind can be *** a breach of contract,but it is not fraud"), aff'd, 932 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1991). "Were our courts to accept plaintiff's assertion that promisesthat go unfulfilled are actionable under the Consumer Fraud Act,consumer plaintiffs could convert any suit for breach of contractinto a consumer[-]fraud action." Zankle, 311 Ill. App. 3d at312, 724 N.E.2d at 992.

Defendants acknowledged the warranty and, in fact, maderepairs to Deer Run No. 2 in accordance with it. Only after theparties' relationship soured did defendants refuse to honor thewarranty. This does not strike us as a fraud in the making ofthe contract but, rather, as exactly the type of breach ofcontract or express warranty that the Consumer Fraud Act does notcover. We are further persuaded to make this distinction byplaintiffs' recognition, in count IV of their fifth-amendedcomplaint, that the breach of the express warranty existed as aseparate cause of action for defendants' failure to honor theone-year workmanship guarantee. The trial court erred in findingthat defendants violated the Consumer Fraud Act by offering andthen disavowing the warranty. The error was harmless. A singledeceptive practice or misrepresentation qualifies as a violationof the Consumer Fraud Act. Breckenridge, 246 Ill. App. 3d at822, 616 N.E.2d at 623. The representation, in the contract,that the Jorgensons had received no notice of any violation of adwelling code could be considered misleading under the circumstances. Thus, the trial court's judgment on count II was notmanifestly erroneous.

B. Attorney Fees

Section 10a(c) of the Consumer Fraud Act says that thecourt may award attorney fees to the prevailing party. 815 ILCS505/10a(c) (West 1996). Defendants argue that the award ofattorney fees is excessive because the court awarded fees forwork that plaintiffs' attorneys did on claims other than the oneunder the Consumer Fraud Act. Plaintiffs won only $4,216.11 forthe plumbing. Defendants assert that plaintiffs could notpossibly have run up $38,896 in fees and expenses in litigating aclaim for $4,216.11.

Whether to award attorney fees lies within the trialcourt's discretion, and we will not overturn such an award unlessthe trial court abused its discretion. Grove v. Huffman, 262Ill. App. 3d 531, 539, 634 N.E.2d 1184, 1189 (1994), citing Eklv. Knecht, 223 Ill. App. 3d 234, 246, 585 N.E.2d 156, 166 (1991). Generally, the cases hold that unless the proofs of the statutoryclaim and of the nonstatutory claim are the same, the prevailingparty must differentiate between the work done on the statutoryclaim and the work done on the nonstatutory claim. See Schorschv. Fireside Chrysler-Plymouth, Mazda, Inc., 286 Ill. App. 3d1028, 1031-32, 677 N.E.2d 976, 979 (1997); Roche v. FiresideChrysler-Plymouth, Mazda, Inc., 235 Ill. App. 3d 70, 87, 600N.E.2d 1218, 1229 (1992); Rubin v. Marshall Field & Co., 232 Ill.App. 3d 522, 534, 597 N.E.2d 688, 695-96 (1992); Ciampi v. OgdenChrysler Plymouth, Inc., 262 Ill. App. 3d 94, 114-15, 634 N.E.2d448, 463 (1994); Grove, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 539, 634 N.E.2d at1190.

Plaintiffs brought actions for breach of the impliedwarranty of habitability, breach of an express warranty, common-law fraud, and violations of the Consumer Fraud Act. The proofsof common-law fraud were indistinguishable from those of theConsumer Fraud Act. Facts supporting a finding of common-lawfraud necessarily support a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act,if the fraud was committed in the conduct of trade or commerce. Siegel, 153 Ill. 2d at 543, 607 N.E.2d at 198. As to thoseissues, we do not find any abuse of discretion in the trialcourt's award.

We find that the trial court abused its discretion,however, in awarding fees and expenses for plaintiffs' prosecution of the warranty claims. Plaintiffs argue that the claimsare factually indistinguishable, having "something to do with theone[-]year workmanship guarantee, the false warranty in thepurchase agreement, the plumbing problems, and [d]efendants'deceptive acts and omissions." We already have said that thetrial court erred in holding that the breach of the one-yearworkmanship guarantee was a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act. Moreover, the court found that plaintiffs had abandoned theirclaim for breach of express warranty as an independent cause ofaction.

While we acknowledge that the breach of the impliedwarranty of habitability did involve the plumbing defects, italso was based in part on the structural defects in Deer Run No.2. Our review of the record persuades us to accept defendants'argument that much of the trial was given to a discussion ofthese habitability matters, which are factually distinct from anyfraudulent conduct of defendants. The portions of the trial (andthe attorneys' preparation) pertaining to the habitability theoryare not so intertwined with the common-law and consumer-fraudtheories as to be indistinguishable from them. Different expertswere called as to each theory; the attorneys' time in contactingthem could be separated out.

Moreover, the trial court heard only evidence of thereasonableness of plaintiffs' attorney fees and not of thedivision of the attorneys' time. Insofar as the trial court mayhave awarded fees for representation on matters other than theConsumer Fraud Act claim, the court's award of nearly all ofplaintiffs' attorney fees was erroneous. We vacate the trialcourt's award of attorney fees and remand for a further hearingon this issue in accordance with the views expressed herein.

C. Punitive Damages

Plaintiffs contend, on cross-appeal, that the trialcourt erred in denying their prayer for punitive damages. Wedisagree. Section 10a(a) of the Consumer Fraud Act permits thetrial court, in its discretion, to award punitive damages. 815ILCS 505/10a(a) (West 1996). However, courts should awardpunitive damages only for conduct that is outrageous, eitherbecause the defendant's motive was evil or the acts showed areckless disregard of others' rights. Totz v. Continental DuPageAcura, 236 Ill. App. 3d 891, 909, 602 N.E.2d 1374, 1386 (1992). The purpose of awarding punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer and, in doing so, deter that party and others from committing similar wrongful acts. Totz, 236 Ill. App. 3d at 909, 1602N.E.2d at 1386. Punitive damages are not favored in the law;thus, courts should be careful never to award such damagesimproperly or unwisely. Kleidon v. Rizza Chevrolet, Inc., 173Ill. App. 3d 116, 121, 527 N.E.2d 374, 377 (1988).

In reviewing a decision on punitive damages, an appellate court must not disturb the trial court's decision unless thetrial court abused its discretion. Beaton & Associates, Ltd. v.Joslyn Manufacturing & Supply Co., 159 Ill. App. 3d 834, 846, 512N.E.2d 1286, 1293 (1987). A court abused its discretion only ifno reasonable person could agree with the court. See, e.g., Inre Marriage of Dunseth, 260 Ill. App. 3d 816, 831, 633 N.E.2d 82,94 (1994). Here, the trial court held a full evidentiary hearingon punitive damages and then denied the requested relief. Itdoes not appear that the trial court abused its discretion. Thecourt could well have found that defendants' deceptive or fraudulent conduct was not the result of an evil motive or undertakenwith a reckless disregard for the rights of others. Plaintiffs'attempts to convince us otherwise are unavailing.

D. Prejudgment Interest

Plaintiffs also argue on cross-appeal that the trialcourt erred in denying prejudgment interest. For similar reasons, we disagree. "In Illinois, prejudgment interest may berecovered when warranted by equitable considerations, and disallowed if such an award would not comport with justice and equity." In re Estate of Wernick, 127 Ill. 2d 61, 87, 535 N.E.2d876, 888 (1989). The goal of proceedings sounding in equity isto make the injured party whole. Wernick, 127 Ill. 2d at 86, 535N.E.2d at 887. However, the determination of the equities of thecase is "a matter lying within the sound discretion of the trialjudge. [Citations.] Such a determination will not be disturbedon review unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion." Wernick, 127 Ill. 2d at 87, 535 N.E.2d at 888.

As with the issue of punitive damages, a reviewingcourt ought not substitute its judgment for that of the trialcourt unless no reasonable person could adopt the trial court'sposition. Beaton & Associates, Ltd., 159 Ill. App. 3d at 846,512 N.E.2d at 1293; Dunseth, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 831, 633 N.E.2dat 94. Here, the trial court held a full evidentiary hearing onthe issue of prejudgment interest and then denied the requestedrelief. The evidence presented showed that after the plaintiffsmoved out of Deer Run No. 2, they rented the residence for twoyears. Plaintiffs thereby realized income for the period theywere allegedly deprived of the use of the purchase price. Thetrial court was in the best position to determine the effect ofthis income on the equities of the case and whether rescissionalone would make plaintiffs whole. We do not find that the trialcourt abused its discretion in denying prejudgment interest.

E. Request for Further Modification of Judgment

Plaintiffs next argue that the trial court erred inrefusing to further modify the judgment to summarily award themthe difference between the rescission amount and the sale price,instead inviting them to file a sixth-amended complaint and toprove such damages in an evidentiary hearing.

Our research reveals no Illinois case directly onpoint, but a legal encyclopedia says: "Seeking relief by rescission is not deemed an election so irrevocable as to preclude anamendment claiming damages for the fraud, although there iscontrary authority." 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud & Deceit