May 13, 2002

In June 2000, plaintiff, Bill Krohe, was awarded aline-of-duty disability pension by the City of BloomingtonPension Board (Board) based on injuries he sustained as afirefighter for defendant, the City of Bloomington (City). Thereafter, plaintiff requested that the City continue to pay thehealth insurance premiums for him and his family pursuant tosection 10 of the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (Act) (820ILCS 320/10 (West 2000)). The City denied the request, statingit was not required to pay the premiums.

In October 2000, plaintiff filed a complaint fordeclaratory judgment, requesting the trial court enter an orderthat plaintiff was entitled to have the premiums paid by the Citypursuant to section 10 of the Act. In March 2001, the trialcourt, in construing section 10 of the Act, found the City wasrequired to pay the health insurance premiums.

On appeal, the City argues the trial court erred ininterpreting "catastrophic" injury under section 10 of the Act(820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2000)) to mean any injury resulting in aline-of-duty disability under section 4-110 of the IllinoisPension Code (Code) (40 ILCS 5/4-110 (West 2000)). We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In June 2000, plaintiff was awarded a line-of-dutydisability pension by the Board based on injuries he sustainedwhile performing his duties as a firefighter for the City. Laterthat month, plaintiff requested that the City continue to pay thehealth insurance premiums for him and his family pursuant tosection 10 of the Act, which provides, in part: "An employer whoemploys a full-time *** firefighter, who *** suffers a catastrophic injury or is killed in the line of duty shall pay theentire premium of the employer's health insurance plan for theinjured employee," his spouse, and dependent children. 820 ILCS320/10(a) (West 2000). The City countered it was not required to

pay premiums for plaintiff and his family because "a line[-]of[-]duty injury is not equivalent to suffering a 'catastrophic' injury."

In October 2000, plaintiff filed a complaint fordeclaratory judgment, seeking an order from the trial court thathe was entitled to have the health insurance premiums for him andhis family paid by the City pursuant to section 10 of the Act. 820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2000). The complaint alleged the purposeof section 10 was "to protect all firefighters who are receivinga duty-related disability without limitation on the nature of theinjury."

In January 2001, the trial court conducted a hearing onplaintiff's complaint. The issue before the court was whetherplaintiff had suffered a "catastrophic injury" as defined by theAct. Plaintiff maintained the phrase "catastrophic injury" wasambiguous and required the court to determine the legislativeintent to determine its meaning. Specifically, plaintiff arguedthe trial court should consider the comments made by SenatorLaura Kent Donahue in the November 1997 legislative debate tooverride Governor Edgar's veto of House Bill 1347, which becamethe Act at issue here. Senator Donahue stated, in part: "I'dlike to say for the sake of the record what we mean by catastrophically injured. What it means is that it is our intent todefine 'catastrophically injured' as a police officer orfirefighter who, due to injuries, has been forced to take a line-of-duty disability." 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings,November 14, 1997, at 136 (statements of Senator Donahue).

In March 2001, the trial court, in its order construingsection 10 of the Act, stated the parties agreed plaintiffsustained an injury while performing his duties as a firefighterand as a result was permanently injured. The trial court foundin favor of plaintiff stating, in part:

"Because the term, 'catastrophicallyinjured' is not defined, the [c]ourt hasreviewed the legislative debate to determinethe intent and meaning of this language. Thelegislative debate clearly indicates thatthose individuals (a firefighter in thiscase) who are disabled in the line of dutyare entitled to have their health insurancepremiums paid by the employer (in this casethe City of Bloomington)."

This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

The City argues the trial court erred in construingsection 10 of the Act to require it to pay plaintiff's healthinsurance premiums after plaintiff was disabled in the line ofduty. We disagree.

Statutory construction is a matter of law and appellatereview is de novo. People v. Slover, 323 Ill. App. 3d 620, 623,753 N.E.2d 554, 557 (2001). The cardinal rule of statutoryconstruction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of thelegislature. People v. Latona, 184 Ill. 2d 260, 269, 703 N.E.2d901, 906 (1998). The words of a statute are to be given theirplain and commonly understood meanings. Panhandle Eastern PipeLine Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 314 Ill. App. 3d296, 301, 734 N.E.2d 18, 22 (2000). When the language of astatute is clear and unambiguous, it will be given effect withoutresort to the other tools of statutory construction. Segers v.Industrial Comm'n, 191 Ill. 2d 421, 431, 732 N.E.2d 488, 494(2000).

Section 10 of the Act provides, in part:

"An employer who employs a full-time ***firefighter, who *** suffers a catastrophicinjury or is killed in the line of duty shallpay the entire premium of the employer'shealth insurance plan for the injured employee, the injured employee's spouse, andfor each dependent child of the injured employee until the child reaches the age ofmajority ***. ***

* * *

(b) In order for the *** firefighter,spouse, or dependent children to be eligiblefor insurance coverage under this Act, theinjury or death must have occurred as theresult of the *** firefighter's response towhat is reasonably believed to be an emergency, an unlawful act perpetrated by another, or during the investigation of a criminal act. Nothing in this [s]ection shall beconstrued to limit health insurance coverageor pension benefits for which the officer,firefighter, spouse, or dependent childrenmay otherwise be eligible." 820 ILCS 320/10(West 2000).

The term "catastrophic injury" is not defined by theAct. Thus, we must look elsewhere to determine the intent of thelegislature. In its brief, the City correctly states that astatute is not interpreted by the statements or comments oflegislators; rather, "'a statute is interpreted by its language,which if certain and unambiguous, must be given effect as written.'" (Emphasis added.) Chicago SMSA Limited Partnership v.Department of Revenue, 306 Ill. App. 3d 977, 986, 715 N.E.2d 719,726 (1999), quoting People v. James, 246 Ill. App. 3d 939, 948,617 N.E.2d 115, 120 (1993). Here, however, the intent of thelanguage of the Act is uncertain and ambiguous. Such ambiguityleads us to consider the legislative history in order to reachthe end result in this case. See People v. Rose, 268 Ill. App.3d 174, 178, 643 N.E.2d 865, 868 (1994) (where a statute'slanguage is ambiguous, examination of legislative history isappropriate).

As the trial court did, we note that Senator Donahue,for the sake of the record, stated the legislature intended todefine those "'catastrophically injured' as *** police officer[s]or firefighter[s] who, due to injuries, [have] been forced totake a line-of-duty disability." 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., SenateProceedings, November 14, 1997, at 136 (statements of SenatorDonahue). In determining legislative intent, courts may "consider relevant statements by legislators concerning the natureand effect of the proposed law." Rose, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 178,643 N.E.2d at 868. The comments made by Senator Donahue, thebill's sponsor, should not be discounted by the judiciary indetermining legislative intent when the remarks were purposefullyincluded in the record for the sole reason of specifying legislative intent. Consideration of legislative debates is a legitimate and beneficial source for determining the intent of thelegislature. See People v. Billingsley, 67 Ill. App. 2d 292,297, 213 N.E.2d 765, 768 (1966) (committee comments are anappropriate and valuable source for determining legislativeintent). As the fundamental purpose of statutory construction isto ascertain the intent of the legislature, the trial court'sreview of the transcripts of the legislative debate was appropriate.

We are mindful the First District Appellate Court hasreached a decision contrary to our holding today. See Villarrealv. Village of Schaumburg, 325 Ill. App. 3d 1157, 759 N.E.2d 76(2001). In Villarreal, a police officer injured in the performance of his official duties for the defendant village soughtbenefits under the Act. Villarreal, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 1159,759 N.E.2d at 78. The First District cited a federal statute inassigning its own definition to the term "catastrophic injury"and also reviewed the laws of other states. Villarreal, 325 Ill.App. 3d at 1164, 759 N.E.2d at 82-83. It is unclear whether thefloor debates from the Illinois Senate were ever brought to thecourt's attention, but the court concluded the language of theact was clear and unambiguous and eschewed extrinsic aids ofstatutory construction for interpretive guidance.

We conclude the meaning of the term "catastrophicinjury" necessarily sets the parameters of the legislativeenactment, and, as such, the term's uncertain definition rendersthe Act ambiguous.

In the case sub judice, the dissent criticizes themajority for ignoring Town of the City of Bloomington v.Bloomington Township, 233 Ill. App. 3d 724, 599 N.E.2d 62 (1992). Slip op. at 11. City of Bloomington, however, was not a casewhere legislative debates were examined to construe the meaningof a statute. Instead, the defendant, Bloomington Township,offered the expert testimony of the executive director of theTownship Officials Association of Illinois to opine on thelegislative intent of a statute. City of Bloomington, 233 Ill.App. 3d at 735, 599 N.E.2d at 69. The court correctly rejectedthe evidence as improper for determining legislative intent. City of Bloomington, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 735, 599 N.E.2d at 69. The dicta cited by the dissent, however, have no applicationhere.

The questions posed in the dissent suggest the senatorsexpected no deference to be given to the chief sponsor in defining the term "catastrophic injury." Slip op. at 13. Thus, wepose our own rhetorical question: does our dissenting colleaguereally believe the senators intended for the definition assignedby the chief sponsor of the bill to be ignored in favor ofwhatever definition the judiciary assigned to the term?

In his epilogue, our dissenting colleague suggests thelegislature can amend the Act to apply to future disabled line-of-duty victims but the Act provides no relief for plaintiff inthis case. Slip op. at 18. We choose to grant plaintiff thebenefits the legislature intended for him to receive. We simplyassign the same meaning to "catastrophic injury" as that assignedby the bill's chief sponsor in floor debate before the fullSenate, the media, and the public in a forum where every word isrecorded and preserved for public and judicial scrutiny. Wetrust the policymakers will amend the statute and make it morelimiting if the chief sponsor's definition of "catastrophicinjury" is not acceptable.

Clearly, the Illinois General Assembly sought tofulfill an important state interest by enacting this statuteproviding additional benefits for the state's public safetyofficers. The legislative branch of government is responsiblefor making public policy, and the judiciary should give effect toenactments by the legislature establishing public policy. Here,there is no challenge of constitutional infirmity, and ourdeference to the clearly expressed will of the legislature isrequired. Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to the insurancebenefits sought for himself and his family.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

Affirmed.

MYERSCOUGH, J., concurs.

STEIGMANN, J., dissents.

JUSTICE STEIGMANN, dissenting:

The City argues that the trial court erred by equating"catastrophic" injury under section 10 of the Act (820 ILCS320/10 (West 2000)) with a line-of-duty disability under section40 of the Code (40 ILCS 5/4-110 (West 2000)). Because I agree, Irespectfully dissent.

In my judgment, the majority opinion is wrong because(1) it gives inappropriate weight to the remarks of a singlelegislator, (2) it fails to properly analyze the term "catastrophic injury," and (3) it fails to consider how other jurisdictions have defined that term in similar contexts. I willdiscuss each of these failings in turn.

The majority writes that because the term "catastrophicinjury" is not defined in the Act, it "must look elsewhere todetermine the intent of the legislature." Slip op. at 5. Theproblem, however, is that the majority--like the trial court--begins and ends its inquiry by focusing solely on the remarks ofSenator Donahue. To the extent that such remarks can everproperly be deemed "legislative history," I reject the notionthat this court can rely on them in construing section 10 of theAct (820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2000)).

As Justice Scalia has written, "[t]he greatest defectof legislative history is its illegitimacy. We are governed bylaws, not by the intentions of legislators." Conroy v. Aniskoff,507 U.S. 511, 519, 123 L. Ed. 2d 229, 238, 113 S. Ct. 1562, 1567(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).

In support of its use of this "legislative history,"the majority cites People v. Rose, 268 Ill. App. 3d 174, 178, 643N.E.2d 865, 868 (1994), for the proposition that courts mayconsider relevant statements by legislators concerning the natureand effect of a proposed law. However, the majority ignores Townof the City of Bloomington, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 736, 599 N.E.2dat 70, in which this court wrote the following:

"[L]egislators do not make laws by making speeches on the floor of the legislativechamber or by writing memos for committeemeetings. They make laws by majority vote ona specifically worded bill that has been readthree times before each house and distributedto each legislator. (Ill. Const. 1970, art.IV,