KT Winneburg v. Calhoun County Board of Review

SUPREME COURT CASES

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State: Illinois

Court: 4th District Appellate

Docket No: 4-10-0062 Rel

Case Date: 09/09/2010

Preview:Filed 9/9/10

NO. 4-10-0062 IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT

KT WINNEBURG, LLC, a Missouri ) Appeal from Limited Liability Company Registered ) Circuit Court of to do Business in the State of ) Calhoun County Illinois, ) No. 09TX1 Petitioner-Appellant, ) v. ) THE CALHOUN COUNTY BOARD OF REVIEW, ) and S. BRANDI FESTER, Calhoun County ) Honorable Supervisor of Assessments, ) Richard D. Greenlief, Respondents-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding. _________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court: In April 2008, taxpayer, KT Winneburg, LLC, purchased the real property in question--namely, approximately 88 tracts of land situated in Calhoun County--in bulk at a foreclosure sale. Subsequently, respondent, S. Brandi Fester, Calhoun County supervisor of assessments (Supervisor), changed the classification of the property from farmland to residential and reassessed it accordingly, resulting in an increase in taxpayer's propertytax liability. In April 2009, following an administrative hearing, respondent, the Calhoun County Board of Review (Board of Review), issued decisions against taxpayer on all lots, upholding the Supervisor's assessments. In April 2009, taxpayer filed its

initial "Complaint for Review of Assessment/Objection to Assessment" in the circuit court, in which it sought an order requiring the Supervisor to assess the lots as farmland instead of residential. In December 2009, taxpayer amended its complaint to

include a count for declaratory relief.

In January 2010, the

court entered judgment in favor of respondents and against taxpayer as to taxpayer's claims for mandamus and declaratory relief. Taxpayer appeals, arguing the circuit court erred by finding (1) section 10-30 of the Property Tax Code (Code) (35 ILCS 200/10-30 (West 2008)) does not require the Supervisor to assess and value the lots in question as farmland and (2) section 10-31 of the Code (35 ILCS 200/10-31 (West Supp. 2009)) does not apply retroactively to the April 2008 foreclosure sale. We find

we lack subject-matter jurisdiction and, accordingly, dismiss the appeal. I. BACKGROUND In June 1995, a real-estate developer purchased 420 acres of real estate, including the land making up the 88 lots in question, which was subsequently classified as farmland, pursuant to section 10-30 of the Code (35 ILCS 200/10-30 (West 2008)), for purposes of property-tax assessment and valuation. From 1997 to

2005, several developers platted some or all of the 420 acres, including the 88 lots in question, into 9 subdivisions. In 2005,

35 of the 88 lots were reclassified and reassessed as residential. In October 2007, taxpayer purchased mortgages on the 88 lots in question and, in December 2007, taxpayer foreclosed on the mortgages. In April 2008, taxpayer purchased all 88 lots in In October 2008, 48 of the remaining - 2 -

bulk at a foreclosure sale.

53 lots classified and assessed as farmland were reclassified and reassessed as residential. In March 2009, the Board of Review held a hearing on taxpayer's complaint regarding the Supervisor's 2008 assessment of all 88 properties. Because the record on appeal lacks a

record or report of proceedings before the Board of Review, the evidence and arguments presented are not before us. In April

2009, the Board of Review upheld the Supervisor's assessments. In April 2009, taxpayer filed its "Complaint for Review of Assessment/Objection to Assessment" in the circuit court. Taxpayer asserted the foreclosure sale did not constitute an "initial sale," as that term is used in section 10-30 of the Code, where it serves as a trigger cutting off the preferential valuation and assessment of certain parcels of land as farmland, provided by the same statute. 2008). See 35 ILCS 200/10-30(c) (West

In its prayer for relief, taxpayer asked the court to

conduct a de novo review of the lots' assessment and sought a mandamus requiring respondents to apply the preferential assessment and valuation method to taxpayer's land and to refund the excess taxes collected. Neither party presented the court with

the record or report of proceedings before the Board of Review. Effective August 14, 2009, the General Assembly amended section 10-30 of the Code (35 ILCS 200/10-30 (West Supp. 2009)) and enacted new section 10-31 (35 ILCS 200/10-31 (West Supp. 2009)), which explicitly excludes initial sales and mortgageforeclosure sales from the events triggering loss of the prefer- 3 -

ential treatment.

In November 2009, taxpayer obtained leave of

the circuit court to file an amended complaint to address the new law. Taxpayer's amended complaint included a second count, in

which it sought a declaratory judgment to the effect section 1031 applied retroactively to the April 2008 foreclosure sale. The parties stipulated to the facts of the case, including the ownership and tax-assessment histories of the 88 lots. They also "stipulated" to (1) the circuit court's juris-

diction of the parties and the subject matter and (2) an actual controversy between the parties as to the applicability of section 10-31. In January 2010, the circuit court entered judgment for respondents on both counts of taxpayer's amended complaint. The

court specifically found, inter alia, (1) the April 2008 foreclosure sale constitutes an "initial sale" discontinuing the preferential treatment of the lots provided for by section 10-30, and (2) section 10-31 does not apply retroactively to the foreclosure sale. This appeal followed. II. ANALYSIS On appeal, taxpayer argues the circuit court erred by denying its preferential tax treatment under section 10-30 of the Code (35 ILCS 200/10-30 (West 2008)). Specifically, taxpayer

argues the foreclosure sale of the property in question does not constitute an "initial sale" as that term is used in section 1030. Alternatively, taxpayer argues section 10-31 (35 ILCS - 4 -

200/10-31 (West Supp. 2009)) should apply retroactively to exempt the foreclosure sale from triggering loss of the preferential assessment. Respondents respond (1) the court lacked subject-

matter jurisdiction to hear petitioner's complaint, (2) the foreclosure sale was an "initial sale," and (3) section 10-31 should not apply retroactively. We agree with respondents the

circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction "A reviewing court must ascertain its jurisdiction before proceeding in a cause of action, regardless of whether either party has raised the issue." Secura Insurance Co. v.

Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d 209, 213, 902 N.E.2d 662, 664 (2009). "This court has no choice but to dismiss R&G, Inc. v. Midwest Region

appeals when we lack jurisdiction."

Foundation for Fair Contracting, Inc., 351 Ill. App. 3d 318, 325, 812 N.E.2d 1044, 1049 (2004). "If a trial court did not have

jurisdiction, the parties cannot confer jurisdiction on a reviewing court merely by taking an appeal." Greer v. Illinois Liquor

Control Comm'n, 185 Ill. App. 3d 219, 221, 541 N.E.2d 216, 217 (1989). Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, stipulated

to, or consented to by the parties, nor can it be conferred by estoppel. Jones v. Industrial Comm'n, 335 Ill. App. 3d 340, 343, Thus, even though respondents

780 N.E.2d 697, 700 (2002).

submitted to the circuit court's exercise of jurisdiction in this case, it remains their prerogative to challenge it on appeal. "Subject[-]matter jurisdiction refers to a court's - 5 -

power both to adjudicate the general question involved and to grant the particular relief requested." In re Estate of Gebis, Thus, whether

186 Ill. 2d 188, 192, 710 N.E.2d 385, 387 (1999).

the circuit court had jurisdiction here depends, in part, on the type of case presented. A circuit court may obtain subject-matter jurisdiction over a challenge to a property-tax assessment or valuation through either of two mutually exclusive procedures: (1) administrative review (35 ILCS 200/16-195 (West 2008)) or (2) tax objection (35 ILCS 200/23-5 (West 2008)). Madison Two Associates

v. Pappas, 227 Ill. 2d 474, 477, 884 N.E.2d 142, 146 (2008). "'[T]he character of a motion should be determined from its content, and a court is not bound by the title of a document given by a party.' [Citation.] Thus, a court should examine the

substance of a document to determine how it should treat the document. at 1046-47. [Citation.]" R&G, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 321, 812 N.E.2d

This proposition holds equally true for petitions in

the circuit court. Due to its ambiguous title, allegations, and prayer for relief, taxpayer's complaint is not particularly amenable to categorization. Accordingly, we consider, in turn, whether the

circuit court in this case obtained subject-matter jurisdiction over this case under either procedure. We then consider whether

any exceptions would permit a circuit court to hear taxpayer's petition outside these procedures. subject-matter jurisdiction. - 6 We conclude the court lacked

B. Administrative Review As a petition for administrative review, taxpayer's complaint did not vest the circuit court with subject-matter jurisdiction because the Code does not provide for administrative review of board-of-review decisions. Article VI, section 9, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides: "Circuit Courts shall have such power to review administrative action as provided by law." art. VI,

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