JUSTICE TURNER delivered the opinion of the court:

In April 2002, plaintiff, Losardo Lucas, a prisonerin the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC), filed a prose petition for mandamus against defendants, Anne R. Taylorand the Prisoner Review Board (PRB), alleging (1) he did notreceive procedural due process before the PRB and (2) hisgood-conduct credits were revoked before they were "earned." In July 2002, defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which thetrial court granted.

On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erred indismissing his petition. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was sentenced to 42 years in prison in1985 for murder, weapon possession, and assault, and he iscurrently an inmate at the Tamms Correctional Center. InApril 2002, plaintiff filed a pro se petition for mandamus,naming the PRB and its chairman, Taylor, as defendants. Plaintiff alleged the PRB revoked good-conduct credits withoutgiving him 24-hour notice of a hearing, a hearing where hecould call witnesses or present evidence, or a written statement relied on by the PRB in making its decision. Also,plaintiff claimed the PRB revoked good-conduct credits he "hadnot yet earned." For example, plaintiff alleged by the timehe had served 5 years in prison, the PRB had improperly revoked 8 years and 11 months' worth of credits. In his prayerfor relief, plaintiff asked the trial court to compel defendants to provide due process at future hearings and to restore12 years and 3 months of his revoked good-conduct credits.

In May 2002, defendants filed a motion for a bill ofparticulars, requesting plaintiff specify which inmate disciplinary reports were the basis for the revocation of his 12years and 3 months of good-conduct credits. In his June 2002response, plaintiff claimed the PRB never informed him when itapproved the DOC Director's decision to revoke his good-conduct credit. Plaintiff did attach numerous disciplinaryreports to his response, along with DOC documents indicatingthe amount of good-conduct credits that had been revoked overseveral years. The documents revealed instances where theadjustment committee recommended revocation of plaintiff'sgood-conduct credits and the DOC Director and the PRB approvedthe recommendation. In several instances, the DOC Directorreduced the amount recommended by the adjustment committee andthe PRB approved the reduction. On multiple occasions, plaintiff refused to appear before the PRB or refused to speak tothe panel.

In July 2002, defendants filed a motion to dismisspursuant to sections 2-615 and 2-619(a)(9) of the Code ofCivil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619(a)(9) (West 2002)),alleging plaintiff failed to show a clear, legal right to adue-process hearing before the PRB and defendants had noministerial duty to restore plaintiff's good-conduct credits. Defendants also claimed plaintiff was not required to receivehis good-conduct credit on a daily basis instead of upon hisarrival to prison.

In December 2002, the trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. The court found defendants had noinvolvement in the awarding of statutory good time and werenot a part of DOC. The court also held that although a prisoner is entitled to a due-process hearing before the prisonadjustment committee pursuant to Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.539, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935, 94 S. Ct. 2963 (1974), the Wolff requirements did not apply to the PRB. The court found the PRB"reviews the recommendations of [DOC] and the [p]laintiff isnot entitled to two due[-]process hearings as he has argued inhis complaint."

In January 2003, plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider, claiming the PRB is required to conduct a due-processhearing pursuant to Wolff as only the PRB can revoke good-conduct credits. Defendants filed a response, claiming thePRB is a reviewing body and is not required to conduct aformal hearing when revoking good time. In August 2003, thetrial court denied plaintiff's motion. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues the trial court erred in dismissinghis mandamus complaint. We disagree.

A. Petition for Mandamus

"Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy to enforce, asa matter of right, 'the performance of official duties by apublic officer where no exercise of discretion on his part isinvolved.'" Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d 198, 229, 710N.E.2d 798, 813 (1999), quoting Madden v. Cronson, 114 Ill. 2d504, 514, 501 N.E.2d 1267, 1272 (1986). A court will award awrit of mandamus "only if a plaintiff establishes a clear,affirmative right to relief, a clear duty of the public official to act, and a clear authority in the public official tocomply with the writ." People ex rel. Ryan v. Roe, 201 Ill.2d 552, 555, 778 N.E.2d 701, 703 (2002). A plaintiff must setforth every material fact necessary to show he or she isentitled to a writ of mandamus, and the plaintiff bears theburden to establish a clear, legal right to it. Chicago Ass'nof Commerce & Industry v. Regional Transportation Authority,86 Ill. 2d 179, 185, 427 N.E.2d 153, 156 (1981).

A decision to grant or deny mandamus will not bereversed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight ofthe evidence. Howell v. Snyder, 326 Ill. App. 3d 450, 453,760 N.E.2d 1009, 1011 (2001). On appeal, this court reviews"de novo, however, the granting of a motion to dismiss apetition for mandamus." Howell, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 453, 760N.E.2d at 1011.

When ruling on a motion to dismiss under eithersection 2-615 or section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure,"the trial court must interpret all pleadings and supportingdocuments in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Chicago Motor Club v. Robinson, 316 Ill. App. 3d 1163, 1171,739 N.E.2d 889, 894-95 (2000), citing Toombs v. City of Champaign, 245 Ill. App. 3d 580, 583, 615 N.E.2d 50, 51 (1993). The trial court should grant the motion to dismiss only if theplaintiff can prove no set of facts to support the cause ofaction. Hatch v. Szymanski, 325 Ill. App. 3d 736, 739, 759N.E.2d 585, 588 (2001).

B. Due Process and the PRB

Plaintiff argues he stated a claim for mandamusbecause the PRB failed to comply with due process. Plaintiffclaims the PRB is the body that hears and decides whether torevoke an inmate's good-conduct credits when more than 30 daysare at issue. Thus, he argues the PRB must provide the minimum procedural safeguards provided for by the United StatesSupreme Court in Wolff. In analyzing the due-process requirements in inmate disciplinary proceedings, this court in Durbinv. Gilmore, 307 Ill. App. 3d 337, 343, 718 N.E.2d 292, 297(1999), stated:

"Due process requires only that the inmatereceive (1) advance written notice of thedisciplinary charges at least 24 hoursprior to hearing; (2) when consistent withinstitutional safety and correctionalgoals, an opportunity to call witnesses andpresent documentary evidence in hisdefense; and (3) a written statement by thefact finder of the evidence relied on andthe reasons for the disciplinary action. [Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-66, 41 L. Ed. 2dat 956, 94 S. Ct. at 2979]."

Defendants, however, maintain plaintiff failed tostate a mandamus claim because he did not show he had a clear,legal right to receive procedural due process from the PRB. Instead, defendants argue Illinois statutes and regulationsprovide that if an inmate's good-conduct credits are revoked,then the inmate is entitled to due process before the prisonadjustment committee not the PRB.

To determine the process due before an inmate'sgood-conduct credits can be revoked, we must look at therelevant statutes and regulations. Statutory construction isa matter of law, and appellate review is de novo. People v.Shanklin, 329 Ill. App. 3d 1144, 1145, 769 N.E.2d 547, 548(2002). The cardinal rule of statutory construction is toascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v. Latona, 184 Ill. 2d 260, 269, 703 N.E.2d 901, 906(1998). The words of a statute are to be given their plainand commonly understood meanings. Krohe v. City ofBloomington, 329 Ill. App. 3d 1133, 1135-36, 769 N.E.2d 551,553 (2002). When the language of a statute is clear andunambiguous, it will be given effect without resort to theother tools of statutory construction. Segers v. IndustrialComm'n, 191 Ill. 2d 421, 431, 732 N.E.2d 488, 494 (2000).

Initially, we set forth a summary of the entireinmate disciplinary process and the steps required before aninmate's good-conduct credits can be revoked.

"[I]f a correctional officer wishes tocharge an inmate with a violation of DOCregulations, the officer prepares adisciplinary report describing the incidentin question. An adjustment committeeconsisting of three members then reviewsthat report. The committee acts as a fact-finding body and also providesrecommendations on how much good time aninmate should lose. The warden of thecorrectional center involved then reviewsthe adjustment committee's recommendationand forwards it to the Director of DOC forfinal approval. The Director can approveon his own the revocation of an inmate'sgood time of one month or less in a givencalendar year. Any greater loss of goodtime must be submitted to the [PRB] for itsreview and final determination." In reM.S., 239 Ill. App. 3d 938, 941, 606 N.E.2d768, 770 (1992).

Illinois inmates have a statutory right to receivegood-conduct credits, and thus they have a liberty interestentitling them to procedural safeguards under the due-processclause of the fourteenth amendment. Hamilton v. O'Leary, 976F.2d 341, 344 (7th Cir. 1992), citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557,41 L. Ed. 2d at 951, 94 S. Ct. at 2975. Section 3-6-3(a)(1)of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS5/3-6-3(a)(1) (West 2002)) provides "[DOC] shall prescriberules and regulations for the early release on account of goodconduct of persons committed to [DOC] which shall be subjectto review by the [PRB]." DOC sets forth the rules andregulations for revoking good-conduct credits, and "no inmatemay be penalized more than one year of good[-]conduct creditfor any one infraction." 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(c) (West 2002).

The DOC Director must also establish disciplinaryprocedures consistent with due process, including theestablishment of disciplinary boards to hear and determinecharges, notice of the violation to the inmate, hearingsallowing the inmate to testify or call witnesses, and awritten statement of the fact finder's decision. 730 ILCS5/3-8-7(e)(1) through (e)(5) (West 2002). To that end, theDOC Director created adjustment committees to hear inmatedisciplinary reports. 20 Ill. Adm. Code