JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs, Christine Malcome, individually and as specialadministratrix of the estate of Daniel Malcome, appeal the McLeanCounty circuit court's order dismissing the complaint against defendant, Toledo, Peoria & Western Railway Corporation (Toledo). Weaffirm.

At approximately 9:30 p.m. on November 29, 1999,Christine's husband, Daniel Malcome, was driving south along Road1980 East in McLean County. A train belonging to Toledo was stoppedon a track that crossed the road at right angles, and the third offive consecutive flatcars blocked the road. Daniel crashed into theflatcar and died as a result. Christine brought this negligenceaction individually and as the administratrix of Daniel's estate. The complaint alleged that Toledo was negligent in failing to providean adequate warning of the stopped train and in creating anextrahazardous condition.

Toledo moved to dismiss for failure to state a cause ofaction under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS5/2-615 (West 2002)). In particular, Toledo asserted that thecomplaint failed to allege a duty. The trial court granted themotion but allowed Christine to amend her complaint, which she did. Toledo again moved to dismiss, and the court granted the motion,dismissing the amended complaint with prejudice. Christine filed amotion to reconsider, which the court denied.

This appeal followed.

A motion to dismiss under section 2-615 challenges thelegal sufficiency of the complaint. Bajwa v. Metropolitan LifeInsurance Co., 208 Ill. 2d 414, 421, 804 N.E.2d 519, 525 (2004). Dismissal is appropriate only where, viewing the allegations in thelight most favorable to the plaintiff, it is clear that no set offacts can be proved under the pleadings that will entitle the plaintiff to relief. Bajwa, 208 Ill. 2d at 421, 804 N.E.2d at 525. Wereview de novo a circuit court's decision to dismiss under section 2-615. People ex rel. Ryan v. World Church of the Creator, 198 Ill. 2d115, 120, 760 N.E.2d 953, 956 (2001).

The key issue in this case is whether Christine adequatelyalleged a duty on the part of Toledo. A complaint alleging negligence must set forth facts establishing that defendant owed plaintiffa duty, breached that duty, and thereby proximately caused plaintiffinjury. Bajwa, 208 Ill. 2d at 421, 804 N.E.2d at 526. The existenceof a legal duty is a question of law to be determined by the court. Bajwa, 208 Ill. 2d at 422, 804 N.E.2d at 526.

There have been enough instances over the years of motorvehicles colliding with standing trains that the courts have developed a special rule to address the situation. Illinois's version ofthis rule is that "a train stopped at a crossing is generally held tobe adequate notice and warning of its presence to any traveler who isin the exercise of ordinary care for his own safety, and the railroadis under no duty to give additional signs, signals[,] or warnings." Dunn v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 127 Ill. 2d 350, 357, 537 N.E.2d738, 741 (1989). This rule is subject to the following exception: if"special circumstances" are present, then the railroad may have aduty to provide warnings beyond the mere presence of the train. Dunn, 127 Ill. 2d at 357, 537 N.E.2d at 741.

The rule regarding stopped trains has its detractors. Onefederal court has described it as "a legal dinosaur, which, once out,tramples twentieth century negligence law and then lumbers back toits dark cave only to await another victim." Hurst v. Union PacificR.R. Co., 958 F.2d 1002, 1003 (10th Cir. 1992). The rule calls tomind the discredited "stop, look, and listen" approach that oncedenied recovery to a motorist who failed to take every precautionbefore daring to cross a railway. See Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v.Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 72 L. Ed. 167, 48 S. Ct. 24 (1927), overruledin Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 78 L. Ed. 1149, 54 S. Ct.580 (1934). In placing on the motorist the burden to avoid anaccident, the stopped-train rule resembles a rule of contributorynegligence. Trevino v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 916 F.2d 1230, 1235(7th Cir. 1990). Our supreme court has held, however, that the ruleis concerned not with contributory negligence, but with a railroad'sduty; it was therefore not affected by this state's switch to acomparative- negligence regime. Dunn, 127 Ill. 2d at 367, 537 N.E.2dat 745. The Dunn case, like this one, involved a motorist (inthat case on a motorcycle) who crashed into a stopped railroad car atapproximately 9:30 p.m. Dunn, 127 Ill. 2d at 354, 537 N.E.2d at 739. His survivors alleged in part that the railroad was negligent infailing to warn motorists of the stopped train under the circumstances. These circumstances included darkness, vehicular traffic, alack of lighting, and the grades surrounding the crossing. The trialcourt dismissed the negligence counts, and the supreme court ultimately affirmed the dismissal, holding that the complaint did notallege special circumstances sufficient to remove the case from thegeneral rule that a stopped train warns motorists of its presence. Dunn, 127 Ill. 2d at 362-63, 537 N.E.2d at 743.

We find that Dunn is squarely on point and controls thiscase. If anything, the allegations in Christine's complaint haveless substance than those in Dunn. The essential factual allegationsof Christine's complaint reduce to this: Daniel was driving at nightand hit Toledo's flatcar. This is insufficient to establish specialcircumstances under Dunn; Christine has failed to allege a duty andtherefore to state a claim for relief.

Christine attempts to distinguish this case from Dunn onthe basis that in Dunn considerable discovery had occurred before thecase was dismissed. It is true that Christine sought discoverybefore her amended complaint was dismissed and never got the depositions or interrogatory responses she requested. On the other hand,she has given no indication of how the lack of discovery has affectedher ability to plead a sufficient cause of action. This is not thetype of case in which the defendant has exclusive control of thefacts needed to plead a cause of action. See Bryson v. News AmericaPublications, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 110, 672 N.E.2d 1207, 1224-25(1996). The types of things that would qualify as special circumstances so as to avoid the rule in Dunn generally are as available toChristine as to Toledo. See, e.g., Petricek v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry.Co., 21 Ill. App. 2d 60, 66, 157 N.E.2d 421, 424 (1959) (FirstDistrict) (blinding snowstorm). Facts that Christine points to onappeal as tending to show special circumstances--the heights of thetrack and roadway, Daniel's line of vision as he drove, the fact thathis speedometer was lodged at around 50 miles per hour--come from herown investigation. We conclude that the lack of discovery does notexcuse Christine's failure to state a cause of action.

Christine also points out that Toledo failed to complywith a statute prohibiting a railroad from blocking a crossing forlonger than 10 minutes (625 ILCS 5/18c-7402(1)(b) (West 2002), butthis observation is unavailing. The prohibition is intended toprevent traffic delays, not collisions. Fox v. Illinois Central R.R.Co., 308 Ill. App. 367, 374, 31 N.E.2d 805, 808-09 (1941) (SecondDistrict). It stands to reason that if a train stopped on a crossingis notice of its own presence (as Dunn holds), that will remain trueno matter how long the train is stopped. Whether Toledo's train wason the track for 8 minutes or for 45 minutes, as Christine claims,Toledo did not have a duty to warn Daniel absent special circumstances. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court was correctwhen it determined that Christine's complaint failed to state a causeof action.

As for the motion to reconsider, we will not disturb thecourt's decision to deny such a motion absent an abuse of discretion. Williams v. Dorsey, 273 Ill. App. 3d 893, 903, 652 N.E.2d 1286, 1293(1995). The purpose of a motion to reconsider is to bring to thecourt's attention newly discovered evidence, changes in the law, orerrors in the court's previous application of existing law. Gardnerv. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 213 Ill. App. 3d 242,248, 571 N.E.2d 1107, 1111 (1991). Christine's motion did no suchthing, and the court was thus within its discretion to deny themotion.

In light of the foregoing, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

Affirmed.

McCULLOUGH, J., concurs.

APPLETON, J., dissents.

JUSTICE APPLETON, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent from the holding of the majority inthis case. Without going so far as to find the stopped-train rule tobe an anachronism as the Tenth Circuit colorfully did in Hurst, 958F.2d 1002, I do not find the rule as most recently enunciated by oursupreme court in Dunn, 127 Ill. 2d 350, 537 N.E.2d 738, supports thejudgment entered on the pleadings here.

It is clear that Dunn left open the door to a plaintiffwho could establish "special circumstances" that could support a dutyon the part of a railroad to provide warnings beyond the mere presence of the train. I agree that plaintiff here alleged as specialcircumstances factors that Dunn specifically found not to qualify assuch, i.e., darkness, vehicular traffic, a lack of lighting, and thegrade of the crossing.

I would find, however, that plaintiff alleged one othersituational fact, which in my mind constitutes a special circumstance: that the railway cars blocking the road onto which plaintiff's decedent crashed his vehicle were not standard sized railroadcars but were rather flat or "lowboy" cars that may have presentedoncoming traffic no profile that would be observable by one approaching the intersection who is driving with due and proper regard forhis safety.

This is not to say that the involvement of such carsautomatically creates liability for the railroad. I would suggestthat more needs to be known about them, e.g., their exact dimension,color, whether any reflective markings were present, et cetera. Iconclude, however, plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded the nature ofthe cars to establish the potential of a special circumstance sufficient to avoid judgment on the pleadings.