Miller v. White

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Miller v. White

State: Illinois

Court: 4th District Appellate

Docket No: 4-06-0673 Rel

Case Date: 04/09/2007

Preview:NO. 4-06-0673 IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT DAROLD A. MILLER, JR., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JESSE WHITE, Secretary of State, State of Illinois, Defendant-Appellant.

Filed 4/9/07

) Appeal from ) Circuit Court of ) Sangamon County ) No. 05MR472 ) ) Honorable ) Leslie J. Graves, ) Judge Presiding. _________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH delivered the opinion of the court: Plaintiff, Darold A. Miller, Jr., pleaded guilty to driving while impaired in Indiana, an offense substantially similar to driving under the influence (DUI) in Illinois. The

authorities in Indiana reported plaintiff's conviction to defendant, Jesse White, in his capacity as Illinois' Secretary of State (Secretary) as required by the Driver's License Compact (Compact). The Secretary then revoked plaintiff's Illinois Plaintiff asked the

driver's license and driving privileges.

Secretary to rescind the order of revocation, and after a hearing, the Secretary refused. Plaintiff sought administrative The circuit court reversed

review of the Secretary's decision.

the Secretary's decision and ordered the Secretary to rescind the order of revocation. The Secretary appeals, and we reverse the

circuit court's judgment. I. BACKGROUND

On January 9, 2005, plaintiff, a resident of Sheldon, Illinois, was arrested in Newton County, Indiana, for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. One month later, plaintiff

pleaded guilty to the Class C misdemeanor and the parties agreed he would be sentenced to 60 days in jail, all of which was suspended except for the one day he already served; pay $1,100 in fines and costs; and have his driver's license suspended for one year for his refusal to take a chemical breath test, an additional 30 days' suspension thereafter, and then restricted for another 180 days wherein plaintiff would be allowed to drive in Indiana for employment purposes and in cases of medical emergency. The Indiana court directed its clerk to transmit to the Secretary that plaintiff's plea "and accompanying sentence be treated as a [s]upervision [o]rder pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/5-61(c) in the State of Illinois." The Indiana court further

ordered "that the Illinois Secretary of State is to rescind any summary suspension in regards to [plaintiff]." original.) On May 8, 2005, the Secretary revoked plaintiff's driving privileges pursuant to section 6-206(a)(6) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Vehicle Code) (625 ILCS 5/6-206(a)(6) (West 2004)), because the offense of which plaintiff was convicted would have been grounds for suspension or revocation had it been - 2 (Emphasis in

committed in Illinois. Plaintiff sought rescission of the Secretary's order of revocation and a hearing was held on July 12, 2005. After

hearing evidence, the hearing officer issued his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommendation that plaintiff's petition be denied. The hearing officer concluded plaintiff

failed to submit sufficient evidence to warrant rescission of the order of revocation as (1) he did not present evidence that (a) the Indiana court had jurisdiction over the Secretary or (b) the Indiana court had jurisdiction to "provide through Illinois law a sentence (supervision), which is not provided for in the laws of the State where the offense and conviction occurred"; (2) the Secretary was not a party to the proceeding involving the charge against plaintiff in Indiana; and (3) plaintiff was convicted of operating a vehicle while intoxicated, an offense, which if committed in Illinois, would be grounds for revocation of his driver's license and privileges. On July 26, 2005, the Secretary

adopted the hearing officer's recommendation and denied the petition. On August 31, 2005, plaintiff filed his complaint for administrative review in the circuit court. ted briefs in support of their positions. The parties submitPlaintiff's brief

framed the issue as "whether the Secretary erred, and violated [section 6-703 of the Vehicle Code] when it revoked the Plain- 3 -

tiff's driver's license." On July 10, 2006, the circuit court entered an order reversing the Secretary's decision and directing the Secretary to rescind the order of revocation with regard to plaintiff's driver's license. The court found the Secretary's refusal "to

rescind the [p]laintiff's revocation of his [d]river's [l]icense violates the provisions of [section 6-703] in that [the Secretary] has failed to give the same effect to conduct occurring out [of] [s]tate as it would if such conduct had occurred" in Illinois. Moreover, the court stated that plaintiff's "sentence is

entitled to being treated as supervision under the provision of [section 5-6-1(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-6-1(c) (West 2004))] in that the Indiana [c]ourt specifically found that [p]laintiff should be granted court supervision." Finally, the court concluded the Secretary

treated plaintiff "more harshly or more severely" because his offense occurred in Indiana "than the conduct or behavior would have been treated had the offense occurred in the state of Illinois." This appeal followed. II. ANALYSIS In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute that plaintiff was convicted of driving while impaired in Indiana and that offense is substantially similar to the offense of DUI in - 4 -

Illinois.

On administrative review, plaintiff argued, and the

circuit court accepted the arguments, that the Secretary violated section 6-703 of the Vehicle Code and that the Indiana sentence is entitled to being treated as court supervision under section 5-6-1(c) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5-6-1(c) (West 2004)). Further, the court opined the Secretary treated plaintiff's conduct more harshly because it occurred in Indiana rather than in Illinois. On appeal, the Secretary argues (1) the Compact only requires him to treat plaintiff's out-of-state conviction for DUI the same as he would treat that conviction had the conduct occurred in Illinois, (2) he is authorized to revoke a person's driving privileges if that person is convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol in another state, and (3) section 5-61(c) of the Unified Code merely provides that entry of an order of supervision is a matter of discretion. A. Standard of Review The Secretary's final administrative decisions are subject to judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 through 113 (West 2004)), and a reviewing court may not overturn an administrative agency's decision unless the administrative agency exercised its authority in an arbitrary and capricious manner or its decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence (Bruce v. White, 344 Ill. App. 3d 795, - 5 -

798-99, 801 N.E.2d 581, 584 (2003)).

The Secretary's findings

and conclusions on questions of fact are prima facie true and correct and if anything in the record fairly supports the agency's decision, that decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. N.E.2d at 584. Bruce, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 799, 801

"An agency's conclusion on a question of law is Comprehensive Community Solutions, Inc. v.

reviewed de novo."

Rockford School District No. 205, 216 Ill. 2d 455, 471, 837 N.E.2d 1, 10 (2005). Additionally, we review the Secretary's Mefford v. White,

decision and not the circuit court's decision.

331 Ill. App. 3d 167, 173, 770 N.E.2d 1251, 1256 (2002). B. Driver's License Compact Illinois is a member of the Compact. 700 through 6-708 (West 2004). Compact. See 625 ILCS 5/6-

Indiana is also a member of the

See Ind. Code Ann.

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