Miranda v. Madigan

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Miranda v. Madigan

State: Illinois

Court: 4th District Appellate

Docket No: 4-07-0504 Rel

Case Date: 04/21/2008

Preview:Filed 4/21/08

NO. 4-07-0504 IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT

BRIAN MIRANDA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LISA MADIGAN, Attorney General, State of Illinois; and THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE, Defendants-Appellees.

) Appeal from ) Circuit Court of ) Sangamon County ) No. 07MR33 ) ) Honorable ) Robert J. Eggers, ) Judge Presiding. _________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court: In January 2007, plaintiff, Brian Miranda, filed a pro se complaint for a declaratory judgment against defendants, Lisa Madigan, the Attorney General of Illinois, and the Illinois Department of the State Police. He sought a declaration that he

need not register under the Child Murderer and Violent Offender Against Youth Registration Act (Registration Act) (730 ILCS 154/1 through 9999 (West 2006)) upon his release from prison. trial court dismissed the complaint. affirm. I. BACKGROUND In January 2007, plaintiff filed a pro se complaint for a declaratory judgment. He alleged that he is serving a 30-year Plaintiff appeals. The We

sentence for first degree murder based on a gang-related homicide that occurred in 1993. At the time of the offense, plaintiff was In his complaint,

17 years old and the victim was 15 years old.

plaintiff stated that the Registration Act requires him to register as a child murderer with local law enforcement upon his release from prison and for the rest of his life. register would constitute a felony. Plaintiff contended that the Registration Act is retroactive as applied to him and it creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, and increases his liability for past conduct, which violates his due-process rights. He also claimed that the 5 His failure to

statute violates the general savings clause (savings clause). ILCS 70/4 (West 2006). However, plaintiff denied that he was

challenging the Registration Act as an ex post facto punishment. Plaintiff sought a declaration that he need not register as a child murderer. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under sections 2615 (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2006)) and 2-619 (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2006)) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Defendants argued

that the application of the Registration Act to plaintiff would not violate his due-process rights because prior to its enactment in 2006, child murderers were already required to register under a similar statute, the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) (730 ILCS 150/1 through 12 (West 2006)). The Supreme Court of Illi-

nois had upheld SORA despite the fact that it applied retroactively to offenders who committed their crimes prior to its enactment. People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418-19, 739 - 2 -

N.E.2d 433, 437-38 (2000). Defendants also contended that plaintiff's argument that the statute imposed a new liability on him essentially was an ex post facto argument, despite his disclaiming that argument, and noted that the courts had rejected such arguments regarding offender registration and notification laws because they do not impose additional punishments. Additionally, defendants noted

that the savings clause does not apply to plaintiff's case. The trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss on April 4, 2007, "[f]or the reasons stated by the Defendants in their Motion to Dismiss." On April 25, 2007, plaintiff filed a

motion to reconsider, which the court denied on June 8, 2007. This appeal followed. II. ANALYSIS On appeal, plaintiff presents six issues for review. Five of them address plaintiff's ultimate contention that he should not have to register as a child murderer upon his release from prison. He presents those issues as follows: (1) whether

plaintiff had a duty to register as a child murderer or sex offender at the time of his conviction; (2) whether the Registration Act is a civil or criminal statute; (3) whether the Registration Act has a retroactive effect; (4) whether the Registration Act violates plaintiff's due-process rights by imposing a new duty or obligation and increased liability; and (5) whether - 3 -

the savings clause applies to the Registration Act.

Plaintiff's

sixth argument is that the trial court erred by dismissing his entire complaint where defendants did not provide a reason to dismiss paragraphs 9 through 12 in their memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss. We review de novo a trial court's Nestle USA, Inc. v.

decision to grant a motion to dismiss.

Dunlap, 365 Ill. App. 3d 727, 731, 852 N.E.2d 282, 286 (2006). A. Background Because the Registration Act has been in effect only since 2006, no published decisions address constitutional challenges to it. However, Illinois courts have considered constitu-

tional challenges to SORA and its predecessors, from which the Registration Act developed and to which the Registration Act is very similar. In 1986, the legislature enacted the Habitual Child Sex Offender Registration Act, which was the first statute to require certain offenders to register upon their release from prison. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 221. In 1993, that act was 730 ILCS 150/1

renamed the Child Sex Offender Registration Act. (West Supp. 1993).

Then, in 1996, the Child Sex Offender Regis730 ILCS

tration Act was renamed SORA and extensively amended. 150/1 (West 1996).

While the 1986 and 1993 versions of the

statute only required sex offenders to register, the 1996 amendments expanded the registration requirement to those who commit- 4 -

ted certain violent offenses against children that did not necessarily have a sexual component. Among the offenses that

required offenders to register under SORA was "[f]irst degree murder under Section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961[,] when the victim was a person under 18 years of age, the defendant was at least 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, and the offense was committed on or after June 1, 1996." 730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.6) (West 1996). Plaintiff was not required

to register under the 1996 version of SORA because he committed his offense in 1993. In 2004, the legislature deleted the language in SORA that provided that only those who committed the first degree murder of a child after June 1, 1996, were obligated to register. 730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.6) (West 2004). However, it added the

condition that child murderers who committed their offenses before June 1, 1996, had to register if they were incarcerated in an Illinois Department of Corrections facility on August 20, 2004. 730 ILCS 150/2(C-5) (West 2004). Accordingly, plaintiff

was required to register under the 2004 version of SORA. The legislature amended SORA yet again in 2006 to require only those child murderers whose offenses were "sexually motivated" to register as sex offenders. (West 2006). 730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.6)

Though the 2006 amendment relieved plaintiff of his

obligation to register under SORA, the legislature simultaneously - 5 -

enacted the Registration Act.

Pub. Act 94-945,

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