JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

In this case, we consider whether a bank has a duty torefuse to lend money to a person when (1) the bank knows that theborrower intends to use the money to purchase a car and (2) thebank knows or should have known that the borrower (a) does nothave a valid driver's license and (b) has a record of numerousserious traffic law violations. We hold that a bank has no suchduty.

In December 2003, plaintiff, Jerry Northcutt, filed acomplaint against defendants, Wayne Chapman, Michael Brannan,Premier Bank of Jacksonville, and Pleasant Plains State Bank, asubsidiary of Illinois National Bank. (The record suggests thatPremier Bank of Jacksonville was formerly known as PleasantPlains Bank. We thus hereinafter refer to both defendant banksas simply, "the bank.") Northcutt sought to recover for injurieshe suffered when Chapman, who was driving his Ford Escort, failedto yield to oncoming traffic before turning left into a privatedriveway and struck Northcutt, who was riding a motorcycle.

According to Northcutt's complaint, between 1996 and1998, Chapman was cited and convicted on four traffic violations. In January 1999, his license was suspended for accruing 3 trafficviolations in 12 months. In July 1999, Chapman received anothertraffic citation and was later convicted. In August 1999, hereceived another traffic citation and turned his license in asbail. In October 1999, Chapman was cited for failing to drive onthe right side of the roadway after he caused an accident thatresulted in the death of another driver. He was later convictedon that citation, and his license was suspended. In July 2001,Chapman was cited for driving on a suspended license, and in July2002, he was convicted of that offense. In May 2002, Brannansold Chapman the Ford Escort that Chapman was driving when hestruck and injured Northcutt.

Northcutt further alleged that (1) Chapman negligentlycaused his injuries by failing to yield to keep a proper lookout(count I); (2) Brannan negligently entrusted the Ford Escort toChapman (count II); and (3) the bank negligently entrusted theFord Escort to Chapman when it loaned Chapman the funds to buythe car and it knew or should have known that Chapman (a) did nothave a valid driver's license and (b) was an incompetent driver. (Count III made this allegation against Pleasant Plains StateBank, and count IV made the same allegation against PremierBank.)

In January and February 2004, the bank filed motions todismiss counts III and IV of Northcutt's complaint, pursuant tosection 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615(West 2002)). The motions asserted that Northcutt failed tostate a cause of action against the bank because the bank did nothave a duty to determine Chapman's driving competency beforeloaning him money to purchase the Ford Escort.

In March 2004, the trial court granted the bank'smotions to dismiss. In so doing, the court noted that for anentrustment to have occurred, the bank would have had to have asuperior right to possess the entrusted article--namely, the FordEscort. The court also found that it was "speculation that butfor the loaning of money, [Chapman] would not have obtained avehicle."

Later in March 2004, the bank filed a motion seeking(1) an order dismissing counts III and IV with prejudice and (2)a Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) finding thatno just reason existed for delaying an appeal. At an April 2004hearing, Northcutt did not object to the bank's motion, and thetrial court entered an order dismissing counts III and IV withprejudice and finding that no just reason existed for delayingappeal of its order.

This appeal followed.

A section 2-615 motion to dismiss a complaint challenges its legal sufficiency and questions whether its allegations, when viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff,are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief canbe granted. Vitro v. Mihelcic, 209 Ill. 2d 76, 81, 806 N.E.2d632, 634 (2004). A section 2-615 motion admits all well-pleadedfacts as true. However, conclusions of law or factual conclusions that are not supported by allegations of specific fact arenot admitted. Provenzale v. Forister, 318 Ill. App. 3d 869, 878,743 N.E.2d 676, 683 (2001). We review de novo the trial court'sruling on a section 2-615 motion to dismiss. Vitro, 209 Ill. 2dat 81, 806 N.E.2d at 634.

Northcutt first argues that the trial court erred bygranting the bank's motion to dismiss counts III and IV of hiscomplaint because the bank's lending money to Chapman for thepurpose of buying a car, knowing that Chapman was an unlicensed,reckless, and incompetent driver, constituted negligent entrustment under section 308 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts(Restatement (Second) of Torts