JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:

In June 2003, Troy and Debra Parish filed a complaintagainst Country Mutual Insurance Company (Country Mutual), seekingdeclaratory relief. In October 2003, Country Mutual filed a motionto dismiss Troy and Debra's complaint. In November 2003, the trialcourt entered an order granting Country Mutual's motion to dismiss. Troy and Debra appeal, arguing the two-year limitations provision tobring any legal action against Country Mutual found in the insurancepolicy impermissibly limited the time they could assert a claim forunderinsured benefits under the policy. We affirm.

Debra Parish was involved in a motor vehicle accident onMarch 16, 1999. Debra allegedly sustained injuries as a result ofthe accident. As of July 26, 2001, Country Mutual, Debra's insurer,had paid $1,842.10 for Debra's medical treatment under the med-payprovision of the insurance policy. In September 2001, more than twoyears after the accident, Debra had surgery as a result of theaccident.

The other driver involved in the accident with Debra wasinsured by Geico Direct Insurance (Geico). Sometime prior to December 27, 2002, Debra settled with Geico for the limits of its policy,$20,000. On December 27, 2002, Troy and Debra placed Country Mutualon notice of their intent to file a claim under the underinsuredprovisions of their insurance policy. In April 2003, Country Mutualdenied any underinsured coverage because the time for Troy and Debrato present an underinsured motorist claim under the insurance policyexpired in May 2001, two years after the date of the accident.

In June 2003, Troy and Debra filed a complaint againstCountry Mutual, asking the trial court to declare Troy and Debra wereentitled to the underinsured coverage. In October 2003, CountryMutual filed a motion to dismiss Troy and Debra's complaint based onthe two-year limitations clause found in the policy. In November2003, the court granted Country Mutual's motion to dismiss. Thisappeal followed.

According to Troy and Debra's brief, they concede the two-year limitations clause at issue in this case has been upheld byIllinois courts in many situations. However, Troy and Debra arguethe facts in this case distinguish this case from those prior decisions. We disagree and affirm.

A. Standard of Review

Country Mutual states in its brief "[t]he decision togrant or deny a request for declaratory relief rests within the sounddiscretion of the trial court, and that determination will not bedisturbed absent an abuse thereof." Troy and Debra also state intheir brief the trial court's "decision is in error and against themanifest weight of the evidence." However, because the trial courtgranted Country Mutual's motion to dismiss under section 2-619 of theCode of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2002)), wereview the decision de novo. AG Farms, Inc. v. American PremierUnderwriters, Inc., 296 Ill. App. 3d 684, 688, 695 N.E.2d 882, 886(1998). The parties "fail to distinguish between refusing to grantdeclaratory relief after consideration of the merits and granting ofa motion to dismiss on the pleadings." AG Farms, 296 Ill. App. 3d at688, 695 N.E.2d at 886.

B. Insurance Policy Provisions

Section 2 of the insurance policy at issue explains theuninsured and underinsured motorist coverage provided by the policy. Under section 2, the policy lists a series of conditions pertainingto the uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage the policyprovides. The final condition listed under section 2 states:

"Legal Action Against Us. No suit, action, orarbitration proceedings for recovery of anyclaim may be brought against us until the insured has fully complied with all the terms ofthis policy. Further, any suit, action, orarbitration will be barred unless commencedwithin two years after the date of the accident. Arbitration proceedings will not commence until we receive your written demand forarbitration." (Emphasis in original).

In this case, Troy and Debra did not inform Country Mutual of theirintent to file a claim under the underinsured provisions of theirinsurance policy until December 2002, more than three years and ninemonths after Debra's accident.

According to the Illinois Supreme Court:

"In construing an insurance policy, the courtmust ascertain the intent of the parties to thecontract. [Citations.] To ascertain the meaning of the policy's words and the intent of theparties, the court must construe the policy asa whole [citations] with due regard to the riskundertaken, the subject matter that is insuredand the purposes of the entire contract [citation]. If the words in the policy are unambiguous, a court must afford them their plain,ordinary, and popular meaning. [Citations.] However, if the words in the policy are susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, they are ambiguous [citation] and will beconstrued in favor of the insured and againstthe insurer who drafted the policy[citations]." (Emphasis omitted.) OutboardMarine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,154 Ill. 2d 90, 108-09, 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1212-13 (1992).

Troy and Debra do not argue the terms of the policy are ambiguous. Therefore, we give the terms of the policy their plain meaning. Under the plain meaning of the aforementioned policy provision, thepolicy required Troy and Debra to commence any legal action forunderinsured benefits against Country Mutual within two years of thedate of Debra's accident. According to the policy, because Troy andDebra failed to commence their legal action against Country Mutualwithin two years of the date of the accident, their claim againstCountry Mutual is barred.

However, Troy and Debra argue the time-limitationprovision is against public policy. An insurance policy is acontract between the company and the policyholder. Outboard MarineCorp., 154 Ill. 2d at 108, 607 N.E.2d at 1212. Unless the terms ofthe contract are against public policy when applied, the termsdetermine the benefits available under the contract. State FarmMutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Villicana, 181 Ill. 2d 436, 442,692 N.E.2d 1196, 1199 (1998). This court has held declaring a policyprovision void as against public policy is an "extraordinary remedy,"which this court finds "unpalatable." Vansickle v. Country MutualInsurance Co., 272 Ill. App. 3d 841, 842-43, 651 N.E.2d 706, 707(1995). In this case, Troy and Debra correctly concede thelimitations provision at issue in this case has been upheld by thiscourt as well as others in many situations. See Shelton v. CountryMutual Insurance Co., 161 Ill. App. 3d 652, 515 N.E.2d 235 (1987)(First District); Hannigan v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 264 Ill.App. 3d 336, 636 N.E.2d 897 (1994) (First District); Vansickle, 272Ill. App. 3d 841, 651 N.E.2d 706; Flatt v. Country Mutual InsuranceCo., 289 Ill. App. 3d 1097, 682 N.E.2d 1228 (1997) (Fourth District);Hale v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 334 Ill. App. 3d 751, 778N.E.2d 721 (2002) (Fifth District). Troy and Debra fail to cite anyauthority where the limitations provision at issue in this case hasnot been upheld. However, Troy and Debra argue this case isfactually distinct from the other cases where this clause has beenupheld because the "insured did not in any way appreciate the valueof her damages previous to this two[-]year time period passing."

While this might be true, "[i]nsurance companies areentitled to reasonably limit their exposure from an insurancecontract." Vansickle, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 843, 651 N.E.2d at 707. This court has previously stated:

"We are not unmindful of the problems createdwhen an insured's legal action against atortfeasor is prolonged past the two-yearperiod. Nevertheless, the insured cansufficiently allege a cause of action for UIMmotorist benefits if she has sufficient factsto proceed against the tortfeasor. The onlyadditional allegations required are that theinsured's damages and UM-UIM coverage exceedthe torfeasor's liability insurance. Insurancecompanies that utilize suit limitationprovisions must expect to be subjected tolawsuits which allege the likelihood ofliability under the UM-UIM coverage. Ofcourse, the insurance company can avoid thelawsuit by agreeing with the insured to put theUM-UIM issue on hold until the resolution ofthe action against the tortfeasor. As apractical matter, this is an insurancecompany's probable (and most reasonable) courseof action." Vansickle, 272 Ill. App. 3d at843, 651 N.E.2d at 707.

While Troy and Debra argue they were not aware of the extent of theirdamages until after the two-year limitations period had passed, theyshould have been aware of the tortfeasor's limited insurance coveragefrom Geico and the possibility their damages could exceed thetortfeasor's limited coverage over the period of months or yearsnecessary to resolve their claim.

Troy and Debra cite the Fifth District Appellate Court'sdecision in Hale, 334 Ill. App. 3d 751, 778 N.E.2d 721, for thefollowing proposition:

"The purpose of the limitations clause isnotification--not a trap for insureds failingto use the precise wording suggested by theinsurer. To hold otherwise would mean thatwith every minor claim, the attorney would needto formally request arbitration or fearmalpractice for failing to do so. Theinsurance industry could not desire thatoutcome because its companies would beinundated with premature arbitration demands. Use of the exact words should not dictatecoverage or lack thereof. The form of filingan underinsured-motorist claim, whichnecessitates an arbitration demand, should notdictate the substance of the request. To theextent that other cases are contrary to ourholding, we disagree with those cases." Hale,334 Ill. App. 3d at 755, 778 N.E.2d at 724.

However, this case is distinguishable from Hale. In Hale, theplaintiff's attorney sent a letter to Country Mutual within the two-year time limit after his accident. The letter stated:

"'I have been retained to represent yourinsured, Mark Hale, for injuries sustained in amotor vehicle accident on April 11, 1997. Itappears that we have an underinsured claim. Atthis time I ask that you disclose theunderinsured motorist and medical paymentspolicy limits of Mr. Hale.'" Hale, 334 Ill.App. 3d at 753, 778 N.E.2d at 722.

In the instant case, neither Troy nor Debra informedCountry Mutual they had an underinsured motorist claim within the twoyears provided by the policy. Because Troy and Debra did not notifyCountry Mutual of their underinsured claim in any manner in the twoyears after the accident, we do not need to determine whether weagree with the Fifth District's reasoning that an insured need notformally demand arbitration to preserve his or her right to make aclaim against Country Mutual for underinsured benefits so long as theinsured notifies Country Mutual of the insured's belief he or she hasan underinsured claim.

Troy and Debra also argue this case is similar to theFirst District Appellate Court's decision in Coronet Insurance Co. v.Ferrill, 134 Ill. App. 3d 483, 481 N.E.2d 43 (1985). They argue "thenotice provision in this case impermissibly limited the time withinwhich the [p]laintiff could assert her claim for damages because theinsured did not in any way appreciate the value of her damagesprevious to this two-year time period passing." However, this caseis distinguishable from Coronet.

The insurance policy provision at issue in Coronet"required that an insured making an uninsured motorist claim based onthe insolvency of a tortfeasor's insurer must notify Coronet of hisintent to make such a claim within one year of the insolvency." Coronet, 134 Ill. App. 3d at 484, 481 N.E.2d at 45. According to theFirst District:

"Under the instant provision, the limitationsperiod begins to run from the time thetortfeasor's insurer became insolvent, an eventof which the insured may not be aware. Here,Ferrill did not learn of the insolvency until 21/2 months after it occurred. He notifiedCoronet of this fact within a year after helearned of it. An analogy to the discoveryrule, similar to those which have beenrecognized by Illinois courts in other contexts[citations] would have applicability to thefacts before us. Under this rule, the one-year[-]notice[-]period requirement would notbegin to run until the claimant knew orreasonably should have known of the insolvencyof the other motorist's insurer." Coronet, 134Ill. App. 3d at 488, 481 N.E.2d at 47.

In this case, the two-year limitations period began to run on the dayof the accident, a date of which Troy and Debra were well aware.

In interpreting the same limitations provision at issue inthe case at bar, the First District Appellate Court stated:

"The policy provision at issue here was clearin its requirements, making it unnecessary forthe discovery rule to be applied. The policystated that the demand for arbitration must bebrought within two years of the accident. Therefore, there was no need to determine whenplaintiff knew or should have known of theexistence of the right to sue. The claim wasto be made within two years of the accident." Hannigan, 264 Ill. App. 3d at 343, 636 N.E.2dat 902.

We agree, the discovery rule does not apply to the limitationsprovision at issue in this case.

As a result of the above analysis, we find the time-limitation provision at issue in this case does not violate publicpolicy. Public policy does not require invalidation of a clearlywritten provision simply to avoid disappointment to an insured. Menke v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 78 Ill. 2d 420, 426, 401N.E.2d 539, 542 (1980). Therefore, the trial court did not err ingranting Country Mutual's motion to dismiss.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

Affirmed.

KNECHT, P.J., and TURNER, J., concur.