JUSTICE McCULLOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Daniel Parker, appeals the trial court's grantof summary judgment in his pro se action for mandamus, in favor ofdefendants, Donald L. Snyder, Jr. (Director), and the Department ofCorrections (DOC). On appeal, the issue is whether plaintiff isentitled to mandamus relief. We affirm.

On March 16, 1995, DOC classified plaintiff as a Level Einmate, reflecting that he presented an extremely high risk ofescape. Plaintiff had previously been found guilty of the offense ofattempted escape in a prison disciplinary proceeding.

On July 27, 2000, Roger D. Cowan, warden of Menard Correctional Center, issued a procedural bulletin addressed to all Level Einmates, stating the following: "Effective August 1, 2000, thefollowing changes mandated by Administrative Directive will requireyour visits be non-contact only. The number of adult visitors onyour visiting list will be limited to ten."

On September 7, 2000, defendant Kenneth R. Briley, wardenof Stateville Correctional Center, issued Warden's Bulletin No. 00-111, regarding extremely high level escape risk visits. The bulletinstated the following:

"Effective 10/1/00, all visits for inmateswho are classified as extremely high level escaperisks will be conducted in the non-contact visiting room. Only ten persons, 17 years or older,will be approved to visit an inmate who is classified as an extremely high level escape risk. Only two persons may visit at any one time. Special visiting lists will be distributed to allaffected inmates. Inmates are responsible fornotifying prospective visitors of these policychanges."

Plaintiff filed a number of grievances related to theaforementioned administrative directives. Grievance officers deniedthose grievances contained in the record on appeal, stating that eachsuch denial was based on plaintiff's high risk of escape and/or LevelE status and was mandated by an administrative directive. (Onegrievance filed and the response thereto are not contained in therecord.)

On June 21, 2002, plaintiff filed a pro se petition formandamus relief pursuant to article XIV of the Illinois Code of CivilProcedure (735 ILCS 5/14-101 through 14-109 (West 2002)) againstdefendants, the Director; Briley; George E. DeTella, AssociateDirector of DOC; and Jonathan R. Walls, warden of Menard CorrectionalCenter. The petition alleged, inter alia, that the loss of contactvisitation privileges violated state law and substantive due process. On February 11, 2003, the trial court dismissed without prejudicedefendants DeTella, Briley, and Walls, where they were sued in theirofficial capacities. On May 19, 2003, plaintiff filed a motion forpartial summary judgment. On June 16, 2003, the State filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. On July 28, 2003, the court deniedplaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted the State'smotion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by denying hismotion for summary judgment and granting the State's motion forsummary judgment where the facts show (1) restriction of his visitingprivileges to "non-contact only" was inconsistent with the relevantstatutes as they existed prior to the enactment of Public Act 89-688(Pub. Act 89-688, eff. June 1, 1997 (1996 Ill. Laws 3738)), which hasbeen declared unconstitutional (People v. Burdunice, 211 Ill. 2d 264,271, 811 N.E.2d 678, 683 (2004)), and (2) such restrictions violatedhis substantive due-process rights.

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, showthat no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party isentitled to judgment as a matter of law. Roth v. Opiela, 211 Ill. 2d536, 542, 813 N.E.2d 114, 117 (2004); 735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2002). The standard of review on appeal for the grant or denial of a motionfor summary judgment is de novo. Abrams v. City of Chicago, 211 Ill.2d 251, 258, 811 N.E.2d 670, 674 (2004).

As we stated recently in Lucas v. Taylor, 349 Ill. App. 3d995, ___, 812 N.E.2d 72, 75 (2004):

"'Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy toenforce, as a matter of right, "the performanceof official duties by a public officer where noexercise of discretion on his part is involved."' Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d 198, 229, 710N.E.2d 798, 813 (1999), quoting Madden v.Cronson, 114 Ill. 2d 504, 514, 501 N.E.2d 1267,1272 (1986). A court will award a writ ofmandamus 'only if a plaintiff establishes aclear, affirmative right to relief, a clear dutyof the public official to act, and a clearauthority in the public official to comply withthe writ.' People ex rel. Ryan v. Roe, 201 Ill.2d 552, 555, 778 N.E.2d 701, 703 (2002). Aplaintiff must set forth every material factnecessary to show he or she is entitled to a writof mandamus, and the plaintiff bears the burdento establish a clear, legal right to it. ChicagoAss'n of Commerce & Industry v. RegionalTransportation Authority, 86 Ill. 2d 179, 185,427 N.E.2d 153, 156 (1981)."

Plaintiff first argues that his visitation restrictionsare inconsistent with sections 3-7-2(f) and 3-8-7(b)(2) of theUnified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) as they existed prior tothe enactment of Public Act 89-688, which was declaredunconstitutional. See 730 ILCS 5/3-7-2(f), 3-8-7(b)(2) (West 1996). The State acknowledges that Public Act 89-688 is unconstitutional andtherefore void but argues that defendants complied with state law asit existed prior to Public Act 89-688's enactment.

The previous version of section 3-7-2(f) of the UnifiedCode provided as follows:

"All of the institutions and facilities ofthe Department shall permit every committedperson to receive visitors, except in case ofabuse of the visiting privilege or when the chiefadministrative officer determines that suchvisiting would be harmful or dangerous to thesecurity, safety or morale of the institution orfacility. Clergy, religious chaplain andattorney visiting privileges shall be as broad asthe security of the institution or facility willallow." (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/3-7-2(f)(West 1996).

The plain language of section 3-7-2(f) does not grantunrestricted visitation; it merely allows inmates to receivevisitors, and even then just to the extent it does not hinder thesafety or security of the institution or facility. Here, plaintiffwas not denied all visitation, nor were the restrictions soburdensome as to constructively deny him visitation under section 3-7-2(f). The visitation restrictions placed on plaintiff were notdisciplinary; rather, they were discretionary safety and securitymeasures applied to all prisoners in the respective facilities. Accordingly, section 3-7-2(f) would not even apply to plaintiff'ssituation.

The previous version of section 3-8-7(b)(2) of the UnifiedCode, addressing disciplinary procedures, read as follows:

"Disciplinary restrictions on visitations,work, education or program assignments, and theuse of the prison's library shall be related asclosely as practicable to abuse of suchprivileges or facilities. This paragraph shallnot apply to segregation or isolation of personsfor purposes of institutional control." 730 ILCS5/3-8-7(b)(2) (West 1996).

Citing section 3-1-2(h) of the Unified Code, which defines"discipline" (730 ILCS 5/3-1-2(h) (West 2000)), plaintiff contendsthat his visitation restrictions constitute "disciplinaryrestrictions" that bring his situation within the scope of section 3-8-7(b)(2).

Section 3-1-2(h) defines "discipline" as "the rules andregulations for the maintenance of order and the protection ofpersons and property within the institutions and facilities of theDepartment and their enforcement." 730 ILCS 5/3-1-2(h) (West 2000). The Unified Code does not define "disciplinary restriction," butwhere the words and phrases defined under the Unified Code have aparticular context that clearly requires a different meaning, thecontextual meaning controls (730 ILCS 5/3-1-1 (West 2000)).

We reject plaintiff's attempt to equate the general term"discipline" with the specific term "disciplinary restrictions" underthe Unified Code. A review of the statutory sections within theUnified Code conclusively shows that "disciplinary" is applied toindividual acts and the sanctions thereto, while "discipline" appliesto institutional control generally. See 730 ILCS 5/3-1-1 through 8-6-1 (West 1996 & 2000). Section 3-8-7 of the Unified Code is nodifferent.

The restrictions attached to the Level E classificationwere "reasonable security measures to classify those inmates who haveexhibited behavior which indicates they are likely to attempt anescape." The restrictions were not a "disciplinary" measure forplaintiff's 1995 attempted escape, an infraction for which DOCimposed separate sanctions against plaintiff only. We find nosuggestion that defendants acted outside the scope of theirdiscretionary powers "[t]o develop and maintain programs of control"and "[t]o make all rules and regulations and exercise all powers andduties vested by law in the Department." 730 ILCS 5/3-2-2(d), (m)(West 2000).

Plaintiff also argues that his visitation restrictionsdeprived him of his substantive due-process rights. We need notaddress whether plaintiff has a protectible liberty interest in thelevel of visitation allowed. Even if plaintiff had such an interest,these matters do not involve fundamental constitutional rights;therefore, the rational-basis test applies. People v. R.G., 131 Ill.2d 328, 342, 546 N.E.2d 533, 540 (1989).

The restrictions attached to the Level E classificationwere reasonable security measures to classify those inmatesexhibiting behavior indicating they are likely to attempt an escape. Placing restrictions on the contact of such inmates with outsideindividuals is rationally related to safety and security concerns. Accordingly, plaintiff's substantive due-process argument fails.

Plaintiff had no clear right to relief, and defendantswere entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial courtproperly denied plaintiff's petition for mandamus.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

Affirmed.

COOK and TURNER, JJ., concur.