MODIFIED ON DENIAL OF REHEARING

JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:

In December 1999, the trial court convicted defendant,Montel Avant, of possession of a controlled substance with intentto deliver (more than 1 gram but not more than 15 grams of asubstance containing cocaine) (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West1998)) and later sentenced him to four years in prison.

Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the trial courterred by denying his motion to suppress evidence because theevidence was obtained during an illegal seizure, and (2) hisconviction should be reversed because it was based, in part, on apolice laboratory report (hereinafter lab report) admitted intoevidence pursuant to section 115-15 of the Code of CriminalProcedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/115-15 (West 1998)), whichthe Supreme Court of Illinois declared unconstitutional in Peoplev. McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d 127, 140, 729 N.E.2d 470, 478 (2000). This court rendered an opinion affirming the trial court'sjudgment. People v. Avant, No. 4-00-1083 (June 20, 2001). Defendant filed a petition for rehearing. We now withdraw ouropinion filed June 20, 2001, and by this opinion, reverse thetrial court's judgment. We reverse.

Champaign police officer Mark E. Huckstep was the onlywitness to testify at the August 1999 hearing on defendant'smotion to suppress evidence. Huckstep testified as follows.

In April 1999, he was a member of Champaign'scommunity-policing unit and was assigned to the housing projectsand surrounding area, which included North Fourth Street. Heworked 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. shifts at that time.

Around 2 p.m. on April 29, 1999, Huckstep was patrolling the 900 block of North Fourth Street with his partner, MaryBunyard, in an unmarked police car. Both officers were inuniform. Huckstep observed defendant, who was walking south onFourth Street as Huckstep was driving north. Huckstep describedhis interest in defendant as follows: "I wasn't familiar withhim. I [had] seen him around there the last few days, but I[had] never spoken to him before, so I wanted to get acquaintedwith him." Huckstep said that defendant "appeared to be hangingaround in the 900 block" and did not appear to be intoxicated orunder the influence of anything.

Huckstep turned off of Fourth Street onto East Eureka,parked on the side of the road, got out of the car, and approached defendant (who was still walking southbound on FourthStreet north of Eureka). Bunyard got out of the car and followedHuckstep, but she was "not too close" to him. She was about 10feet behind Huckstep. Huckstep asked defendant if he could speakto him and defendant said, "yeah." Huckstep asked defendant ifhe had any identification. Defendant did not have identificationon him but provided his personal information verbally toHuckstep. Huckstep then called in a warrant check, using theradio on his shoulder, and learned that defendant had no outstanding warrants. Huckstep then asked defendant if he hadanything illegal on his person. Defendant said, "yeah, I havesome rocks." Huckstep took that to mean "rock cocaine" and askeddefendant to hand the rocks to him. Defendant reached into hisleft coat pocket, pulled out a bag, and handed it to Huckstep. Huckstep said that the police had received "a lot of complaintsabout high drug activity going on in that block for quite sometime," and he had seen defendant hanging around in that area thefew days previous.

The following colloquy occurred:

"Q. [ASSISTANT STATE'S ATTORNEY]: Yourstopping of [defendant] was merely to satisfyyour desire to ascertain his identity?

A. [HUCKSTEP]: Yes. When I stopped himwas what I would consider to be a voluntarycontact.

Q. But it was merely to ascertain hisidentity? It was pursuant to no other investigative function, correct?

A. I was not familiar with his identity,no.

Q. All right. And you weren't investigating any robberies, burglaries, or anyother crimes where you might have been seeking the identity of any individual?

A. No.

* * *

Q. So the fact that you'd seen thisindividual a couple of times before in [sic],in and of itself, is not suspicious, is it?

A. I would say in the block that he'dbeen hanging in, the way he had been hanging,yeah, it was suspicious.

Q. Well, you keep saying [']hanging.['] Can you describe that as any particular criminal or suspicious activity?

A. That's not criminal, no.

* * *

Q. Do you think that all young men who,as you say, just [']hang['] like [defendant]are under suspicion and should be stopped?

A. I'm not saying all men that hangshould be stopped, but as a police officerit's my job to get acquainted with peopleespecially in the community[-]policing role. My job is to get out and deal with the publicmore."

On re-cross-examination, defense counsel queriedfurther, as follows:

"Q. What was suspicious about [defendant]?

A. The fact that he'd just been--I hadn't seen him prior to that except for thelast two or three days and that he just continued to hang in that immediate area whichhad been a high drug activity area.

Q. Okay. When you say he was [']hanging['], can you describe the distance or theparameters of the area in which you saw himhanging?

A. Within that block maybe as far downas the convenient store, within a two-blockrange, walking back and forth on the sidewalk.

Q. Over what sort of time period are wetalking about him walking from one end to theother?

***

A. Two to three days, probably four tofive hours, if I recall right, a day."

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial courtdenied defendant's motion to suppress the evidence and explainedits ruling, in pertinent part:

"Based on the evidence, I find and conclude that [Huckstep's] contact with thisdefendant was not a seizure, but was rather acontact by [Huckstep], which contact was apart of [Huckstep's] community[-]caretakingfunction. The duration of the entire transaction was approximately three minutes."

At defendant's December 1999 bench trial, Hucksteptestified consistently with his testimony at the hearing ondefendant's motion to suppress evidence. In addition, he testified that (1) the 900 block of North Fourth Street is a highdrug-trafficking area; (2) he had seen defendant on a couple ofdays prior to April 29, 1999, "stead[il]y walking back and forth,up and down the sidewalk" spanning two blocks; and (3) defendanthanded him a bag containing 26 individual bags of crack cocaine.

Roberta Johnson, an employee in the evidence section ofthe Champaign police department, testified that she transportedthe drug evidence to the Illinois State Police Laboratory inSpringfield and identified the lab report that was generated as aresult. The State moved to admit the lab report into evidence. The defendant did not object, and the trial court admitted thereport.

The trial court found defendant guilty of possession ofa controlled substance with intent to deliver (more than 1 grambut not more than 15 grams of a substance containing cocaine)(720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 1998)) and sentenced him as stated. This appeal followed.

Defendant first argues that the trial court erred bydenying his motion to suppress evidence because it was obtainedin an illegal seizure in violation of the fourth amendment of theUnited States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. IV). Specifically, he contends that (1) the court erred by finding thatHuckstep was performing a community-caretaking function duringtheir encounter, and (2) Huckstep did not have the degree ofsuspicion necessary to justify an investigatory detention underTerry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868(1968). We agree.

1. Standard of Review

When the facts are not in dispute, as in this case, wereview de novo a trial court's determination on a motion tosuppress evidence. People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 204-05, 718N.E.2d 1, 35 (1999).

2. Community-Caretaking Function

"[T]he community[-]caretaking function does not providean independent exception to the requirements of the fourthamendment. Instead, it is a moniker used to describe consensualencounters between the police and members of the public." Peoplev. Dale, 301 Ill. App. 3d 593, 600, 703 N.E.2d 927, 932 (1998). The community-caretaking function has been described as policeconduct that is "'"totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of acriminal statute."[Citation.]'" People v. Bailey, 314 Ill. App.3d 1059, 1062, 733 N.E.2d 891, 894 (2000). Even when a policeofficer begins a citizen encounter in his capacity as a communitycaretaker, the encounter can be characterized as a seizure if theofficer's conduct during the encounter exceeds the scope of acommunity-caretaking encounter. Bailey, 314 Ill. App. 3d at1062-64, 733 N.E.2d at 894-95 (Officers initially detained thedefendant inside a residence to prevent him from interfering withthe arrest of another; the State's community-caretaking functionargument, however, failed because the officers exceeded thelawful scope of the detention when they questioned defendantabout his own criminality).

In People v. Leifker, 307 Ill. App. 3d 25, 26, 716N.E.2d 1268, 1269 (1999), an officer initially stopped thedefendant, who was walking home on a rural road. The officerasked defendant some questions, wrote down the information, andtold the defendant he could go. After running a computer check,the officer learned that defendant had a prior arrest related todrug paraphernalia. He then stopped the defendant a second time,and the encounter led to the discovery of drug paraphernalia. The reviewing court held that the officer was performing acommunity-caretaking function during the first stop, but in thesecond encounter the officer "detained defendant for the purposeof detecting or acquiring evidence related to a possible criminaloffense, *** [without] possess[ing] beforehand the articulableand reasonable suspicion of criminal activity necessary for alawful Terry stop." Leifker, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 29, 716 N.E.2dat 1271.

Here, even though Huckstep testified that the locationand the "way [defendant] had been hanging, *** it was suspicious," Huckstep also admitted that he stopped defendant tosatisfy his desire to ascertain defendant's identity. He testified that he considered the stop to be a "voluntary contact," andthat, "as a police officer it's my job to get acquainted withpeople especially in the community[-]policing role. My job is toget out and deal with the public more." Huckstep further testified that he had seen defendant in the "last few days, but [had]never spoken to him before, so I wanted to get acquainted withhim." Huckstep's testimony was essentially that he was performing his community-caretaking function.

We find that Huckstep's encounter may have begun as acommunity-caretaking encounter; however, as in Leifker, we findthe encounter exceeded the scope of a community-caretakingencounter and escalated into a seizure. Huckstep may have merelysought an introduction when he approached defendant and asked himhis name. However, Huckstep's further questioning of defendant,after running a check for outstanding warrants on him, turned theencounter investigatory in nature thereby resulting in an investigative detention. Therefore, we find that the trial courterred in finding that Huckstep's contact with defendant was partof Huckstep's community-caretaking function.

This determination, however, does not end our analysis. We next must determine whether the circumstances here weresufficient to warrant an investigative Terry stop initially orsufficient after the initial inquiry. People v. Carlson, 307Ill. App. 3d 77, 81, 716 N.E.2d 1249, 1252 (1999) (the officerwas acting in his community-caretaker capacity when he tapped onthe window of a parked car on the side of the road, awakening thedriver. However, the odor of alcohol and the appearance of thedriver gave rise to articulable suspicion that the driver hadviolated the law); People v. Ciesler, 304 Ill. App. 3d 465, 471,710 N.E.2d 1270, 1275 (1999) (the officer was performing acommunity-caretaking role when she initially approached the cabof the truck to inquire whether the driver needed assistance;once she detected indicia of the driver's intoxication, she hadarticulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify furtherdetention).

2. Investigative Terry Stop

The protection afforded under the fourth amendmentbalances the public interest in controlling crime and effectivelaw enforcement with an individual's right to be free fromunreasonable search and seizure. United States v. Mendenhall,446 U.S. 544, 565, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 517, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1883(1980). Thus, a police officer may conduct a brief investigatorystop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicionthat criminal activity is afoot without violating the fourthamendment. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 145 L. Ed. 2d570, 576, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675 (2000).

"Courts have used a variety of terms tocapture the elusive concept of what cause issufficient to authorize police to stop aperson. Terms like 'articulable reasons' and'founded suspicion' are not self-defining;they fall short of providing clear guidancedispositive of the myriad factual situationsthat arise. But the essence of all that hasbeen written is that the totality of thecircumstances--the whole picture--must betaken into account. Based upon that wholepicture the detaining officers must have aparticularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped ofcriminal activity." United States v. Cortez,449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 628-29, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695 (1981).

This totality-of-the circumstances analysis involves variousobjective observations, and "the determination of reasonablesuspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferencesabout human behavior" (Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125, 145 L. Ed. 2d at577, 120 S. Ct. at 676).

Since the Supreme Court decided Terry, it has "relaxedthe standard announced therein and afforded officers greaterlatitude, particularly in drug cases, in an effort to providethem greater protection." People v. Rivera, 272 Ill. App. 3d502, 507, 650 N.E.2d 1084, 1088 (1995). The Supreme Court inWardlow recently considered whether a Terry stop was justified,and in doing so, examined whether, and to what degree, an individual's flight from police in a high-crime area gave rise to areasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at124-25, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 576-77, 120 S. Ct. at 676-77. Indeciding Wardlow, the Court spoke directly to two issues raisedby the facts of the present case--namely, to what degree areasonable suspicion can be based on (1) the neighborhood wherethe suspicious conduct occurred, and (2) the arguably innocentnature of the conduct itself. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124-26, 145L. Ed. 2d at 576-77, 120 S. Ct. at 676-77. Regarding the issueof to what degree a reasonable suspicion can be based on theneighborhood where the suspicious conduct, the Court wrote asfollows:

"An individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, isnot enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime. [Citation.] But officers arenot required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determiningwhether the circumstances are sufficientlysuspicious to warrant further investigation. Accordingly, we have previously noted thefact that the stop occurred in a 'high[-]crime area' among the relevant contextualconsiderations in a Terry analysis." Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, 145 L. Ed. 2d at576, 120 S. Ct. at 676.

Regarding the second issue of to what degree a reasonable suspicion can be based on the arguably innocent nature of the conductitself, the Court opined as follows:

"Respondent *** also argue[s] that thereare innocent reasons for flight from policeand that, therefore, flight is not necessarily indicative of ongoing criminal activity. This fact is undoubtedly true, but does notestablish a violation of the [f]ourth[a]mendment. Even in Terry, the conductjustifying the stop was ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation. The officer observed two individuals pacing back andforth in front of a store, peering into thewindow[,] and periodically conferring. [Citation.] All of this conduct was by itselflawful, but it also suggested that the individuals were casing the store for a plannedrobbery. Terry recognized that the officerscould detain the individuals to resolve theambiguity. [Citation.]

In allowing such detentions, Terry accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent people. Indeed, the [f]ourth [a]mend-ment accepts that risk in connection withmore drastic police action; persons arrestedand detained on probable cause to believethey have committed a crime may turn out tobe innocent. The Terry stop is a far moreminimal intrusion, simply allowing the officer to briefly investigate further. If theofficer does not learn facts rising to thelevel of probable cause, the individual mustbe allowed to go on his way." Wardlow, 528U.S. at 125-26, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 577, 120 S.Ct. at 677.

A Terry stop still requires that the officer be able topoint to specific and articulable facts which raise a reasonablesuspicion that the person stopped has committed or is about tocommit a crime. People v. Smithers, 83 Ill. 2d 430, 434, 415N.E.2d 327, 330 (1980); People v. Sparks, 315 Ill. App. 3d 786,792, 734 N.E.2d 216, 221 (2000). The Supreme Court of Illinoisrecently defined the reasonableness standard for police conductin the context of a Terry stop:

"'Viewed as a whole, the situation confronting the police officer must be so far fromthe ordinary that any competent officer wouldbe expected to act quickly. The facts supporting the officer's suspicions need notmeet probable cause requirements, but theymust justify more than a mere hunch. Thefacts should not be viewed with analyticalhindsight, but instead should be consideredfrom the perspective of a reasonable officerat the time that the situation confronted himor her.'" People v. Love, 199 Ill. 2d 269,276, ___ N.E.2d ___, ___ (2002), quotingPeople v. Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d 103, 110, 759N.E.2d 899, 903 (2001).

When viewed as a whole, the situation confronting Huckstep wasnot so far from the ordinary that Huckstep would be expected toact quickly. We conclude, therefore, that there was no basis fora Terry stop.

The articulable reasons Huckstep pointed to in supportof his stopping defendant were as follows: (1) he had observeddefendant's behavior for two to three days, (2) he had observeddefendant pacing the same two-block area for four to five hourseach day, and (3) he knew the area to be a high drug-traffickingarea. Huckstep also testified that the way the defendant "hadbeen [']hanging[']" and the location were suspicious. Huckstep,however, did not testify that he was suspicious of defendant. Rather, he testified that he had "seen him around there the lastfew days, *** never spoke to him before, so I wanted to getacquainted with him." Huckstep testified that it was his job toget acquainted with people "especially in the community[-]policing role." Based upon the totality of the circumstances--thewhole picture--in the present case, we find that Huckstep'sparticularized and objective bases for stopping were insufficientto justify a Terry stop. See People v. Harper, 237 Ill. App. 3d202, 205-06, 603 N.E.2d 115, 117 (1992) ("The facts known to theofficers simply did not establish an articulable basis to believethat a crime had been, or was about to be, committed. Theofficers merely observed defendant leave a car parked near thesubject premises, enter the building, remain for a short time,and leave. The officers did not observe any transactions withinthe building or hear any conversations. They did not know whatdefendant did while inside the building. They had not received areport of any crime or suspicious activity in the vicinity. Their decision to stop defendant was based on no more than ahunch that he might be involved in drug activity"); cf. Love, 199Ill. 2d at 277, ___ N.E.2d at ___ (Officer "had more than a merehunch; he had first-hand knowledge of sufficient facts to createa reasonable suspicion that the defendant was selling drugs" whenhe observed what appeared to be a drug transaction. During a 10-minute surveillance, through binoculars, the officer observeddefendant in front of an apartment building in a residentialarea. He saw a man approach a person on a bicycle and give thatperson some money. The person on the bicycle then directed theman toward the defendant. The officer observed defendant removean item from her mouth and handed it to that individual). In thepresent case, unlike Love, Huckstep did not observe anythingexcept defendant walking the same two-block area. Specifically,Huckstep observed defendant walking for approximately four tofive hours a day over the course of two to three days. Noevidence suggested that Huckstep observed defendant doing anything but walking during this period of time or that Huckstepobserved anyone approach defendant or that defendant was involvedin any transaction. Rather, Huckstep stated that he was notfamiliar with defendant. He had seen him in the area "the lastfew days, but I [had] never spoken to him before, so I wanted toget acquainted with him." Huckstep further stated that "it was[my] job to get acquainted with people especially in thecommunity[-]policing role. My job is to get out and deal withthe public more." Like Harper, we conclude that the facts knownto Huckstep simply did not establish an articulable basis tobelieve that a crime had been, or was about to be, committed.

Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that anythingoccurred as a result of Huckstep's initial inquiry with defendantthat gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that defendant was orhad been involved in criminal activity. Accordingly, we holdthat the trial court erred by denying defendant's motion tosuppress. Because we have concluded that the court should havesuppressed the only evidence of defendant's guilt, we reversedefendant's conviction and need not remand for further proceedings. People v. Fondia, 317 Ill. App. 3d 966, 972-73, 740 N.E.2d839, 844 (2000).

Last, defendant argues that this court should reversehis conviction because the only evidence that he possessed drugswas admitted under section 115-15 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/115-15(West 1998)), which the Supreme Court of Illinois declaredunconstitutional in McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d at 140, 729 N.E.2d at478. In light of our resolution of this case, we need notconsider defendant's other claim of error.

For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court'sjudgment.

Reversed.

MYERSCOUGH, J., with COOK, J., concurring.

STEIGMANN, J., dissenting.

JUSTICE STEIGMANN, dissenting:

Although I agree with much of the majority's analysis,I disagree with the result it reaches. In my judgment, whatoccurred in this case was a Terry stop that the circumstancesfully justified.

Clearly, an innocent person might simply walk back andforth along a two-block span for two or three days, four to fivehours per day, as defendant did here. However, in making adetermination of reasonable suspicion, the relevant inquiry isnot whether particular conduct is "innocent" or "guilty," but thedegree of suspicion that attaches to the noncriminal act in lightof existing circumstances, including an officer's knowledge ofthe neighborhood where the conduct occurred and particularpatterns of criminal behavior. See United States v. Sokolow, 490U.S. 1, 10, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 12, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1587 (1989). In this case, (1) Huckstep had observed defendant's behavior fortwo to three days; (2) he observed defendant pacing the same two-block area for four to five hours each day; and (3) Huckstep knewthe area to be a high drug-trafficking area. Viewing Huckstep'sobservations in light of his knowledge of the neighborhood andthe modes of behavior of drug dealers, an inference is clearlyreasonable that defendant had committed, was committing, or wasabout to commit a crime--specifically, trafficking in unlawfuldrugs. Accordingly, this court should hold that the trial courtdid not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress.

The majority seems to place great weight not only onHuckstep's observations of the situation he confronted, but alsohis conclusions concerning it. However, Huckstep's testimonyregarding his suspicions and intent seemed to change dependingupon who was questioning him. For instance, he agreed with theprosecutor that he stopped defendant merely to ascertain hisidentity, not for some other investigative function. Yet, lateron re-cross-examination, he testified about those aspects ofdefendant's conduct that struck him as suspicious.

The majority is correct that this case requires us todetermine whether the circumstances here (1) were sufficient towarrant an investigative Terry stop initially or (2) becamesufficient after Huckstep's initial inquiry. Slip op. at 10. The majority is also correct that a police officer may conduct abrief investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable,articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot withoutviolating the fourth amendment. Slip op. at 10-11. However, ananalysis of these factors requires a focus on the nature of thecircumstances confronting Huckstep, not on what conclusionsHuckstep drew from those circumstances. Despite the seeminginconsistences in Huckstep's testimony concerning why he did whathe did, there was no inconsistency or uncertainty about what hesaw, and, in my judgment, what he saw was sufficient to justify aTerry stop.

The need to focus a court's analysis on the factualcircumstances rather than the subjective conclusions drawn bypolice officers has been discussed in search and seizure casesaddressing whether probable cause to arrest existed in thosecases. For instance, in Buss, 187 Ill. 2d at 203, 718 N.E.2d at34, the supreme court reviewed a trial court's denial of thedefendant's motion to suppress evidence that the police seizedfrom him after searching his car allegedly with his consent. Thedefendant argued on appeal that his consent was the product of anillegal arrest and, therefore, involuntary. The supreme courtaffirmed the denial of defendant's motion to suppress and wrotethe following:

"We begin by addressing the legality ofdefendant's arrest. The circuit court foundthat defendant was not arrested until 12:30p.m. on August 10, at which time the policehad probable cause to arrest him. We mayaffirm the circuit court's ruling on defendant's motion to suppress for any reason inthe record, regardless of whether the circuitcourt expressed this reason as a basis forits conclusion. [Citation.] While we agreethat the police had probable cause to arrestdefendant, we find that probable cause existed before 12:30 p.m. on August 10. Ourreview of the record convinces us that policehad probable cause to arrest defendant whenthey met with him at the Wilmington Dam atapproximately 9 a.m. on August 10." Buss,187 Ill. 2d at 205, 718 N.E.2d at 35.

Interestingly, the two police officers (Sims andMitchell) primarily involved in the murder investigation of thedefendant in Buss did not believe they possessed sufficientevidence to arrest him at the Wilmington Dam at approximately 9a.m. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d at 209, 718 N.E.2d at 37. However, theofficers' legal conclusions did not trouble the supreme court:

"We also reject defendant's suggestionthat the State did not establish probablecause to arrest him because Sims and Mitchelltestified that they believed they did nothave sufficient evidence to arrest defendantat the Wilmington Dam. Probable cause is anobjective standard, and an officer's subjective belief as to the existence of probablecause is not determinative. [Citation.] Aswe have explained, the facts demonstrate thatpolice had probable cause to arrest defendantat the Wilmington Dam, and their subjectivebeliefs to the contrary do not alter thatconclusion." Buss, 187 Ill. 2d at 209, 718N.E.2d at 37.

The supreme court reaffirmed this point in People v.Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 218-19, 743 N.E.2d 48, 68-69 (2000),where the court wrote the following:

"As a final matter, we reject defendant's suggestion that the State did notestablish probable cause to arrest him because a police officer testified at the hearing that the police would not have been ableto obtain an arrest warrant before going todefendant's apartment. 'Probable cause is anobjective standard, and an officer's subjective belief as to the existence of probablecause is not determinative.' Buss, 187 Ill.2d at 209[, 718 N.E.2d at 37] (rejecting thedefendant's argument that the determinationof probable cause was affected by policeofficers' testimony that they did not believethat they had probable cause to arrest thedefendant). As we have discussed, the factsdemonstrate that the police had probablecause to arrest defendant, and a subjectivebelief to the contrary does not change thatconclusion."

Just as probable cause is an objective standard, so isthe standard governing when a reasonable, articulable suspicionexists to warrant a Terry stop. See People v. Chavez, 327 Ill.App. 3d 18, 31-32, 762 N.E.2d 553, 566 (2001) (An objectivestandard is used in determining whether the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of the stop wouldwarrant a person of reasonable caution to believe a Terry stopwas necessary). Indeed, it could hardly be otherwise, given thatthe existence of probable cause to arrest authorizes much moreintrusive police conduct, including a full custodial arrest, aswell as a thorough search incident to arrest.

Huckstep's uncontradicted testimony regarding hisobservations of defendant's conduct provided more than enoughevidence, when judged by an objective standard, to warrantHuckstep's making a Terry stop of defendant. That Huckstep (andthe trial court) may not have thought so does not matter, and themajority errs by placing weight on Huckstep's legal conclusions. The majority's doing so violates the supreme court's holdings onpoint in both Buss and Chapman.

For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent.