PRESIDING JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of thecourt:

After a March 2002 jury trial in the Macon Countycircuit court, defendant, James Ballard, was convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent todeliver with a prior unlawful-possession-of-a-controlled-substance-with-intent-to-deliver conviction. 720 ILCS 570/401(West 2000); 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(2)(D) (West 2000). In April2002, the trial court sentenced him to 15 years' imprisonment. Defendant appeals, contending (1) he was denied a fair trialbecause the State's expert witness testified falsely regardinghis own testimony in a prior drug case; (2) the State failed toprove he had the intent to deliver beyond a reasonable doubt; and(3) the trial court erred in not ruling on his motion in limine,prior to his testimony, as to whether his prior conviction forthe same offense could be used to impeach him. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On the evening of July 13, 2001, Decatur police officers executed a search warrant on defendant's apartment. Uponkicking down the door to the apartment, Sergeant Brian Bellentered the apartment and pursued defendant as he ran down thehallway to the bathroom. Once there, Sergeant Bell retrieved alarge plastic bag defendant was attempting to flush down thetoilet. Inside the plastic bag were 41 plastic Baggie cornerscontaining a chunky, yellowish rock substance.

Prior to trial, defendant unsuccessfully challenged theexecution of the search warrant. He also filed a motion inlimine asking that the State be precluded from introducing his1994 conviction for possession with intent to deliver cocaine,citing prejudicial impact. Defendant renewed his motion duringtrial, arguing the outcome of the motion would impact his decision on whether to testify. The trial court refused to rule onthe motion in advance of defendant testifying, stating the motionwas premature.

Trial in this matter began on March 7, 2002. Decaturpolice officer Chad Ramey testified he conducted surveillance ondefendant and his apartment prior to execution of the searchwarrant. Shortly before execution of the search warrant, defendant left his apartment, went to another apartment, and returned. Officer Ramey also participated in searching defendant's apartment in execution of the warrant. Defendant told him he lived inthe apartment, although Officer Ramey found the usual indicatorsof occupancy were missing. There was Kool-Aid in the refrigerator but no food. There was no bread or other food items found inthe apartment. Two boxes of plastic sandwich bags were found onthe kitchen table. One box was empty, and the other was aboutthree-quarters full. There were few plates and cups in thekitchen. The living room had two couches, a large screen television, multiple DVD (digital video disc) players, and a largestereo system and speakers. Next to one of the couches was apolice scanner. Defendant was unemployed but recently purchasedan automobile. Officer Ramey found no devices that could be usedto smoke crack cocaine.

Mike Cravens, an analyst for the Illinois State Policecrime lab, testified he tested the contents of 18 of the 41Baggies and found them to contain cocaine. The aggregate weightof the 18 rocks of cocaine was 5.1 grams. Individually, theyranged in size from 0.194 grams to 0.359 grams. Cravens visuallyinspected the contents of the remaining 23 Baggies and found themto be similar in size and appearance to the 18 rocks of cocaine. The gross weight of the 23 remaining Baggies and their contentswas 8.6 grams. Cravens did not test the contents of the remaining 23 Baggies because the penalty classifications were the samewhether defendant possessed 5 grams or 13 grams of cocaine.

Edward Root, a Decatur police officer with 13 years ofservice as an agent with the Illinois State Police Task Force X,a drug enforcement unit, testified as an expert on illegal druguse and distribution. Root testified to many hours of trainingand many years of experience, including testifying as an expertin more than 50 cases in Macon County and more than 10 cases infederal court.

Officer Root testified a typical dosage unit of crackcocaine was 0.2 grams and cost approximately $20 on the street. Therefore, the street value of the 18 packets of crack cocainewould be approximately $360. Without objection, Root stated all41 packets had the color, texture, and method of packagingconsistent with crack cocaine. While Root testified a crackaddict could go through multiple dosage units in a short time, hewas not sure an addict could consume that much crack cocaine intwo days. The physical effects of crack cocaine last from 20 to60 minutes. A heavy user of crack cocaine would purchase thedrug in bulk packaging and not in multiple small packages toobtain a price break. Root had never encountered an individualwho purchased 18 individually packaged units solely for personaluse.

Root stated the absence of smoking paraphernalia was anindicia of intent to deliver, although he acknowledged crackcocaine can be smoked through a variety of small household items. He stated in many instances drug dealers do not keep records,scales, cash, cellular phones, pagers, or cutting agents, although these can all be indicia of intent to deliver. In addition, many times crack cocaine is packaged at one location andsold at another. When dealers have recently obtained a newsupply of drugs to sell, they will have little to no cash.

Root gave his opinion that the amount and manner ofpackaging of the crack cocaine in defendant's possession as wellas the absence of smoking paraphernalia were consistent withintent to deliver rather than personal use.

Defense witnesses were Clarence Ballard, defendant'sbrother, and Theresa Hardy, defendant's sister. Both testifiedto defendant's addiction to crack cocaine and, especially,defendant's capacity and inclination for prodigious personalconsumption of crack cocaine.

Clarence testified, before he changed his life, he anddefendant would smoke "anything we could get our hands on." Clarence stated a crack cocaine addict was never sated. Anaddict always wants more. He stated defendant would consume 18dosage units in half an hour. He also stated he and defendantwould sometimes obtain crack cocaine in individually wrappedpackages if that was all they could find but agreed with Root itwas cheaper, and therefore, more preferable, to obtain crackcocaine in bulk.

Hardy, although not a user herself, testified she hadseen defendant smoke crack cocaine on numerous occasions, up to 3 1/2 hours straight. He would use a small metal car antenna asa pipe.

After defendant's motion in limine was denied, hedeclined to testify, citing the trial court's decision to deferruling on the motion until after his testimony as the decidingfactor.

Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlledsubstance with intent to deliver (between 5 and 15 grams) with aprior conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, a Class 1 felony. He filed aposttrial motion, which the trial court denied, and the courtsentenced him to 15 years' imprisonment. His motion to reducesentence was also denied, and this appeal followed.

II. ALLEGED FALSE TESTIMONY BY STATE'S EXPERT WITNESS

Defendant contends Root testified falsely when hestated he had testified in a prior case the evidence in that casewas consistent with personal use and not intent to deliver.

After Root gave his opinion that the amount and manner of packaging crack cocaine in this case were consistent with intent todeliver rather than personal use, defense counsel asked Root ifhe had ever testified as an expert on drug distribution and foundthe circumstances were consistent with mere personal use asopposed to intent to distribute. Root cited his testimony in oneprior case:

"Q. Isn't it true in [sic] each andevery time that you testified as an expertwitness, your opinion has always been thesame, and you have testified under oath everytime that the amount of drugs that you arepresented with in the case is consistent withdistribution as opposed to personal use?

A. That would be incorrect.

Q. Can you cite the case?

A. Rafael Kennedy. Possession of heroin. I testified that the amount he possessed was consistent with personal use.

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Q. And the charge in that case was possession with intent to deliver?

A. Yes. He had--[w]as--[h]e was charged with possession of heroin; also, possession of, I believe, methadone.

Q. What about the methadone? Did you express a contrary opinion with respect to the methadone?

A. I want to say that that wasn't allowed in the testimony. I believe there was an objection to that. I don't think I was able to testify to that.

Q. So there was one case out of howevermany you said wherein the only opinion youexpressed was that the amount of heroin thatthat particular individual possessed or allegedly possessed was consistent or moreconsistent with personal use as opposed todistribution?

A. That's the one that I can recall."

This issue was not raised in the trial court but raisedfor the first time on appeal. Appellate counsel in the presentcase was also the appellate counsel in the case cited by Root. The record has been supplemented with the transcript of Root'stestimony in People v. Rafael Kennedy, Macon County case No. 98-CF-1743. Root testified in that case on May 24, 2000. He wasasked to give his opinion as to whether the heroin was forpersonal consumption or for distribution:

"Q. Based upon your training and yourexperience[,] [p]eople's [e]xhibit [No.] 1 inand of itself, do you have an opinion justfrom that exhibit whether that is consist[sic] at any time with possession for personal use or possession with intent to deliver?

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A. With regards to [e]xhibit [n]umber1, the presence of [10] individually packagedunits would lead me [***] it is an amount todistribute.

Q. What factors do you base that opinion?

A. The fact that they are individuallypackaged rather than one package, plus thepresence of packaging materials, which werefound in the residence."

As for his testimony regarding methadone, Root stated:

"A. I haven't had a lot [sic] experience in it. I know that there is somewhat ofan [underground] network through interviewingseveral people who have used heroin who havebeen going through [m]ethadone treatment. Itis common for them to sometimes get rid oftheir [m]ethadone in exchange of [sic] otherdrugs.

Q. But you don't sell [m]ethadone?

A. I have never encountered anybody who actually sold [m]ethadone, no.

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Q. You indicated that you don't know ofpeople who sell [m]ethadone for cash, but youknow people who trade [m]ethadone for what,heroin?

A. Yes, well[,] and some do it for crack.

Q. So those people deliver that[m]ethadone to the people, they obtain thecontrolled the other controlled substancefrom?

A. Yes.

Q. And before they deliver it, theywouldpossess it with intent to deliverwouldn't they? The [m]ethadone?

A. Yes.

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Q. Who would possess with intent todeliver? The people that are selling it ortrading it with the dealer?

A. The person who is going to the[m]ethadone treatment receives the[m]ethadone from the clinic. They, peopleinvolved in this, will take it to the personwho they are trading it for drugs with.

Q. But not the dealer. The dealerwould just be buying it for himself. Is thatcorrect?

A. I have never interviewed anybodythat has it for resale."

Based on this testimony, defendant asserts Roottestified falsely concerning whether he had ever testified anamount of drugs was consistent with personal use. He claims theeffect of this testimony was to establish his record as anobjective and balanced authority, and defendant equates thistestimony with the falsifying of credentials by expert witnessesin other cases.

In People v. Cornille, 95 Ill. 2d 497, 514, 448 N.E.2d857, 866 (1983), our supreme court concluded once a defendantestablishes the condemned use of false testimony, he is entitledto a new trial unless the State can establish beyond a reasonabledoubt the false testimony was immaterial in that it did notcontribute to the defendant's conviction. Defendant contends theState cannot establish beyond a reasonable doubt its use of falsetestimony was immaterial in that it did not contribute to hisconviction because even though the false testimony went only tothe issue of credibility, it may constitute reversible error. See Cornille, 95 Ill. 2d at 514, 448 N.E.2d at 866.

In Cornille, 95 Ill. 2d at 506, 448 N.E.2d at 859, anexpert witness clearly and knowingly lied about hisqualifications and academic credentials. The case turned on thesharply divergent testimony of expert witnesses. The Staterepeatedly emphasized the credentials, experience, andprofessional reputation of its expert. The supreme court notonly concluded the expert's false testimony was crucial, but alsofaulted the State for failing to take the simple step to verifythe expert's qualifications. Cornille, 95 Ill. 2d at 514, 448N.E.2d at 865-66. The State here vouched for Root's credentials,but it was not in a position to guarantee he would remember withaccuracy all his previous service as an expert.

Root may have mistakenly recalled his testimony from atrial held almost two years earlier. This inaccurate testimonywas in response to cross-examination. It was not offered oranticipated by the State. Root may have been surprised to beasked if he had ever testified as an expert and found thecircumstances of drug possession were consistent with merepersonal use as opposed to intent to distribute. As a policeofficer and expert tendered by the State, it is expected he wouldonly testify to an opinion supporting the State's theory of thecase or the State would not call him as a witness.

Root's mistake did not constitute the kind of condemnedperjured testimony as given by the expert in Cornille. Nothinghere shows Root knew his testimony to be untrue or intended tomislead the jury. The jury was not given a false impression. Defense counsel was able to use the same strategy to attack Root. Defense counsel argued there was only one case in all the timesRoot had testified where his opinion was that the accused'spossession was not for distribution; thus, he argued Root lackedobjectivity. Counsel then argued the opinion offered by ClarenceBallard, who admitted using crack with defendant in the past, wasmore credible.

We agree Root's testimony on that single point was notaccurate, but Clarence confirmed most of what Root told the jury. Clarence stated he and defendant would attempt to buy crack in a"big chunk" because it was cheaper and dealers mostly soldindividually packaged rocks. Further, Theresa Hardy, defendant'ssister, testified defendant would smoke crack in a two-inch pipeconstructed from a metal car antenna, but officers found no suchdevice in the apartment. This testimony, combined with theamount of crack, the presence of a police scanner and high-pricedelectronic equipment when defendant was unemployed (equipment hemight sell to buy more crack if he were just an addict), and theabsence of typical signs of residency in the apartment permit thestrong inference defendant possessed crack cocaine with intent todeliver.

It was unwise for Officer Root to attempt to countercross-examination by offering up a specific case and a specificdefendant to show he had once testified drug possession undercertain circumstances was consistent with personal use as opposedto intent to distribute. His faulty or inaccuratememory--perhaps associated with testimony regarding methadone inthat remembered case--injected an issue for defendant to use onappeal. However, on this record, we conclude the inaccuraterecollection did not contribute to the jury's decision.

III. PROOF OF INTENT TO DELIVER BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT

Defendant contends the State failed to prove his intentto deliver beyond a reasonable doubt. The standard of review iswhether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorableto the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have foundthe essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Schott, 145 Ill. 2d 188, 203, 582 N.E.2d 690, 697(1991). Direct evidence of intent to deliver controlledsubstances is rare, and the intent must usually be proven bycircumstantial evidence. People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 397,408, 657 N.E.2d 1020, 1026 (1995). The issue to be resolved inthis case is whether, after viewing the evidence in the lightmost favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of factcould have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt defendant intendedto deliver the cocaine that was in his possession. See Robinson,167 Ill. 2d at 407, 657 N.E.2d at 1026.

The three elements of intent to deliver are (1) thedefendant had knowledge of the presence of the controlledsubstance, (2) the controlled substance was in the immediatepossession or control of the defendant, and (3) the defendantintended to deliver the controlled substance. 720 ILCS 570/401(West 2000); Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 407, 657 N.E.2d at 1026;People v. Johnson, 334 Ill. App. 3d 666, 677, 778 N.E.2d 772,781-82 (2002).

The following factors have been considered by courts asprobative of intent to deliver: (1) whether the quantity ofcontrolled substance is too large to be viewed as being forpersonal consumption; (2) high purity of drug confiscated; (3)possession of weapons; (4) possession of large amounts of cash;(5) possession of police scanners, beepers, or cellular phones;(6) possession of drug paraphernalia; and (7) the manner in whichsubstance is packaged. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 408, 657 N.E.2dat 1026-27. Whether the inference of intent is sufficientlyraised is determined on a case-by-case basis (Robinson, 167 Ill.2d at 412-13, 657 N.E.2d at 1029); thus, the enumerated factorsare not exclusive.

The quantity of a controlled substance alone can besufficient evidence to prove intent to deliver beyond areasonable doubt where the amount of the controlled substancecould not reasonably be viewed as designed for personalconsumption. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 410-11, 657 N.E.2d at1028. Further, under the appropriate circumstances, thepackaging of a controlled substance, alone, may be sufficientevidence of intent to deliver. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 414, 657N.E.2d at 1029. The standard often cited to meet "the minimumfloor of evidence" necessary to establish an intent to deliver is"drugs packaged for sale and any one additional factor tending toshow intent to deliver." (Emphasis in original.) People v.Beverly, 278 Ill. App. 3d 794, 802, 663 N.E.2d 1061, 1067 (1996).

Defendant contends in this case he possessed only 18rocks of cocaine weighing 5.1 grams. He notes the absence ofother indicia of intent to deliver: currency, weapons, discardedBaggie corners, drug paraphernalia, pagers, beepers, cellularphones, or scales. He points to the testimony of his brotherClarence that he was a heavy user of crack cocaine and could haveconsumed such an amount personally in a short period of time. However, Clarence also testified that because he and defendantwere heavy users, they usually purchased cocaine in large bulkrather than individually packaged doses to obtain favorablepricing.

However, only one factor indicating intent to deliveris needed in addition to the drugs packaged for delivery. Thiscase involved more than 18 individually packaged units. Althoughonly 18 were tested, the remaining 23 looked exactly like the 18which were proved to contain crack cocaine. Where additionaluntested packets, similar in size and appearance to packets thattested positive for cocaine, are found in the same bag, they canbe viewed as probative of intent to deliver. See Robinson, 167Ill. 2d at 410, 657 N.E.2d at 1027. Thus, the quantity of theindividually packaged units in this case indicated an intent todeliver.

Other evidence included the absence of the normalaccoutrements of residency in an apartment; no food but two boxesof plastic sandwich bags, the corners of which are commonly usedto package rocks of crack cocaine; and a police scanner. One boxof the sandwich bags was empty, and the other about three-quarters full. Officer Ramey testified he found a policescanner, although he did not take it into evidence, and he knewthe difference between a police scanner and a citizens band (CB)radio. Clarence, an admitted cocaine addict, testified defendanthad only a CB radio. The jury was entitled to believe OfficerRamey over Clarence.

No cash was found on defendant, but Officer Rameytestified defendant left the apartment, drove to anotherapartment, and returned 10 minutes before the search warrant wasexecuted. Officer Root testified dealers would not have cash onhand if they had just purchased a supply of drugs to sell andcocaine is sometimes packaged and sold at separate locations.

Although unemployed, defendant had recently purchasedan automobile and was in possession of a 60-inch color TV,several DVD players, and a large stereo system. AlthoughClarence and Theresa testified defendant was a crack user,without another source of income, defendant might well have tosell cocaine to buy for his own use or sell his possessions suchas the car, TV, DVD players, and stereo.

Taken in the light most favorable to the State, intentto deliver cocaine was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

IV. MOTION IN LIMINE

Defendant filed a motion in limine prior to trial. Hecontends the trial court erred in declining his request for aruling, prior to his testimony, as to whether his 1994 convictionfor possession with intent to deliver could be used to impeachhim in this trial for the same offense. Prior felony convictionswithin 10 years of the current offense are available to impeach adefendant's credibility only where the trial court conducts abalancing test and determines the probative value outweighs theprejudicial effect. People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 516-19, 268 N.E.2d 695, 698-700 (1971). Because the trial courtrefused to engage in the Montgomery balancing test until he hadtestified and the State offered certified copies of his priorconviction for impeachment purposes, defendant contends he optednot to testify and now contends the refusal of the trial courtacted as an unfair deterrent on his right to testify.

The United States Supreme Court has held a defendantwho does not testify at trial is not entitled to appellate reviewof a trial court's ruling denying a motion in limine seeking toforbid the use of prior convictions for impeachment purposesbecause the argument of possible harm from the ruling on themotion is wholly speculative. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S.38, 41, 83 L. Ed. 2d 443, 447, 105 S. Ct. 460, 463 (1984). Areviewing court cannot assume an adverse ruling on the motionmotivated the defendant to refrain from testifying. Luce, 469U.S. at 41-42, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 448, 105 S. Ct. at 463-64. Thereasoning of Luce has been adopted by many other courts,including those in People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d 148, 193, 641N.E.2d 371, 392 (1994), and People v. Helton, 195 Ill. App. 3d410, 419, 552 N.E.2d 398, 404-05 (1990).

The same reasoning could apply where a trial court hasnot made a ruling on the motion in limine. While defendantcontends the trial court's refusal to rule on the motion was themotivating factor behind his reason for not testifying, the harmcaused by the refusal to rule is speculative as a defendant'sdecision not to testify is seldom based on only one factor. Itis impossible for a reviewing court to determine if the error washarmless without benefit of a defendant's testimony. Luce, 469U.S. at 42, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 448, 105 S. Ct. at 463-64.

The trial court in this case specifically observed ithad no way of knowing what the substance of defendant's testimonywould have been, and therefore, it could not apply the balancingtest required under Montgomery. Likewise, we also refuse toguess at what defendant's testimony might have been, andtherefore, we find the court's refusal to rule on the motion wasnot error.

Further, we note our prior decision in People v. Owen,299 Ill. App. 3d 818, 701 N.E.2d 1174 (1998), where we held atrial court is not obligated to consider a motion in limine onthe merits at all. Owen, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 822, 701 N.E.2d at1177. A trial court need not make a preliminary ruling on theadmissibility of a defendant's prior convictions to impeach himbefore they become at issue, and they become at issue only after(1) a defendant has testified, and (2) the State seeks tointroduce his prior convictions for impeachment purposes in itsrebuttal case. Owen, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 824-25, 701 N.E.2d at1179.

Defendant asks us to reconsider our decision in Owendue to the chilling effect that withholding the Montgomerybalancing test until after a defendant has testified has on adefendant's right to testify in his own defense. Failing that,he attempts to distinguish Owen by noting in that case, the trialcourt refused to rule on the defendant's motion because it wasuntimely as it was filed after the last date for filing ofpretrial motions. Owen, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 820-21, 701 N.E.2dat 1176. In this case, the motion was timely filed on November27, 2001, and called for hearing on March 7, 2002, immediatelyprior to opening statements in the trial. In addition, herenewed his motion after both of his defense witnesses hadtestified, and it was clear his strategy was to essentially admitto possession of cocaine but deny any intent to deliver. As theState notes, however, defendant entered a not guilty plea to allcharges against him, including those solely for possession, andit is impossible to be certain how defendant would havetestified.

As we noted in Owen, our decision was not based on thefact that the trial court refused to rule on defendant's motionas not timely filed.

"[A] court is fully justified to exercise itsdiscretion by telling the moving party that--for whatever reason--the court chooses not toentertain the party's motion in limine andinstead will require the evidence inquestion, if it is to be offered at all, tobe presented in the normal course of thingsduring trial. The court will then make itsruling upon the evidentiary question at issuewhen the matter has become ripe, assuming itever does.

We so hold because, if the court must'balance the prejudice that might be avoidedif it grants the motion against thecomplication or inconvenience that wouldresult if the motion is denied' (Rush [v.Hamdy], 255 Ill. App. 3d [352], 365, 627N.E.2d [1119], 1127 [(1993]), a court mighteasily conclude that the best way to ensure acorrect ruling on a complicated evidentiaryissue is to wait for that issue to becomeripe at trial. Then the court would nolonger need speculate about what the trialevidence might be; instead, the court hasalready heard that evidence, and the contextin which to decide the evidentiary issue hasbecome clear." (Emphases in original.) Owen, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 823-24, 701 N.E.2dat 1178.

While we decline to overrule our decision in Owen, wequestion the trial court's refusal in this case to rule ondefendant's motion in limine. Defendant's motion was addressedto an eight-year-old conviction for possession with intent todeliver. The prejudicial effect of the use of that convictionfor impeachment is obvious. As we noted, it was also defendant'sstrategy to admit possession but deny any intent to deliver. What more did the trial court need to know, particularly afterdefense witnesses testified? Our language in Owen regarding acomplicated evidentiary issue and waiting for the issue to becomeripe hardly seems applicable in this case. We conclude the courtshould have ruled and then defendant could meaningfully considerwhether to exercise his right to testify. Nonetheless, weconclude it was not error for the trial court to refuse to ruleon defendant's motion prior to his testifying.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

Affirmed.

COOK and MYERSCOUGH, JJ., concur.