People v. Barner

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People v. Barner

State: Illinois

Court: 4th District Appellate

Docket No: 4-07-0545 Rel

Case Date: 06/27/2008

Preview:Filed 6/27/08 NO. 4-07-0545 IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHADWICK N. BARNER, Defendant-Appellant. ) Appeal from ) Circuit Court of ) McLean County ) No. 06CF848 ) ) Honorable ) Kevin P. Fitzgerald, ) Judge Presiding. _________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court: In December 2006, a jury convicted defendant, Chadwick N. Barner, of financial institution robbery (720 ILCS 5/16H-40 (West 2004)), a Class 1 felony. In April 2007, the trial court On appeal,

sentenced defendant to 12 1/2 years' imprisonment.

defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to convict him of financial institution robbery because, although he concedes the robbery, the State failed to prove he took the money by force, threat of force, or intimidation, as required by the statute. We affirm. I. BACKGROUND Defendant acknowledges he committed the robbery but argues no evidence showed he used intimidation during the commission of the robbery of the financial institution as required by statute.

The bill of indictment, filed on August 30, 2006, alleged defendant committed financial institution robbery "in that he knowingly and by threat of force or intimidation took money in the custody, control, care, management[,] or possession of Illini Bank, a financial institution." At defendant's December 2006 jury trial, Cynthia Scott testified she was employed with Illini Bank in Danvers, Illinois, as a teller on July 19, 2006. Around noon on that date, an This person was wearing

unusual looking person entered the bank. a black wig, sunglasses, and a dress.

The person's face and neck The

were painted black, and he had tissue stuffed up his nose. person was carrying a large black purse.

As stated, defendant

acknowledges he was this person who robbed the bank. Defendant told Scott to "[g]ive me the money." Scott

was "scared," but gave defendant the money from her drawer. Defendant, in a calm but firm tone, again stated "[g]ive me the money." Scott took this to be an "order." Scott opened up

somebody else's drawer, grabbed some money, and put it on the counter. Defendant put the money in the purse and ran away. The

experience left Scott feeling "traumatized, scared." Photographs of the incident show that defendant had his left hand behind the purse while he approached the teller's counter. The purse was large enough to conceal a weapon. The jury convicted defendant, and the trial court - 2 -

sentenced him as stated. This appeal followed. II. ANALYSIS Defendant contends the facts are undisputed and thus the appropriate standard of review is de novo. The State argues

the parties dispute what facts can be reasonably inferred from the trial evidence; and thus the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. the State. We agree with

However, insofar as we are a called upon to interpret

the financial-institution-robbery statute, which is a question of law, we review that issue de novo. See People v. Brooks, 221

Ill. 2d 381, 388, 851 N.E.2d 59, 62 (2006). As stated, the State charged defendant with financial institution robbery. "A person commits the offense of financial institution robbery when the person, by force or threat of force, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take, from the person or presence of another, or obtains or attempts to obtain by extortion, any property or money or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, - 3 -

control, management, or possession of, a financial institution." (West 2006). It is undisputed defendant did not use force or explicitly threaten the use of force. defendant used intimidation. The financial-institution-robbery statute does not define "intimidation." this issue. Neither do any Illinois decisions address The issue here is whether 720 ILCS 5/16H-40

As a result, defendant urges this court to construe

the financial-institution-robbery statute with the intimidation statute (720 ILCS 5/12-6 (West 2004)). "Under the doctrine of in pari materia, two statutes dealing with the same subject will be considered with reference to one another to give them harmonious effect. [Citation.] The doctrine is also applicable

to different sections of the same statute, and is consistent with the fundamental rule of statutory interpretation that all the provisions of a statute must be viewed as a whole. [Citation.]" People v. McCarty, 223

Ill. 2d 109, 133-34, 858 N.E.2d 15, 31 (2006). We conclude it would not be proper to read the - 4 -

financial-institution-robbery statute in para materia with the intimidation statute as they do not concern the same subject. "The purpose of the intimidation statute is to prohibit the making of threats intended to compel a person to act against his will, and the gist of the offense is the exercise of improper influence--the making of a threat with the intent to coerce another." People v. Peterson, 306 Ill. App. 3d 1091, 1099-1100,

715 N.E.2d 1221, 1227 (1999); see also People v. Verkruysse, 261 Ill. App. 3d 972, 975, 639 N.E.2d 881, 883 (1994) ("'gravamen of the offense [of intimidation] is improper influence on another.' (People v. Tennin (1987), 162 Ill. App. 3d 520, 525, 515 N.E.2d 1056[, 1059].)"). The legislature has declared the financial-

institution-robbery statute concerns the subject of financial crime. See 720 ILCS 5/16H-5 (West 2004). Moreover, "[s]tatutes should be construed, if possible, so that no term is rendered superfluous or meaningless." Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 397, 634 N.E.2d 712, 715 (1994). If we read the term

"intimidation," as used in the financial-institution-robbery statute, to require a threat as defendant urges, it would be redundant, as the statute states "[a] person commits the offense of financial institution robbery when the person, by force or threat of force, or by intimidation." 2004). 720 ILCS 5/16H-40 (West

Because the statute talks about force or the threat of - 5 -

force in addition to intimidation, the term "intimidation" must mean something other than force or the threat of force. Instead, we look elsewhere to help us construe the financial-institution-robbery statute. The legislative history

shows this statute was "modeled very tightly after existing federal and State statutes." 93d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate

Proceedings, April 4, 2003, at 44-45 (statements of Senator Cullerton). The bill created financial crimes that "have been 93d

traditionally under the purview of the Federal Government." Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 14, 2003, at 164-65 (statements of Representative O'Brien).

The federal bank-robbery

statute (18 U.S.C.

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