JUSTICE TURNER delivered the opinion of the court:

In November 2001, the State charged defendant, AlonzoBass, with one count of driving while under the influence of alcohol(DUI) and one count of driving with a blood-alcohol concentration of0.08 or greater. In June 2002, a jury found defendant guilty ofdriving with a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.08 or greater. InAugust 2002, the trial court denied defendant's posttrial motion andsentenced him to 24 months' conditional discharge. The court alsoordered him to pay $500 in court-appointed attorney fees.

On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred in (1)allowing the results of the preliminary breath test (PBT) to beadmitted in evidence by the State on rebuttal and (2) ordering him topay $500 for the services of his court-appointed counsel. We affirmdefendant's conviction, vacate the order directing him to pay forcourt-appointed counsel, and remand with directions.

I. BACKGROUND

In November 2001, the State charged defendant by information with one count of DUI (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2000)) andone count of driving with a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.08 orgreater (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1) (West 2000)). Defendant pleaded notguilty.

In June 2002, the State withdrew the DUI charge, and thecase proceeded to a jury trial on the remaining count. TroyPhillips, an officer with the Illinois State Police, testified he wason patrol on March 11, 2001. At approximately 1:30 a.m., he stoppeda car, driven by defendant, for speeding. Defendant indicated he wascoming from the "Grove Street," which Officer Phillips believed was aRantoul tavern. When asked if he had been drinking, defendant statedhe had two beers. Officer Phillips described defendant as having"glassy, bloodshot eyes," "a very strong odor of alcohol on and abouthis person," and slurred speech. Defendant agreed to participate infield-sobriety tests, and Officer Phillips administered thehorizontal gaze nystagmus test, the walk-and-turn test, and the one-legged stand test. Based on defendant's performance on the tests,Officer Phillips believed he was under the influence of alcohol andplaced him under arrest.

Upon searching defendant's vehicle, Officer Phillipslocated "an open bottle of Paul Mason Brandy under the passengerseat." Phillips noticed a "small amount" of brandy inside the bottlethat was "cool to the touch." Once at the jail, Phillips read thestatutory "warning to motorist" to defendant and asked him to take abreath test. Defendant agreed to do so and Phillips observed him forover a 20-minute period. Thereafter, Phillips used the IntoximeterECIR to administer the breath test.

Richard Bright, a breath-analysis equipment technicianwith the State Police, testified he is required to test breath-testequipment once within every 62-day period for its accuracy. Hestated he checked and certified the accuracy of the machine used inthis case on March 9, 2001.

The trial court read a stipulation, stating that afterdefendant "submitted to a breath sample on March 11 of 2001, at 3:09a.m., the ECIR breath instrument indicated that the [d]efendant'sblood[-]alcohol concentration was [0].106." The State then restedits case.

Defendant testified he and Jimmy Brooks went to the GroveStreet Tavern in the late evening of March 10 and the early morningof March 11, 2001. Defendant testified he may have had "a soda" butnothing alcoholic to drink because he had been sick with the stomachflu and was still taking medicine for it. After being stopped by thepolice, defendant "walked normal" during the field-sobriety tests andwas not swaying or having trouble maintaining his balance. Whenasked on cross-examination if he told Officer Phillips he had twobeers that evening, defendant stated, "No, I did not. I wouldn't dothat, if I had. That just convicted myself."

Jimmy Brooks testified defendant did not have anyalcoholic beverages at Grove Street but just had a Pepsi. Brooksstated he never had any brandy that evening and did not see anybottles in defendant's car.

Over defense counsel's objections, the trial court allowedthe State to use the results from the PBT for impeachment purposesduring rebuttal. Officer Phillips testified he read the Mirandawarnings (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86S. Ct. 1602 (1966)) to defendant, and defendant told the officer hehad two beers that evening. Officer Phillips testified to histraining in administering portable breath tests on devices approvedby the State Police. He had defendant submit to a PBT prior toplacing him under arrest, which resulted in a reading of 0.120.

Following closing arguments, the jury found defendantguilty of driving with a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.08 orgreater. In July 2002, defendant filed a motion for new trial,arguing the trial court erred in, inter alia, permitting the State'suse of the PBT results in rebuttal and admitting the testimonywithout a proper foundation. In August 2002, the court denied themotion. Thereafter, the court sentenced defendant to 24 months'conditional discharge, imposed a $200 fine, and ordered him toperform 200 hours of public-service work. The court called for ahearing on court-appointed attorney fees, and defendant stated he wascurrently working at Thomas Paine School and earning about $1,100 permonth. The court assessed a $500 court-appointed attorney fee to bepaid within 22 months. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Preliminary Breath-Test Results as Impeachment in Rebuttal

Defendant argues the trial court erred in allowing theresults of the PBT to be admitted into evidence by the State onrebuttal to impeach his testimony. We agree.

Section 11-501.5 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (VehicleCode) states, in part, as follows:

"(a) If a law[-]enforcement officer hasreasonable suspicion to believe that a personis violating or has violated [s]ection 11-501or a similar provision of a local ordinance,the officer, prior to an arrest, may requestthe person to provide a sample of his or herbreath for a preliminary breath[-]screeningtest using a portable device approved by theDepartment of State Police. The person mayrefuse the test. The results of thispreliminary breath[-]screening test may be usedby the law[-]enforcement officer for thepurpose of assisting with the determination ofwhether to require a chemical test asauthorized under [s]ections 11-501.1 and 11-501.2, and the appropriate type of test torequest. Any chemical test authorized under[s]ections 11-501.1 and 11-501.2 may berequested by the officer regardless of theresult of the preliminary breath[-]screeningtest, if probable cause for an arrest exists. The result of a preliminary breath[-]screeningtest may be used by the defendant as evidencein any administrative or court proceedinginvolving a violation of [s]ection 11-501 or11-501.1." 625 ILCS 5/11-501.5(a) (West 2000).

In People v. Rose, 268 Ill. App. 3d 174, 176, 643 N.E.2d865, 867 (1994), this court had to decide whether PBT results wereadmissible by the State in a criminal proceeding during the State'scase in chief. In looking at section 11-501.5 of the Vehicle Code,the court stated, in part, as follows:

"The language of section 11-501.5 isunclear because it fails to declare whether theState may admit the results of a PBT in acriminal proceeding. Section 11-501.5 allowsthe State to use PBT results to determinewhether further chemical testing is justified,but the section is silent on whether the Statemay use PBT results to prove intoxication. Inaddition, section 11-501.5 specifies adefendant may use the results of a PBT ineither an administrative or a court proceeding,but is silent on whether the State maysimilarly use the results of a PBT." (Emphasisin original.) Rose, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 178,643 N.E.2d at 868.

In looking at legislative intent, the court found the primary purposeof section 11-501.5 is "to aid police officers in assessing probablecause to arrest." Rose, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 180, 643 N.E.2d at 869. Although the statutory language would appear to allow the PBT resultsto be admitted to establish probable cause at the time of arrest(Rose, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 180, 643 N.E.2d at 870), "PBT results arenot admissible by the State during its case in chief in a criminalproceeding involving a DUI charge" (Rose, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 181,643 N.E.2d at 870). The court expressed no opinion whether PBTresults are admissible by the State to rebut testimony by the defensethat the defendant was not intoxicated at the time of arrest or wherethe State is attempting to impeach the defendant's testimony he wasnot intoxicated at the time of arrest, or if Department of PublicHealth regulations were such that a PBT could meet the foundationalrequirements of section 11-501.2 of the Vehicle Code. Rose, 268 Ill.App. 3d at 183, 643 N.E.2d at 871-72.

Since Rose, several courts have considered the reach ofsection 11-501.5 of the Vehicle Code. In People v. Halsey, 273 Ill.App. 3d 160, 163, 652 N.E.2d 434, 436 (1995), this court held PBTresults were admissible in evidence by the State involving offensesnot arising under section 11-501 or 11-501.1 of the Vehicle Code. InPeople v. Davis, 296 Ill. App. 3d 923, 928, 695 N.E.2d 1363, 1366(1998), the Third District found, based on the statute, PBT resultswere admissible in a proceeding where a police officer's probable-cause determination was being challenged. In People v. Brooks, 334Ill. App. 3d 722, 729, 778 N.E.2d 336, 342 (2002), the Fifth Districtfound testimony concerning a defendant's refusal to submit to a PBTwas inadmissible in the State's case in chief. In People v. Rozela,345 Ill. App. 3d 217, 227, 802 N.E.2d 372, 380 (2003), the SecondDistrict reviewed a case involving a petition to rescind a statutorysummary suspension and found section 11-501.5 permitted the State tointroduce PBT results to support the officer's conclusion he hadprobable cause to arrest defendant for DUI.

In the case sub judice, we are confronted with the issueof whether the Vehicle Code permits the State to use PBT results inits rebuttal for the limited purpose of impeaching defendant'stestimony that he had not consumed any alcohol. The cardinal rule ofstatutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intentof the legislature. People v. Latona, 184 Ill. 2d 260, 269, 703N.E.2d 901, 906 (1998). The words of a statute are to be given theirplain and commonly understood meanings. Krohe v. City ofBloomington, 329 Ill. App. 3d 1133, 1135-36, 769 N.E.2d 551, 553(2002).

The language of the statute clearly allows a defendant touse PBT results as evidence in a criminal trial. Courts have alsofound the language allows the State to introduce PBT results to showthe existence of probable cause at the time of arrest. Rozela, 345Ill. App. 3d at 227, 802 N.E.2d at 380; Davis, 296 Ill. App. 3d at928, 695 N.E.2d at 1366; Rose, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 180, 643 N.E.2d at869. However, the statute makes no mention of the State's use of PBTresults in rebuttal to impeach the defendant's testimony. Considering the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, meaningthe expression of one thing implies the exclusion of another, we findthe language of the Vehicle Code does not allow for such use by theState. Had the legislature intended PBT results to be admissible inthis situation, it could and should have explicitly said so in thestatute. As we find no statutory authority for the State's use ofthe PBT results in this case, we find the trial court erred inadmitting the results in the State's rebuttal.

Even accepting defendant's contention that the trial courterred in allowing the PBT results to be used by the State in itsrebuttal, we conclude any error was harmless. Under a harmless-erroranalysis, the burden is on the State to prove the jury verdict wouldhave been the same absent the error to avoid reversal. People v.Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335, 347, 788 N.E.2d 1117, 1124 (2001)(supplemental opinion filed on denial of rehearing 2003).

Here, Officer Phillips testified he stopped defendant forspeeding and noticed his "glassy, bloodshot eyes" with "a very strongodor of alcohol" on him and slurred speech. Based on defendant'sperformance on the field-sobriety tests, Officer Phillips believed hewas under the influence of alcohol. Phillips also located an openbottle of brandy under the passenger seat that was "cool to thetouch," and the passenger denied it belonged to him. At the jail,defendant's blood-alcohol concentration measured 0.106. Based onOfficer Phillips's testimony concerning defendant's condition at thetime of the traffic stop and defendant's blood-alcohol reading at thejail, the evidence establishes defendant was guilty of driving with ablood-alcohol concentration greater than 0.08. Thus, as the State'srebuttal evidence was harmless, a new trial is not required.

B. Payment for Court-Appointed Counsel

Defendant argues the trial court erred in ordering him topay $500 for the services of his court-appointed counsel. We agree.

At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trialcourt stated, in part, as follows:

"THE COURT: Cause called for hearing asto court-appointed attorney fees. Mr. Bass,are you currently employed[?]

MR. BASS: Yes.

THE COURT: Where are you working?

MR. BASS: Thomas Paine School.

THE COURT: All right. And how much areyou earning per month?

MR. BASS: About [$]1100.

THE COURT: All right. I will assess acourt-appointed attorney fee of [$500] due tothe fact that Mr. Appleman has had to preparefor an extensive jury trial in this matter.

Mr. Bass, you'll need to pay that within22 months from this date.

Mr. Appleman, I'll tender the paymentorder for court-appointed attorney."

Defendant's March 2002 affidavit requesting an appointed attorneyindicated he earned $800 per month as a janitor and paid $50 permonth in child support.

Section 113-3.1(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of1963 (Criminal Procedure Code) (725 ILCS 5/113-3.1(a) (West 2000))requires a trial court to conduct a hearing as to the defendant'sfinancial resources to determine his ability to pay reimbursement forcourt-appointed counsel. People v. Love, 177 Ill. 2d 550, 556, 687N.E.2d 32, 35 (1997).

"At the hearing, the trial court is to considerthe affidavit prepared by [the] defendant inseeking court-appointed counsel. 725 ILCS5/113-3.1(a) (West 2000). In addition, thedefendant must (1) have notice that the trialcourt is considering imposing a payment orderpursuant to section 113-3.1 of the [CriminalProcedure] Code and (2) be given theopportunity to present evidence regarding herability to pay and other relevant circumstancesand otherwise be heard regarding whether thecourt should impose such an order. People v.Johnson, 297 Ill. App. 3d 163, 164-65, 696N.E.2d 1269, 1270 (1998). The trial court maynot simply order reimbursement in a perfunctorymanner." People v. Roberson, 335 Ill. App. 3d798, 803-04, 780 N.E.2d 1144, 1148 (2002).

In this case, the only notice given by the trial court wasits call for a hearing on court-appointed counsel fees and the twoquestions to defendant about his employment and earnings per month. The record does not show the court considered defendant's financialaffidavit. Further, defendant was not given an opportunity topresent evidence or be heard regarding the imposition of the $500payment. Therefore, we must vacate the court's order requiringdefendant to pay $500 for court-appointed counsel fees and remand fora hearing on defendant's ability to pay for such services pursuant tosection 113-3.1 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we affirm defendant's convictionand vacate the recoupment order and remand with directions.

Affirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded withdirections.

KNECHT, P.J., concurs.

MYERSCOUGH, J., specially concurs.

I would affirm the trial court on all grounds.

The PBT results should be admissible to impeachdefendant's and Brooks's testimony that defendant had not consumedany alcoholic beverage. The trial court clearly limited the use ofthe PBT results to impeachment only. This evidence is thereforerelevant to an issue in the case, and it should be admitted becauseits admission does not contravene statutory law or a rule ofevidence. See Halsey, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 163-64, 652 N.E.2d at 436.

Similarly, use of illegally obtained evidence, otherwiseinadmissible, may be used to impeach defendant and his witness wheredefendant testifies. See People v. James, 153 Ill. App. 3d 131, 133,505 N.E.2d 1118, 1119 (1987); People v. Campbell, 332 Ill. App. 3d721, 724, 773 N.E.2d 776, 779 (2002). If defendant's otherwiseinadmissible items of evidence may be admitted for impeachmentpurposes, so should the PBT results.

Moreover, because these PBT results were not used assubstantive evidence to establish intoxication, but only asimpeachment, they should not be subjected to the standards ofadmissibility to establish intoxication. If the results may be usedto establish probable cause, they should be allowed to establishimpeachment, especially where PBT results are not consideredinherently unreliable (Halsey, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 163-64, 652 N.E.2dat 436). Further, the proper foundation for this impeachment wasprovided:

"Q. Okay, did you have a portablebreath[-]testing device with you in your squadcar on March 11th of 2001?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. And is that portable breath test routinelycertified as accurate?

A. Yes. Every ninety days we turn it into[sic] the district headquarters in Pesotum, wherethey then certify it.

* * *

Q. Did you have the [d]efendant submit to aportable breath test on March 11th of 2001, prior toplacing him under arrest?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. And what was the result of that portablebreath test?

MR. APPLEMAN: Objection. Foundation.

THE COURT: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: .120."

For these reasons, I would affirm the trial court on allissues, and I specially concur.