PRESIDING JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:

In February 2004, a jury convicted defendant, WilliamWade Baumgartner, of one count of felony perjury for filing astatement of candidacy in which he allegedly falsely stated underoath that his address was in Moultrie County, Illinois (10 ILCS5/29-10 (West 2002)). In March 2004, the trial court sentenceddefendant to 12 months' conditional discharge and ordered him topay a $500 fine and perform 75 hours' public service. Defendantappeals, arguing, inter alia, that the indictment charging himwith perjury is void. We reverse.

Defendant was born in 1974 and was raised exclusivelyin Moultrie County, Illinois. In 1992, defendant graduated fromhigh school in Moultrie County and enrolled at the University ofIllinois at Urbana-Champaign (U of I) in the College of Agriculture. While at U of I, defendant returned to his home inMoultrie County regularly to work on the family farm with hisfather. Throughout his undergraduate years at U of I, defendantlived both on and off campus in Champaign-Urbana but continued tohold a Moultrie County driver's license and a Moultrie Countyvoter's registration.

Defendant received his bachelor of science degree inanimal science from U of I in 1996 and immediately began to studyfor a master's degree, also at U of I. Although he continued tolive in Champaign-Urbana, he continued to hold his MoultrieCounty driver's license and voter's registration.

In 1997, defendant married his wife Jenny, and theymoved into an apartment in Mahomet together. When Jenny changedher name to Baumgartner, she changed her legal address, includingher driver's license and voter's registration, to ChampaignCounty. Defendant however, maintained his driver's license andvoter's registration in Moultrie County. The couple later movedto a townhouse in Champaign, with Jenny once again changing herlegal residence to that address and defendant keeping his addressin Moultrie County. Defendant continued to spend a great deal oftime in Moultrie County helping his father on the family farm.

In January 1999, defendant received his master ofscience degree from U of I. He immediately began work on adoctoral degree in animal genetics and later enrolled in theCollege of Law as well. Jenny had also begun studying for amaster's degree with the intention to seek a doctorate as well. To save money on rent while they completed their studies, in June1999 they purchased a house in Champaign. Defendant testifiedthat they were not represented by an attorney and did not readall of the paperwork fully but the mortgage contained a clauserequiring the borrower to use the real estate as a principalresidence for one year after the purchase. The Champaign housealso received a real-property-tax homestead exemption.

In August 1999, defendant and his cousin purchased an86.7-acre Moultrie County farm from their grandmother Baum-gartner, which had been used for the family farm. In October2000, defendant acquired his grandfather's home in Sullivan inMoultrie County from his mother and grandmother. One of thepreconditions of the conveyance was a requirement that defendant's school address be listed and not his father's address inMoultrie County because of a conflict between the mother andfather, who were divorced. Also around this time, defendant andJenny purchased two used automobiles, both of which were registered at the Champaign address.

Despite living in Champaign while he attended school,defendant returned to his home in Moultrie County frequently. Heaveraged two or three days a week spent at the house in MoultrieCounty, and as his academic schedule became more flexible, hewould often spend three or four days in a row in Moultrie County. During these times at home, he would stay in his room at hisfather's house. Defendant returned to Moultrie County to vote ineach general election from 1994 through 2002 and several others. He received a General Assembly Scholarship for the 2001-02 schoolyear at U of I, which required that he be a resident of thedistrict including Moultrie County but not Champaign County.

In the summer of 2001, defendant's father asked defendant to run for election to the county board of Moultrie County. Defendant's father made several inquiries with a number oflawyers about defendant's eligibility to run for office eventhough he was a full-time student in Champaign. After receivingseveral informal opinions that defendant was eligible to run foroffice, defendant filed a statement of candidacy in the formprovided by the statute (10 ILCS 5/7-10 (West 2002)), whichprovided in pertinent part:

"I, W. Wade Baumgartner, being first duly sworn, say that I reside at R.R. #1 Box 133 Street, in the ___ of Windsor Zip Code 61957 in the County of Moultrie State of Illinois; that I am a qualified voter therein and am a qualified [p]rimary voter of the Republican Party; that I am a candidate for nomination to the office of County board in the ___ District, to be voted upon at the primary election to be held on March 19, 2002, and that I am legally qualified (including being the holder of any license that may be an eligibility requirement for the office I seek the nomination for) to hold such office and that I have filed (or I will file before the close of the petition filing period) a Statement of Economic Interests as required by the Illinois Governmental Ethics Act and I hereby request that my name be printed upon the official Republican Primary ballot for nomination for such office. /s W. WadeBaumgartner."

At the top of the form were boxes for "name," "address-zip code,""office," "district," and "party." In those boxes, defendant putsubstantially the same information as he did in the form of thestatement, including the address at R.R. #1 in Windsor. AlthoughWindsor is in Shelby County, the location of defendant's familyfarm at R.R. #1 is in rural Moultrie County. Defendant thencampaigned for and was successfully elected to the County boardfor Moultrie County. No one challenged his qualifications orelection either before or after his election. He was seated andheld office until this prosecution was filed in August 2003.

On August 27, 2003, the office of the Illinois AttorneyGeneral filed an information against defendant, charging him withperjury pursuant to section 29-10 of the Election Code (10 ILCS5/29-10 (West 2002)). On October 15, 2003, a bill of indictmentwas filed against defendant for the same charge, which providedin pertinent part:

"that W. Wade Baumgartner, on or about December 15, 2001, at and within said County of Moultrie, State of Illinois, committed the offense of PERJURY in that the said [d]efen-dant made a false statement in an affidavit required by the Illinois Election Code [(10 ILCS 5/7-10 (West 2002))] to-wit:  a State-ment of Candidacy: stating that his address was R.R. #1, Box 133, Windsor, Illinois, material to the issue in question which he did not believe to be true, in violation of Act 5, Section 29-10, Chapter 10 of the Illinois Compiled Statutes."

Defendant made several objections to both the form andsubstance of the indictment, all of which were denied by thetrial court. The court also rejected each of four nonpatternjury instructions submitted by defendant that attempted toexplain the law of residency. The court held that "residence"was a common and clearly understood concept requiring no furtherexplanation. Upon the preceding evidence, the jury convicteddefendant of one count of perjury. The trial court sentenced himas stated. This appeal follows.

Defendant is charged with violating section 29-10(a) ofthe Election Code (10 ILCS 5/29-10(a) (West 2002)), which provides in pertinent part as follows:

"Any person who makes a false statement,material to the issue or point in question, which he does not believe to be true, in any affidavit, certificate[,] or sworn oral de-claration required by any provision of the [Election] Code shall be guilty of a Class 3 felony."

A person seeking the office of county board member must be alegal voter and have been a resident of the county for at leastone year preceding the election. 55 ILCS 5/2-3015 (West 2002). The indictment charges that defendant made a false statement in arequired affidavit by stating that his address was R.R. #1 Box133, Windsor, in Moultrie County, Illinois. The State's positionis that defendant was at the relevant time a resident of Champaign County and not Moultrie County. Defendant argues that theindictment against him is unconstitutionally vague because theterms "residence" and "address" are not sufficiently defined inthe statute. Because the statute is fairly clear that "address"refers to the address of a candidate's "residence," we will treatthe indictment as charging defendant with falsely representinghis residence and only examine the term "residence" as it is usedin the statute.

Although defendant makes the argument that the right torun for office is guaranteed by the first amendment and thestatute is therefore invalid on its face, the case he cites insupport is inapposite on this issue, so we will examine theconstitutionality of the statute only as applied in this case. "To prevail in a vagueness challenge to a statute that does notimplicate first amendment concerns, a party must demonstrate thatthe statute was vague as applied to the conduct for which theparty is being prosecuted." People v. Jihan, 127 Ill. 2d 379,385, 537 N.E.2d 751, 754 (1989). "That is, the party must showthat the statute did not provide clear notice that the party'sconduct was prohibited." Jihan, 127 Ill. 2d at 385, 537 N.E.2dat 754. "[T]here is a greater tolerance for statutory ambiguityin civil proceedings than in criminal proceedings 'because theconsequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe.'" Jihan, 127 Ill. 2d at 387, 537 N.E.2d at 755, quoting Village ofHoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.489, 498-99, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362, 372, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 1193 (1982). For a statute to provide due process, it must "'"givethe person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity toknow what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly."'" People v. Einoder, 209 Ill. 2d 443, 450, 808 N.E.2d 517, 522(2004), quoting Russell v. Department of Natural Resources, 183Ill. 2d 434, 442, 701 N.E.2d 1056, 1060 (1998), quoting Graynedv. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 227, 92S. Ct. 2294, 2298-99 (1972). A statute violates due process onthe basis of vagueness "'"only if its terms are so ill-definedthat the ultimate decision as to its meaning rests on the opinions and whims of the trier of fact rather than any objectivecriteria or facts."' [Citations.]" People ex rel. Sherman v.Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d 264, 291, 786 N.E.2d 139, 157 (2003). Thequestion in this case is whether the term "residence" is socommonly understood that it is proper to submit a person'sstatement of residence to a jury without any guidance in order todetermine if he knowingly made a false statement.

Both parties have submitted differing usages of theterm "residence." However, because eligibility to run for officeis closely linked to the ability to vote within a particularjurisdiction, we will use the definition of "residence" as usedwithin the Election Code for voter registration. See 55 ILCS5/2-3015 (West 2002) (no person is eligible to hold the office ofcounty board member unless he is a legal voter and has been aresident of the county for at least one year). Along with hisstatement of residence, defendant swore that he was a qualifiedvoter in Moultrie County.

Two elements are necessary to create a "residence" forvoter registration purposes: physical presence and an intent toremain there as a permanent resident. Delk v. Board of ElectionCommissioners, 112 Ill. App. 3d 735, 738, 445 N.E.2d 1232, 1235(1983). Residence is lost upon abandonment; however, "'anabsence for months, or even years, if all the while intended as amere temporary absence for some temporary purpose, to be followedby a resumption of the former residence, will not be an abandonment.'" Stein v. County Board of School Trustees, 40 Ill. 2d477, 480, 240 N.E.2d 668, 669 (1968), quoting Kreitz v.Behrensmeyer, 125 Ill. 141, 195, 17 N.E. 232, 253 (1888). "[W]here a person leaves his residence and goes to another place,even if it be another [s]tate, with an intention to return to hisformer abode, or with only a conditional intention of acquiring anew residence, he does not lose his former residence so long ashis intention remains conditional." Pope v. Board of ElectionCommissioners, 370 Ill. 196, 201, 18 N.E.2d 214, 216 (1938). Tochange residence, "there must be, both in fact and intention, anabandonment of the former residence and a new domicile acquiredby actual residence, coupled with the intention to make it apermanent home." Welsh v. Shumway, 232 Ill. 54, 77, 83 N.E. 549,559 (1907).

Here, the State contends that despite defendant'sclaims, he was no longer a resident of Moultrie County, but hisactions showed his intention to become a resident of ChampaignCounty. It is uncontested that defendant owned a house inChampaign and had numerous contacts with Champaign County. However, it is clear from the record that the reason for defendant's presence in Champaign County was that he was a student atthe U of I. The courts in Illinois have long held that a studentin a college town is presumed not to have changed his residenceto the town in which he is attending school. Dale v. Irwin, 78Ill. 170, 182 (1875); Welsh, 232 Ill. at 88, 83 N.E. at 562;Anderson v. Pifer, 315 Ill. 164, 167, 146 N.E. 171, 173 (1924). Although a college student may become a resident of a collegetown if he is entirely free from parental control, has no intention of returning to the parental home upon the completion of hisstudies, regards the college town as his home, and has no otherhome to return to in case of sickness or other affliction, theburden is on the student to prove his residence in the collegetown. Welsh, 232 Ill. at 87-88, 83 N.E. at 562-63. All of thesecases, Dale, Welsh, and Anderson, involve students attempting toestablish residency in their college towns and the court decidingthat they had not because their stay in the college town was onlytemporary. This is the first case we can find where a studentcontinued to claim his parent's residence, his former home, ashis residence for purposes of voting and running for office andthe State challenged his ability to do so after the fact by wayof a perjury charge.

One argument presented by the State is that defendanthad started his own family and no longer had the intention ofmoving back into his childhood home, which has since been demonstrated by defendant's purchase of his own home in MoultrieCounty after he completed his studies. However, in the case ofstudents, "[t]he fact that a student does not expect to returnhome to live after he finishes school is not a very importantone, for most persons attending universities and colleges expect,when they graduate, to enter some kind of business for themselves." Anderson, 315 Ill. at 168, 146 N.E. at 173. "Thecontrolling inquiry in deciding the residence of students, aswith all others, is, where 'does the party actually make his homeand claim for the time to exercise the rights of property or ofcitizenship incident to or resulting from permanent residence?'" Welsh, 232 Ill. at 88-89, 83 N.E. at 563, quoting Kreitz, 125Ill. at 196, 17 N.E. at 253. In other words, "'it is necessary*** to determine whether while at college [a student] is at hishome,--his residence,--or temporarily absent from it.'" Welsh,232 Ill. at 87, 83 N.E. at 562, quoting McCrary, Elections