PRESIDING JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:

On April 26, 2001, defendant, Anthony B. Blakely,pleaded guilty in case No. 00-CF-118 to one count of being a sexoffender who failed to notify police of a change of address (730ILCS 150/6 (West 2000)) and one count of domestic battery (720ILCS 5/12-3.2(a) (West 2000)), and he pleaded guilty in case No.00-CF-777 to obstructing justice (720 ILCS 5/31-4(a) (West2000)). On June 1, 2001, the trial court sentenced defendant forboth cases to consecutive prison terms of three years, a total ofsix years.

On August 8, 2001, the trial court denied defendant'smotions to withdraw the guilty pleas and reconsider the sentences, and defendant appealed. This court initially remandeddefendant's appeal because the record on appeal did not include aSupreme Court Rule 604(d) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)) certificate forone of the cases. People v. Blakely, No. 4-01-0710 (February 26,2003) (unpublished summary order under Supreme Court Rule23(c)(2)). At the remand hearing in March 2003, the trial courtagain denied defendant's motions to withdraw the guilty pleas andreconsider the sentences, finding that the requisite Rule 604(d)certificates had been filed with the circuit clerk in both cases,but one had been excluded from the appellate record. Defendantnow appeals from the trial court's order and alleges the trialcourt erred in assessing twice the mileage costs incurred by thesheriff's office when it transported him from Colorado.

In June 2001, the trial court ordered defendant to pay$1,126 as costs in case No. 00-CF-118 and $1,201 as costs in caseNo. 00-CF-777. The costs in case No. 00-CF-118 include sheriff'sfees of $1,200.70 with $144.70 paid as of sentencing. In caseNo. 00-CF-777, the sheriff's fees totaled $1,056 with no paymentshaving been made. In the two arrest warrants, the return ofservices, both dated April 3, 2001, state an officer traveled2,000 miles at 50 cents per mile. In each case, the courtassessed a $1,000 sheriff's fee for the 2,000 miles traveled toarrest defendant.

Section 4-5001 of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/4-5001(West 2000)) authorizes imposing, upon a defendant's conviction,sheriff's fees for the cost of returning a defendant from outsidethe State of Illinois to the jurisdiction. Such fees are calculated by mileage, "[m]ileage for each mile of necessary travel***, calculating from the place of holding court to the place ofresidence of the defendant, *** 50 [cents] each way." 55 ILCS5/4-5001 (West 2000). The section further states:

"The foregoing fees allowed by this [s]ection are the maximum fees that may be collected from any officer, agency, depart-ment[,] or other instrumentality of the [s]tate. The county board may, however, by ordinance, increase the fees allowed by this [s]ection and collect those increased fees from all persons and entities other than officers, agencies, departments[,] and other instrumen-talities of the [s]tate if the increase is justified by an acceptable cost study showing that the fees allowed by this [s]ection are not sufficient to cover the costs of providing the service." 55 ILCS 5/4-5001 (West 2000).

Defendant argues it was error for the trial court toorder him to pay twice, $1,000 under each case, for the sheriff'sone trip to Colorado to bring him back to Illinois. Defendantargues the language of section 4-5001 allows mileage reimbursement only for expenses actually incurred and requiring him to paymileage twice for one trip gives McLean County an added windfallthat is not authorized under the section. The State counters thecosts were not improper based on Vannatta v. Brewer, 85 Ill. 114(1877) (the court held sheriff's fees could be assessed upon eachof several witnesses the sheriff served with a subpoena at thesame residence).

The language of section 4-5001 contemplates reimbursingthe county for costs actually incurred. Mileage is calculatedbased on "each mile of necessary travel." Further, the sectionexplicitly states the fees allowed by this section "are themaximum fees that may be collected" and the county board mayincrease the fees "if the increase is justified by an acceptablecost study showing that the fees allowed *** are not sufficientto cover the costs of providing the service." 55 ILCS 5/4-5001(West 2000). The language suggests the statute intends only tocover the costs of providing the service.

The 1877 Vannatta case is distinguishable. Vannattawas based on an earlier version of the statute that did notprovide for fees where the officer failed in effecting service. Vannatta, 85 Ill. at 115 ("officers frequently make fruitlessjourneys, and fail in effecting service *** in which case nomileage is allowed"). The current statute allows for fees in"serving or attempting to serve" subpoenas. 55 ILCS 5/4-5001(West 2000). In Vannatta, the court awarded the county multiplefees for the one trip in that case because the officers in othercases received no fees if they failed to effect service orreceived no fees over those necessary to get to a defendant orwitness's residence, even if they had to travel further than thatresidence to effect service. Vannatta, 85 Ill. at 115-16. Allowing officers to collect multiple fees for one trip balancedthe losses incurred when the officers were not reimbursed foractual miles expended on attempts. The Vannatta decision furtherdoes not take into account the statutory language found in thecurrent section that provides the section allows the "maximumfees that may be collected" and those fees may not be increasedunless "justified by an acceptable cost study." 55 ILCS 5/4-5001(West 2000).

Under the current version of section 4-5001, the countyis entitled to be reimbursed for the actual mileage costs incurred. Requiring a defendant to pay the mileage twice for onetrip simply because that defendant is wanted in two differentcases in the same jurisdiction is not contemplated under thestatute. Defendant's claimed error is, therefore, meritorious.

While defendant's claim has merit, defendant acknowledges that this error has not been properly preserved for appeal. Defendant requests this court review the issue under the plain-error rule (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)) or, in the alternative,asserts an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim due to hiscounsel's failure to object to the double fee. The State responds that this issue cannot be raised for the first time onappeal, citing People v. Horn, 64 Ill. App. 3d 717, 381 N.E.2d790 (1978) (the court held the defendant could not, for the firsttime on appeal, raise the issue of whether the trial court erredin assessing him twice for sheriff's mileage when the defendantwas served with subpoenas and warrants for both cases simultaneously). We note that "the waiver rule is a limitation on theparties, not a limitation on the jurisdiction of the courts." People v. Hamilton, 179 Ill. 2d 319, 323, 688 N.E.2d 1166, 1169(1997). Therefore, in the interest of providing guidance in thisissue, we hold that defendant should only be required to pay theactual costs incurred, $1,000.

For the reasons stated, we remand with directions tomodify the order of judgment in a manner consistent with thisopinion.

Remanded with instructions.

McCULLOUGH and KNECHT, JJ., concur.