JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

In April 1998, the trial court placed defendant, LelenL. Bonds, on probation after he pleaded guilty to possession of acontrolled substance with intent to deliver (less than one gramof a substance containing cocaine) (720 ILCS 570/401(d) (WestSupp. 1997)). The State subsequently filed a petition to revokedefendant's probation, and defendant later admitted the petition's allegations. In December 1998, the court conducted aresentencing hearing and resentenced defendant to seven years inprison. After doing so, the court admonished defendant that hewas required to file a motion to reconsider sentence within 30days to preserve any sentencing issues he wished to raise onappeal.

In April 1999, defendant filed a motion for reductionof sentence accompanied by a "motion to file untimely." Thetrial court gave defendant an opportunity to file an amendedmotion, which he did. In July 1999, the court denied defendant'smotions in his absence.

Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erredby denying his motion for reduction of sentence and motion tofile untimely. We affirm.

In its October 1998 petition to revoke defendant'sprobation, the State alleged, in pertinent part, that defendantcommitted the offense of possession of cannabis (not more than2.5 grams of a substance containing cannabis) on two separatedates in September 1998 (720 ILCS 550/4(a) (West 1998)). InNovember 1998, defendant admitted the allegations in the State'spetition and the court set the matter for resentencing thefollowing month.

At the December 28, 1998, resentencing hearing, thetrial court considered the presentence report, heard testimonyfrom defendant and arguments of counsel, and resentenced defendant to seven years in prison. The court then admonished defendant as follows:

"In terms of his appeal rights on theadmission to the petition to revoke and nowthis new offense, I do have to tell you thatyou have a right to appeal. Prior to takingan appeal, you must file in the trial court,that is with the [c]ircuit [c]lerk's[o]ffice, not my office, within 30 days ofthe date of your sentence. So that would be30 days from today's date, you should file awritten motion asking to have the trial courtreconsider the sentence or to have thejudgment vacated and for leave to withdrawyour admission or plea setting forth thegrounds for the motion. If the motion isallowed, the sentence would be modified orthe admission, plea, sentence and judgmentwill be vacated and a trial date set on thecharges to which the admission was made. Upon the request of the State, any chargesthat may have been dismissed as a part of theplea agreement, will be reinstated and alsoset for trial. If you are indigent, withoutenough money of your own, a copy of thetranscript of the proceedings at the time ofyour admission or plea and sentence will beprovided without cost to you and an attorneyappointed to assist you in the preparation ofthe motion. You should understand that inany appeal taken from the judgment onadmission or plea, any issue or claim oferror not raised in the motion to reconsiderthe sentence or to vacate the judgment andwithdraw your admission or plea, shall bedeemed waived unless raised in this motion."

On April 14, 1999, defendant filed a motion forreduction of sentence, in which he wrote that the reason for hisdelay in filing was "because of the emotional state of mind hewas in after the sentence was imposed upon him." The motion wasverified, showing on its face that defendant signed it under oathon March 26, 1999. Accompanying defendant's motion for reductionof sentence was a motion to file untimely, which was a formmotion, meaning that it was a preprinted motion containingvarious blank spots in some of its paragraphs.

On May 4, 1999, the trial court conducted a briefhearing on defendant's motions, noting that defendant was in theDepartment of Corrections, and only an assistant State's Attorneywas present. The court stated that paragraphs two and three ofdefendant's "motion to file untimely" were blank and before thecourt could rule upon the motion, those paragraphs would need tobe completed. Accordingly, the court granted defendant leave tofile an amended, complete motion to file untimely.

Both orally at the hearing and in its written order,the trial court emphasized that it was not considering the motionfor reduction of sentence at that time but only whether it "wouldeven allow this to proceed." Defendant was given until June 4,1999, to file any amended motions, with the case continued untilJune 15, 1999, for further proceedings.

On May 18, 1999, defendant filed an amended motion tofile untimely, which now had the blanks in paragraphs two andthree filled in. Those paragraphs, as amended, showed that onJanuary 7, 1999, defendant was transferred from the Adams Countyjail to the Graham Correctional Center to begin his sentence, andthat he remained there for 22 days for the purpose of orientationbefore being transferred to the Vandalia Correctional Center.

Because the trial court was involved in a jury trial,the court continued the previously allotted June 15 hearing onits own motion until July 6, 1999. On that date, the Stateappeared by an assistant State's Attorney, but defendant did notappear either personally or by counsel. The prosecutor statedher objection to defendant's motion to file untimely, which thecourt sustained, denying the motion. This appeal followed.

Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denyinghis motions to reconsider sentence and to file untimely. Specifically, he contends that the court's denial of his motionsas untimely was improper for the following reasons: (1) thecourt erred in its admonitions because, in the context ofprobation revocation proceedings, he was not required to file amotion to reconsider sentence before he could appeal hissentence; (2) the court had jurisdiction to consider bothmotions; (3) the court infringed his due process rights "and hisright to meaningful access to the courts, by holding a hearingand allowing input from the prosecutor on the timeliness of thedefendant's motion, without providing notice to the defendant orallowing him to respond"; and (4) he was not culpably negligentin filing his motions late.

The fundamental problem with defendant's entireargument is that it is premised upon the assertion thatgenerally, and particularly under the facts of this case, he mayfile an untimely motion to reconsider sentence that the trialcourt can and should consider. This premise is not correct.

Because only the trial court's legal conclusions are atissue here, we review the court's ruling de novo. See In reD.G., 144 Ill. 2d 404, 408-09, 581 N.E.2d 648, 649 (1991) ("whereneither the facts nor [the] credibility of the witnesses iscontested, the issue *** is a legal question which a reviewingcourt may consider de novo").

Defendant first argues that the trial court providedhim with inaccurate and misleading admonitions concerning what hewas required to do to preserve his right to challenge hissentence on appeal from his probation revocation. Specifically,he contends that the court erred in its admonitions because, inthe context of probation revocation proceedings, he was notrequired to file a motion to reconsider sentence before he couldappeal his sentence.

In People v. Tufte, 165 Ill. 2d 66, 71-72, 649 N.E.2d374, 377 (1995), the supreme court held that a defendant'sadmission that he violated the terms of his conditional dischargeshould not be construed as a guilty plea, so as to trigger thetrial court's duty, under Supreme Court Rule 605(b) (145 Ill. 2dR. 605(b)), to admonish the defendant that he is required to filea motion to vacate his guilty plea, or a motion to reconsider hissentence, before the defendant may appeal from the trial court'sjudgment. Following Tufte, this court in In re J.E.M.Y., 289Ill. App 3d 389, 390-91, 682 N.E.2d 451, 452 (1997), concludedthat an admission to a probation violation, as occurred in thiscase, did not require compliance with Rule 604(d) (145 Ill. 2d R.604(d)). That rule requires a defendant appealing from ajudgment entered upon a plea of guilty to first file in the trialcourt, within 30 days of the date on which his sentence wasimposed, a motion to reconsider the sentence if he only wishes tochallenge his sentence on appeal. Thus, defendant is correct inhis assertion that the trial court's admonition to him was notaccurate where the court told him that, before he could appeal,he first had to file a motion to reconsider sentence within 30days of the date of his sentencing. However, our analysis doesnot end here.

While most cases concerning Rules 604(d) and 605(b)address trial court admonitions that say too little (see, e.g.,People v. Anderson, 309 Ill. App. 3d 417, 722 N.E.2d 244 (1999)),this case involves a trial court's admonition that said too much. Here, the court instructed defendant that he needed to file amotion to reconsider sentence within 30 days if he wanted toappeal his sentence even though he could have appealed hissentence directly without taking that action. Thus, this courtmust determine the effect of the court's incorrect admonition andwhether it excuses the untimely filing of defendant's motion toreconsider sentence.

Although the trial court incorrectly informed defendantthat he needed to file a motion to reconsider sentence before hecould appeal, the law does not prohibit a defendant from choosingto file such a motion. In other words, a defendant who has beensentenced after admitting to the allegations of a petition torevoke probation, who believes either that the court erred at thesentencing hearing or imposed an excessive sentence, is permittedunder the law to file within 30 days of that sentence a motion toreconsider. If such a motion is timely filed, whether the lawrequired that motion or not, the trial court must consider it indue course and make its ruling.

Thus, in the present case, the trial court informeddefendant about filing a motion to reconsider sentence and thatif defendant wished to file such a motion, he must do so within30 days of the resentencing hearing. That the trial court alsotold defendant that his failure to file such a motion woulddefeat his right to appeal is not relevant to defendant's claimthat the court erred by denying his motion to reconsider asuntimely. Moreover, the court's incorrect admonition amountsessentially to surplusage on this record because defendant hasnever sought to appeal his sentence. Instead, all he has soughtis a hearing before the trial court to reconsider his sentence.

Defendant also argues that the trial court hadjurisdiction to consider his untimely motion to reconsidersentence. We disagree.

Motions to reconsider sentence are governed first bythe specific provisions of Rule 604(d) and second by generalprinciples governing trial court jurisdiction. First, Rule604(d) requires that a motion to reconsider sentence must befiled "within 30 days of the date on which sentence is imposed." 145 Ill. 2d 604(d). In Anderson, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 421, 722N.E.2d at 247, this court spoke of how Rule 604(d) requiresstrict compliance with its provisions. In People v. Handy, 278Ill. App. 3d 829, 837, 664 N.E.2d 1042, 1047 (1996), this courtobserved that in People v. Foster, 171 Ill. 2d 469, 665 N.E.2d823 (1996), the Supreme Court of Illinois, in the course of afour-page opinion, referred four times to the need for "strictcompliance" with Rule 604(d). See also People v. Pegues, 277Ill. App. 3d 884, 887, 661 N.E.2d 405, 406-07 (1996) (failure tofile motion to reconsider sentence before trial court withinprescribed 30-day time period forfeits opportunity to do so).

Second, general provisions limiting trial courtjurisdiction to 30 days after final judgment (here, theimposition of sentence) apply as well. In People v. Wakeland, 15Ill. 2d 265, 269, 154 N.E.2d 245, 248 (1958), the Supreme Courtof Illinois wrote the following:

"It is well settled that during the period of[30] days following the entry of a judgmentof conviction, the court has jurisdiction tocorrect an error therein, provided judgmentremains unexecuted. When a person accused ofa crime has been convicted, sentenced[,] anddelivered into the custody of the properofficer of the penitentiary under a mittimus,the court rendering the judgment and imposingthe sentence loses jurisdiction over the caseand is without power to vacate, set aside[,]or modify the judgment ***."

See also People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 393, 581 N.E.2d 637,643 (1991) ("once a defendant has been sentenced and placed intothe custody of the Department of Corrections, the court renderingjudgment and imposing sentence loses jurisdiction over the caseand is without power to vacate, set aside[,] or modify thejudgment").

The only case defendant cites in support of his claimthat the trial court had jurisdiction to consider his untimelyfiled motion to reconsider sentence is People v. Mink, 141 Ill.2d 163, 565 N.E.2d 975 (1990), but that case is completelyinapposite. In Mink, the defendant was convicted of drugoffenses and filed a motion for a new trial, which the trialcourt granted. The State subsequently filed a motion forreconsideration, which was granted, and the court reinstated thedefendant's convictions. The appellate court reversed, holdingthat the first ruling on the defendant's posttrial motion was, insubstance, an acquittal, and that double jeopardy principlesbarred the trial court from reconsidering the order. Mink, 141Ill. 2d at 166, 565 N.E.2d at 976.

The supreme court granted the State's petition forleave to appeal and reversed, holding that the trial court didnot violate double jeopardy principles when it reconsidered thenew trial order and entered judgment on the jury's findings ofguilt. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d at 180, 565 N.E.2d at 982. In thecourse of its decision, the supreme court wrote that "[s]o longas the case was pending before it, the trial court hadjurisdiction to reconsider any order which had previously beenentered." Mink, 141 Ill. 2d at 171, 565 N.E.2d at 979. Citingthis language, defendant argues that in the present case, "thetrial court retained jurisdiction, and in fact exercised it, whenthe court issued its order of May 4, 1999, allowing the defendantto amend his pleadings." We disagree.

Defendant's argument and citation to Mink assume that,when the trial court issued its order of May 4, 1999, it alreadyhad jurisdiction regarding defendant's untimely motion toreconsider sentence. In fact, the court did not.

The trial court had warned defendant at his sentencinghearing that if he wished to file a motion to reconsidersentence, he must do so within 30 days of that date. Defendantfailed to take that action, and as a result, the court had nojurisdiction to entertain either his motion to reconsidersentence or the accompanying motion to file untimely that werefiled 3 1/2 months after the sentencing hearing. That the courtin its May 9, 1999, order, seemingly purported to exercisejurisdiction with regard to these motions did not render itsaction legitimate.

To better illustrate the weakness in defendant'sposition, it is helpful to imagine that he filed his motions 21/2 years, rather than 2 1/2 months, late. Under defendant'stheory, the trial court would still have jurisdiction over hismotion to reconsider sentence. Indeed, defendant's argumentcontains no outside range for when such a motion could be filedor properly considered by the court.

Defendant also contends that the trial court erred bydenying his motions in a July 1999 proceeding when (1) he was notpresent and (2) the court permitted the prosecutor to state herobjection to those motions. We agree with defendant that underordinary circumstances, these procedures would be problematic. However, in this instance the trial court was withoutjurisdiction to entertain his motions in the first place. Uponreceiving those motions, the court should have entered an ordersummarily denying them. Thus, any alleged impropriety in thecourt's handling of those motions could not constitute a denialof defendant's due process rights.

Last, we note that defendant, in his motion to fileuntimely, attempted to explain that the untimely filing of hismotion to reconsider sentence was not due to his culpablenegligence. However, this is an irrelevant consideration. Although the legislature has provided that an otherwise untimelypostconviction petition may be accepted by the trial court if thepetitioner "alleges facts showing that the delay was not due tohis or her culpable negligence" (725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West1998)), Rule 604(d) contains no such provision, nor does any caselaw exist that recognizes a claim that the absence of culpablenegligence excuses the untimely filing of a motion to reconsidersentence. This appears to be a matter of first impression inIllinois, and we explicitly reject that claim.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

Affirmed.

McCULLOUGH and MYERSCOUGH, JJ., concur.