PRESIDING JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of thecourt:

In February 2003, after a stipulated bench trial, thejudge found defendant, Ronnie Bostic, guilty of unlawful possessionof drug paraphernalia in violation of section 3.5 of the Drug Paraphernalia Control Act (Act) (720 ILCS 600/1 through 7 (West 2002)). The trial court sentenced him to one year's probation.

Bostic appeals, arguing (1) the State failed to prove theglass pipe found in his car was "marketed for use" as drug paraphernalia, (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppressbecause the search of his car was not a valid inventory search, and(3) defendant is entitled to a per-diem credit against his fines. Wereverse.

The facts in this case are undisputed. In April 2002,Officer Travis Brown of the Paxton police department stopped Bostic'svehicle after observing the vehicle had an obstructed rearviewmirror. Bostic was driving the car, and he was the only person inthe automobile. Officer Brown asked to see Bostic's driver's license. Bostic told Officer Brown his license had been suspended. Officer Brown ordered Bostic out of the car, handcuffed him, andplaced him in the squad car. Officer Brown then confirmed Bostic didnot have a valid Illinois driver's license. Officer Brown placedBostic under arrest and called for a tow. According to OfficerBrown, the vehicle had to be towed because no one else was availableto drive the vehicle and it could not be legally parked where it was. Officer Brown then asked Bostic if the vehicle contained anythingillegal. Bostic responded a marijuana pipe might be under thedriver's seat of the vehicle. Prior to leaving the scene, OfficerBrown conducted an inventory search of the vehicle and discovered a"dark-colored glass pipe" under the driver's seat.

Bostic was charged for unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia pursuant to section 3.5 of the Act. In September 2002,Bostic filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in his car. Atthe hearing on the motion, Officer Brown admitted he did not informBostic of his rights against self-incrimination before asking him ifthe vehicle contained anything illegal. In addition, Officer Browntestified Bostic did not give him specific permission to search thevehicle. Officer Brown also testified it was standard procedure totake an inventory of the contents of a vehicle if it had to be towed. Bostic argued the evidence found in the vehicle should be suppressed. The trial court denied the motion, ruling the inevitable-discoveryrule applied because of the inventory search Officer Brown testifiedhe would have conducted.

In February 2003, a stipulated bench trial was held. Thesole issue raised by the defense was whether the glass pipe was "drugparaphernalia" as defined by the Act. Bostic argued he was notguilty because no evidence showed the pipe was "marketed for use" asdrug paraphernalia as the Act required. The defense and prosecutionstipulated to the evidence presented at the suppression hearing forpurposes of the trial. Both parties also stipulated Officer Brownwould testify Bostic told Officer Brown the pipe was used to smokemarijuana and a field test on the burn around the pipe was positivefor marijuana. In addition, both parties stipulated Officer Brownwould testify based on his experience the pipe was an item used andmanufactured to smoke marijuana. Both parties also stipulated theprosecution did not have any evidence showing the purpose for whichthe glass pipe was marketed. Based on the stipulated evidence, thetrial court found Bostic guilty.

This appeal followed.

On appeal, Bostic argued the trial court's judgment shouldbe reversed because (1) the State failed to prove the glass pipe was"marketed for use" as drug paraphernalia as it is required to do and,therefore, did not prove its case under section 3.5 of the Act and(2) the glass pipe should have been suppressed as the fruit of anillegal search of his vehicle. In addition, Bostic argued he isentitled to per-diem credit against his fines. The State argues thecourt correctly held the prosecution proved its case and the searchwas legal. The State concedes Bostic is entitled to a $5 creditagainst his fine.

We first address Bostic's argument the State failed toprove its case under section 3.5 of the Act because it did notintroduce any evidence the glass pipe was "marketed for use" as drugparaphernalia. Ordinarily, when a defendant argues the State failedto prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, a reviewing court willanalyze the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecutionand determine if any rational trier of fact could have found thedefendant guilty. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261, 478N.E.2d 267, 277 (1985). However, in this case, the issue is whetherthe trial court misinterpreted the Act. "Because the interpretationof a statute is a question of law, our review is de novo." People v.Reeves, 326 Ill. App. 3d 1083, 1084, 762 N.E.2d 1124, 1125 (2002).

In April 2002, when Officer Brown arrested Bostic, section3.5 of the Act stated:

"A person who knowingly possesses an itemof drug paraphernalia with the intent to use itin ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing cannabis or a controlled substance into thehuman body, or in preparing cannabis or a controlled substance for that use, is guilty of aClass A misdemeanor for which the court shallimpose a minimum fine of $750 in addition toany other penalty prescribed for a Class A misdemeanor." 720 ILCS 600/3.5(a) (West 2002).

According to the Act:

"'Drug paraphernalia' means all equipment,products[,] and materials of any kind which arepeculiar to and marketed for use in planting,propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting,manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing, preparing, testing, analyzing,packaging, repackaging, storing, containing,concealing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling[,]or otherwise introducing into the human bodycannabis or a controlled substance in violationof the 'Cannabis Control Act' or the 'IllinoisControlled Substances Act'." (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 600/2(d) (West 2002).

We have already ruled on this issue in Reeves. In Reeves,326 Ill. App. 3d at 1084, 762 N.E.2d at 1125, the defendant was foundguilty of possessing drug paraphernalia, a crack pipe. However, inreversing the trial court's decision, we stated the following:

"Under section 3.5, it is not enough topossess an item with the intent of using it toingest a controlled substance. Under section3.5, the item possessed must be 'drug paraphernalia.' 'Drug paraphernalia' is defined as 'allequipment, products[,] and materials of anykind which are peculiar to and marketed for usein' growing, producing, storing, or ingestingcannabis or a controlled substance. 720 ILCS600/2(d) (West 2000).

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Where one is charged with possession ofdrug paraphernalia, it should logically not benecessary to prove that any person marketed theitem with the intent that the item be used toingest drugs. Rather, it should only be necessary to prove that the person possessed theitem 'with the intent to use it in ingesting,inhaling, or otherwise introducing cannabis ora controlled substance into the human body.' 720 ILCS 600/3.5(a) (West 2000). Nevertheless,the definition of 'drug paraphernalia' whichapplies to sale and delivery cases also appliesto possession cases: items 'which are peculiarto and marketed for use' (emphasis added) ingrowing, producing, storing, or ingesting." Reeves, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 1085-86, 762 N.E.2dat 1126, quoting 720 ILCS 600/2(d) (West 2000).

In Reeves, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 1086, 762 N.E.2d at 1126-27, the defendant did not argue he did not possess the homemade crackpipe, which was the reason for his charge. In addition, no questionexisted that the crack pipe, a glass tube with a brillo pad as afiltering agent, is "'peculiar to'" drug use. Reeves, 326 Ill. App.3d at 1086, 762 N.E.2d at 1127. In addition, the presence of cocainewas found on the pipe. Reeves, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 1086, 762 N.E.2dat 1127. According to our decision:

"The only question [was] whether the crack pipewas 'marketed' for use with drugs. The plainmeaning of the statute seems to be that homemade items which have never been marketed cannot constitute drug paraphernalia. While thismay be a legislative oversight, we are not allowed to ignore the clear language of the statute." Reeves, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 1086, 762N.E.2d at 1127.

Since we filed our decision in Reeves, the Second and Fifth Districtshave followed our reasoning. See People v. Harrell, 342 Ill. App. 3d904, 911, 795 N.E.2d 1022, 1027 (2003) (Second District, reversingconviction "although [the] defendant admitted that he used the pipeto smoke cocaine, there was no evidence about the pipe itself andwhether it was marketed specifically for use as a crack pipe");People v. Hughes, 343 Ill. App. 3d 506, 513, 798 N.E.2d 763, 770(2003) (Fifth District).

The State argues Bostic's conviction should be upheldbecause merchants have been found in violation of the Act whereposted disclaimers represented an awareness of the illicit nature ofthe items for sale. See People v. Crow's Nest, Inc., 137 Ill. App.3d 461, 464-65, 484 N.E.2d 907, 909 (1985) (Fifth District); Peoplev. Zeigler, 139 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 1091-92, 488 N.E.2d 310, 312(1986) (Third District). They also argue the glass pipe seized inthis case is similar to the items listed in section 2(d) of the Act.

Both Crow's Nest and Ziegler are distinguishable from thecase at bar. In Crow's Nest, 137 Ill. App. 3d at 462, 484 N.E.2d at907-08, the defendant was enjoined from further sales of drug paraphernalia. The defendant was involved in the wholesaling and retailing of tobacco and tobacco-accessory items. Crow's Nest, 137 Ill.App. 3d at 462-63, 484 N.E.2d at 908. The appellate court found thetrial court's findings that the defendant was marketing items for usewith controlled substances were supported by the record. Crow'sNest, 137 Ill. App. 3d at 464, 484 N.E.2d at 909. The defendant hadposted signs in its store stating the items should not be used withcontrolled substances and required its customers to sign statementsof intent. Crow's Nest, 137 Ill. App. 3d at 464, 484 N.E.2d at 909. The appellate court found "[s]uch disclaimers by the defendantrepresent his awareness of the nature of the items sold and cannotrelieve the defendant from the responsibility for their sale." Crow's Nest, 137 Ill. App. 3d at 465, 484 N.E.2d at 909.

In Ziegler, 139 Ill. App. 3d at 1089, 488 N.E.2d at 311,the defendants were also enjoined from continuing their mail-orderbusiness because it was a public nuisance as defined by section 3 ofthe Act. The defendants argued the items they were selling were notbeing "marketed for use" with illegal drugs. Ziegler, 139 Ill. App.3d at 1091, 488 N.E.2d at 312. As in Crow's Nest, the defendants inZiegler, 139 Ill. App. 3d at 1091, 488 N.E.2d at 312, attempted torely on disclaimers in their catalogs stating the products wereintended only to be used with "tobacco and legal smoking herbs." Theappellate court found the disclaimers represented an awareness of thenature of the products the defendant was selling. Ziegler, 139 Ill.App. 3d at 1091-92, 488 N.E.2d at 312. In addition, the court found"the sincerity of the disclaimers is subject to doubt when the pipesand other items are sold under trade names which incorporate slangidentified with the illegal drug trade." Ziegler, 139 Ill. App. 3dat 1092, 488 N.E.2d at 312.

In this case, unlike in Crow's Nest and Ziegler, the Statedid not introduce any evidence regarding the purpose for which theglass pipe was marketed. In fact, at the bench trial, the Stateconceded it could not introduce any evidence concerning the purposefor which the glass pipe was marketed.

While we agree the glass pipe is similar to some of theitems listed in section 2(d) of the Act, we cannot affirm a conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia under the Act withoutevidence the item was "marketed for use" with a controlled substance. As we stated in Reeves, it should not logically be necessary to provethe item was marketed to be used to ingest drugs. However, accordingto the Act when Bostic was arrested, the "definition of 'drug paraphernalia' which applies to sale and delivery cases also applies topossession cases: items 'which are peculiar to and marketed for use'(emphasis added) in growing, producing, storing, or ingesting. 720ILCS 600/2(d) (West 2000)." Reeves, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 1086, 762N.E.2d at 1126. Even though Bostic admitted to Officer Brown he usedthe pipe to smoke marijuana and the field test for cannabis on a burnaround the pipe was positive, the lack of evidence showing the pipewas "marketed for use" with a controlled substance is fatal to theState's case under the Act as it was written at the time of Bostic'sarrest.

We note Public Act 93-526, which became effective onAugust 12, 2003, amended section 2(d) of Act by replacing the "peculiar to and marketed for use" language at issue in this case withlanguage reading "intended to be used unlawfully." Pub. Act 93-526,eff. August 12, 2003 (2003 Ill. Legis. Serv. 2620 (West 2003)),amending 720 ILCS 600/2 (West 2002). We must apply the law as it waswritten at the time of Bostic's arrest.

As a result of our prior discussion of the Act as it waswritten at the time of Bostic's arrest, we need not address whetherthe trial court erred in denying Bostic's motion to suppress theevidence found in the search of Bostic's car because the only evidence found was the glass pipe.

For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court'sjudgment.

Reversed.

STEIGMANN and McCULLOUGH, JJ., concur.