JUSTICE TURNER delivered the opinion of the court:

In October 1999, the State charged defendant, CharlesE. Bramlett, with the offense of aggravated criminal sexualabuse, a Class 2 felony, in violation of section 12-16(c)(1)(i)of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/12-16(c)(1)(i)(West 1998)). In July 2000, the State filed an amended petitionto proceed under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (Act) (725ILCS 205/0.01 through 12 (West 1998)). In August 2000, defendantstipulated to two psychiatric evaluation reports and admitted theState had sufficient evidence to prove he was a sexually dangerous person. The trial court found defendant to be sexuallydangerous and ordered him committed to the Illinois Department ofCorrections for care and treatment.

On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred inallowing him to stipulate to evidence establishing him as asexually dangerous person without first admonishing him pursuantto Supreme Court Rule 402 (177 Ill. 2d R. 402) to determine thevoluntariness of his stipulation. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In October 1999, the State charged defendant with onecount of aggravated criminal sexual abuse in violation of section12-16(c)(1)(i) of the Code, alleging defendant, 17 years of ageor older, committed an act of sexual conduct with A.T.A., underthe age of 13 when the act was committed, in that he knowinglyfondled the genitals of A.T.A. for the purpose of the sexualarousal or gratification of defendant.

In January 2000, the State filed a petition to proceedunder the Act (725 ILCS 205/0.01 through 12 (West 1998)). At ahearing on defendant's motion to dismiss the petition, the trialcourt granted the State leave to file the petition. The courtalso ordered defendant to be examined by two psychiatrists, Dr.Bohlen and Dr. Killian.

In June 2000, the State indicated to the trial courtthe two psychiatrists had found defendant not to be a sexuallydangerous person. The State also indicated defendant was arrested on new matters, and the State sought a court-ordered re-examination of defendant by the two psychiatrists. The trialcourt granted the State's motion for reexamination, noting thenew charges against defendant were similar to his pendingcriminal case.

In July 2000, the State filed an amended petition toproceed under the Act. The State alleged defendant was chargedwith one count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse based on anApril 1999 incident. The petition alleged defendant resigned hisposition as custodian at an elementary school after being accusedof lifting the dress and touching the legs of a 10-year-old girlin 1989. Further, in May 2000, defendant allegedly had incidentsof sexual contact with a seven-year-old girl even after he wasordered by the court to have no contact with minor children. TheState also alleged defendant was suffering from a mental disorderwhich had existed for more than one year prior to the filing ofthis petition, coupled with criminal propensities to the commission of sexual offenses, and has demonstrated propensities toacts of sexual assault or sexual molestation of children, makinghim a sexually dangerous person.

In August 2000, the trial court conducted a hearing onthe State's petition to proceed under the Act, which included thefollowing exchange:

"THE COURT: It's my understanding, MissEssenburg, the State at this time is willingto stipulate to the findings of DoctorsKillian and Bohlen, who are qualified psychiatrists under the Sexually Dangerous PersonsAct, and stipulate to the findings that atthis time Mr. Bramlett is a sexually dangerous person as defined by Illinois law; isthat correct?

MS. ESSENBURG: The State is prepared tostipulate to that, Your Honor, yes.

THE COURT: Miss Behnke, it's my understanding that Mr. Bramlett will *** stipulateto the reports and the findings of the twodoctors; is that correct?

MS. BEHNKE: That is correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Bramlett, is thatyour understanding; is that correct?

DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right, we'll show then bystipulation of the parties then that the[c]ourt makes a finding that based upon thetestimony of Doctors Bohlen and Killian,through their reports, that Mr. Bramlettsuffers from a mental disorder which hasexisted for more than a year prior to thefiling of the [p]etition, which is coupledwith criminal propensities for the commissionof sex offenses and that he has demonstratedpropensities toward acts of sexual assault orsexual molestation of children.

It is therefore my finding by this[c]ourt that he is therefore a sexually dangerous person."

Thereafter, the trial court entered an order finding defendanthad stipulated to the psychiatric reports and admitted the Statehad sufficient evidence to prove he was a sexually dangerousperson. The court dismissed without prejudice defendant's chargeof aggravated criminal sexual abuse. The court also ordereddefendant committed to the custody of the Illinois Department ofCorrections for care and treatment. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

Defendant first argues the trial court erred in allowing defendant to stipulate to evidence establishing him as asexually dangerous person without first admonishing him pursuantto Supreme Court Rule 402 to determine the voluntariness of hisstipulation. We disagree. The question presented in this case,whether the trial court was required to ascertain the voluntariness of defendant's stipulation establishing him as a sexuallydangerous person, is a question of law, and such questions arereviewed de novo (Woods v. Cole, 181 Ill. 2d 512, 516, 693 N.E.2d333, 335 (1998)).

The Illinois legislature has defined a sexuallydangerous person under the Act as one who suffers from a mentaldisorder coupled with criminal propensities to the commission ofsex offenses and has demonstrated propensities toward acts ofsexual assault or sexual molestation of children. 725 ILCS205/1.01 (West 1998). The Act serves the purpose of (1) protecting the public by sequestering sexually dangerous persons untilsuch persons have recovered and are released and (2) subjectingsexually dangerous persons to treatment such that they mayrecover from the propensity to commit sexual offenses and berehabilitated. People v. Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d 318, 323-24, 752N.E.2d 1055, 1058-59 (2001).

The General Assembly, in passing the Act, sought thecommitment of sexually dangerous persons for treatment instead ofcriminally punishing them for their criminal sexual offenses. People v. Cooper, 132 Ill. 2d 347, 355, 547 N.E.2d 449, 454(1989). Our supreme court has stated "the Act does not promotetraditional aims of punishment, such as retribution or deterrence. Rather, under the Act, the State has a statutoryobligation to provide care and treatment for persons adjudgedsexually dangerous." Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d at 325, 752 N.E.2d at1059.

A proceeding under the Act is civil in nature. 725ILCS 205/3.01 (West 1998). However, because of the loss ofliberty a commitment can cause, the Act provides certainprotections afforded to criminal defendants. People v. Kastman,309 Ill. App. 3d 516, 518, 722 N.E.2d 1202, 1205 (2000). Forexample, the State must prove the defendant is subject to confinement as a sexually dangerous person beyond a reasonabledoubt. 725 ILCS 205/3.01 (West 1998); People v. Akers, 301 Ill.App. 3d 745, 749, 704 N.E.2d 452, 454 (1998). Further, respondents have the right to demand a jury trial and to be representedby counsel in the proceedings. 725 ILCS 205/5 (West 1998). Likewise, a respondent under the Act is entitled to the effectiveassistance of counsel under the standard used in criminal cases. People v. Dinwiddie, 306 Ill. App. 3d 294, 300, 715 N.E.2d 647,652 (1999).

In the case sub judice, defendant argues Rule 402admonishments should have been given here because the proceedingswere the equivalent of a guilty plea in a criminal case. Wedisagree. Rule 402 requires admonishments by the court in"hearings on pleas of guilty, or in any case in which the defenseoffers to stipulate that the evidence is sufficient to convict." 177 Ill. 2d R. 402. The Supreme Court of Illinois has statedproceedings under the Act are not criminal proceedings. Peoplev. Allen, 107 Ill. 2d 91, 103, 481 N.E.2d 690, 696 (1985), aff'd, 478 U.S. 364, 92 L. Ed. 2d 296, 106 S. Ct. 2988 (1986). TheUnited States Supreme Court, in reviewing Allen, noted the Act"does not appear to promote either of 'the traditional aims ofpunishment--retribution and deterrence.'" Allen v. Illinois, 478U.S. at 370, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 305, 106 S. Ct. at 2992, quotingKennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168, 9 L. Ed. 2d 644,661, 83 S. Ct. 554, 567 (1963). As the Act itself describes theproceedings as civil in nature, and as commitment under the Actdoes not constitute a criminal conviction, Rule 402 does notapply.

Defendant also argues due process and fundamentalfairness require the trial court to give admonishments beforeaccepting defendant's stipulation. We disagree.

This court has acknowledged "the importance ofscrupulously ensuring the fairness of judicial proceedings thatmay result in indefinite commitment of a person determined to besexually dangerous." People v. Antoine, 286 Ill. App. 3d 920,923, 676 N.E.2d 1374, 1376 (1997). In People v. Pembrock, 23Ill. App. 3d 991, 995, 320 N.E.2d 470, 473 (1974), aff'd, 62 Ill.2d 317, 342 N.E.2d 28 (1976), the First District, in deciding thereasonable doubt standard applied to proceedings under the Act,also addressed the Act as to the requirements of Rule 402 and dueprocess. The court stated, in part:

"Although we have held that a standardof proof of beyond a reasonable doubt must beused in sexually dangerous persons proceedings, we do not believe that other elementsof the criminal process, such as admonitionsregarding a right to a jury trial, a right toappeal and the consequences of a guilty plea,are also constitutionally required as hasbeen contended by defendant. We have notedabove that the requirements of due processare not static but may vary depending uponthe nature of the interests involved. Whileboth the civil proceedings in question andcriminal prosecutions may result in a loss ofliberty, substantial differences exist between them. Foremost among these are that ina commitment under the Act there is no inference of moral blameworthiness since a findingof sexual dangerousness indicates that adefendant's inability to conform to the dictates of the law is the product of a mentalillness and, secondly, commitment under theAct, unlike criminal incarceration, is notintended as punishment. Thus our supremecourt has specifically rejected defendant'sarguments regarding jury trial admonitions[citation] and right to appeal [citation]. Moreover, since commitment under the Act doesnot constitute a criminal conviction, SupremeCourt Rule 402 [citation] does not apply." Pembrock, 23 Ill. App. 3d at 995, 320 N.E.2dat 473-74.

As we find the court's elaboration on the Act persuasive, weadopt its reasoning and find the requirements of due process donot require admonishments here as they are required in a plea ofguilty in a criminal case. Our holding is also supported by oursupreme court's conclusion that "due process of law does notrequire that the safeguards and procedural requirementssurrounding the waiver of a defendant's right to jury trial in acriminal case be followed in a proceeding under the SexuallyDangerous Persons Act." People v. Studdard, 51 Ill. 2d 190, 197,281 N.E.2d 678, 681 (1972).

We also note the Act provides an additional safeguardto guarantee the fairness and reliability of the proceedings. Section 4 requires the court to appoint two qualified psychiatrists to personally examine the defendant to determine if thatperson is sexually dangerous. 725 ILCS 205/4 (West 1998). Theexamining psychiatrists must then file a report with the courtcontaining the results of their examination. 725 ILCS 205/4(West 1998). Thus, the Act provides a defendant with adequateand necessary protections before he may be committed to theDepartment of Corrections.

Defendant argues admonitions must still be given todetermine the voluntariness of his stipulation. However, thiscourt has held there is no constitutional requirement that adefendant in a proceeding under the Act must be fit to standtrial. Akers, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 751, 704 N.E.2d at 455. Similarly, there is no constitutional requirement that the trialcourt give admonishments to defendant to determine the voluntariness of a stipulation.

In this case, defendant was represented by counsel whoagreed, along with defendant, to stipulate to the findings of thetwo psychiatrists that defendant was a sexually dangerous person. The trial court received the stipulation and was privy to thereports and opinions from the two examining psychiatrists. Nocourt has held due process also required the trial court to givethe admonishments required for defendants in a criminal case, andwe decline to hold the admonishments were constitutionallynecessary.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

Affirmed.

McCULLOUGH, P.J., and STEIGMANN, J., concur.