People v. Caldwell
State: Illinois
Court: 4th District Appellate
Docket No: 4-96-0902
Case Date: 03/20/1998
NO. 4-96-0902
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Champaign County
NATHANIEL CALDWELL, JR., ) No. 95CF411
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Harold L. Jensen,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE GREEN delivered the opinion of the court:
On March 31, 1995, defendant, Nathaniel Caldwell, Jr.,
was charged with the first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2)
(West 1994)) of his 97-year-old great-aunt, Neppie Donaldson,
aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(6) (West 1994)) of Brian
Gallagher (a Champaign police officer), and resisting or ob-
structing a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 1994)).
Following a jury trial on September 18, 1996, defendant was found
guilty of involuntary manslaughter and was sentenced to an
extended term of 10 years' imprisonment. Defendant appeals his
conviction, contending the State failed to prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that (1) he performed some criminal act to cause
injury to Donaldson and (2) a supervening event unconnected to
him was not the cause of Donaldson's death.
On appeal, defendant maintains (1) there was no direct
evidence that he broke Donaldson's neck and severed her spinal
cord by striking her head with a cast-iron skillet; (2) there was
no blood or hair found on the skillet, and the blood found in the
kitchen and on defendant's shoes and clothing was not consistent
with staining that is associated with violent blows to a person;
(3) Donaldson's medical history showed she was prone to falling
and the findings of the treating physician and forensic patholo-
gist permitted an inference that Donaldson's fractured neck was
caused by her falling onto an object; and (4) when she was near
death, Donaldson indicated her injuries were accidentally caused.
Defendant also maintains that Donaldson's conscious decision to
be disconnected from her ventilator was an intervening act that
relieved him of responsibility for her death.
The State's case consisted of the following evidence:
(1) defendant's hostility toward Donaldson prior to her injury
and his throwing of a cast-iron skillet; (2) his consciousness of
guilt as shown by his attempt to clean Donaldson's blood from the
kitchen and his resistance and aggression toward the paramedics,
firefighters, and police, who were providing aid to Donaldson;
(3) forensic blood evidence consistent with the theory that
defendant struck Donaldson's head with a cast-iron skillet; (4)
Donaldson's spontaneous statement to the paramedics that she had
been hit; and (5) expert medical opinions that Donaldson's
injuries were caused by rapid, blunt force trauma to her head and
neck consistent with being struck by an object and inconsistent
with the theory that she fell from a standing position or against
a flat surface.
Wallace Pearson, Donaldson's second cousin who visited
her about three times a week, testified at trial that on the
morning of March 31, 1995, he noticed the porch light on at
Donaldson's home and, thinking this was unusual, stopped by to
talk to her. Pearson stated Donaldson was usually very happy,
but when she answered the door, she seemed upset and her spirits
were "very low." Pearson testified that the defendant
(Donaldson's nephew) was in the kitchen cooking, turned the
burner on the stove up too high and, when Donaldson told him to
turn it down, defendant told Donaldson he was tired of her
telling him to do certain things in the kitchen and he was going
to do what he wanted. Pearson stated he told defendant not to
treat Donaldson so disrespectfully, and defendant, swearing, told
Pearson he hated him and then told Donaldson to shut her mouth
and not to come into the kitchen. Pearson stated defendant then
threw a cast-iron skillet through the doorway of the kitchen
where Donaldson was standing, and it went over Donaldson's head
and hit Pearson on the leg as he was seated in a chair in the
living room. Pearson admitted he did not know whether defendant
was throwing the skillet at him or at Donaldson, but he said
Donaldson was much closer to defendant than he was. Pearson
stated defendant then picked up a medium-sized, black frying pan
and held it down at his side in his right hand while his left
hand was on another blackened pan that was sitting on the stove.
Pearson indicated he told Donaldson to sit and leave defendant
alone so defendant would "not do anything to her." Pearson
stated defendant ordered him to leave the house, which he did so
that defendant would calm down. Pearson stated that when he left
Donaldson was not injured. Pearson testified he then drove to
his home three blocks away and immediately telephoned defendant's
aunt, Neppie Caldwell, in Loda. He told her to come to town
because he was afraid defendant was going to hurt Donaldson.
While he was on the telephone, Pearson stated he heard sirens and
saw a fire truck pull up to Donaldson's home.
Paramedic Lawrence Sapp testified that when he arrived,
defendant merely pointed to the living room and said, "[s]he's in
there." Sapp stated (1) Donaldson was slumped in a chair in the
living room; (2) there was dried blood on the left side of her
forehead; and (3) Donaldson was conscious, but she could not move
her arms or legs. Sapp stated initially Donaldson was able to
speak in a soft, quiet voice, but she did not respond when he
first asked her what happened. When Sapp then asked defendant
what happened, defendant was angry and agitated, and stated,
"[w]hat do you think happened?" Sapp stated that when he asked
defendant if Donaldson had fallen, defendant indicated she had
fallen in the kitchen. He stated, however, that defendant
offered no further explanation regarding Donaldson's injuries,
never offered to help, and never asked about her condition. Sapp
indicated that during his second conversation with Donaldson,
when he asked her if she had fallen, she did not respond; howev-
er, when he asked if she had been hit, she nodded her head
slightly in the affirmative. Sapp stated at this point Donaldson
was no longer able to speak and could only give nonverbal re-
sponses.
Terry Swift and Donald Rhodes, both members of the City
of Champaign fire and rescue squad, testified that when they
arrived at the house, defendant was standing in the doorway of
the porch and shouted, "[g]et the *** out of here and go back to
the fire department. You're not needed here." The firemen
indicated defendant allowed them into the house only when Sapp
told him he needed their assistance to put Donaldson into the
ambulance. Swift and Rhodes both said that when another police
officer asked how Donaldson fell, defendant responded to the
effect of, "I'll show you how *** she fell," or "[h]ow *** do you
think she fell[?]" Defendant then struck the officer.
Brian Gallagher, a Champaign police officer, testified
he arrived at the scene at approximately 10:45 a.m., and defen-
dant was standing in the doorway between the front porch and the
living room. He said he initially asked defendant how he was and
defendant responded he was doing fine. When Gallagher asked what
happened, defendant's attitude changed and he stated it was none
of the officer's business. He said defendant was stressed,
anxious, and used profanity. When Gallagher asked how Donaldson
fell, defendant said words to the effect of "[h]ow *** do you
fall" and struck Gallagher's face with his fists. Gallagher said
he was forced to use pepper spray to restrain defendant, and
defendant then went outside and tried to walk away. Gallagher
stopped him and, with the help of the firemen, placed him under
arrest.
Joe Siefferman, a crime scene technician with the
Illinois State Police, testified that when he arrived at the
scene, he found a bloodstained sweater draped over a chair in the
living room, a bloodstained rug, and various areas of blood in
the kitchen but none elsewhere in the house. He described
several cast-iron pans he found in the kitchen, one of which had
blood on the handle. He stated he saw blood "spatters" on a
pencil, on the face of overhead and base cabinet doors in the
kitchen, and on paper towels in a waste can near the kitchen
sink. He said he also found a bucket near the kitchen sink with
a bloodstained rag mop. Siefferman stated blood was smeared on a
rubber floor mat that appeared to have been wiped with a cloth
and there was a light wiping of blood on the floor of the kitch-
en.
Kristen Boster, a forensic scientist with the Illinois
State Police, testified she examined bloodstains from the rag mop
head and the bottom cuff of the jeans defendant was wearing at
the time he was arrested, and those stains matched Donaldson's
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) profile and were dissimilar to
defendant's profile. She stated Donaldson's DNA profile would
occur in approximately 1 in 300 million African-Americans and 1
in 700 million caucasians. Donaldson was African-American.
Dr. James Scott Gregory testified he was an emergency
room physician and trauma surgeon at Carle Foundation Hospital in
Urbana and he treated Donaldson when she arrived at the hospital
on March 31, 1995. He said he was called to the trauma room by
physicians who were in the process of resuscitating Donaldson
following her cardiopulmonary arrest. He said he observed a
laceration over her left forehead and eyebrow involving a cut and
crushing of the skin and she had a fracture of the cervical spine
just below the base of her skull. Gregory stated the fracture
severed the spinal cord and she had no ability to breathe on her
own or maintain her blood pressure. He indicated her prognosis
included ventilator dependence and complete paralysis of her arms
and legs. He discussed the ramifications of her physical condi-
tion with her. He said Donaldson could nod her head a bit to
answer "yes" questions and flex her head and mouth to answer "no"
questions. He said she understood what paralysis was and "empha-
tically" indicated she did not want to live with complete paraly-
sis. He also asked questions regarding her birthday and Thanks-
giving, which her family stated she answered appropriately,
indicating her level of consciousness was normal.
Gregory further testified that he asked Donaldson if
she had fallen and she "shook her head yes." When he asked her
if she had been hit, she indicated "no." He stated that she
paused before answering both questions, although she had answered
previous questions very quickly. When he asked her if she wanted
to remain on the ventilator, she indicated "no." He said the
ventilator was then removed and she died within minutes.
Gregory stated that based upon his examination of
Donaldson, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, her
injuries were consistent with being struck in the head with a
heavy object such as a pan. He said the laceration and cut
injury to the scalp area, as well as the injuries to the spinal
cord and neck, were consistent with and could have been caused by
a blow to the front of the head that made her head arch backward.
On cross-examination, Gregory testified that due to the
lack of mention of a skull fracture in the autopsy report,
Donaldson's injury could be consistent with a serious fall "given
certain circumstances," such as falling into an object or strik-
ing an object as she fell. He acknowledged that on the day he
treated Donaldson, he was of the opinion her injuries could have
been caused by a blow or a fall. He stated, however, that had
Donaldson sustained a skull fracture, he would be more inclined
to exclude a fall as the cause of her injuries. Finally, Gregory
admitted that if Donaldson had not requested that life support be
removed, it was "medically possible" that she could have been
alive, albeit a quadriplegic, at the time of trial.
Dr. Violette Hnilica, a forensic pathologist, testified
she performed the autopsy on Donaldson. She described the injury
to Donaldson's left forehead and noted she had a tear that went
all the way through the skin to the bone and a large amount of
hemorrhage around the wound. She also described Donaldson's
broken neck. Hnilica was of the opinion that Donaldson's death
was the result of blunt force injuries of the head and neck. She
thought the injuries were caused by something with a flat or
curved, rather than a sharp or penetrating, surface. She was
also of the opinion that this type of injury was not consistent
with a fall from her normal height. She said it was much more
massive than she sees with falls, except for falls from massive
heights such as falling out of a many-story building. She stated
the injuries were consistent with being struck in the forehead
with an object. She agreed, however, that Donaldson had a small
bruise on her hip that was consistent with a fall.
Kevin Lumney, a forensic biologist with the Illinois
State Police crime laboratory, testified he examined a skillet
taken from Donaldson's home and found no human hairs on it.
Stipulated testimony indicated a forensic scientist who examined
trace evidence recovered from the skillet also did not find any
human hair. Paula Cardosi, a forensic scientist for the Illinois
State Police crime laboratory, testified she did not observe any
metallic particles in swabs taken from Donaldson's wound.
Dr. Marshall Fogle testified Donaldson became his
patient in 1979 and she had many health problems. He stated she
had a heart disease that could cause a loss of consciousness as a
result of the illness. He said her medical conditions could be
triggered by stressful events. Fogle stated Donaldson also had
osteoarthritis and had complained that her right leg sometimes
gave out.
Fogle testified that in 1993, Donaldson fell without
any warning due to a "drop attack" or sudden loss of conscious-
ness. He said that, in May 1994, Donaldson again fell without
loss of consciousness and, in November 1994, she complained of
falling frequently.
Dr. Thomas Malee, an optometrist, testified he last
treated Donaldson in March 1994. At that time, she indicated she
had broken her glasses when she fell. He said she had cataracts
in both eyes that impaired her vision.
Caldwell, defendant's aunt, testified she had visited
Donaldson and defendant on a regular basis over the previous 10
years and had never seen defendant act in a violent manner toward
Donaldson. She said Donaldson never expressed any fear of
defendant or made any complaints of abuse by him. Anna Owens, a
friend of Donaldson's, and Joan Redding, defendant's sister, con-
curred in Caldwell's assessment of defendant's behavior toward
Donaldson. Lucie Green, Donaldson's great-niece, testified,
however, that Donaldson was compassionate and caring toward
defendant and defendant was indifferent to Donaldson. Moreover,
police detective Charles Shepard testified in rebuttal that when
he interviewed Caldwell and Owens on March 31, 1995, after
Donaldson's death, they told him they had seen defendant get
angry and yell and curse at Donaldson on other occasions.
Defendant contends on appeal that the State failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the cause of Donald-
son's injuries, first, because there was no direct evidence to
support the State's theory that he broke her neck by striking her
with a cast-iron skillet and, second, because a supervening
event, i.e., the removal of life support, that was unconnected to
defendant was the cause of her death.
The standard of review for questions involving the
sufficiency of the evidence is whether, after viewing all the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d
409, 457-58, 662 N.E.2d 1328, 1349-50 (1996).
The parties agree that in a murder prosecution the
prosecution must establish, as part of the corpus delicti, that
death resulted from a criminal agency. People v. Rogers, 263
Ill. App. 3d 120, 126, 635 N.E.2d 889, 893 (1994).
"Once the State has shown 'the existence,
through the act of the accused, of a suffi-
cient cause of death, the death is presumed
to have resulted from such act, unless it
appears death was caused by a supervening act
disconnected from any act of the defendant.'"
People v. Gittings, 136 Ill. App. 3d 655,
661, 483 N.E.2d 553, 559 (1985), quoting
People v. Meyers, 392 Ill. 355, 359, 64
N.E.2d 531, 533 (1945).
Defendant argues the State proved only that (1) Donald-
son suffered a fractured neck, which could have been caused by a
blow to the head, a fall from massive heights, or a fall onto an
object; (2) defendant engaged in an altercation with Pearson and
Donaldson before her injury; (3) defendant threw a skillet that
flew over Donaldson's head and hit Pearson; and (4) defendant was
agitated, as shown by his behavior and fight with a police
officer. Defendant argues this evidence was insufficient to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Donaldson's injury was
caused by a criminal agency.
Defendant notes there was no forensic evidence he
struck Donaldson with a cast-iron skillet and no evidence that
blood or hair had been cleaned from the skillet.
Defendant further argues there was extensive evidence
that Donaldson had a history of falling. Finally, he contends
Donaldson's "dying declaration" when Dr. Gregory asked if she had
fallen was that she had not been hit.
However, Dr. Hnilica testified that in her expert
opinion Donaldson's injuries could not have resulted from a fall
from a normal height and only a fall from "massive heights" or a
blow to the head could have caused her injuries. Dr. Gregory
also testified that in his opinion the injuries were consistent
with a blow to the head. Finally, defendant's anger and dislike
toward Donaldson moments before her neck was fractured were
relevant to show he was the cause of her injuries. See People v.
Crayton, 175 Ill. App. 3d 932, 946-47, 530 N.E.2d 651, 660-61
(1988). The jury could have reasonably found, based upon the
evidence, that defendant was the cause of Donaldson's injuries.
Donaldson next argues that regardless of whether the
State proved that some act of his caused Donaldson's injuries,
the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Donald-
son's decision to be withdrawn from life support was an interven-
ing event that was not the cause of Donaldson's death. Defendant
notes Dr. Gregory admitted on cross-examination that it was
"medically possible" for Donaldson to still be alive had she not
opted to have life support withdrawn. He claims her decision was
a supervening act that insulated him from responsibility for her
death.
The question of whether a causal connection exists
between defendant's conduct and the death of the deceased is one
for the trier of fact. People v. Brackett, 117 Ill. 2d 170, 177,
510 N.E.2d 877, 881 (1987). An accused is not criminally respon-
sible for the death of another unless his actions are the cause
of the death. He contends the State was required to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that defendant's act was a contributing cause
of the death, such that the death did not result from a source
unconnected with the defendant's act. People v. Ethridge, 243
Ill. App. 3d 446, 465, 610 N.E.2d 1305, 1317 (1993).
A supervening cause has been defined as "[a] new
effective cause which, operating independently of anything else,
becomes proximate cause of accident." Black's Law Dictionary
1438 (6th ed. 1979). Defendant maintains Donaldson's decision to
have life support withdrawn was a supervening cause of her death
since she would not have died had she stayed on life support.
Defendant cites State v. Ruane, 912 S.W.2d 766 (Tenn.
1995), where the court found that a victim's decision to be
removed from life support could be a supervening cause. The
court determined, however, under the facts presented there, that
the decision did not rise to the level of a supervening cause.
Ruane, 912 S.W.2d at 775.
In Ruane, the defendant shot the victim and the victim
suffered a severed spinal column in the neck. Medical testimony
was presented that the victim could have lived with a ventilator
and would have been alive at the time of trial. The victim
determined he did not want to live with life support assistance
and, when the life support was terminated, he died. That defen-
dant was subsequently convicted of second degree murder. The
appellate court determined that where the death resulted from a
foreseeable act of the accused, the victim's conscious decision
to withdraw life support was not a supervening act. Ruane, 912
S.W.2d at 775.
Defendant argues here, unlike in Ruane, that Illinois
has the Living Will Act that provides the right to have life
support withdrawn "in instances of a terminal condition." 755
ILCS 35/1 (West 1992). A "[t]erminal condition" is defined as
"an incurable and irreversible condition which is such that death
is imminent and the application of death delaying procedures
serves only to prolong the dying process." 755 ILCS 35/2(h)
(West 1992). Defendant argues this statute provides a procedure
for withdrawal of life support only for terminally ill adults who
are at the point where death is imminent. He notes Donaldson
would be alive if not for the withdrawal of life support, and the
Illinois Living Will Act (755 ILCS 35/1 et seq. (West 1992)) does
not give the right to have life support withdrawn in people with
her condition. He notes Donaldson enjoyed life, and she had no
living will nor gave any other indication she would not have
desired life with mechanical assistance. He concludes, there-
fore, that the conscious decision to withdraw life support was a
supervening act and his actions were not the cause of Donaldson's
death.
This court has previously considered the question of
whether the removal of life support was the cause of death in a
homicide case. In People v. Driver, 62 Ill. App. 3d 847, 379
N.E.2d 840 (1978), the defendant was convicted of murder follow-
ing the death of the victim after he was disconnected from a
respirator at the request of the victim's family. This court,
noting the victim's brain wave pattern was flat, held the cause
of the victim's death was the beating on January 22, 1976, and
not the removal from the respirator on January 27, 1976.
In State v. Guess, 44 Conn. App. 790, 692 A.2d 849
(1997), the court upheld a murder conviction where the victim had
no evidence of brain stem function after the defendant shot him
in the head and the victim's family directed that life support be
withdrawn. The court there did not adopt a definition of death
that included brain death but, instead, looked to traditional
principles of causation. Thus, the court determined that defen-
dant could be found guilty of murder, despite the action of
another in removing the victim from life support systems. The
court held that it was reasonably foreseeable that relatives of
the victim would request the removal of life support systems
after a person had received a massive bullet wound to the brain
and was being kept alive only by machinery, with chances for
recovery slim. The court stated, "[t]he removal of those systems
is not an intervening cause breaking the chain of causation that
started with the defendant's act." Guess, 44 Conn. App. at 800,
692 A.2d at 857.
In Illinois, a competent person has the right to refuse
all types of medical treatment, including life-saving or life-
sustaining procedures. In re Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33,
44-45, 549 N.E.2d 292, 297 (1989). Donaldson's decision to
remove artificial life support was consistent with Illinois
policy and was the natural and foreseeable result of defendant's
wrongful act. The cause of her death was not the removal of the
ventilator, but the criminal act that defendant performed which
generated the need for the life support in the first instance.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit
court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
GARMAN, P.J., and STEIGMANN, J., concur.
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